Thank you, Mr. Chair.
We're very pleased to be here today to be able to answer the questions of the committee relating to this very important issue. I don't have an actual formal opening statement, but I simply do want to emphasize that the environment that we are working in, from the point of view of technology, is basically a business application environment. Virtually the primary competence of an MP is communication and so everything we do is to facilitate that rather than just sort of have a kind of lockdown. So that's an important consideration.
When last we appeared before you, the CIO, Louis Bard, was explaining that there are really three components when you look at this kind of situation. There's the technology. There are the actual procedures around the technology. And then there are the people. As I say, the technology we have is a business application environment, so it's not the kind of thing that is set up for encryption and “top secret” and so forth and so on, but we do have procedures within this environment that I think adequately respond to the need for confidentiality and for great care in dealing with sensitive documents.
The difficulty that we run into, and Monsieur Bard made that point
when we appeared before the committee the last time is that some people are not concerned about established procedures. If a cover page clearly says "confidential" and someone chooses to pay no attention to that warning and not be concerned about the confidentiality of the document in question, we are really in a bind.
We saw with the WikiLeaks, on a far larger scale and in a quite different sort of situation, the fact that people get around even the most sophisticated of technologies and of procedures. So the whole question of people is very important, and Louis is going to be in a position to answer, I think, the questions you have about certain characteristics of the way we do the documents that would assist committees.
I think one of the basic things we're hoping will come out of this discussion with the committee is that we would recommend that each committee, once it gets to the point of looking at drafting a report, take the time to step back and have a reflection on what the risks are if the report is leaked. This will differ from one study to another. There are certain things that are highly sensitive. There are others where, for instance, in the study of a bill, all of the sessions have been public as the witnesses have been heard and whatnot, so the report still technically is confidential until it's presented in the House, potentially, but at the same time, people are quite well aware of how the discussion is going.
In something like pre-budget consultations, where there is this level of sensitivity, then there might be some use for the committee to stand back. I'm not suggesting that they didn't do that adequately; they were faced with a different sort of situation. But if they stood back and looked at how much security or how many features of security they wanted to embed in the report that would nonetheless still meet their needs in terms of the facility of getting to the report and so forth, then we think that would be enormously helpful.
It's more a question of raising awareness, but we are still vulnerable to people's decision not to be concerned, as I said, about the intention of the committees they are dealing with.
That completes what I had to say. We are available to answer questions.