I'll approach it from three brief perspectives: a policy lens, a management lens, and a capability [Technical difficulty—Editor].
The alliance is realizing a need for rapid decision-making capacities and capabilities, the ability to come to consensus quickly on crisis issues or near-crisis issues. That's a place where Canada has played and needs to continue to play a role at the government level by saying that we need to get past discussions about why a European issue is a European issue versus a NATO issue, because there is a lot of tension between the EU and NATO. Canada has a place and a role to play in that, and it does.
On the management side, Canada does a lot of work in the corners in terms of the cyber-readiness of the alliance and the fiscal management of the alliance. It carries a lot of water in that particular space, and we need to continue to do that.
On the capability front, we are seeing that the nature of warfare is changing. We see an increasing issue of action inside the democratic institutions of Germany, the function of elections and interference by Russia, etc., and also the change in warfare where it is no longer about heavy weapons and the like; it's really going to be about smaller capabilities, slighter forces, less targetable from beyond-line-of-sight weapons and all that sort of stuff.
There is a lot of thinking that we need to collectively make sure that we remain interoperable so that the ones and zeros between all the countries are able to continue to be exchanged, be meaningful, and be able to be moved quickly.
Europe is big, but it's not that big. You should be able to place and move, place and move, and have the posture and the logistics necessary to sustain missions at pace for a long period of time. Canada has contributed and continues to—and needs to continue to—contribute to that dialogue about the force capabilities the alliance needs.