Information & Ethics Committee on Dec. 8th, 2025

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Good morning, everyone.

I would now like to call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 22 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(h), the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, September 17, 2025, and the order of reference of October 28, 2025, the committee is resuming its study of the Conflict of Interest Act.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses for today.

We have, from the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Konrad von Finckenstein, commissioner; Lyne Robinson-Dalpé, director of advisory and compliance; and Michael Aquilino, legal counsel.

Welcome to committee.

Commissioner, you have up to five minutes to address the committee. Go ahead, sir.

[Konrad von Finckenstein, Commissioner, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner]

Good morning.

I'm pleased to appear before the committee during its review of the Conflict of Interest Act. You have already introduced the colleagues I have joining me.

I commend the committee for conducting this review. In the past 18 years, there have been just a few minor amendments to address specific matters.

The act has been working quite well since it took effect in 2007 and has met the purposes set out in section 3. There is, however, room for improvement. We have identified six legislative changes that could make the administration more efficient.

They are based not just on my own experience as Commissioner over the past two years. They also reflect the experience of the Commissioner's office in administering the act for almost two decades.

The first is a proposed amendment to the Parliament of Canada Act under which a commissioner is appointed. It would let the lobbying commissioner step in temporarily if there is no Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. While the commissioner's office can manage day-to-day administration of the Conflict of Interest Act, only the commissioner can exercise the discretion given in various provisions.

The other five amendments concern the Conflict of Interest Act.

One, my office recommends adding “apparent” conflicts to public office holders’ general duty to arrange their private affairs in a way that prevents conflicts of interest. This would make the act more consistent with the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons and the ethics rules for federal public servants.

Two, allow some assets to be designated as “exempt assets” if they pose no risk of conflict of interest. The Commissioner has no discretion to exempt any assets from the act’s blanket prohibition on reporting public office holders owning controlled assets.

Exchange-traded funds are a perfect example of that.

Third, allow public officers to participate in matters affecting the private interests of their friends and relatives if those interests are the same as those of other members of a broad class of which they are part. This would make the act more consistent with the code.

Fourth, let the commissioner approve outside activities that don't conflict with reporting public office holders' official duties. The act restricts activities that are not part of their official duties. There are some limited exceptions, but they don't cover many activities that would not cause a conflict. Teaching is, for instance, a perfect example.

Fifth, raise the maximum administrative monetary penalties. This is not to make them more punitive but to stress the importance of meeting the act's reporting requirement.

These recommendations were discussed in our last annual report under the act. As the committee will recall, I also mentioned them during my last appearance.

As part of this review of the Conflict of Interest Act, we have been following this committee's work and the testimony of other witnesses. Some interesting points have been raised about enhanced education, increased transparency and greater accountability, among other topics.

I'm pleased to answer any questions the committee may have about my recommendations or those of others who appeared before the committee.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Commissioner.

We have six-minute rounds starting with Mr. Barrett.

Go ahead, sir.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

The Liberals' Bill C-15 creates a new power for ministers to exempt companies from federal laws, and this can be done in secret. This opens the door to conflicts of interest that Parliament and your office might never see.

If a minister can grant exemptions, and they can be granted to companies that they are connected to and even conceal their orders from public release, won't this, at a minimum, make it harder to detect that a conflict of interest exists? Doesn't it also create the opportunity for real conflicts of interest to occur with no effective oversight whatsoever?

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

Just because the minister is authorized by statute to do something doesn't mean he can avoid the Conflict of Interest Act. If it is part of his function to exempt a company, he can do that. However, if, under the act, there is a conflict of interest, as you suggested in your example, then he has to recuse himself. The act is quite clear: He cannot participate in the decision. He can't even be in the room. He has to absent himself when that decision is made.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

There appears to be a systemic gap being created, though, Commissioner. It's a path for ministers to bypass the usual parliamentary safeguards and ethical scrutiny by shifting decisions into private exemption orders.

Does that not present a cause for concern for parliamentarians?

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

I'm not sure I follow you, Mr. Barrett. Where is the shifting taking place here?

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

The effect of the orders is not public. They can exempt the normal release of information that we would see. It's for a period of years and there would be no detection that it has occurred. We assume that the minister leaves the room, but oftentimes we find out that a breach has occurred only because of the release of information, access to information requests, inquiries of ministry, order paper questions and the like.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

When you say the exemption is secret, do you mean the act authorizes the minister to make a decision and not to publicize it?

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

The information does need to be publicized in the Gazette.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

If the company is exempted, that means if they weren't exempted they couldn't do this. Presumably, the exemption has to be published somewhere.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

One would hope that it would be through the transparency that's required, but that's not the effect of the budget implementation act, Bill C-15.

Your question that I've provoked is born out of the same expectation that Canadians have about transparency and openness that we expect from government. Instead, we're moving off the path of normal government and into exemptions to all laws except the Criminal Code. That's what the act says.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

First of all, Bill C-15 is not law yet; it has to be passed by Parliament.

Second, the obligation to not act in contravention of the conflict of interest is there. You posit that he will make an exemption that benefits himself and people will not know about it.

I always have difficulty answering a hypothetical question. If you give me an actual case or an actual fact, I can answer it. I don't quite see how we can have a secret exemption. The effect of the exemption will be public and people will ask, like you, why this company is doing it, when normally an act would require A, B, and C. Where do they get the authority?

Therefore, somebody will say that there is an exemption and here it is.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

To be clear, I don't see the mechanism in the legislation that would publish the exemptions that are able to be made to all laws except the Criminal Code, including the Lobbying Act, access to information laws and the Conflict of Interest Act.

Am I to understand, then, that the law as it's written, should it come into force and without giving any hypothetical examples, gives rise to no concern for you?

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

Parliament has the authority to enact what it wants. As you know, Parliament is supreme. If it enacts that, we will look at the act. I have not looked at it from this particular aspect that you mentioned, but I cannot understand the rationale of how you can have an exemption that is secret and will not be.... After all, it's an authorization and has to appear somewhere.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

The expectation I think Canadians have, as Parliament is supreme and has passed laws including the Conflict of Interest Act, the Lobbying Act and access to information laws, is there's no reason for a government to put forward legislation that gives them the opportunity to exempt themselves from all laws except the Criminal Code.

I think that Canadians should be rightly concerned. I certainly am.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Barrett.

Ms. Lapointe, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, everyone, to the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics.

Mr. von Finckenstein, in your opening remarks, you said that you had listened to all the testimony that has been given so far in this study. I assume you listened carefully to that of Michael Sabia and Marc‑André Blanchard. During their testimony, they talked a lot about the blind trust and the conflict of interest screen.

I'd like to hear your opinion on that screen and whether you're satisfied with the way it's being managed by the Prime Minister's chief of staff and the top public servant.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

The conflict of interest screen is a method that has been approved by the Federal Court of Appeal and that helps in administering the Conflict of Interest Act. It's a preventive measure. We don't want a conflict of interest to arise that would require the Prime Minister, or anyone else, to recuse themselves.

For that reason, the men responsible for his day-to-day work and the documents that land on his desk will review them to see if they contain anything that may cause the Prime Minister to have to recuse himself. If they find something that represents a potential conflict of interest, they'll prevent it from getting to the Prime Minister, and they'll go to another minister. The Prime Minister is only informed about it when the decision takes effect, so he has no chance of changing that decision.

In short, it's a preventive measure that was approved by the Federal Court of Appeal. Mr. Sabia and Mr. Blanchard are the people who are responsible for all the documents that come before the Prime Minister, whether on the bureaucratic side or the political side. The two of them work with a large team to review every single thing that has to come before the Prime Minister to see if there's a potential conflict of interest. If so, the document isn't presented to the Prime Minister.

Representatives from the Prime Minister's Office have explained to the committee what they do to manage the screen. Based on their testimony, I believe that it's a measure that works well.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

Thank you for that clarification.

Mr. Sabia and Mr. Blanchard told us that they used an assessment tool to help them decide whether or not to submit an issue to the Prime Minister. They also explained to us that they were constantly working with you.

I'd like to know how you help the chief of staff and the top public servant in those kinds of situations.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

As you know, it's my role to give advice to people who are subject to the Conflict of Interest Act. Obviously, the Prime Minister is subject to the act.

If there are problems, Mr. Blanchard or Mr. Sabia call us and we give them advice. What I or my colleagues tell them is confidential. However, we have had conversations initiated by Mr. Blanchard's office and by Mr. Sabia's office, and I imagine we'll have more in the future.

[Linda Lapointe, Liberal, Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, QC]

We know that Mr. Sabia and Mr. Blanchard are managing the screen. However, we learned through their testimony that they aren't involved in the blind trust at all. That's managed by external people.

I'd like to hear your comments on that.

[Konrad von Finckenstein]

The Prime Minister put all of his assets in a blind trust. He doesn't touch it, he doesn't talk to the trustee, and he doesn't make any decisions about that trust. Naturally, he knows what assets he owned before handing them over to the trustee.

That said, decisions relating to companies in which he held assets could be profitable for him if those decisions led to an increase in the assets' value. That's why a conflict of interest screen was put in place. The idea is to prevent the Prime Minister from making any decisions that relate to the assets in the blind trust and that could affect their value.

He obviously only knows the assets that were placed in the blind trust in the first place. Maybe those assets have changed or have since been sold.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Commissioner.

Thank you, Ms. Lapointe.

Mr. Thériault, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, Commissioner, to you and your colleagues.

With all due respect, please feel free to answer in English. There are important nuances, and I don't think your command of French makes it possible to convey those nuances right now. The interpreters also do a very good job.

When Mr. Sabia came to meet with us, he submitted to the committee the assessment tool for applying the Prime Minister's conflict of interest screen. I asked him if he was required to report to the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. He answered that this wasn't necessary because there was constant co-operation, there was total transparency, and he shared all the activities related to the Prime Minister's conflict of interest screen with the Commissioner's office.

I then asked Mr. Blanchard about this because I was wondering about Mr. Sabia's answer. Mr. Blanchard said that they were frequently in contact with you and that you contributed to their analyses.

I'm a little confused by that. In your previous testimony, I asked you about accountability because I thought the conflict of interest screen should be managed independently. I suggested that the Commissioner's office should do that. You answered that, if that were the case, you would also be in a conflict of interest, and that you couldn't be both judge and stakeholder. You explained that if your office were involved in administering the screen, you would be the one who would have to make a decision if there was a conflict of interest.

First, is there accountability to your office or not?

Is your contribution to applying the screen that frequent?