Information & Ethics Committee on March 10th, 2023

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

That would be very helpful.

[Cheuk Kwan]

These are basically public records.

One of the things I want to talk about is that I speak the language, I live the culture and I understand the modus operandi of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as many of its proxies, so we are in a sense on the ground. We pretty much know who's who. I mean, if we want to say who are the 11 potential nominees that CSIS has mentioned, I could pretty much guess who they are. It's an open secret that both Mr. Tohti and I have been living with and knowing who's who. That's why, after so many years, it's no longer a surprise to us that the recent CSIS report has come out with this explosive intelligence, if you will.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

I think this question will go to our guest from the Munk School.

In various testimonies the Australian model of the foreign agent registry was mentioned. Have you done research as to its effectiveness? What are the things we should be adapting to a Canadian context? What things shouldn't we be adapting to a Canadian context?

[Gabrielle Lim]

I haven't researched specifically the Australian foreign agent registry. My sense though is that Canada could set one up. How effective it would be....

A lot of these operations are covert or clandestine by nature. Even if you were to put agents and register everyone, my sense is they will find alternate means to evade or circumvent the registry.

There's also no strong evidence one way or another that labelling someone as a foreign agent or an entity might change an audience's mind. For example, YouTube has a labelling procedure. They label anything that comes from, say, a Russian state agency, a Chinese state agency or any state agency. The effects are mixed. People still watch these videos. They still comment on these videos. They still consume these videos. Whether or not that actually deters people from watching or believing it, to be honest, the research is still out.

However, I think Mr. Kwan mentioned something earlier that I think would be worth exploring. That's having a dedicated rapid response hotline for individuals or communities that really need to seek security. This could be helping them with their devices if they're being harassed online, off-line or both. It usually happens at the same time.

We could also explore having an independent agency that's separate from law enforcement, CBSA or CSIS, to address specifically transnational repression. I think that would be really helpful in supporting victims and targeted communities.

I think there are other methods.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Ms. Lim. We may get to those in a second.

Before we go to Mr. Villemure, I want to ensure, Mr. Kwan, that you have your interpretation device available. Ms. Lim, make sure you're on the proper interpretation channel.

Mr. Villemure, you have the floor for six minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Kwan, thank you for being with us this morning.

Do you believe that the Government of Canada is abandoning the Chinese diaspora who are being retaliated against by the Chinese regime?

[Cheuk Kwan]

I would say that “abandoning” is a very strong word. I would say “ignore” is a better word to describe that kind of thing.

For many years we've been shouting the same messages. Even back in 2006 when I presented to this committee, we basically said that China controls everything. They know everything. Even if you change your cellphone, they can quickly find you, from Beijing and Toronto. It is something that I believe the government should take a stronger message and stance on.

I agree with many of the critics about the registry, saying that it may not be 100% effective. Certainly, we understand that. We think that as long as we're not ignoring.... As long as the government is seen as actively trying to protect the integrity of its election as well as its community, then it will send a strong message back to hostile countries and forces like China, Russia and Iran saying, “We are watching over our citizens as well, so don't ever try to exert pressure, harass or intimidate any of our Canadians.”

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

In your opinion, the Canadian government is not currently sending this message to the Chinese leadership.

[Cheuk Kwan]

Can you repeat the question? Sorry.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Certainly.

In your opinion, right now, Canada is not conveying the message to the Chinese government that Canada will protect its citizens.

[Cheuk Kwan]

I strongly believe that a more external, more explicit public display is worth it.

Right now, as you know, we are under COVID. People are looking at the racism of Chinese Canadians. This line that setting up a registry is an attack on the Chinese Canadian community, I will not buy. This is a standard line given by the Chinese Communist Party. They're using the same line for everything, for COVID and anything else.

I hope that the government would not buy into the fact that just because you're setting up a foreign agent registry you're setting up a registry for all Chinese Canadians.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

The distinction is fundamental.

Can you tell us a little bit about the Chinese police stations we hear about in the media?

[Cheuk Kwan]

Yes, this is something that has been exposed by a Spanish non-governmental organization and we had not known about it before. However, once it was pointed out to us who runs these stations and who is behind them, who the civil organizations behind these police stations are, we were not surprised because these are well-known names.

I want to point out to you, Monsieur, that the Journal de Montréal just yesterday had an article about two police stations in Brossard and in Montreal, and they were run by the same woman who is a city councillor of Brossard. She openly advertised herself as being a partner of the Chinese Communist Party, so this is a thing, first of all, we are not surprised actually happens.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Do you believe that such tactics have been used elsewhere in the world or that what is happening in Canada is a first?

[Cheuk Kwan]

These tactics have been used in a great many other countries. I believe they have identified 100 stations around the world, of which Canada has five or six, I believe, three in Toronto and now two in Montreal and one in Vancouver.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service should therefore not be surprised that such places exist, since they are already operating elsewhere in the world.

[Cheuk Kwan]

Right. The report was issued by Safeguard Defenders. It is a Spanish organization.

I know that China has very similar, in fact more severe, operations in Australia, in Spain, and in many other European countries, and, of course, in other non-European countries as well.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

You mentioned a little earlier that you knew the names of the ridings of the parliamentarians who were involved here. If I am to believe your opinion, it was common knowledge.

Would you be able to name the constituencies or the regions?

[Cheuk Kwan]

I can share with you two highly suspected cases of electoral influencing. In Kenny Chiu's riding, the Conservative MP lost his seat because he was the one who had a private member's bill on the foreign agent registry. The second riding of which we are very highly suspicious is Bob Saroya's in Markham. He'd been winning by 20,000, or 15,000 votes every other election, but this election a Chinese-aligned candidate from the other party has taken over by at least 5,000 or 7,000 votes.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Kwan.

Merci, Monsieur Villemure.

Mr. Green, you're up next, for six minutes.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all the witnesses who've made it here today. It was important for this committee that we took the opportunity to cover topics that hadn't previously been explored at other committees so as not to duplicate work. I think starting in this way, particularly as it relates to the material impacts for people who are here, is an important part of the process, and I'm glad we are able to embark on it.

Ms. Lim, in the article entitled “The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign-Influence Operations and Disinformation” you stated that our fears and concerns that foreign actors are somehow interfering with democracy in deliberative discourse are counterintuitively allowing for the further erosion of democracy and deliberative discourse. Can you expand on this in relation to the current allegations of foreign interference?

[Gabrielle Lim]

Yes, I think we tracked 79 countries that, in the last 10 years, have passed laws on misinformation and foreign interference in elections. They will very frequently cite or point to democratic nations such as the U.S., Canada, France, Germany, the U.K. or Australia for why they're doing what they're doing. The justification tends to fall under the broad rubric of national security. That's why I think only using legislative means to curtail some of this stuff is dangerous. Other, less democratic countries without the guardrails we have in Canada will use our rhetoric to pass and justify their own laws.

One example is, I believe, Kyrgyzstan. They passed a pretty broad law that allows the government to take down content and censor whatever they dislike. As reasons for doing this, they specifically cited the U.K. white paper on online harms and NetzDG, the German bill. I think they also cited a French fake news bill.

Again, I don't want to say we should ignore what's happening in Canada. I just think we have to be very careful about how we frame it and specifically call out the effects and outcomes. I think the testimonies of the other panellists are really important for bringing that out. That's why I also highlight transnational repression. It's not the same as other types of foreign interference.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

How would you specifically define “transnational repression”?

[Gabrielle Lim]

I think there are two big points to it.

One, it's directed by a foreign government and happening on our territory.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I raised that because I'm from Hamilton. Anecdotally, we witnessed this back in September 2019, when McMaster students hosted a well-known Uighur activist, Rukiye Turdush. The event was disrupted by students who were bussed in.

Would this fit that kind of action?