Information & Ethics Committee on Oct. 8th, 2025

[W. Scott Thurlow]

If you have any actual examples where you think that tension exists, I suggest you put them on the table. I don't believe Canadians see it through the same prism that you do, but it's entirely within your rights to adduce that evidence here and allow for people to be informed by it.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

With the meetings the Prime Minister had in New York and Washington, we already know there are conflicts with the funds he has invested in and the money managers he met in the United States.

I don't know if he's acting in the interests of the country or himself, and because of the failure to have transparency around how he governs his decisions, on behalf of the 100,000-plus Canadians I represent from Calgary Heritage, I'd say there are some serious problems.

[W. Scott Thurlow]

I have no evidence that he still holds those funds. That's the whole purpose of the blind trust.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Thurlow and Mr. Majumdar.

Mr. Sari, you will be splitting your time with Mr. Saini.

You have five minutes. Go ahead.

[Abdelhaq Sari, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Thurlow, thank you for being with us today and providing such interesting and informative answers.

Before I get to my question, I would like to explain a particular point of view.

Before I got into politics in 2017, I had a lot of reservations. I was in a very different field, another world, and I wondered whether I should get into politics. I'd say everyone is reluctant for a number of reasons. Political life has constraints, and it's not easy.

That said, I'd like to hear what you think of a potentially more restrictive regime, one where public office holders would be required to sell their assets. Do you think it could deter skilled people in good careers wanting to avoid any conflict of interest from getting into politics? Could it be detrimental to such people?

[W. Scott Thurlow]

I think this is entirely consistent with the questions that Mr. Majumdar was asking. It's not about coming down from the mountain to serve the great public; it's about there being a disincentive to doing so, whether it's up or down. It could be as simple as a member who's part of a union and would no longer have access to pension benefits because they came to the House of Commons and would be stepping away from the work they're doing.

We don't want to see people being forced to make decisions of divestiture even with the tax exemptions that the conflict of interest commissioner talked about, which I found very interesting. That's a good point and a good way of looking at it. However, ultimately, these people will sometimes have more than just a business interest; sometimes it's an emotional tie.

[Abdelhaq Sari, Liberal, Bourassa, QC]

I'd like to ask a more constructive question to see what we could improve, since no system, law or code is perfect. What do you think about the fact that the Conflict of Interest Act and the conflict of interest code for members of the House of Commons were harmonized to make them much more similar and convenient?

[W. Scott Thurlow]

As I said earlier, I think we should do everything in our power to have one set of rules so that there isn't the opportunity for misinterpretation among the various officers, and that includes the Senate side. There are good reasons they're divorced, but there are competing interpretations coming to the fore.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

You have two minutes and 20 seconds, Mr. Saini. Go ahead.

[Gurbux Saini, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

We heard that public office holders should be forced to sell their assets to avoid conflicts. Would that not preclude lots of people who have good strength in running the country and in finance...if that was the case?

[W. Scott Thurlow]

I would not suggest that people have to divest their assets. Your home, for most Canadians, is your biggest asset. That's how you get tied to your constituency. You don't want people selling their homes. I think that is a disincentive to the public service.

If I could, I'll just focus this on trust in public office holders. I, as a Canadian, trust the people who are given the opportunities and privileges to do the moral and ethical thing, to use Mr. Thériault's words. That's what our system is based on. Our entire system of laws is about the individuals we invest that trust into. I understand that cynicism is sometimes used for political gain. That is 100% fair ball. If that is how you want to go after your opponents, you absolutely can. I choose not to do that. I invest trust in these people because they have stepped forward to swear or sign an oath, depending on who they are. If they sign an oath as a minister to be loyal to the Crown, that oath is what we should be placing our faith in.

[Gurbux Saini, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Are there any changes to our ethical legal framework that you believe should be implemented, whether they be in the act or the code?

[W. Scott Thurlow]

The emphasis has to be placed on what is an improper use of authority. As I said, parliamentary secretaries and ministers have the interests of their constituents in mind, which they themselves aren't necessarily always able to defend. I think that's inappropriate. Parliamentarians should be able to do that work. That language, which currently exists on the commissioner's website, needs to be strengthened.

I have been very consistent in saying that the laws we have are ones that create trust among the citizenry. I think we have to invest trust in individuals. I'm not in a position to criticize the people who are part of that matrix right now. As a Canadian, I invest that trust in them.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Thurlow, for your testimony today in front of the committee.

That concludes our first hour.

We're going to reset and make sure the witness online is ready to go. We'll suspend for a few minutes. We'll be back soon.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Welcome to the second hour.

We have two individuals appearing. First, we have Mr. Gregory J. Levine, who is a lawyer, ethics consultant and social scientist. Welcome, Mr. Levine. We also have Mr. Guy Giorno, who is appearing as an individual. Mr. Giorno is a lawyer.

We'll start with you, Mr. Levine, if you're okay to address the committee for five minutes. Go ahead, sir.

[Gregory J. Levine, Lawyer, Ethics Consultant and Social Scientist, As an Individual]

Thank you for the opportunity to share some thoughts about the Conflict of Interest Act.

As mentioned, I'm a semi-retired lawyer interested in administrative, municipal and ethics law. I've been interested in government ethics law for over 30 years. I've worked in various capacities, including as a general counsel to a provincial ombudsperson and a municipal integrity commissioner for several municipalities. I've also appeared on policy panels for one federal and two municipal commissions of inquiry regarding ethics matters. I've written a certain amount of stuff on this topic.

I've also had, and I mention this tangentially, a very extended period, over the last many years, as a caregiver. There are many elements of care, of course—compassion, love, dedication. One aspect I'd like to mention is respect. Interestingly, the idea of respect permeates much of ethical discussion and practice. Professor Greene indicated in his presentation to this committee that the ethic of mutual respect is foundational to democracy. Through respect, we hear the concerns of others, listen to their arguments, understand their interests and arrive at equitable and fair solutions.

Government ethics have established rules that help and guide us in respecting our polity and need for fair, unbiased and publicly responsible decision-making. The Conflict of Interest Act is one such set of rules. I can't articulate all that this act does, but I would like to mention a few issues, some very broadly, for the rest of my few minutes.

Conceptually, the act changes traditional approaches to conflict of interest in that it treats conflict itself as a problem. The common law view was that conflicts should be disclosed and that the person with a conflict would not participate in decisions respecting matters that could further his or her private interests. Public duty was seen to clash with private interests, but conflict of interest was a precondition, a state of interestedness, that if not disclosed and not subject to withdrawal from participation, could lead to corruption or biased decision-making. Conflict of interest is not corruption, and they should not be seen as the same. One is a possible precondition to the other.

Private interests are important. Traditionally, the common law, and then the first regulation of conflicts, focused on monetary and pecuniary interests. This is not because financial interests, however described, are the most important interests, but because they are the most easily quantifiable in ostensibly objective terms. Emotional or psychological and relational interests, though, are powerful and important and can affect decision-making.

I have several other points, but I'm just going to mention appearances. Appearances can be important too. Apparent conflict of interest is different from reasonable apprehension of bias. I've used, in my little description here, a definition from the B.C. Members' Conflict of Interest Act. It says an apparent conflict occurs “if there is a reasonable perception, which a reasonably well informed person could properly have, that the member's ability to exercise an official power or perform an official duty or function must have been affected by the member's private interest.” There has to be an objective interest at stake, not merely a sense that there must be some interest.

There are numerous rules. I know the issue of divestment comes up, so I expect it will, and similarly the conflict screens, so I'll just leave it at that.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Levine.

You're short of time. I like that. It gives more opportunity for questions. It's perfect.

Mr. Giorno, you have five minutes to address the committee. Go ahead.

[Guy Giorno, Lawyer, As an Individual]

Thank you and good evening.

As the chair said, my name is Guy Giorno. I'm a partner in Canada's largest law firm, Fasken, where I lead the political law practice, which covers lobbying, legal compliance, conflict of interest, accountability and transparency laws, campaign finance, parliamentary investigations and more. I'm an adjunct professor at Carleton University, teaching the course “Ethics in Political Management”. I also currently serve as the appointed integrity commissioner of 20 municipalities in Ontario. As a part-time integrity commissioner, I am no longer active in partisan politics.

I used to chair the Law of Lobbying and Ethics Committee of the Canadian Bar Association. I was twice elected to the board of the Council on Governmental Ethics Laws, which is the pre-eminent organization of North American government ethics administrators.

I appear this evening in a personal capacity. These opinions don't reflect the views of my law firm, its clients, any municipality, the university or any other individual or entity except me.

This evening, I offer two recommendations. First, most of the Conflict of Interest Act is toothless. Most of its rules—in fact, all of its important rules—aren't backed by penalties, and that has to change. Second, several key provisions of a document called “Open and Accountable Government”, which is just a policy statement, not a law, should be moved into the Conflict of Interest Act.

As you'll be aware, the act replaced the code of conduct that, in its most recognizable form, dates back to former prime minister Chrétien and, before him, former prime minister Mulroney. The code, through successive prime ministers, was merely a guideline.

The advantage of a law over a guideline is that a law has teeth. Break the law and one can be charged, convicted, fined or imprisoned. That's not what happened. For the most part, the act is no more enforceable than the code it replaced.

There are 55 separate rules in the Conflict of Interest Act. Only 15 of them—the most minor 15—carry penalties. The 55 rules can be divided into 31 prohibitions—things you shall not do—and 24 duties—things you must do. Almost all of the important rules are among the 31 prohibitions and none carries a penalty. Nine of the duties, the most important nine duties, also carry no penalty. You can't be fined for breaching them and you can't go to jail. In total, there are 40 out of 55 rules with no penalties.

Examples include section 33, which says that a former public office holder shall not take improper advantage of a previous public office; sections 8 and 9, which say that officials shall not use their positions or influence to further their private interests or those of their relatives or friends; and section 21 on mandatory recusal from any decision, discussion, debate or vote where the official would be in a conflict of interest.

For those who break these rules, and 36 more of them, nobody gets charged or fined or goes to jail. The worst that can happen is somebody can get written up or named in a report. In theory, an official can be dismissed from office, but by my count, in 18 and a half years that has never happened.

Fines only apply to making financial disclosures to the commissioner. Miss a financial disclosure and you could be fined up to $500. The commissioner is recommending a sixfold increase in the maximum fine for these minor infractions, from $500 to $3,000. In my respectful submission, that one-off change is unhelpful.

You can make the penalties for minor infractions 6,000 times bigger, but as long as officials can get away with breaking the 40 most important rules, fiddling with the minor rules actually makes things worse. It's worse because it sends a message that the big rules aren't taken seriously and get to be ignored.

My second point is about adding things into the act.

I mentioned the old code of conduct. Most of the old code ended up in the act, but a small portion of it found its way into a document, which under Mr. Harper was called “Accountable Government” and under Mr. Trudeau and now Mr. Carney is called “Open and Accountable Government”. There, the content was combined with other expectations. All of it is not a law, just a bunch of guidelines.

Two significant later editions made their way into these guidelines. Mr. Harper added a section to prevent government business from being commingled with partisan fundraising. It is called “Annex B Fundraising and Dealing with Lobbyists: Best Practices for Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries”. Mr. Trudeau added the very important “Annex I Code of Conduct for Ministerial Exempt Staff”.

In my view, those two annexes, annex B and annex I, are so important that they need to be put somewhere with teeth, which they don't have now. I would port them into the code of conduct, along with any other provisions of the document “Open and Accountable Government” that belong in a law, not just a policy statement.

Thank you, Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Giorno.

Mr. Barrett, go ahead for six minutes, please.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

Mr. Giorno, would you agree that banning ministers from holding assets in tax haven jurisdictions is a simple but effective way to strengthen Canadians' trust that ministers and the Prime Minister aren't hiding conflicts of interest offshore?

[Guy Giorno]

I'm not sure how simple it is, but there are some things that can be done.

It's easy to legislate that people who are public office holders—and we're talking about only 3,000 people or fewer—should be residents of Canada, so they can't take advantage of residing somewhere else. They can't be operating a company, or at least a reporting public office holder is not permitted by law to operate a company or business. They shouldn't be running businesses that are operating in tax havens. Beyond that, with a definition, that should be workable.

I'll note that it's very important to ensure that our reporting public office holders have investments in places where there is transparency and disclosure. One of the attributes of a tax haven is that there is no transparency and no disclosure. It actually frustrates the work of the act and the commissioner enforcing the act.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

If senior staff for these public office holders have to publicly disclose their finances, should that same transparency apply to party leaders and leadership candidates who seek to govern the country?

Let me add a bit of a precision here when I talk about party leaders. In elections in recent years, earning a seat on the debate stage, for example, has been confined to people who are reasonably expected to be in a party holding official status and that has seats in the House of Commons. For the sake of this conversation, let's not just say anyone who is defined as being in a party, but as being in a party that might hold seats in the House of Commons—the leader of a party who might reasonably be expected to elect members to the House.

[Guy Giorno]

That's a legitimate policy suggestion. I don't actually have a view on that. I note that it raises a question of who will regulate it, whether it will be the regulator of our elections—the Chief Electoral Officer—or the regulator of this act, but it's certainly open for discussion to expand the scope of the people who are made to disclose, for sure.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands—Rideau Lakes, ON]

The act defines divestment to include keeping assets in a blind trust. It's a loophole. I don't think for a second that when Canadians hear someone say, “Well, I divested my assets”, questions of conflicts of interest and questions of transparency have all been answered. Isn't it time that we require the Prime Minister and party leaders to fully sell controlled assets within 30 days of taking office? We're being specific here. We're not talking about their home, but controlled assets.

[Guy Giorno]

That, again, is a policy proposal. It's certainly worthy of discussion. I'll simply note the following things.

The member is right. Divestment is being defined to include what is not divestment, which is a challenge.

The second thing is that the commissioner has told us that the assets in these blind trusts are not mixing or churning the way one would expect them to, which creates the problem that people then know what's in their blind trust, when the whole purpose of the trust is that they're not supposed to.

I'll add that I agree with the commissioner that if there is to be mandatory, real divestment, not blind trusts, a solution would be to compensate public office holders so they're made whole. The taxes on capital gains go to the Crown anyway, so the Crown can easily forego those for the sake of making the Conflict of Interest Act work, if that's what Parliament decides is necessary.