Thank you, Madam Chair.
Members of the committee, good evening.
My name is David Vigneault, and I am the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I am accompanied this evening by Cherie Henderson, assistant director for requirements at CSIS, and Marie-Hélène Chayer, the executive director of the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre.
I want to thank you for the invitation to appear before you today concerning the invocation of the Emergencies Act. I am thankful for this opportunity to discuss this very important topic with you.
What I can freely say for certain is that CSIS is at all times dedicated to working closely with communities and our partners across the country to keep Canada and all Canadians safe.
As this committee is well aware, CSIS has the mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, advise the government on these threats and, when appropriate, take measures or steps to reduce them.
Threats to the security of Canada are defined in section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. They include espionage, sabotage, foreign influenced activities that are clandestine or deceptive and that include threats, terrorism and violent extremism, as well as subversion.
I must stress that CSIS is specifically prohibited from investigating lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, except when it is carried out in conjunction with activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada.
In the case of the “freedom convoy”, CSIS was concerned by the threat of ideologically motivated violent extremism, or IMVE, and specifically the potential for serious acts of violence. As I recently said publicly, IMVE currently represents a significant national security threat. The combination of major disruptive events like the pandemic, the ever-increasing influence of social media, and the spread of conspiracy theories has created an environment ripe for exploitation by influencers and extremists. This environment has the potential to inspire individuals to commit acts of violence.
The threat from IMVE is constantly evolving, fuelled by extreme views around race, gender, power and authority. IMVE is a threat that thrives on division and festers in the online space, but the hateful online rhetoric associated with these views is spilling over into the real world with the tragic consequences, including for equity-deserving communities across Canada.
In the lead-up to the “freedom convoy”, CSIS closely monitored known IMVE threat actors to assess any threats of serious acts of violence. This operational posture was informed by context. For one, CSIS has observed a rise in anti-authority, violent rhetoric particularly related to public health measures. CSIS was also aware of the opportunities that large gatherings and protests could offer IMVE actors to carry out acts of violence and recruit like-minded individuals. Finally, CSIS was concerned about the threat posed by lone actors.
Throughout the events of January and February, CSIS remained engaged with the RCMP and other law enforcement partners to ensure the timely sharing of information. As you know, the definition of public order emergency in the Emergencies Act refers to “threats to the security of Canada” as defined in the CSIS Act.
In determining if a situation rises to the level of a public order emergency, the Governor in Council can consider multiple sources of information, not just CSIS intelligence. Indeed, CSIS is but one among the various federal departments and agencies whose collective advice ultimately informed the decision by the Governor in Council to invoke the Emergencies Act.
Before I conclude, I would like to point out that some factors will limit what I will be able to speak publicly about this evening. As I'm sure you'll appreciate, there are some things that I'm prevented from saying in public under the Security of Information Act. Furthermore, the intelligence and advice we provide to the government is classified in order to protect our sources and methods.
I take the responsibility of protecting our employees, our sources and our tradecraft very seriously.
In closing, I'd like to assure the committee that, although CSIS often works in the shadows, it is determined to respect its commitment to ensure the safety of Canadians. That commitment depends on interaction with the communities to protect, and partnership with other government agencies, law enforcement services, civil society, academia and the private sector.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
