Information & Ethics Committee on Nov. 20th, 2025

[Leslie Church, Liberal, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

Fantastic.

My colleagues are interested in the notion of what constitutes a private interest and matters of general application and matters that affect a broad class of persons.

Could you explain for us a little bit more how you go about, when the screen is in operation, determining when there is a matter of general application?

[Marc-André Blanchard]

When there's a matter of general application, it actually applies to all Canadians or to all taxpayers or to all individuals. That's the very broad definition of this. When you look at the document—the assessment tool that was provided yesterday—they give you the tools and the threshold questions that are being asked in this context of the matter of general application.

If it's a matter of general application and the answer is yes, then the matter is of general application and the screen does not need to be triggered and no further analysis is required.

If the answer is no, then we go to the next question, and this is where we look at, if it's not of general application, whether it is of a broad class. If it is of a broad class, then we analyze whether the company involved has a disproportionate interest or benefit in this environment.

[Leslie Church, Liberal, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

What is the role of the Ethics Commissioner in working through this process with you, and how often would you communicate with the Ethics Commissioner and their office?

[Marc-André Blanchard]

The main day-to-day work of this assessment tool is performed by the deputy secretary to the Privy Council responsible for governance. Her office is in regular consultation with the Ethics Commissioner's office.

On our side, on the political side, this is why I was very happy to answer Mr. Cooper. For the meeting he was referring to in London, we had verified each and every one of those guests and whether they could be part of a screen or not. The answer was no, because none of them were related to Brookfield, and then we went and had a discussion with the Ethics Commissioner on these issues. This is how it works.

In the context of meetings, it's more on the political side that we maybe have the lead, because this is how the request for meetings or the organization comes in. Then, on the policy decision, it's largely done under the deputy secretary to the Privy Council responsible for governance.

[Leslie Church, Liberal, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

That's a very good segue to a question I have about the specific process for screening out meetings and decisions to ensure that the Prime Minister is in compliance.

Could you take us through that a little bit?

[Marc-André Blanchard]

When a meeting is thought of or is being requested, there's someone who works with me, and that person actually makes a first check whether that company is on the annex A list. If it's in annex A, then there's no meeting. We go further, and we say that for any meeting that occurs, we make sure there's no mention of any business between the government and any entities listed in annex A.

There's a double check. The first is the identity, and then, if it's a third party that comes in and wants to discuss a plan, an option or something like a project that involves one of the companies in annex A, then it triggers, and we say that the meeting cannot occur.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Ms. Church and Monsieur Blanchard.

Mr. Thériault, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Blanchard, as part of this review of the Conflict of Interest Act, I aim to restore people's trust in democratic institutions by establishing special rules for the Prime Minister and ministers, given the Prime Minister's objective attitude regarding his previous and current responsibilities. For MPs, it's already done, and Mr. Sabia agreed. He has spoken highly of this before.

I wanted to clarify that, because my goal is not to catch Mr. Carney out. My goal is to analyze this unusual situation. Rarely have we seen a Clerk of the Privy Council divest himself of his shares to protect his Prime Minister and publish a conflict of interest screen. It is clearly important to point it out.

I'll ask you the same question I asked Mr. Sabia yesterday: Do you know what's in the Prime Minister's blind trust?

[Marc-André Blanchard]

No, I don't, because I don't need that information to do my job. My role relates to the conflict of interest screen and the companies listed in schedule A. That's what I have to manage.

As I explained, and as Nigel Wright also explained in his testimony, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner can find out what's in the blind trust if he wishes.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Only the Ethics Commissioner knows the full and detailed contents. That's what you're saying.

[Marc-André Blanchard]

I don't know what's in it. My understanding is that only the trustee and the Ethics Commissioner know.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

What you're saying is that you feel you have the necessary skills to apply the conflict of interest screen. However, Mr. Sabia—

[Marc-André Blanchard]

I would say that I feel I have the necessary skills to do so, because that's the measure the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner chose to implement to prevent a conflict of interest. I'm comfortable with this measure.

The Ethics Commissioner is an officer of Parliament—

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

I don't need that part of the answer. My time is running out, and I want to talk about something else.

Yesterday, I asked Mr. Sabia if he thought he needed to be accountable to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner as part of the implementation of the conflict of interest screen. He said no, since he works with the Commissioner every day.

It seems to be a rather complicated responsibility to manage the Prime Minister's interests if you have to be in contact with the Commissioner every day. Wouldn't it have been simpler for Mr. Carney to divest himself of his shares in Brookfield, as Mr. Sabia did? That's his choice, but wouldn't it have been simpler to do that? We'll be looking at that option as part of our study.

[Marc-André Blanchard]

As the Clerk of the Privy Council told you yesterday, and as the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner told you when he appeared before the committee, we have to strike a balance between attracting the best political talents, and having the highest possible ethical standards. The ethics rules applied in Mr. Carney's case are recognized by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as being among the most rigid in the world. That is not insignificant.

Also, I mentioned in my presentation, Canadians elected Mr. Carney because of—

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

I got that. It was in your opening statement.

[Marc-André Blanchard]

—his business experience.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

I didn't ask you about your opening statement. What I'm getting at—

[Marc-André Blanchard]

That's an important part of the answer.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Not really.

Here's what I'm getting at. Is it true that there are daily communications with the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner? I assume it's not with the Commissioner himself, but with someone from his office. However, if there is daily communication with the Office of the Commissioner, does this not mean that the Office of the Commissioner is part of your team?

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

A short answer, please, Mr. Blanchard.

[Marc-André Blanchard]

The Prime Minister's Office is not in daily contact with the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. It's more on a regular basis.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Mr. Thériault, your time is up.

Mr. Hardy, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Gabriel Hardy, Conservative, Montmorency—Charlevoix, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, Mr. Blanchard. Thank you for joining us today.

We've been focusing on the details and the analysis of very specific things, so I'd like to go a little broader. Actually, I'd like to take a step back. Every witness we've heard from told us to make sure institutions regain the public's trust. They said democracy is under pressure, and trust has been lost. As you pointed out at the outset today, Mr. Sabia said the same thing.

The first thing to do in a crisis is to simply be transparent. There's been a lot of talk about that in this committee. The second thing is to do a hard fix of the situation by going to the other end of the spectrum. You talked about striking a balance. Do you think it's important for the public to feel that we've made a hard fix, and that we've worked hard to regain public trust?

[Marc-André Blanchard]

In my opening remarks, I referred to Democracy Watch v. Canada (Attorney General), a case that was heard by the Federal Court of Appeal in 2018 in which the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner was granted standing. Here's what I found interesting about the court's decision. I'll read an excerpt in English, because that's the language it was written in. At the end of his decision, the judge said:

“the publication of conflict of interest screens may well end up providing more information to the public than the publication of recusals.”

What seems to be emerging from this decision is interesting. The measures in place, and the list of companies listed in schedule A, are already very transparent, much more, in fact, than the usual measures used for elected officials.