Foreign Affairs Committee on June 9th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much for your statement.

We will go next to Dr. Visoka.

[Gëzim Visoka, Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies, Dublin City University, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

My name is Gëzim Visoka, and I am an associate professor of peace and conflict studies at Dublin City University in Ireland. My research focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding, the dynamics of diplomatic recognition and the rise of counterpeace forces in the Balkans.

For three decades, peace in the western Balkans has hinged on the stability and values of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Today, however, shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities and internal hesitation within the EU are directly undermining that security.

Today I want to highlight three interlinked trends that are affecting security in the western Balkans.

First, as we witness democratic backsliding and autocratization, as well as a global decline in the liberal international order, the Balkan countries are mirroring these trends. Serbia is no longer classified as a democracy but as an electoral autocracy experiencing protracted social instability. Other Balkan countries remain only partially free, affected by political instability, corruption, and in some places, restricted media freedom. As democracy promotion fades away from the spotlight of western foreign policy, regional leaders are actively backtracking on critical reforms.

Second, a shift towards transactional diplomacy, promoted by the Trump administration, has revived dangerous revisionist tendencies and heightened ethnic tensions, undermining the international peacebuilding and state-building investments of the past three decades. We've seen armed and sabotage attacks by Serb groups in northern Kosovo, coupled with aggressive disinformation campaigns designed to inflame ethnic frictions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, and ethnic polarization in North Macedonia and Montenegro. Furthermore, U.S. pressure on NATO and threats to withdraw security support from Europe have triggered competitive militarization politics and policies in the western Balkans. These cracks directly benefit Russia's grand strategy, which relies on disinformation, collaboration with antipeace actors and exploitation of frozen conflicts to weaken European and Euro-Atlantic security.

Third, security threats in the western Balkans do not come solely from hostile external forces such as Russia. EU and NATO membership remains the primary strategic goal for the region, but enlargement has largely stalled because of the EU's lack of political will to integrate the western Balkans. Only recently has the EU signalled a renewed interest in expediting accession procedures, particularly for Montenegro and Albania, driven by the geopolitical imperative to offer membership prospects to Ukraine and Moldova to deter Russian aggression. A critical weakness remains within the EU itself. Kosovo remains unrecognized by five EU member states—Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain—four of which are NATO members that have so far blocked Kosovo's EU and NATO membership path and indirectly contributed to the stalled normalization of relations with Serbia. Their recognition of Kosovo and their willingness to unblock its Euro-Atlantic path would ultimately make Europe safer and more prosperous.

Honourable members of the committee, Canada has a proud history of supporting peace operations and the rules-based international order in the western Balkans. At this critical time, I believe that Canada is uniquely positioned to provide principled leadership to the Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Balkans. We cannot allow transactional politics to undo three decades of peacebuilding. Canada can, and should, play a pivotal role in rallying NATO and EU allies towards a unified, decisive stance on democracy and regional integration; the preservation of peace in and the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the recognition of Kosovo's independence and its rightful membership in international organizations.

Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We will next go to Mr. Boonstra to make an opening statement.

[Jos Boonstra, Senior Researcher, Centre for European Security Studies]

Dear chair and members, thank you for this opportunity to share with you my take on the security situation in the Balkans.

I work for the Centre for European Security Studies in the Netherlands. We are an NGO that was established in 1993 with the initial aim of assisting central and east European countries with their democratic transition in the field of defence and security governance, work that is ongoing today. Our focus in the western Balkans has been to build capacity and foster co-operation in the security sector among oversight actors. Foremost are parliaments in the Balkans but also audits and ombudsman institutions and civil society.

By way of introduction, I would like to raise three points, moving from broad to detailed. The first point is with regard to the European Union and the Balkans. Last Friday the EU and western Balkan leaders met in Montenegro to discuss enlargement, a process that has been stuck since Croatia joined in 2013. EU and Balkan leaders seem to accept a status quo. The EU member states value stability in the Balkans and are averse to explaining to their constituents why North Macedonia or Serbia should become an EU member. At the same time, Balkan leaders value a grip on power and want to keep managing their clientelist networks. However, the western Balkan population at large remains without benefits. Young people leave to seek work elsewhere, most often in the European Union.

The summit produced two results. First, people in the western Balkans and the EU will stop paying extra roaming costs over calls and data when visiting each other. That is a tangible result for all those families with children living abroad. Second, maybe more in the long term, Germany and France presented a non-paper that opens a debate among EU member states to revise the current enlargement policy into a staged process in which associate members reap benefits and gain influence at an earlier stage. Such a process is long overdue, as enlargement is not solely a benefactor-recipient relationship anymore. EU member states will need to think strategically. The EU needs the western Balkans and vice versa.

My second point relates directly to security in the Balkans. The EU, together with Canada, should think about how to include the western Balkans in new security co-operation initiatives next to, or as part of, the EU and NATO. One proposal here is the security and defence partnership, for instance, that the EU and Canada concluded one year ago. What impact will increased defence spending and militarization in the EU have on the western Balkans? How can the region be an asset instead of a burden? These questions should, in my view, dominate the security agenda with the western Balkans. Also, the broader region should be considered; this includes Bulgaria and Romania with the Black Sea, as well as Croatia and Greece with the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina remain the focal points of potential instability. Both countries have had their share of incursions and incidents in recent years. In travelling to these countries, I ask civil society representatives if they see an imminent threat of an incident turning into a broader crisis. The responses go both ways—that violence could easily erupt and that the vivid memory of war averts a new one. Both views hold truth. For this reason, an international presence in Kosovo and Bosnia remains imperative.

Finally, to conclude on a positive note regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, CESS has been working in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the last few years, together with NGOs from Sarajevo and Banja Luka. We work with members of Parliament, civil servants, civil society actors and students. Most are keen to travel between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska to exchange experiences and build networks of co-operation.

For too long, international donors have regarded Bosnia and Herzegovina as a place not worth investing in because of its problematic governance system and a lack of political will. Nonetheless, bringing people together, especially youth, creates security and progress.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much for your statement.

We'll go next to questions from the members, beginning with Ziad Aboultaif. You have six minutes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses for appearing today before the committee.

We know the ambition of Kosovo to enter the EU and NATO is probably top of mind and a top policy when it comes to the government and the people of Kosovo.

I would like to start with one question and ask each one of you to answer. I'll give you the order to answer in. The question is this: What is the roadblock in Kosovo's way when it comes to fulfilling those ambitions?

I'll start with Dr. Brajshori and then go to Dr. Visoka and Mr. Boonstra.

[Muhamet Brajshori]

I will raise three issues in the roadblock to Kosovo's membership in the EU.

Number one, which is the most crucial, is the non-recognition by five EU member states: Greece, Spain, Slovenia, Cyprus and Romania. They are still blocking Kosovo politically from moving forward in the European integration process. Kosovo applied more than two years ago to gain candidate status and has been trying to open the accession talks. It's still being kept unaddressed by the European Union. Kosovo is the only country inside Europe that has applied for membership in the European Union and is not getting a response from the EU.

In the past, we had Morocco and Tunisia applying, and their requests were not addressed. Kosovo is making history in this regard because of political issues and divisions inside the EU. It's been nearly 20 years since Kosovo declared independence. I want to be very direct and undiplomatic. By not recognizing Kosovo, these five member states of the European Union are not aligning themselves with the Euro-Atlantic and other states that have recognized Kosovo, such as Canada, the U.S. and other EU member states. They are keeping their position in line with Russia and China, which still don't recognize Kosovo. It doesn't help the EU not to show leadership and a unified standing in the western Balkans.

Number two—I will be very brief on this—is the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Kosovo remains a hostage of Serbia's unwillingness to become committed to a dialogue process, which would benefit itself and be an advantage.

If we are able, in a period, to address these two key issues, we will give Kosovo a chance to show whether it can fulfill the criteria and that it deserves to move on towards European Union membership. Without having a proper process, Kosovo is not able to show whether it's ready to become a member of the EU, because it's not being given that ability to—

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

I apologize for cutting you off, but I have limited time and I need to move to the two other witnesses.

Please answer briefly, because I have another question for all of you.

[Gëzim Visoka]

Thank you. I'll proceed.

To build on what Dr. Brajshori noted, the main roadblock is a lack of vision. In particular, the EU lacks a unified position on Kosovo, and it has to make up its mind. Does it consider Kosovo an independent and sovereign state, or is it still a protectorate or a territory that is contested?

The second matter that is contested is this deep-rooted division within the EU and NATO when it comes to Kosovo's NATO intervention. The vision of what international order should have proceeded after the Cold War still pertains to and continues to resemble and manifest in Kosovo.

The main roadblock is a lack of a unified position on Kosovo on the side of the EU. Certainly, the five member states of the EU that don't recognize Kosovo are not a unified bloc. They have their own different historical reasons, and these reasons are not justifiable. Some of them are process-oriented; some of them are procedural, and some of them are legacy issues, because they did not change their view, as Canada and others did, to recognize Kosovo immediately. They are stuck in that stubborn position, and now there's a path dependent on that position, which, as the time passes, gets more difficult and worsens.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Mr. Boonstra, go ahead, please.

[Jos Boonstra]

I will try to build further on those two good answers.

Indeed, it's very problematic that the citizens of a country in which people pay with euros need visas to travel to the European Union.

Beside problems with the European Union and NATO member states, there are also still problems in Kosovo itself. Kosovo had a good start in 2008, when it became independent, in being able to build brand new institutions that did not have all the heritage that neighbouring countries were carrying. Still, politicians in Kosovo lack any will to move forward. There is still a problem with corruption and clientelism. That is a large blockage in making progress in democratic reform.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

That political deadlock is one of the issues you did not mention in full.

Can you comment on that quickly, Mr. Boonstra?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Give a very brief response, please.

[Jos Boonstra]

The political deadlock has been going on for years now. There is good hope that things will change after the latest elections and the recent EU summit. I think there will be more pressure exerted on Kosovo. There will be a bigger understanding that this country needs to come to terms politically.

I have hope, but it's nothing more than hope, I'm afraid.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

Next, we have MP Anita Vandenbeld.

You have six minutes.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here.

I'd like to touch on this for my first question: Each of you mentioned, in some way, this connection among security, stability and democratic resilience.

Mr. Brajshori, I noticed that you talked about the persistence of uncertainty as being one of the things that open up foreign interference.

Dr. Visoka, I noticed that you talked about how democracy promotion is fading away among western leaders, which I think was a very powerful statement.

Dr. Boonstra, I know you do a lot of capacity building. You also mentioned parliaments.

Could each of you talk about why it's important for countries like Canada to continue to support even technical assistance and democratic resilience in places like the Balkans, in order to facilitate security interests?

Dr. Brajshori is first.

[Muhamet Brajshori]

I will try to be very brief.

The western Balkans are part of the transatlantic area. They should not remain a grey zone in this part of the world. It's very important that countries like Canada, with rich traditions of democracy and democratically controlled armed forces, get involved in reforming the security structures in the region and supporting them.

As I mentioned in my brief statement, defence is a very crucial sector in which the Canadian private sector, armed forces and government can get involved in assisting countries—especially Kosovo, North Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. Canada can play a crucial role in supporting them in achieving the reforms they need to get aligned with NATO standards. In this regard, having a Canadian presence in this part of the world is very important. It will help these countries achieve their benchmarks. Most of them are part of NATO. In the case of Kosovo—which is still not part of NATO—this will help it to at least achieve those standards for when the political conditions are created in which it can become a member of NATO without any hurdle.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Dr. Visoka.

[Gëzim Visoka]

With regard to democratic resilience and the fading of the democratization agenda in the U.S. and other places, my view is that Kosovo, for a long time, was governed and administered by the international community. It did not really have a chance to demonstrate democratic resilience. Only now, perhaps in the last five or six years, has it operated on all aspects of governance without micro-interference. In that regard, I think it's doing well. It is holding regular elections, perhaps too many, but certainly all of them are assessed by the European monitors as democratic, fair and inclusive, including the one that happened this weekend.

Kosovo is a really good example in demonstrating that capacity, even under the current conditions. At the moment, the U.S. has removed democracy promotion, rule of law and anticorruption measures from their foreign policy priorities. Kosovo is realigning its attention to the European Union and other transatlantic partners and collaborations. In that sense, the short-term effects are not negative, but my fear is that as the U.S. and perhaps.... I hope that in the EU, we don't see an authoritarian turn. As long as the EU, Canada and other transatlantic allies remain within the remit of the liberal international order, Kosovo could retain its democratic character.

My fear in the long term is that if there is an authoritarian turn overall in the world, it will be a big challenge for Kosovo, because it's a small state and it will have to align with allies. If those allies no longer promote democracy and democratic values, it will be a challenge to adapt and survive in that new order.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Now we have Mr. Boonstra.

[Jos Boonstra]

I think that Canada can really offer an alternative, a fresh perspective on democracy that is in line with what the EU presents, but is slightly different. I think it would be extremely welcome in the Balkans to hear from others, not always from Berlin, Paris, The Hague or Madrid. That is very important.

It would be important to find a niche. For instance, one niche would be the legislature. A hearing like this is exemplary for countries in the Balkans. Parliaments have no experience in holding such hearings. Issues such as budget oversight, research capacity in Parliament and postlegislative scrutiny are all topics that Canada has a lot of experience with in Parliament, and it would be very beneficial in the field of security to transfer this to southeast European countries.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you.

I only have a few seconds left. I will just ask each of you to say, in a couple of words, how serious the risk in the region for broader conflict is. How seriously should we take this?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Give very brief responses, please, because we are almost over time.

[Muhamet Brajshori]

It is serious as long as we see western allies giving up on the idea that the western Balkans should become part of the western project.

[Gëzim Visoka]

My main concern is the Trump administration and their betrayal of the fundamental democratic values and principles that they've promoted for decades in the Balkans. This is providing openings to nationalists and to antipeace actors to revive their old historical revisionist projects.