Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you for the invitation.
I'd like to congratulate the committee on this study. It's essential for Canadians to be able to rely on a democracy that is free of foreign interference, during elections as well as its everyday activities.
I'm pleased to meet everyone, but I can't disclose any classified information, as you know. I, like others, am bound to secrecy. Accordingly, I've decided to discuss a number of incidents of foreign interference that are known to the public and that might be useful to you in your work.
Although I've been retired for five years now, I'm still involved in these issues as a senior fellow at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and am also on the board of directors of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.
Let's look at a few public domain episodes.
On July 15, 2015, two weeks before the beginning of the election campaign, when I was deputy minister of foreign affairs, the office of protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs released a reminder to foreign diplomatic missions of the Vienna convention's obligation not to interfere in the host country's affairs. At a time when the public was not as sensitized to foreign interference in Canada, we were criticized for having done that—putting people on notice.
In September 2016, one of the first important cyber foreign interference actions targeted an international institution, which was the World Anti-Doping Agency in Montreal, as well as several of its international partners including the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, as part of a major disinformation campaign in retaliation for the sanctions imposed on Russia by WADA and the Olympic movement. While many international media reported on the incident, there was no domestic media attention until October 2018, when Canada and other countries attributed the action to the Russian military intelligence agency, the GRU.
Shortly after, the same GRU actors were back in action in the 2016 U.S. election with similar methods and tactics. In January 2017—days before transition—President Obama declassified part of the intelligence collected by the U.S. national security agencies. His action had limited impact, which raises important questions for your work, such as the independence of the person who's going to make the intervention to release information; the reliability of the intelligence, because it was really fresh; and the timing of it in doing it just a few days before a president from a different party is coming in.
In July 2018, following a thorough investigation, special counsel Robert Mueller laid charges against 12 Russian military intelligence officers of the same GRU.
In October 2018, the U.S. and several countries including Canada condemned the actions of Russian actors in the poisoning of the Skripal family in the United Kingdom; their efforts to interfere in the investigation by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Netherlands; and the attack on WADA in Montreal and its partners, including the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport. U.S. authorities laid new indictment charges against seven Russian GRU officers. Three of them had also been indicted in the context of the U.S. election.
Let's spend some time on the measures.
A number of incidents have led to several of the measures recently discussed at your meetings, including amendments to the Canada Elections Act, an annual assessment by the Communications Security Establishment, the CSE, of foreign cyber interference. In addition to information sessions available to all the political parties. After that, because these risks are equally present in the analog world, similar measures were taken by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. These measures gradually evolved into observation mechanisms, and the directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which you discussed at recent sessions and just discussed with Mr. Wernick at the end of his appearance.
That leads me to some of the questions raised in stories published by the Globe and Mail and Global News. On the one hand, I can't discuss allegations concerning iormation about certain June 2017 incidents that were mentioned in one of Sam Cooper's articles in February 2023. However, as I retired in May 2018, before the dates involving the other alleged information, I am able to comment, but strictly on the basis of my professional experience and on my ongoing personal interest in these issues.
On the one hand, it is essential to reassure Canadians that any serious allegation of foreign interference, whether during an election or in another aspect of our democracy, will be subject to a rigorous examination. I hope that the various reviews launched will bring light to the alleged information and also, as importantly, inform the public policy on the required measures to equip the relevant institutional actors in prevention, deterrence and the application of consequences.
The proposal to consider a registry for foreign influence deserves consideration, but it can be only one element of a broader strategy, as has been suggested by past reports of organizations such as the task force on national security of the GSPIA at the University of Ottawa, or the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.
However, the reading of the various articles raises the risk of interpreting intelligence as evidence. I encourage you to carefully read the op-ed by Professor Stephanie Carvin on what intelligence is and is not.
I have held a top secret clearance for more than 25 years. While intelligence is essential to better appreciate a threat, very little of what we could see supports action by competent authorities. Even when it does, there are often constraints on its use that may come from the need to protect the methods and the sources or the continued legislative shortcoming of not being able to bring intelligence as evidence while allowing a fair defence.
In this context, your review and all the other examinations not only are critical to bring light to the alleged information, but are in the interests of Canada and Canadians to develop the appropriate tool kit to counter foreign interference in all aspects of our democratic life.
Thank you.
