National Defence Committee on Oct. 2nd, 2025

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number five of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.

Pursuant to the motion adopted on September 16, 2025, the committee is meeting to commence its study on the integration of the Canadian Coast Guard into the Department of National Defence.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely by using the Zoom application.

Before we continue, I ask all in-person participants to consult the audio guidelines to help prevent feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of participants, including interpreters.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses and members. First, please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic, and please mute yourselves when you are not speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

I will give a reminder that all comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can, and we appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

Before I talk to the witnesses, as I know we're in a public format, I want to congratulate all members of the committee for an outstanding job last Wednesday during the military exercise. For those of you who are watching, you may not know that the vice-chair of the committee had to wear fatigues, like the rest of us, and he didn't fall down, so congratulations, vice-chair, for standing up for the entire time of the committee meeting.

In fact, it was a great opportunity for some camaraderie and understanding of what our troops are doing day in and day out. It was a very worthwhile event. We did over 200 kilometres via off-road vehicles and helicopters, and of course there was a lot of hiking and walking and a lot of interaction with our troops, who told us first-hand about some of the challenges they face and the things we need to overcome. Thank you to the folks at Petawawa for hosting us.

Now I would like to welcome the witnesses.

Today we have Mr. Chris Henderson. We have Professor James Boutilier. We have the associate professor and director of the Canadian Maritime Security Network, Mr. Adam Lajeunesse, and we have the national president of the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, Ms. Teresa Eschuk.

We are going to have opening statements by all four of you. I will now invite Mr. Henderson to make his opening statement.

You have five minutes.

[Chris Henderson, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning. Thank you to the members of the committee for the opportunity to speak with you this morning on the integration of the Canadian Coast Guard into the Department of National Defence.

My name is Chris Henderson. It was my privilege to serve Canada for 37 years, first as a member of the Royal Canadian Navy, serving at sea and ashore, and subsequently in a range of executive positions in the federal public service, mostly concerned with defence and security. I retired in April 2024 after serving four years as the deputy commissioner for operations at the Canadian Coast Guard.

It was in that capacity that I worked to raise the profile of the Coast Guard within the national security apparatus of Canada, as well as trying to promote a stronger focus within the Coast Guard on the contribution it could make to Canada's national security. Both efforts took more time and energy than one might expect.

Fortunately, we are meeting today because there has been a sea change in the evolution of the Coast Guard, and I would like to share my thoughts on how to realize the potential of the Coast Guard as an instrument of national power that can make much deeper contributions to the safety, security and sovereignty of the nation in years to come.

Two major developments occurred earlier this year that should lead the Coast Guard in this positive direction. The first was the introduction of Bill C-2, which, for the first time, has codified a formal role for the Coast Guard in national security—specifically, that it will henceforth be charged with collecting, analyzing and sharing intelligence about Canada's maritime domain. The second was the machinery of government change that recently saw the move of the Coast Guard from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans to the Department of National Defence.

These are important changes, to be sure, but to be frank, these are but the first baby steps to get the Coast Guard to where it should have been years ago and where, I would submit, Canadians could be forgiven for expecting it already was. By this I mean conceptually, as opposed to being specifically part of National Defence.

While this is a modest start, there remain gaps in the Coast Guard's tool kit that militate against the realization of its potential.

First, my strong recommendation is to provide new legislation—the Canadian Coast Guard act—that would enshrine its national security role, provide a framework for the future delegation of additional authorities and make the commissioner a deputy head within the federal public service, backed by their own departmental staff, so that he or she may assume their appropriate, equal position among the leaders of Canada's defence, security and intelligence agencies.

Second, I believe the Coast Guard should be given a law enforcement mandate to protect Canada's interests any time and anywhere in our huge expanse of maritime territory. Such a mandate would augment, not diminish, the roles of the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency and the conservation and protection branch of Fisheries and Oceans. Such a change would, however, require significant culture change and a long runway to achieve success.

Next, there remain a variety of maritime safety and security tools vested in other departments that should be consolidated within a legislated Coast Guard. These include, but are not limited to, the national aerial surveillance program and the office of boating safety, both currently within Transport Canada; the Canadian Hydrographic Service, which is part of Fisheries and Oceans; and the Canadian Ice Service of Environment and Climate Change.

Additionally, it will be imperative for Canada's leaders to recognize and expand upon the Coast Guard's areas of quiet, perennial excellence, which provide our nation with a significant comparative advantage in a region of growing importance and strategic focus.

For example, the Coast Guard has deep operational links, grounded in 60-plus years of Arctic experience, with the coast guards and navies of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. The British, Chilean, German, Japanese and Korean coast guards are also strengthening their connections with the Canadian Coast Guard because of its matchless expertise in the Arctic.

All of this is to say nothing of the profound relationship between the Canadian Coast Guard and the United States Coast Guard, the opportunity for Canada to take a leading role in defending the northwest flank of NATO, or the Canadian Coast Guard's leadership in multilateral coast guard fora around the world.

Of course, Coasties are far too modest to toot their own horns, but I can assure you that every like-minded nation with interests in the Atlantic, Pacific or Arctic Ocean respects the Coast Guard's operational excellence and seeks its advice and guidance.

Indeed, our adversaries also respect the Canadian Coast Guard's track record in the Arctic, and it is possible, if not immediately likely, that in a postbellum world, the Canadian Coast Guard could provide some space for confidence-building measures between erstwhile competitors.

In the meantime, and much more urgently, we owe it to Canadians to maximize the investments being made in the renewal of the Coast Guards's fleet by harnessing it fully to the effort to monitor, understand and protect Canada's maritime domain on all four of Canada's coasts. Every ship must be a sensor, and every one of those sensors must be connected to a robust, secure network over which data, intelligence and action flow seamlessly. Every member of every crew must see themselves as a vital part of that web of knowledge, security and sovereignty. All of this is something that we need to do, and do well, for ourselves as a mature nation with an obligation to safeguard our national interests, not because of pressure from the United States or through the erroneous belief that moving the Coast Guard to National Defence will tip the balance in our NATO contributions.

I am deeply gratified that this House committee is taking the time to study the implications of the evolution of the Coast Guard as it assumes greater responsibility within the national security apparatus of the nation. The interest and leadership of each member of this committee are truly important and necessary to ensure that this good work continues.

Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Mr. Henderson.

We'll now pass it over to Mr. James Boutilier.

You have five minutes.

[James Boutilier, Professor, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome you from the pre-dawn darkness of Victoria on the west coast.

I'd like to make four or five observations by way of scene-setting.

I applaud the government's decision to incorporate the Coast Guard within DND. My colleague, Mr. Henderson, has articulated elegantly the value of that integration. It is, in my estimation, very long overdue indeed. It's a blindingly obvious symbiotic relationship between two maritime organizations desperately in need of greater financial support and attention. It's a case, I think, of the sum being much more than the whole of the parts. We have a Coast Guard fleet larger numerically than the major elements of the Royal Canadian Navy, and one that has an acute and intimate understanding of our great northern flank.

It was back in 1957 that HMCS Labrador, the Arctic patrol ship of the Royal Canadian Navy, last transited the Arctic. More recently, of course, as you are well aware, the Arctic and offshore patrol ships have operated in the area, but they are in many ways woefully inadequate in terms of the equipment they carry on board.

I think there has been, over the years, an abject failure on the part of successive governments to honour the principal responsibility they have—that is to say, to provide defence and security for the nation. What makes their conduct even more criminal—and I use that word with some care—is that they were fully aware of the inadequacy of the preparations involved with respect to the Canadian Armed Forces and, in this setting, with respect to the Canadian Coast Guard.

There was an element of complacency and naïveté, which we are now obliged to address. For years, we were, to put it frankly, a nation of sleepwalkers in terms of the larger security dimension. We live, ladies and gentlemen, in what is self-evidently a dangerous and difficult and different world, and our opponents are brutal. They are intent and they will give us no quarter in the final analysis. We have become accustomed, rightly, to operating according to rules of law and to principles of warfare, and these are, for the most part, irrelevant to our principal competitors. They march to a different drum, and we need to be fully aware of that fact.

We are, in a word, at war. I don't say that unnecessarily and I don't say that provocatively, but when you look at the steady deterioration of the international geostrategic environment, what you see in sabotage, in interference operations, in grey zone activities threatens the very integrity of Canada, and we would be, I think, naive indeed if we failed to appreciate that and prepare accordingly.

What I would leave you with is one word: urgency. This, in my estimation, in reviewing the activities in the defence and security realm over the past 25 years, has been woefully absent. Time is not on our side, and we face a resolute and, in many ways, enormous competitor. We have, for example, only to look at the China Coast Guard, which has 225 ships, including two 10,000-tonne vessels, larger than anything in the Royal Canadian Navy. This is a force that is not benign, like our Coast Guard, but one that is used in a paramilitary role to advance China's interests. We have Russia with 41 icebreakers, a situation that will be impossible to replicate without decades of endeavour on our part.

This is a deeply serious state of affairs. We can no longer be laggards. We must act with immediate resolve.

The union of the Coast Guard and the navy in an operational context is an enormously important and positive step in terms of enhancing the ability of both services to increase our sensory capacity and to expand our knowledge, particularly in the high north.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Professor, thank you very much for your comments.

I'll pass it over to Mr. Lajeunesse.

You have five minutes.

[Adam Lajeunesse, Associate Professor, Canadian Maritime Security Network]

Good morning, and thank you for having me here.

I'm happy to provide comments today representing both the Naval Association of Canada and the Canadian Maritime Security Network.

To begin with, I applaud the government's decision to move the Coast Guard to DND. It's a move that is long overdue. I intend to focus today on areas where greater integration of training, operations and capability development can address current challenges and enhance Canada's maritime effectiveness.

First, this is an opportunity. Today, many of the RCN's junior officers are not receiving meaningful exposure to life at sea during the first 12 to 18 months of their commission. There is simply a lack of ship space. This lack of early sea time represents a missed opportunity, both for professional development, retention and personnel advancement and for facilitating operational readiness. The Coast Guard operates year-round, including in demanding Arctic environments, and embedding junior RCN officers aboard Coast Guard vessels during their initial training period would allow these officers to gain valuable real-world experience.

At the same time, the Coast Guard would benefit from their presence and skills, since the Coast Guard itself is short of personnel. Such an arrangement would be mutually advantageous and would help to build a generation of naval officers with a broader understanding of Canada's maritime operational landscape.

To formalize this collaboration, I propose the creation of a combined officer and sailor training program between the RCN and the Canadian Coast Guard. This could include the establishment of a single schoolhouse for core elements of officer training, ensuring that both organizations receive consistent foundational instruction. A standardization of qualifications is important, especially in areas like maritime engineering, which would make personnel more interchangeable and enable smoother collaboration during joint operations. Coordinating training deployments would give junior officers and sailors exposure to a wide variety of vessels, operating environments and mission types. As a secondary benefit, it would also establish, in the formative years of service, a better understanding of each other's challenges and work environments, thereby hopefully fostering lasting professional personal relationships. Such integration would not only improve individual competency but strengthen institutional ties between the navy and the Coast Guard.

Second, the Canadian Coast Guard's fleet could also play a larger role in supporting national defence operations, particularly in the Arctic. For example, Coast Guard vessels could conduct expanded hydrographic and survey missions in the northern waters, generating data that will directly support RCN operational planning and navigation. The growth of the Coast Guard fleet will, hopefully, provide that spare capacity.

Outfitting selected Coast Guard vessels with appropriate communication systems, and possibly electronic support mechanisms, would enable them to operate effectively in combined task groups, when forming such task groups makes sense. This would require ensuring that Coast Guard personnel receive the necessary training and familiarity with some of this new electronic equipment and be granted security clearances to handle classified information and to safeguard such systems in Coast Guard vessels.

Deploying UAVs from Coast Guard vessels for coastal surveillance and intelligence-gathering would also significantly augment Canada's maritime domain awareness. A joint UAV procurement and training program with the navy, which is also moving in this direction, would have obvious economies of scale. These measures would enhance both surveillance and response capability without requiring the immediate acquisition of new platforms.

We should also consider reallocating certain maritime coastal defence vessel roles to the Coast Guard where appropriate. By leveraging the Coast Guard's existing infrastructure and expertise in areas like coastal patrol and surveillance, the RCN could focus its limited resources on higher-end warfighting capabilities.

In tandem, Canada could explore arming select Coast Guard vessels and establishing procedures for the carriage of ammunition, allowing them to undertake limited defensive or enforcement tasks where appropriate and authorized. Such changes would be significant and must be accompanied by appropriate training, policy development and legal frameworks. They're worth examining as part of a grand strategy.

There are also important communications issues at play here. The Coast Guard workforce is very anxious at present about how this move changes their employment terms, career progression and tasks. This change arrived suddenly, and I think better communication is needed about what this means at the HR and operational level.

A second critical issue is how the Coast Guard's current command and control model would fit within the hierarchical, centralized military structure. The Coast Guard currently operates with strong, independent regional organizations, and for good reason. Over many decades, the Coast Guard has refined a structure that reflects the vast diversity of Canada's maritime environments and the distinct operational requirements of each region. This decentralized model is not a historical accident. It's deliberate. It provides structure built to meet Canada's extraordinary maritime challenges. Imposing a top-down, deferential hierarchy characteristic of military and naval command would risk undermining the effectiveness of those regional organizations, which have been built over decades. I recommend a strong voice from the Coast Guard in how this move is effected and how these new chains of command are built.

In summary, greater integration between the RCN and the Coast Guard offers real benefits, capability development and effectiveness. By combining training programs, aligning qualifications and enhancing Coast Guard platforms with modern surveillance and communication systems, Canada can achieve more resilient and flexible maritime operations. I urge the committee to pay close attention to workforce engagement, communication strategy and organizational design as part of any future integration discussions.

Thank you. I'd be pleased to take your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

Ms. Eschuk, you have up to five minutes as well. Then we'll get into the round of questions.

[Teresa Eschuk, National President, Union of Canadian Transportation Employees]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and to weigh in on this important issue.

I am here on behalf of the Union of Canadian Transportation Employees, which represents more than 3,500 Canadian Coast Guard workers. These are the men and women who crew our ships, launch in all weather to save lives, monitor marine traffic on all three coasts, protect our environment, staff our rescue coordination centres and keep our historic lighthouses lit. They are proud of their roles, proud of their civilian service and proud of the unique contribution made by the Canadian Coast Guard to Canada's security and safety.

We do not oppose the moving of responsibilities of the Coast Guard to National Defence. We do, however, want to raise the key issues and concerns that matter most to our members.

I would like to begin with the Coast Guard's legacy and identity. The Coast Guard has never been on the sidelines of Canada's defence. During the Second World War, lighthouse keepers along the Atlantic and Pacific served as Canada's first line of defence, literally keeping the lights on as our eyes on the coasts. This history continues today. The Coast Guard has quietly but steadfastly supported Fisheries and Oceans, Transport Canada and National Defence when it comes to protecting Canada's waterways. It has done so with skill, professionalism and dedication, but often with inadequate tools and declining infrastructure. Many of our historic lighthouses, for example, have fallen into disarray through neglect and a lack of proper funding. If this transfer proceeds—we know it has—we hope it will not mean further erosion, but rather renewed investment in these critical assets that are part of Canada's maritime backbone.

The first and perhaps greatest concern we must raise is chronic underfunding. For decades, the Coast Guard has been stretched far too thin, with too few vessels, too little modern equipment and too few trained hands to crew them. Recruitment and retention are serious problems, especially for our seafarers and search and rescue technicians.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Excuse me, Ms. Eschuk.

Can you raise your headset a little bit? You're just a bit hard to hear.

[Teresa Eschuk]

I'm sorry.

Is that better?

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

That's better. Very good.

Please continue.

[Teresa Eschuk]

Thank you.

Many of our members believe that under Fisheries and Oceans, funds intended for the Coast Guard were too often absorbed into the department's own internal operations. We must ensure that every dollar allocated to the Coast Guard reaches the Coast Guard. The money is needed to cover new duties and repair the long-standing gaps in people and equipment.

The second concern is one of identity. Our members chose the Coast Guard because it is a civilian agency. They are not soldiers. They did not enlist in the Canadian Armed Forces. They provide a distinct, essential service as civilians, and that must be preserved. The Coast Guard is at its best when it is focused on saving lives, ensuring safe navigation and protecting our coasts. Its credibility depends on its neutrality, its accessibility and its civilian mandate. We urge this committee to clearly affirm that the Coast Guard remains a civilian association under the umbrella of National Defence.

The third concern is marine security. The marine security operation centres, or MSOCs, bring together multiple departments, including DND, the RCMP, the CBSA, Transport Canada and the Coast Guard, to coordinate intelligence and response on our waterways. Originally, Canada operated seven MSOC bases, providing 24-7 coverage on all three coasts. In the recent year, the federal government has shut down four of those sites. In the UCTE's opinion, that decision has left significant gaps in our national marine security. Our members are the ones on the front line, gathering necessary data and intelligence, but too often, their role is limited to passing it up the chain. With this transition, the MSOCs should not just collect information but have the authority and resources to analyze and act on that intelligence, hence enhancing the national security of Canada.

We urge this committee to consider restoring the MSOCs to the original seven bases, to ensure full coverage across Canada, and expanding the Coast Guard's responsibilities with the MSOCs, to ensure that our members' expertise is fully applied and not sidelined. Strengthening the Coast Guard's role in the MSOCs is essential if Canada's marine security is to be cohesive, reliable and effective.

Finally, I must raise a practical but critical concern: administration and pay. Many public servants struggle with the Phoenix pay system. Believe it or not, it's been 10 years since that system came into play, and it's still not working. It's plagued with errors, underpayments and long delays in correction when the pay is wrong. For this transfer, we were provided with a year's notice before fully transferring over to DND. That preparation is welcome, but preparation alone does not remove risk. Our members cannot afford to face another round of pay errors. They deserve certainty that, on the day this transfer takes place, the guarantees we have been given will hold. That requires clear accountability before, during and after the handover to ensure that systems are aligned, oversight is maintained and members are paid accurately and on time. We urge this committee to treat payroll stability as a priority. Pay is one of the most basic responsibilities of any employer, and it must be guaranteed throughout this transition.

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, this transfer is an opportunity, but it's also a test. It is an opportunity to give the Coast Guard the funding, authority and recognition it has long been denied. It is also a test of our ability to protect the identity of a proud civilian service, to strengthen marine security and to manage the transition responsibly so workers do not pay the price.

Our members are proud of their service to Canada. They do not ask for praise. They only ask for the tools, respect and stability to continue doing their jobs.

I thank you for your attention, and I look forward to any of your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Ms. Eschuk. I apologize for having to interrupt you earlier.

We're going to move on to questions. To kick us off is a distinguished veteran of the Royal Canadian Navy.

Mr. Jeff Kibble, it's over to you. You have six minutes.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the panel for joining us today.

Mr. Henderson, I don't think we've crossed paths before.

Dr. Boutilier, it's great to hear from you, from beautiful Vancouver Island. It's good to see you again.

I would like to explore two areas, now that an OIC has been made effective transferring the Coast Guard under National Defence. Specifically, the first area is the Coast Guard spending, which currently qualifies towards NATO defence spending, and the second is some of the specific changes that will need to be made. I appreciate some of the excellent suggestions and observations that were made in your opening remarks, which did address this, but I will explore it a little bit further.

The August 2025 NATO press release defines NATO defence expenditures. It says, “In such cases, expenditure is included only in proportion to the forces that are trained in military tactics, are equipped as a military force, can operate under direct military authority...and can, realistically, be deployed outside national territory in support of a military force.”

In that light, what percentage of Coast Guard training and operations is as per the NATO definition? What are they trained in, in terms of military tactics?

This is for anyone in the panel.

[Adam Lajeunesse]

If I could offer a very brief introduction to that, I think the accounting is a bit opaque. The Government of Canada has, for some time now, been looking to move more Coast Guard spending into that 2%, and now that 3.5%. In the big picture, I think the objective from that accounting perspective is to demonstrate that Coast Guard vessels and operations, which previously were purely civilian, now also have a security mandate. For instance, a Coast Guard icebreaker in the north, which is undertaking community resupply support and search and rescue capacity, now may be equipped with sensors in order to monitor, say, Chinese marine scientific research.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you.

I'm not hearing anything about military tactics in that answer.

I'm also wondering, because you mentioned resupply operations, etc., what percentage of them are equipped with military equipment that gives them that capability, beyond supporting the military. These are the requirements for NATO spending.

[Adam Lajeunesse]

Today, I believe it's none. However, the point of the movement into DND is that we will expand—

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

This is current, and that's fair enough. That's what I'm looking for. I understand, as was alluded to in some of your comments, that this will be expanding.

They are now a special operating agency, and they are reporting to the deputy minister, not to the chief of the defence staff. Do you see this as “under direct military authority” and command, as per the NATO definition currently?

[Adam Lajeunesse]

I would say yes.

Chris, I believe you have your hand up. Can you add something to that?

[Chris Henderson]

Thank you.

I would absolutely not see the alignment under the deputy minister as being part of the military chain of command. To Madame Eschuk's point, it should not be. I think it is a civilian organization, and it needs to remain a civilian organization.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you.

In your opinion, can the Coast Guard, as currently trained and equipped, operate in international waters in support of a military force, again, under the NATO definition for the spending, which I am focusing on at the moment?

[Chris Henderson]

Yes, I do believe that the Canadian Coast Guard is prepared and ready to operate in international waters in support of military operations. Icebreaking is a good example of that capability. However, they are not trained in combat operations. They are not a combat-capable force, and they are not equipped to conduct combat operations.

If that's—

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

So you are suggesting that they are currently capable of supporting the military and deploying into international or foreign waters outside of the Canadian Arctic and Canadian waters.

[Chris Henderson]

Yes, I am. I agree with that statement.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

I have spoken to many Coast Guard members, and I find them in two distinct groups: those who are outspoken against the militarization of the Coast Guard and those who are very much in favour. This is a barometer-type question. In your experience, do you have a sense of the percentages of these two camps? Both are fairly outspoken groups.