I will be very pleased to follow Mr. Lee's suggestion.
First of all, we fully agree with the Canadian Bar Association. At the Ligue des droits et libertés, we have essentially the same concerns and find ourselves confronted with the same legal structure which, unfortunately, is not well known to the public. Very few people are aware of section 25.1 of the Criminal Code. I am certain that nobody who has spoken to you on the street--none of your actual constituents--has ever asked you what is going on with this section of the Criminal Code.
I would just ask you to imagine the following scenario. Imagine an unnamed country or State where the laws allow the police to engage in assaults, wiretapping and a whole series of violent offences, such as threats, kidnapping, hostage taking, forcible confinement, and searches which, in actual fact, turn into break and entry for the purposes of committing theft--and those are just a couple of examples. The police would have complete immunity. Such acts would be deemed justified for investigative purposes. Imagine that in that society, human rights are respected, but since that law exists, there is always the possibility that someone will use it, because of the way it's drafted.
That is precisely the situation in which we find ourselves. Even if we want to believe that the police generally act in good faith, how could we ever forget, particularly in Quebec--at least I hope not--what occurred during the 1970s, when RCMP officers burned down barns, stole political party lists and committed a number of offences that led to the inquiry with which you are certainly familiar, the MacDonald Commission of Inquiry in the 1980s.
Nor should we forget that in the 1980s and 1990s, a guy by the name of Boivin was with the CNTU but was working for CSIS at the same time. He had encouraged one of his union colleagues to blow up a hotel in Saguenay—Lac-St-Jean, an area located north of Quebec City. Of course, CSIS did not agree with these acts, but the fact is one can very quickly find oneself in such a situation.
I forgot to mention an important aspect: imagine a country where all these acts can be committed without any judicial review. In that regard, the Ligue des droits et libertés fully agrees with the Canadian Bar Association: judicial authorization is absolutely necessary for the commission of these kinds of acts. The police cannot engage in wiretapping without judicial authorization and without strict prior conditions having been met--in other words, without having demonstrated that other investigative means were attempted and that no other means is available to ensure a successful investigation, etc., before being given a warrant specifying a specific period of applicability. We're talking here about people's private lives, and therefore, the judge issues a warrant.
One may wonder how it works with section 25.1. Could an undercover police officer or a double agent engage in wiretapping to boost his image with certain criminals? Could a police officer commit a series of assaults or thefts, once again in order to boost his undercover image? To what extent will a police officer understand the difference between common assault, assault with bodily injury, and so on? What will happen in cases where common assault becomes assault with bodily injury or aggravated assault?
As lawyers, we are well aware of the fact that common assault can, when an incident occurs, quickly become aggravated assault. In some cases, it may go even further. We also know that there is a principle in criminal law that says you take the victim the way he is.
In these situations, we believe it is extremely dangerous to allow the police to commit offences against the integrity of the person. We also find it very dangerous and worrisome that people would not be advised when their property has not been destroyed. Indeed, someone who has been threatened with forcible confinement but has not been advised by the police will not complain to his lawyer or a judge, because that person does not know that a policeman was responsible.
The police officer who engages in breaking and entering, or kidnaps or forcibly confines someone is not wearing a police badge. This is often done by a police officer in civilian clothes working undercover in a criminal group who wants to establish a reputation in order to collect evidence.
I do not intend to read my entire brief. It is only five pages long, but the CBA has already covered many of our points. However, I do want to address another theme, which is compensation. It is practically impossible for a victim--in other words, someone whose property has been destroyed or who has been physically assaulted by a police officer wearing civilian clothes who committed a criminal offence, to actually sue that police officer. First of all, it often happens that the victim does not know. Furthermore, if the victim does not have the wherewithal to proceed with a lawsuit, it would be illusory to believe that such an individual could go through all the steps required to be compensated.
If Parliament decides to maintain these provisions, an automatic victim compensation mechanism is absolutely essential. If Parliament decides to maintain these provisions, judicial authorization will also be required, as well as an external monitoring mechanism--in other words, a mechanism for impartial judicial review--and political accountability. That could take the form of a committee composed of Members of Parliament that would sit in camera, but there must be a political body with the authority to take a close look at what police officers have done.
I have provided you with a paper by Ms. Shirley Heafey in which she very clearly explains that even the RCMP's existing mechanisms are not effective. They are inadequate given the reality, and especially the current reality. They are even more inadequate for dealing with offences that practically no one knows have been committed by public officers.
I have referred to hearings in camera, and although I readily admit that in camera discussions may be necessary at times, most of the committee's work should be carried out in public, because it is important for members of the public to know what police officers are doing. In fact, over the next ten years, it would be just as dangerous, in terms of the police's image, for people to be unaware of what police officers are doing, as to gradually discover what kinds of offences have been committed, the detailed reasons for their commission and, as my colleague stated, what the results of those actions were.
We have another suggestion to make. If reports are prepared by all provincial solicitors general and by the Solicitor General of Canada, we would suggest that a Canada-wide report be prepared that would include all the provincial reports, because an individual who wants to know who did what has to go and ask the provinces individually. For a number of years now, there have been integrated task forces in place that include municipal, provincial, and federal police officers, as well as members of federal agencies--since we are talking about agencies as well, and not only the police--and foreign agencies such as the FBI, more generally, and certainly the CIA. The Arar Inquiry has provided ample evidence of that up until now.
So, when task forces such as these are acting together, who does what and under whose orders? In these cases, it's important to have a report that provides an overview of the situation as a whole.
I don't have much time left, but the final point I would like to make may surprise you, since it has to do with torture. Indeed, you may be surprised to know that the offence of torture set out in the Criminal Code is similar to the offence of torture found in the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which Canada signed in 1987. The immunity granted public officers does not exclude the offence of torture. The basic definition of torture is that it is carried out by a public officer or authority. All the police officers I spoke to told me that they cannot engage in torture because they are not authorized to commit bodily harm.
According to our definition, that is an incorrect interpretation of the term “torture”. I'm not talking about Washington's definition, but ours. We believe in that regard that there is no requirement to commit bodily harm. Assault with bodily injury means that there must be injuries which are neither permanent nor inconsequential. Our definition of torture is based on the presence of severe pain.
Indeed, it is possible to suffer severe pain or suffering without actually sustaining any injury whatsoever. The human imagination and the techniques in that regard are quite well developed. We have only to think of those cases involving sensory deprivation, where people are shut away in a room deprived of light, where people lose all sense of time, or where music is used. You have only to think of Guantanamo. All of these techniques were developed specifically to cause suffering without causing injuries. The cartoon image of the police officer with his telephone book comes immediately to mind. But it is basically the same principle. However, the situation today is that technology is far more refined.
In that sense, torture would be possible under section 25.1. The current debate has to do with whether or not that is included in assault with bodily injury. It's an interesting legal debate, but what we must consider is the police officer who may be told that there can be no torture when there are no injuries. In such cases, he might make an individual suffer for the purposes of intimidating him, given that intimidation is allowed. He could supposedly do this without this constituting torture. But that is absolutely untrue. Police officers, who are not legal experts, are being given the wrong message.
In closing, I want to emphasize that these provisions raise two major problems. We can only repeat what we stated in 2001. At the time, the Ligue des droits et libertés was opposed to this legislation. It has had the effect of encouraging a culture of silence among police officers and, in particular, trivializing torture and the violation of fundamental rights globally. Granting this type of immunity to police is of tremendous concern to us. That all citizens, without exception, are equal before the law is a fundamental principle of the rule of law, and one which is the very foundation of a democratic society.
Like the Canadian Bar Association, we are asking that section 25.1 be withdrawn.