Thank you, Chair.
It's a pleasure to be back on PROC. As some of you will remember, I was on this committee in the 42nd Parliament. This is a committee that, certainly in the time I was on it, did some really good work. Part of the reason for that is that this committee has always been full of members who really put the institution first. I think there's a bit of a lack of that right now. We as legislators are the front line of democracy. We are the ones who have to look at safeguarding the institution and the processes.
Many of you know that before I got into politics I was working internationally on democratic development and parliamentary strengthening. I worked with UNDP's global program on parliamentary strengthening. I worked with OSCE in very difficult places, where legislative oversight of the security sector was very difficult, such as Bosnia and Kosovo. We developed some best practices.
What I'm concerned about today is the way in which and the venues through which this kind of oversight is happening, where it should happen and where it shouldn't. We anticipated things like this election interference or, might I even say, interference in our democratic processes writ large. As many of you know, I'm a member of SDIR, of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights. I was chair of that committee when we studied the Uighurs, and, as many of you know, China has sanctioned not only the members of that subcommittee, because of the report saying that what was happening to the Uighurs was a genocide, but also the entire committee.
Yes, I want the committee to know where I'm coming from. This is a very serious issue, and I don't think there's anybody here who doesn't take this issue very seriously, whether we're talking about interference by China, by Russia, by Iran or by anybody else, or interference in our entire democratic process, including our own committees and our own committee processes. That's just to tell you where I'm coming from as someone who has been sanctioned by China.
Having said that, I think we need to look at where the best place is to have these conversations. Obviously the Canadian public, everybody, would love to know what our intelligence institutions, our executive branch of government and our cabinet knew, when they knew it, how they knew it and what they did about it. Do you know who else would like to know that? China. China would love to know what we knew, what we didn't know, how we found that out and, more importantly, what we did about it. These are not things that can be talked about in a public and open forum.
However, this is a dilemma that legislatures all around the world have. You can go online and find numerous reports of the United Nations development program of OSCE, or of DCAF, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, that talk about best practices with respect to where the best place is for legislative branches, for people like you and me, for members of Parliament to oversee these kinds of things. If in a public committee like this one, or in a public inquiry, we call, let's say, Katie Telford or any other government official and ask them about classified materials, we know ahead of time that they won't be able to answer about anything that's classified.
Then the answer has to be, “I can't discuss that. I'm not at liberty to say. That is classified.” We know ahead of time that we're putting them in that position. I can't imagine why as parliamentarians we would want to put officials into a position where they have to either break the law or be in contempt of Parliament or look like they're obfuscating.
The only reason to do that is if you want it to look as though they're obfuscating, if you want it to look as though they're covering up something. Even if those people who testify have all the answers that could explain everything and would actually make them look very good, they can't talk about it, so why, if it were about the institution, as I know this committee has always been—if it were really about protecting our democratic processes—would we put officials in that kind of position, unless it was to try to make them look bad and to try to make it look as though there is something to hide?
In that case, trying to make it look as though there's something to hide and casting doubt on people's faith in the processes, in the integrity of our democratic system—I'll be very honest—is something that would probably make China very happy. Then the question becomes what we do about it. If not here, if not in public, how is it that we as legislators...? It is very legitimate for legislators to have the right to oversee everything the government does.
Even more importantly, I've worked in very fragile states. I've worked in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the president has his own republican guard that has absolutely no oversight by any civilian or other body, and I know how important it is that legislative branches are able to do this. There are entire reports of DCAF and UNDP that cite NSICOP as a global best practice as to how legislators can oversee the security sector. That's why I feel as though, yes, we anticipated this, and, yes, we know.... I don't think there's anybody who doesn't believe that other countries make attempts to undermine democratic processes. We are in a world today where the split is not east-west as it was in the Cold War, or right-left. The split is not north-south. The real divide in the world today is democracy and authoritarianism. Authoritarian states are learning from one another. They are working together. I see colleagues here who are on the Subcommittee on International Human Rights. We know that full well, because we hear testimony day in and day out.
Right now, we're hearing from women in Iran and we're hearing about what authoritarian states do to their citizens. That divide is something about which we have to be very, very careful. Canada has always been a bit protected in history because of our geographic boundaries. We have a democratic country to the south and essentially oceans around the rest, so in a world where the dangers are geographic, where wars happen through physical contact across borders, Canada has always been a bit protected. The problem today is that while warfare is happening, obviously, physically, the real danger right now is hybrid warfare. The real danger is cyberwarfare.
The problem with that—I heard just last week that China has an entire military wing on cognitive domain operations—is that it is something and it's not new. Russia has always had propaganda. If you talk to people in places like Estonia and Lithuania, they say they've always known; they've had that critical thinking because they've always known that was there.
Our problem, because we have been somewhat innocent throughout our history and because Canada hasn't been subject to having nefarious actors on its borders, is that we don't live along a geopolitical fault line like the Balkans, which is a place, as I said, I've spent several years working in. Therefore, we haven't necessarily anticipated it enough over the last number of decades, but the fact is that they can get right into our living room. They can get right into our child's device or our phones. This is a real threat, and I want the public who might be listening today to know that absolutely, we take that threat very, very seriously.
Having sat now for seven and a half years on the government side, I have seen how seriously we have taken that threat. As someone who has been sanctioned by both China and Russia, I know personally that this is something we should not take lightly, but I'm not seeing this being taken seriously as a threat in the discourse that has been happening over the last few weeks. What I'm seeing is—and you've seen it—even today, former senator Hugh Segal talking about “gotcha” politics. There seems to be an interest in trying to make it look as though one party over another is not taking it seriously.
Frankly, I found it really difficult to sit in the House the last few weeks and hear suggestions that as legislators, as Canadians, we're not acting in the best interests of our country, because I believe fully—and I've always been an MP who has worked very closely across party lines—that if we sit and work together, we can have the processes that allow for legislative oversight.
NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, was created for exactly this kind of situation—so that it can be depoliticized, so that opposition members can have secret clearances that will allow them to get access to things that, in almost every other country, only the executive branch would have access to. You have members from both houses, from the House of Commons and the Senate. You have members of all the recognized opposition parties and government members present who work in the way that, I think, Parliament should always work, where you are looking at the national interest first and where you put aside your party hat and actually work to make sure that, where there are changes that need to be made, you can make those changes.
Are the processes perfect? No. In fact, NSICOP itself has put together a number of recommendations over the years about how these processes can be improved. The fact is that you have a place where you can ask those questions, where you can get the secret information, where somebody who comes to testify can actually offer what they know and can offer that secret information in an environment where even the opposition is present.
That committee can then make reports that are ultimately made public. That committee can make reports that will not say, “This is what the government knew and this is how they knew it and this is the person who told them,” because this could put a lot of people in danger. Instead, it makes reports that say, “We've had access to the materials. The government gave us full access—or didn't give us full access. The government acted—or didn't act—on the materials that it was given,” and then it makes that available to the public.
In fact, what that does is make it so that you have incentives for the government to ensure that it is providing those materials. This is a committee that is actually almost unique in the world. A number of reports have used Canada and our NSICOP as a case study, because, as you can imagine, there are a lot of governments out there that don't want to give secret information to opposition members. This is something that we probably would have put in place if we could have seen ahead exactly what's happening right now with these allegations of election interference. If we had actually looked ahead and said, “We need to create something that will involve a process whereby we can actually respond to this,” NSICOP would be precisely the committee we would have created.
The U.K. has intelligence and security agencies. The U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament can scrutinize other bodies that form part of the management and structure of the U.K. intelligence community, including things like the Joint Intelligence Organisation, the National Security Secretariat, the Cabinet Office, the office for security and counterintelligence and the Home Office. It's not quite structured in the same way ours is. In fact, it's more like our Liaison Committee. It has the chairs of other parliamentary committees on it.
If you look, for instance, at Spain, they have a commission on the Congress of Deputies. I won't go into details about all of that, but I can just give some examples of what other countries have. In France, for instance, they have the Parliamentary Delegation for Intelligence, which also is a bicameral parliamentary committee. It has eight members. It's responsible for monitoring the performance of the French intelligence agencies, and it can take testimony from the Prime Minister, ministers and heads of agencies, and call for papers.
In the U.S., they have the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
In fact, in Australia, in 2017, they did an entire report on the Five Eyes, and they actually said what the Five Eyes, including Canada, do when it comes to legislative oversight of the security sector. That was right after NSICOP was first formed, and they listed what Canada was doing in a very positive light and had some recommendations for going forward.
We talked already about the U.S. and the U.K., but it also talks about New Zealand and Australia.
In Australia, the six agencies that comprise the intelligence community are overseen by a parliamentary committee that examines their administration and expenditure. That's a bit of a different role, because of course we have different mechanisms in committees that oversee expenditures of the intelligence, security and defence sectors.
I'll probably come back to this a bit later, but as you can see, there are a number of different examples around the world of this kind of thing. New Zealand, in 2017, created something whereby the security agencies are overseen by a parliamentary committee that can look at policy, administration and expenditure. If you look at some of these international examples, every one of them talks about Canada and says why Canada has one of the best practices.
Looking at the permanent members of this committee, I just don't understand why, when we have one of the best mechanisms to do exactly what needs to be done right now, which is legislative oversight in a space that does not put at risk any of our security agencies or any of our intelligence operatives—that does not reveal to adversaries in the world exactly what we know, how we know it and what we don't know—we are having this almost deck-chairs-on-the-Titanic kind of debate about whether it should be a public inquiry or whether it should be here at PROC. The fact is that we have the mechanism.
That's one of the reasons I wanted to come today. Many of you know that I did work internationally. There are numerous reports that I could talk about, but what many people don't know is that, in between, I also worked in the House leader's office under the Paul Martin government. In 2004, one of the things many of you might know is that Paul Martin gave a speech at Osgoode Hall, when he was running for leadership.
At that time, one of the key platforms in his leadership campaign was democratic reform, strengthening the legislative branch vis-à-vis the executive branch. As we have all seen and as is now well documented, over decades the executive branch and the Prime Minister's Office in Canada have gained more power vis-à-vis the legislative branch. One of the things Paul Martin wanted to do was to create a democratic reform action plan that would rebalance and give more power to the legislative branch.
At that time, I was in the Liberal research bureau, and I happened to be the researcher for the Liberal democracy caucus. A lot of the ideas in that Osgoode Hall speech actually came from the democracy caucus.
One of those ideas was to create a national security oversight committee of parliamentarians. That's something we were talking about already in 2002, and then, in 2003 and 2004, when Paul Martin first became prime minister, he established the first-ever minister of democratic reform. It happened at that time that it was also the House leader. We've had some phenomenal ministers of democratic reform and House leaders since then.
I was then brought in. I was director of parliamentary affairs in that office of the House leader and minister of democratic reform. Specifically, my role was to work with the Senate, with the House of Commons, with PROC at the time, with parliamentarians and with civil society experts to help to turn those ideas that he had put forward during his leadership campaign into an actual action plan. We worked with PCO and actually did get through cabinet and table in the House of Commons a democratic reform action plan. This was in February 2004. It included the national security committee.
I will read you the bullet of what the recommendation was. It stated, “The government will seek the support of Parliament to create a National Security Committee of Parliamentarians. Members would be sworn-in as Privy Councillors so they could be briefed on national security issues.” The one thing we haven't done is swear in members as privy councillors, which is something we can all maybe have a conversation about, because there is always room for improvement. The fact is, though, that was in February 2004. I have been working on this file for 20 years.
We started working on this when I was in LRB in 2002, and then in 2004 we created this democratic reform action plan. Unfortunately, there was an election shortly after, and when we went into a minority government, a lot of these things didn't actually happen, but what is the first thing we did in 2015 when we formed government? We created NSICOP. We created the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, and in the interim I was working overseas, working specifically on parliamentary oversight, on strengthening legislative branches.
This is precisely the kind of work that I have literally been doing for 20 years, and so I guess I'm a little disappointed, because I was very proud when we created NSICOP. I was actually very proud that Canada created something like that, because this issue of interference is not going away.
I know that for a lot of Canadians it's something they're only reading about in the newspapers right now, but for those of us who have been working in this sector—and also when I was parliamentary secretary for defence, which includes oversight of CSE—for 20 years or more, this is not something that is new. It's not something that is not anticipated, and it's something that we—certainly I, both in Canada and in countries around the world—have been working very hard for decades to find processes whereby we can resolve that dilemma of how to have oversight of things that are secret.
How do you have the legislative branch of elected parliamentarians—who are responsible for overseeing the government and representing citizens—have that at the same time as knowing that certain things have to be classified and certain processes cannot be made public?
I have more to say, Madam Chair, and I might get on the list for later, because what I'd like to do is actually talk about some of the recommendations from some of these reports over the years that, in fact, have exactly what Canada has done. We have the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, which says it must have the authority to conduct inquiries and interrogate members and senior officials of the security sector, to be able to deal with a specialized committee, preferably a permanent or standing committee that is resourced, that has members who demonstrate strong commitment and expertise—which I actually think our NSICOP does—which has sufficient resources, which has adequate time and personnel, logistical support, technical support, expertise among the members and membership that is balanced so that their responsibilities are not overextended and they can dedicate sufficient time.
Maybe some of my colleagues will elaborate on this, but I can go through a number of these recommendations over the years and, in fact, that's exactly what Canada is doing. We are recognized globally as being a leader in this.
I guess what I would leave with is that I don't know why—and I haven't been on the committee to follow the debates that led up to this, but when I look at the motion and the amendments, I don't really understand why we are not using NSICOP. In fact, we've gone beyond that, because the Prime Minister has even said, beyond what is the international best practice, that we're going to have a special rapporteur.
People make fun of the word “rapporteur”, which is a little juvenile, to be honest, because it is used everywhere internationally. When the Secretary General of the United Nations wants to send somebody who is going to be independent and who is going to look at all the facts and have access to everything and report back to the Secretary General, they are called a rapporteur. That is the name.
A special rapporteur will then look at all of the reports, including the work being done on NSICOP—the security committee of parliamentarians—and look at NSIRA, which is a different kind of review—an expert review by independent experts who are able to look at the security sector, which is another thing that has been put into place—and then say, “Okay, I've looked at it all and I don't believe that NSICOP is able to do this. I don't believe that NSIRA is able to do this. I think there's more here. I think we do need a public inquiry, because the government isn't doing what it's meant to do. The processes that are in place aren't working.”
The Prime Minister has said that in that case, he would be open to a public inquiry, but the fact is I don't think it's going to come to that. Maybe I have a little more faith in some of these processes, and certainly I have faith in the members of NSICOP. We get elected to this place, and one of the things.... I'm a process person, and when I did democratic development overseas, when I worked in Parliament, I was a senior adviser to the Parliament of Kosovo when it became a Parliament. When Kosovo became independent it had a small rubber-stamp assembly that was essentially under the authority of the United Nations mission in Kosovo, so it didn't have any real authority. It was an advisory body that could recommend what to do to the UN mission, which had executive and legislative authority at the time.
When they declared independence, overnight that small rubber-stamp assembly had to become a national Parliament. I was the senior adviser with OSCE to the Parliament of Kosovo when it became a Parliament. When I look at those sorts of things and I look at what we put in place in terms of best practices, I would say that the Kosovo assembly probably still has a ways to go. In fact, it could use Canada's model, but the fact is these are the kinds of things that Canadians are going around the world and working on.
I will go through some of the international best practices, because I think it it is important that Canadians understand that nothing is perfect.
We can always learn and improve on the processes we have in place. When I look at NSICOP, I truly think the result of the rapporteur is going to be that we have processes in place, that NSICOP does it. We as MPs want to make the country better. Certainly, when I got elected, I believed very firmly in Canadian democracy. I believe it is resilient. Yes, of course there are many others; there are authoritarians out there who don't want Canada to be strong and resilient in its democratic institutions, and it is our institutions that make us resilient.
When I got elected, I came here with the idea of making this place more democratic, making it function better. One of the first things I did, partly because of the work that I did overseas, but also having been a staff member in the House leader's office, having been a staff member who did all the research for MPs and gave them materials that they could then use and make decisions from—and, by the way, let me tell you the staff of our committees are phenomenal. I don't think any of us would be here and able to do what we do if it weren't for our staff. Having been in that position, after getting elected I wanted to use the voice and incredible privilege of being a parliamentarian to make this place better, and that is something that I still feel very strongly. I see members even on the other side who actually became members of the all-party democracy caucus in the 42nd Parliament.
The reason I reached out across the aisle to create a democracy caucus was specifically that I know there are members, some of whom are process-oriented like me, who really see the institutions and the limitations of the institutions and oversight of the executive and see the threat over decades that has been widely documented, where executive power has grown in comparison to legislative power. I reached out and we created this all-party democracy caucus which still exists—Elizabeth May is the chair this time, but at that time I was the chair—so we could talk about how to make this place better, so that we could work across party lines and put our parties and hats aside, and the incentives in this place.
If I were coming in as OSCE or UNDP and looking at the way our Parliament functions, our Parliament is actually very top-down compared to some of the ones like Kosovo, where we were able to learn from all over the world and benefit from what works well and doesn't work well. The people of Kosovo created their Parliament, but when we as advisers were able to bring to them some of these practices from around the world, they were able to put some of those in right at the outset.
The fact is that the Canadian Parliament has been here for over 150 years, and some of the things we do are still the way they were 150 years ago, when you had a number of, usually, older white men who would take the train, come here to Ottawa—I'm talking about in the 19th century—and decide amongst themselves what was best for the plebeians across the country. There was very little discussion with constituents. There was very little dialogue. Most of it was people who came here, and they wouldn't be able to go back and forth, given the nature of travel at that time. It was a very centralized Parliament. It was in fact a very masculine and adversarial Parliament, which over the years we've been able to change somewhat, but the fact remains that our Parliament needs to work on that.
The incentives here are more about a “gotcha”. They're more about making the other guy look bad than reaching across the aisle and talking to each other.
Even the physical space in this place.... When I want to talk to a member of the opposition, there's almost nowhere we can go. It used to be that the lobbies where we ate were combined. Peter Milliken will tell you about this. We had our own lobbies, but when we went for our meals, we had to talk to each other. Peter Milliken has said...and I firmly believe we should go back to that, because I can tell you, if I'm going....
Certainly, when I was chair of SDIR, I always tried to fight for consensus. This space right now is not a place where we're fighting for consensus. NSICOP is a place where that can happen. Sadly, in part, it's because the cameras are off. I think a lot of us would say that we're able to talk to each other much better and come to common solutions sometimes, when those cameras are off.
It's not because we're not transparent, but it's because there's such an incentive.... If I'm saying something today, there's a sense of, “We're going to get her, we're going to quote that and we're going to make sure that particular thing she said goes on Facebook or YouTube and makes her look bad.” That's the problem with this place. It is about making the other guy look bad.
I've seen that. The motion that's here today.... A lot of this is about making the other party look bad, but the fact is that's not why we got elected. I don't think that's why any of us got elected in the first place. I think we want to work together.
By the way, if you want to look at models of committees that work well together, look at the status of women committee. I'm not an essentialist. I don't think women are by nature somehow better, but the fact is that the status of women committee has had almost entirely consensus reports. It's a committee in which sometimes, when we're talking and asking questions, you wouldn't know who is in what party.
The other one is the Subcommittee on International Human Rights. I think it's because the members of that subcommittee, when we're looking at these kinds of global threats, are looking at them from one place, which is that we are all Canadian. We're looking at them as Canadians and where our place is vis-à-vis other countries that want to do harm to our democratic processes and, frankly, to human rights defenders who find sanctuary here in Canada.
I believe that this particular discussion is better off happening in a place where you're not always talking to the camera and you're not always trying to do “gotchas”. If a good idea comes forward, but it comes from another party, you have to shoot it down just because it's coming from another party.
Sadly, the incentive structure in this place.... There are things we can do, and I could go on about what we can do to make that a bit better, but I think looking at something like NSICOP is precisely the way we can do that.
I'll give you an example. When I was parliamentary secretary for national defence, and covering the CSE as well, I naively saw an NSICOP report that was rather critical.
By the way, look at the NSICOP reports, because a lot of them are actually very critical of the government.
I was getting briefs. I looked at this report, and my first instinct was to go to one of our Liberal members who was on the NSICOP committee and say, “What are you doing? Why didn't you come and talk to us?” She got very defensive and said, “That's not what NSICOP is about. We don't take our direction from the minister's office, or from the parliamentary secretary for that matter. We are an independent committee. We do our work very much according to the evidence and across party lines, but we don't have a parliamentary secretary sitting on the committee, asking us questions about why we're doing it.” She was very resentful that I even did that. I learned my lesson at that time, because I realized that this is something they guard very well.
It's the reason NSICOP is powerful and that it works. It's because the members of the committee take it very seriously that they are independent and that they do not work on behalf of the government or their party. Frankly, I think it would be better if more committees were like that in this place.
I am going to go through some of the things in some of these international recommendations, because I actually think Canadians need to know. Canadians need to know that we have put in place—and it took us a long time, as I said. We put it forward in 2004, and we didn't put it in place until...I think it was 2016, when NSICOP was first created, but the fact is we put in place a mechanism for this kind of discussion, to hear these kinds of witnesses.
I'll say, for instance, in 2021, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, which is colloquially referred to as DCAF—I know many people who think DCAF is funny—