Evidence of meeting #44 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was interference.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Jody Thomas  National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office
Mike MacDonald  Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence, Privy Council Office
Jordan Zed  Interim Foreign and Defence Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister, Privy Council Office
Karen Hogan  Auditor General, Office of the Auditor General
Nicholas Swales  Principal, Office of the Auditor General
Chantal Thibaudeau  Director, Office of the Auditor General

11 a.m.

Conservative

The Vice-Chair Conservative James Bezan

I call this meeting to order.

We are starting meeting number 44. I want to welcome everyone to it. Our chair is indisposed on a parliamentary trip and in sunnier climes than we are right now. We are continuing our study on Arctic security, which we started on October 6 with a motion under Standing Order 108(2).

Joining us today is Jody Thomas, former deputy minister of national defence and no stranger to this committee. She is now the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister. She is joined by Jordan Zed, interim foreign and defence policy adviser to the Prime Minister, and Mike MacDonald, assistant secretary to the cabinet, security and intelligence.

Welcome to all of you.

Ms. Thomas, I invite you to lead off with your opening comments. You have five minutes.

11 a.m.

Jody Thomas National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. It's nice to be back at the national defence committee.

As the chair said, I'm Jody Thomas, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister. In this role, I provide advice and information to the Prime Minister on issues related to foreign affairs, defence, security and intelligence. This includes situational awareness and advice on a range of strategic and operational issues.

I work with officials across government to coordinate and advance a diverse range of activities related to these topics. Many of the files I deal with touch on the Arctic and decisions related to a dynamic region that can have serious domestic and foreign policy implications.

I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to contribute to this important study on Arctic security, which comes at a critical time.

As you're all aware, the Arctic comprises more than 40% of Canada's territory and over 75% of its national coastlines. It is a complex and challenging environment, with a harsh climate, sparse population, limited physical and digital infrastructure and high operating costs. The Arctic is fundamental to Canada's identity and its sovereignty.

It is also an area of high interest for allies and adversaries. Rapid and enduring climate change is making the region more accessible for navigation. New commercial and military technologies are connecting the North to the rest of the world and eroding the region's historical isolation from geopolitical affairs. This, of course, has far-reaching implications for the future of the Arctic.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine halted nearly all western co-operation with the largest Arctic state. This has complicated the important work of the Arctic Council, which is currently under Russian chairmanship until spring 2023, when it will pass to Norway. With the pending accession of Finland and Sweden, seven of eight Arctic states will be NATO allies.

Canada and like-minded Arctic states continue to promote a low-tension vision for the region, but this vision is increasingly complicated by current geopolitical frictions, strategic competition and an evergrowing number of states, both friendly and adversarial, seeking access and influence. While Canada continues to see no immediate threat of military attack to the Canadian Arctic, the Arctic region is generally seen by Canada and its allies as a theatre of competition and potential instability, if it is not closely managed by Canada and like-minded Arctic states.

The rapidly evolving strategic context underscores the importance of effective safety and security frameworks, strong alliances and credible deterrence. Climate change remains the most prominent and visible threat to the Arctic and all its inhabitants, with warming recorded at four times the global average. This is leading to melting ice, rapid coastal erosion, increased precipitation, permafrost degradation, crumbling infrastructure and invasive species migration. Environmental changes are profoundly impacting the health and well-being of northerners, traditional ways of life and northern infrastructure, including critical defence installations.

Adversarial states are increasingly active in the region. They are building Arctic-capable military equipment with the goal of seeking to secure control over strategic assets and resources. They are also looking to make economic investments, which could be leveraged for coercive effect.

The Arctic remains a strategically important region for continental defence, as the north continues to present a potential avenue of access or attack. Rapid technological changes—including in cruise missile and hypersonic technology—and the rise of competition in new domains, such as space, emerging technologies and cyber, are impacting the way states pursue their interests. These changes also enhance their ability to project military force in the Arctic and hold North America at risk.

As maritime navigation continues to increase over the coming years and decades, Canada must prepare to meet growing demands on national capabilities and infrastructure. These include supporting civilian authorities in response to domestic emergencies; ensuring safety of navigation, including port infrastructure; maintaining all-domain awareness of the Arctic environment; enforcing Canadian laws and regulations throughout the region; and being prepared to respond to more frequent search and rescue operations.

Given the current attacks on the international, rules-based order by some nations, Canada and like-minded Arctic states will need to work closely together to ensure Arctic tensions are responsibly managed. Circumpolar collaboration and co-operation among the Arctic states will be essential to achieving such partnerships. Canada's approach will continue to emphasize the need to minimize and manage tensions in the Arctic by, first and foremost, working closely, collectively, and bilaterally with like-minded Arctic partners.

The U.S. remains Canada's premier Arctic partner. This strong relationship, underscored by NORAD, will continue to stand as vital to the defence of the North American Arctic. Canada's Arctic and Northern policy framework also aligns well with the U.S. approach to the region.

As the second-largest Arctic state, Canada is looked upon to be a leader in Arctic issues. It is critical that Canada continue to prepare for increased international activity in the region to defend Arctic sovereignty and to ensure the safety and security of Canadian Arctic inhabitants. This is key to ensuring our sovereignty and our continued ability to meet our commitments for the defence of the continent.

Strengthening Canada's defence and security posture in the Arctic will also ensure Canada is recognized by the United States and other allies as assuming its security and defence responsibilities, an important part of our strategic credibility.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I look forward to answering questions.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

The Vice-Chair Conservative James Bezan

Thank you. We're going to move to our first round.

Mrs. Gallant, you have six minutes.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

China considers itself to be a near-Arctic nation, and the Five Eyes have warned our government about the security threat it poses.

As the NSI adviser to the Prime Minister, why was that contract let without a national security review being done? I'm referring to the contract to build for the RCMP an RF system.

11:05 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

Number one, we need to stop referring to China and its aspirations to be a near-Arctic state in that term. That's its term. It's not ours, and we should not use it. There is no such thing as a near-Arctic state. You're either an Arctic state, or you are not. That's a personal opinion of mine, and it's something I think we should emphasize.

In terms of the particular RFP you referenced, it is premature for me to speak to what occurred in that procurement. It began over a year ago. It is critical that, as we review and update procurement policies, we understand the threat vectors coming at us, we ensure that safety parameters are in RFPs and we determine the kind of technology and where it comes from in our procurements.

That is the work ahead, and the Prime Minister has promised a complete review.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

Let's talk about technology, because the CCP does consider itself a near-Arctic nation, and it has a permanent presence there. It is eager to exploit our rare earth elements. It makes no secret of preferring a Liberal government over a Conservative one, because it seems apparently more compliant.

CSIS reported on political interference earlier this year. As the NSI adviser to the Prime Minister, I would like to know, why was he not advised about the political interference in that CSIS report?

11:05 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

China may consider itself a near-Arctic state. We do not. It does not have a permanent presence in the Arctic. It certainly has a periodic, episodic and seasonal presence in the Arctic. The Chinese are working with Russia, where it's useful to them, to increase their presence in the Arctic. Their interest in critical minerals is known. That is something that we, as one of the richest countries in critical minerals, have to be very aware of.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

The Prime Minister must have known something about the political interference allegations in the 2019 and 2021 elections, because he raised the issues, or he claimed to have raised the issues with President Xi, when he was overseas, and President Xi was quite upset about that.

Was it you who advised him about the reports of political interference in those elections, or was it you who shielded him from knowing about the CSIS report?

11:10 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

Not being in this job during the 2019 election, I did not advise the Prime Minister on foreign interference at that time.

I have briefed the Prime Minister since on foreign interference along with my CSIS colleague. The Prime Minister is briefed regularly. Foreign interference is not just an election-cycle issue. It is a constant. It is something we are constantly vigilant about, and we keep the Prime Minister informed where we see vectors of foreign interference in this country on any number of platforms.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

The CSIS report came earlier this year, and you were the NSI adviser at that time. Why wasn't he advised when the report came out from CSIS, and when did he actually find out about this report and the contents?

11:10 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

You would have to reference the specific report.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

The specific report is the report that CSIS provided, which came out in the news recently, on the election interference in 2019 and 2021.

11:10 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

There's a news report on election interference. There's not necessarily a CSIS report that equates to that news report. The Prime Minister has been thoroughly briefed.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

When was he first thoroughly briefed?

11:10 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

I can't speak to when he was first briefed on foreign interference. He was briefed as recently as two weeks ago on foreign interference in general.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

Is that the earliest you're aware of his being—

11:10 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

No, I said, “as recently as two weeks ago”. He has been briefed, since he has been Prime Minister, on foreign interference.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

Thank you.

During the visit to Ottawa by the “freedom convoy” earlier this year, a spy plane was flying a surveillance pattern. Was it scanning for the presence of the near-Arctic nation that China considers itself to be, for political interference in that?

11:10 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

I think DND would be best placed to answer that question, but the short answer is no. It was a training mission. It should not have been flying at that time.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

It should not have been flying, but if it wasn't scanning for foreign interference—because that's what the allegation was as the motivation behind this convoy—then it was obviously looking at the crowd's faces to identify military members. How many members in the military did that spy plane identify?

11:10 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

You are making assertions here that are not accurate. It was a training mission. It wasn't looking for foreign interference. The convoy was not motivated by foreign interference. It was domestic, ideologically motivated extremism and anger about COVID restrictions. I don't think that we should conflate issues.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON

We're going to be approximately a decade short in having satellite surveillance in the Arctic. What are you going to suggest to the Prime Minister with respect to ensuring that there is no interference or components that come from China, which considers itself to be a near-Arctic nation?

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

The Vice-Chair Conservative James Bezan

You're just out of time there.

Can you provide a very brief answer, Ms. Thomas?

11:10 a.m.

National Security and Intelligence Adviser, Privy Council Office

Jody Thomas

The security of the satellites that Canada puts in orbit is highly managed by the private sector partners, PSPC and certainly the Canadian Space Agency.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

The Vice-Chair Conservative James Bezan

Thank you.

Ms. Lambropoulos, you have the floor for six minutes.