Information & Ethics Committee on Nov. 5th, 2025

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Good afternoon, everyone. I'm sorry for the late start.

We are going to call this meeting to order.

I want to welcome everyone to meeting number 14 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, September 17, 2025, the committee is resuming its review of the Conflict of Interest Act.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses for today.

As individuals, we have Mr. Andrew Stark, a professor of political science at the University of Toronto; and David McLaughlin.

Professor Stark, I want to welcome you to committee. You have up to five minutes to address the committee. Go ahead, sir.

[Andrew Stark, Professor, Political Science, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, and thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee.

I want to note, just in the interest of full disclosure, that 40 years ago I worked in Brian Mulroney’s Prime Minister's Office as the assistant to Dalton Camp, who was then Mr. Mulroney’s senior adviser. I believe—if it's the same David McLaughlin—that David McLaughlin was a friend and a colleague of mine at that time. I haven't seen him since, so it's a pleasure to be reunited, if it's the right fella.

I have had no partisan involvement since well before the Progressive Conservative Party disappeared over 20 years ago. I am here as an academic. Partly because of my background, though, I want to make a brief opening statement not about the law of conflict of interest but about the politics of conflict of interest.

Suppose we know that an office-holder has been influenced in their official conduct by a personal interest that they have. We have actual evidence—maybe through emails they wrote or comments they made to a third party—that their judgment was tainted. That’s not a conflict of interest. That’s corruption. Their judgment in office was corrupted because it was influenced by the personal stake they had in the matter.

A conflict of interest arises when an official is merely in a position to do something in office that affects their interests. They may well be a person of sufficient integrity that they will rise above and totally ignore those interests in their actual decision-making. The problem is that we can never rummage through an official’s mind and know for sure that their judgment was unimpaired by their interest. Therefore, we say to officials not to even raise the question as to whether their judgment was ever impaired. This is because that question is unanswerable. We tell them to arrange their affairs so that they aren’t even in a position where their interests could affect their judgment.

Being in a conflict of interest is thus a serious matter, but it is not necessarily corruption. Conflict of interest law is prophylactic law. It doesn’t prohibit wrongdoing; it prohibits officials from being in a position where they could do something wrong. It does so because any actual wrong would take place in the mind of the office-holder, a place we can never access. In a way, it’s a misnomer to call the conflict of interest laws “ethics laws,” because an official can violate conflict of interest law and still be a person of complete integrity.

Unfortunately, both politicians who get into conflicts of interest and their critics often misunderstand this. A minister who finds himself in a conflict of interest will defensively and indignantly believe that he is being accused of some kind of corruption, so he will angrily deny that he is in any kind of conflict of interest. That doesn’t follow. Maybe his judgment wasn’t corrupted at all. Maybe he feels absolutely certain in his own mind that it wasn’t, but he could still have been in a conflict of interest if he was in a position where it could have been corrupted.

His opposition critics, meanwhile, will suggest that because he was in a conflict of interest, he has done something corrupt. That doesn’t follow either. Just because we know a minister was in a conflict of interest, that doesn’t mean anything one way or another about whether his judgment was actually corrupted.

For his critics, then, the fact that a minister is in a conflict of interest means that he is corrupt; for the minister, his certainty that he is not corrupt means that he couldn’t have even been in a conflict of interest. Both sides mistakenly equate conflict of interest with corruption, so we get consumed with unnecessarily overheated conflict of interest controversies when there are so many more important things on the public agenda.

Let me close with a model of how conflicts of interest should be handled politically, in my view.

In October 2003, Canada’s labour minister, Claudette Bradshaw, announced that she had inadvertently violated federal conflict of interest rules. She had accepted free travel from the Irving family of New Brunswick. As soon as it came to her attention that doing so was prohibited, she took action to reimburse the Irvings, acknowledged that she had fallen afoul of the rules, and apologized. “I apologize to the House,” she said, “and I apologize to all Canadians.” Opposition leader Stephen Harper then responded simply that “Claudette Bradshaw did the honourable thing”. That was it. The matter was closed. Both Ms. Bradshaw and Mr. Harper handled the affair appropriately. Everybody moved on.

That, I believe, is a model of how conflict of interest controversies can and should be handled politically.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Stark.

Mr. McLaughlin, if you would like to, you can address the committee for up to five minutes, sir.

Go ahead.

[David McLaughlin, As an Individual]

Sure.

I have no formal opening statement. Again, I apologize for running behind. I went to the wrong entrance. If you do need some extra time for me at the end, I'm happy to stay a little longer to make that up to you.

I am no expert on conflict of interest or the state of federal law on that. I have no academic or particular expertise in that area. I have been in government at the federal and the provincial level. I ran a democratic reform commission in New Brunswick as the deputy minister. I was Clerk of the Executive Council and Cabinet Secretary in Manitoba. I've been a chief of staff in both the Prime Minister's Office and the Minister of Finance's office. I have seen things of governance, if you will, from various perspectives. If there is some general background or knowledge I can help you with, I'm happy to do it. I believe very strongly in the importance of our democratic institutions and, frankly, very much in the work you do. I feel an obligation to try to assist you in any particular way that I can.

I'll leave it at that, and I'm happy to take any questions you might have.

Hello, Andy.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

All right. Thank you, Mr. McLaughlin.

I'm sure glad the committee can reunite you two today, as we are, so this is great.

Mr. Barrett, you have the floor for six minutes, sir.

Go ahead.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

I'll start with you, Professor Stark.

You've made the comment that ethics rules should protect the public trust. I think that's incredibly important. At a time when the public sees their trust in democratic institutions and elected officials at all-time lows, we need to find ways to bolster public confidence.

Would adding apparent or potential conflicts of interest to the act close a loophole that currently allows compliance? Do you think doing so would address the concern that when the public currently sees a conflict, they feel like there's no action being taken?

[Andrew Stark]

I think that adding a clause mentioning or prohibiting the appearance of a conflict of interest is a good idea, as long as it's understood what “the appearance of a conflict of interest” is. If a conflict of interest itself arises when an official is in a position to affect their interests, even if they are actually uninfluenced by them, then the appearance of a conflict of interest is when they appear to be in a position where their interests could affect their judgment.

An example of that from the United States arose when the Comptroller of the Currency, many years ago, divested all his shares in federal banks that fell under his jurisdiction, but he was accused of being in a conflict of interest because he still had shares in state banks, whose interest he could not affect in office. However, it was deemed to be an appearance of a conflict of interest because the public might not make that distinction.

It's a finer notion, the appearance of a conflict of interest, but certainly I think that officials have an obligation to avoid not simply a conflict of interest, but the appearance of such. To put it another way, their conduct should pass muster even with the most casual observer, meaning somebody who really doesn't pay great attention to the details and might misunderstand them. His obligation is still to make sure they don't draw that conclusion.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

To pick up on something you said with respect to your example about the financial interests of these public office holders, it has been suggested that a prime minister could sell controlled assets and then have the proceeds reinvested by a trustee who is independent from and free from the direction of the public office holder. Why not do that?

[Andrew Stark]

I see no reason for not doing that. That's a way of resolving an actual conflict of interest. What you're describing is a blind trust, where the office-holder gives their assets to a trustee, and the trustee is directed to liquidate them as soon as reasonable—that is, as soon as the trustee can find a buyer for them—and to reinvest them in instruments the office-holder does not know the identity of.

Of course, it can take some time for the trustee to do that, so during the period before the trustee has managed to sell a particular asset, the office-holder, especially if it's a prime minister or another senior office-holder, should recuse themselves or be screened from any involvement with that asset. Once it's sold, then it's no longer an interest of theirs and there's no reason for them to be recused from matters dealing with that asset.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

When public office holders are screened from being involved in discussions or making decisions on matters that put them in a conflict that could benefit their own financial interests, should there be public reporting that this has occurred, so there is visibility for the sake of public confidence that the system is working? The concept of it sounds fine, but the public doesn't have visibility on whether and when it's used. It might strain most people's trust if they hear that it's going to be employees or appointees of that public office holder who are protecting them from that involvement and the decisions.

The current Prime Minister is the example I will use. He has extensive holdings in a company that's invested in transportation, infrastructure, military and power generation—all things that certainly the head of government would touch on in that role.

Do you think there should be public reporting when the screen is used?

[Andrew Stark]

That's something the committee should consider. I would agree with it, depending upon what we're talking about.

As I understand it, the Ethics Commissioner has set up a screen, as you describe it, where two officials in the Prime Minister's office are going to divert issues that might be part of the Prime Minister's portfolio from the Prime Minister's attention, but if that's all that happens, that's not enough.

For example, the Ethics Commissioner should meet periodically with those two officials to review what they have done. Perhaps there are other, more hands-on ways in which the Ethics Commissioner can be—

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Mr. Stark, I'm sorry, but we're over time here. Maybe we can get back to it in a second.

Ms. Church, you have six minutes, please.

[Leslie Church, Liberal, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

Thanks very much, Mr. Chair.

Welcome to you both.

Professor Stark, let me pick up on what you were saying about perceptions of conflict and debunking the assumption that conflict of interest is somehow akin to corruption. I think that's actually a very neat way of getting to the heart of one of the issues we've been wrestling with.

Do you believe that perceptions of conflict, when they're not grounded in evidence, can undermine public trust? How should legislators ensure that perceptions do not overshadow facts?

[Andrew Stark]

I think that perceptions can undermine public trust. Again, we're talking about situations where there isn't even an actual conflict of interest, let alone corruption, but there is the appearance of one. I think that a provision in the conflict of interest legislation that requires office-holders to take care not to allow the appearance of a conflict of interest to arise would be helpful.

The difficulty or the push-back on that, just so everybody knows it, is that it's a very vague provision. It's not necessarily the case that an office-holder—and I can think of cases that involve both Conservative and Liberal governments, but I won't detail them here—or an official did violate what would have been an appearance standard, had there been one, but it's also obvious that they might not have reasonably anticipated that this could have happened.

I think an appearance standard is important, but it's also important to make sure that the penalties attached to it are appropriate, since there is a certain degree of vagueness attached to what it means.

[Leslie Church, Liberal, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

I think where we are struggling a little bit is in understanding how to define that and how to reasonably conclude...broadly in the minds of the public, in some of the examples that you raised, and how to anticipate what is an appearance in someone's mind. It seems like a very subjective determination to be made, where it's difficult to create boundaries in law to guide action.

Talk to me a little bit about your research. How important is it that conflict of interest determinations are made by independent institutions, such as the Ethics Commissioner, rather than through political debate or partisan narratives?

[Andrew Stark]

Before I answer that, let me just say one last thing on the appearance issue.

I am less concerned about a vague law or a provision in the law that simply prohibits the appearance of a conflict of interest, as long as it's well understood that we've moved very far from accusing the official of any kind of corruption. It's something they shouldn't do, but it should be like a Claudette Bradshaw situation: “Sorry, I can see that I may have done something that appears to be a conflict of interest, and I've taken action to correct that.” It's not actually a conflict of interest, and the other side says, “Thank you. That's well done.”

That's basically how it should work, if it can, in politics. I don't know if it can.

[Leslie Church, Liberal, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

I was going to say that I think we all want to aspire to our better angels, but we may find some challenges there.

David, let me turn to you in terms of your lengthy experience in governance at various levels of government.

Could you describe a little bit how you've interacted with conflict of interest frameworks? Do you have experience administering screens or working with people who had screens or blind trusts when you were working in government?

[David McLaughlin]

No, I have no particular experience working with screens or blind trusts as a designated public office holder. When I was in the federal government in former minister Flaherty's office, and then as president and CEO of the national round table on the environment and economy, I had to fill out my own forms, declare any particular conflicts and file all that stuff away. That's really been my only direct experience.

[Leslie Church, Liberal, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

Do you have any advice for us, then, as we're thinking about how to shape and amend our conflict of interest laws? In what ways, given your experience, do you think we could protect public office holders and protect the public trust?

[David McLaughlin]

There are a few things, if I could.

The principle that I tend to work with from being around politics, government and governance for quite awhile is what Ronald Reagan used to say to Mikhail Gorbachev, which was “trust, but verify”, as opposed to “verify, but trust”. You have to have a starting point for this. I think if we want to rebuild and recalibrate trust or renew trust in our system, we have to start with some semblance of trust at the outset, but you have to verify that. That's why we have conflict of interest codes, lobbying rules and all of the associated public hygiene, if you will, for our public sector.

I would suggest that you might consider or take a look at what's been happening in Manitoba recently. Again, it's no surprise, from my experience there. There was a recent conflict of interest ruling by the commissioner there against the former premier, former minister of finance and former minister of the economy over violating the caretaker convention during the period between when the PC government lost and when the NDP government was coming in. The commissioner found that although there was not a private benefit to them, they had broken the rules and the law because they had ignored, if you will, that basic convention that governs our system of responsible government, etc. The commissioner fined them. It was a public fine of, I think, $18,000 in the case of the former premier and $10,000 or $12,000 for the former ministers. The act allows for up to $50,000, so that's not insignificant.

I would urge you to look at the nature of fines, because I think it conveys a really strong sense and view of the matter at hand.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Ms. Church and Mr. McLaughlin.

Mr. Thériault, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Stark, I agree with you on the distinction between corruption and conflict of interest. The fact remains though that a person may place themselves in a conflict of interest voluntarily. In that case, the verdict or analysis might show that it was indeed an instance of corruption.

On the other hand, it must not be assumed from the outset that being in a conflict of interest necessarily indicates corruption. It can be completely involuntary. In that sense, ethics must be proactive.

I agree with you: If we want ethics to be as proactive as possible, we have to consider the appearance of conflict of interest. Public office holders could be told for instance that, according to the Ethics Commissioner, not only must there be no conflict of interest, but there must also be no appearance of conflict of interest. If I am careful to avoid an apparent conflict of interest, it is very likely that I will not be in a conflict of interest. So I agree with you in that regard.

Mr. Stark and Mr. McLaughlin, have you ever had to manage an ethics screen?

[Andrew Stark]

I apologize. I did not hear a translation of that, Monsieur Thériault. I don't know if Mr. McLaughlin, my old friend, knows enough French to answer that question. I don't know what to say about that, but for some reason—

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

I'm going to stop you there, Mr. Stark. The translation was working fine in the room. I wonder if you have the proper translation on your Zoom feed. That might have been it.

I can hear the interpreter in my earpiece.

Mr. Stark, are you on the English translation?

[Andrew Stark]

I don't know, and I don't know where to find it. I'm sorry. I wasn't advised of this.