National Defence Committee on Oct. 2nd, 2025

[Chris Henderson]

I think the question of militarization is important. It may be an impression that's founded on a lack of understanding of what is being proposed. It is not being proposed to militarize the Coast Guard. I think Coast Guard employees could be forgiven for not actually understanding that well enough, because this is a recent change. It will take time for them to get into that space and to understand it. This is not about militarizing the Coast Guard. It's about harnessing the Coast Guard to a surveillance mandate to support maritime security, as a starting point.

I agree with the general idea that there are roughly two camps of people: those who are resistant and those who are very interested in pursuing the move.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you.

Ms. Eschuk, following that question, in terms of the retention of the currently short number of Coast Guard members, what do you assess the impact would be on those who are not looking for these changes?

[Teresa Eschuk]

Right now, what I hear from the majority of our members is that they didn't sign up for the Coast Guard to become militarized. There are other ways they can be involved in that; I mentioned the MSOC.

They have a huge recruiting issue today, and they've had for many years. It comes down to retention. A lot of that is underfunding and being underpaid. These members work in very dangerous conditions, and they're not paid very well. They've done a study, and there's no one to compare them to, but they're very underpaid for the work they do. That's why they have a retention and recruitment issue.

Also, part of that problem is the aging of the vessels. They don't want to be on vessels that are aging. They need the new equipment to be able to be there.

I know that for women in the Coast Guard, it's a huge problem.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you. I appreciate that.

I'm not taking away from the excellent work that the Coast Guard is doing. I appreciate that, and I have worked with them personally. They do excellent work.

I want to confirm that there is no current capability to interdict drug smuggling, human smuggling, illegal fishing, migrant vessels, etc.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

We'll retain that response for a minute. We're over time.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Sorry, Mr. Chair, I was getting a bit carried away there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

We were well over on that one. I gave ample time.

I'm sorry, Jeff.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

No, thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

MP Romanado, it's over to you for six minutes.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us today. I want to start with Mr. Henderson.

First of all, thank you for your service. I know you not only served in the navy, but also served in your capacity under various portfolios in the public service.

I have some questions for you. You mentioned Bill C-2. It includes expanding that mandate of the Canadian Coast Guard to add security-related activities to their mandate, including conducting security patrols and collecting, analyzing and disclosing information or intelligence. The Coast Guard and the Canadian Armed Forces will have a stronger and more coordinated presence in Canada's waters from coast to coast to coast.

What do you feel this new coordinated presence means for Canada's security footprint in the Arctic?

[Chris Henderson]

My view on the improvements is that, first and foremost, should it receive royal assent, Bill C-2 is going to formalize that role, which is more important than it would appear.

The Coast Guard, for many years, has conducted surveillance operations to some degree or another, probably not as much as it could, but it hasn't had that formal role, so it has been more customary. This is where that makes it complicated: When the Coast Guard is looking to develop capabilities or procure equipment that would support its improved work in surveillance, people who have to allocate resources take a look and ask, “Where does it say that you do that? It doesn't say that, so you can't have the money to buy that equipment.” That's one thing that I think is going to be a very direct improvement.

Second, I think that with a formal mandate such as this, you're going to see Coast Guard crews and shore personnel expanding their thinking and their activities in the security space. We saw that in the last couple of years when we conducted some, I'll call them, “experiments” to improve security observation actions, running UAVs off ships in the Arctic, and the crews really stepped up. They really enjoyed that additional responsibility, and we saw a significant increase in reports about suspicious activity just in that integration and flow of information.

I see that there's an opportunity to strengthen, continue and deepen the work of integration and coordination within the marine security operation centres. These are customary organizations; they're not founded in legislation. They exist because they exist, and they ride on good relationships and personalities and a willingness to work together. When you're in the same organization, that clarity, that unity of effort, really helps improve coordination and effectiveness.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you.

You mentioned that it was a modest start, but that there are some gaps. You mentioned that you would recommend that we give a law enforcement mandate to the Canadian Coast Guard. In one of your papers, “A Constabulary Role for the Canadian Coast Guard?”, you mentioned, “Granting additional powers to the CCG to act in the absence of the RCMP, CBSA, or DFO would augment—quite dramatically—the overall capacity and effectiveness of Canadian law enforcement at sea.”

Is that what you were referring to when you mentioned that we should be giving a law enforcement mandate to the Canadian Coast Guard?

[Chris Henderson]

Yes. It is exactly that.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you.

My next question is for Mr. Lajeunesse.

I really appreciate the focus that you have on opportunity and the fact that we have the opportunity to have—I'll use the word that Mr. Henderson used—“Coasties” working with Canadian navy personnel for training opportunities and opportunities to use various vessels, etc.

Can you elaborate on those recommendations and the opportunities that we have in terms of recruitment and retention? We heard from one of the other witnesses that there are difficulties in recruiting for the Canadian Coast Guard. How can that interoperability between the navy and the Coast Guard augment our capacity to recruit and retain members of both services?

[Adam Lajeunesse]

That's absolutely a great question.

One of the problems we have is that we have two siloed services that are recruiting, training and, most importantly, building this new cadre of young recruits separately. Both are having trouble. The Canadian navy, in particular, has done fairly well with its recent recruiting programs, but it does not have enough ships to actually put these people on a ship and out to sea. That is a bit of a bottleneck in their training processes. The Coast Guard, of course, is out to sea all the time. Is there a way that we can create a more common training system?

If we could also create common training systems and standards for marine engineers, techs and different professions, that would allow more interchangeability between the two fleets. That would give us the opportunity to have a certain degree of flexibility that we don't have with two siloed organizations.

There are also economies of scale. One of the problems that my partners on this committee have mentioned is that we don't have new equipment. Chris, you mentioned that the CCG really enjoyed working with the drones. The navy is working on that, too. This new equipment, whether it's certain types of ships or certainly drones and surveillance equipment, is going to be cheaper and easier to buy if we buy it in bulk. It will be easier to maintain if we have a single, coherent maintenance profession. If we can combine the two federal fleets to get that economy of scale, it's going to give us an opportunity to build more faster and help retain people because they have the equipment they need.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

Mr. Savard-Tremblay, you have six minutes.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank all the witnesses for their presentations.

My first question is for Mr. Boutilier.

Let's talk about the Arctic, specifically that big issue, Arctic sovereignty. We know Russia and China have very large fleets. Undersea sensors are needed to monitor the movements of vessels in those fleets. You said that the Canadian Coast Guard's undersea surveillance capacity is non-existent or extremely limited.

Can you clarify your opinion on this matter for the committee members? What is the minimum capacity the Coast Guard needs to play an effective role in Arctic surveillance and defence?

[James Boutilier]

Thank you very much for that question.

It, in fact, grows from the earlier discussion about the role of the Coast Guard, in the sense that when we look at intelligence collection and surveillance and the distribution of information, this is a vital defence issue, which complements and enhances the Royal Canadian Navy's capabilities. We can say that without any military training—further to the earlier question that was put forward about NATO requirements—in fact the Coast Guard has a major role to play.

The Russians have a petro-economy: 42% of their economy is related to gas and oil extraction, almost all of it in the northern flank of Siberia, in Novaya Zemlya, in the Kara peninsula and elsewhere. They have spent enormous sums of money, despite the war in Ukraine, on the enhancement of their ports and surveillance in the north, buttressed, as I mentioned earlier, by the 40-plus icebreakers, of which seven are nuclear-driven.

Further to your question, I would suggest that the Coast Guard has the most intimate relationship with northern communities. Leaving aside physical sensors, whether by surveillance satellites or undersea means, the Coast Guard provides an enormous entree into this vast world. It is truly colossal, the space that's involved to monitor. That relationship, built over many decades, is absolutely unparalleled and one that the navy benefits from enormously by virtue of its current relationship with the Coast Guard.

When it comes to sensors—whether it's what Coast Guard crews see, what is garnered from overflights or what is selected from drone surveillance—the Coast Guard can play an enormously important role in terms of enhancing our broader understanding of what's going on in the north.

[Adam Lajeunesse]

If I may tack a quick comment onto the end of that, sir, I think what's very important to recognize when we talk about the surveillance of adversary activity is that the principal threat is not warships and submarines, particularly coming from China. What we're talking about—and this comes back to the first question about the Coast Guard's military capacity—is that the principal threat is a hybrid threat: illegal Chinese fishing, maritime militia. These are state assets that fall into the grey zone, so we're not necessarily looking to track nuclear attack submarines. I would argue that the most serious threat the Coast Guard can respond to through constabulary means is this hybrid, grey zone threat in the future as we look at Chinese civilian/state vessels coming into the region, which I predict will happen.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

I want to make sure I understand that last point.

Even if submarine surveillance is lacking, that does fall into the hybrid threat category. Therefore, there isn't really a geopolitical threat despite the somewhat explosive context at this point.

Did I get the gist?

[Adam Lajeunesse]

I believe the hybrid threat is a geopolitical threat. I think that will be at the heart of things.

To your comment on submarines, the simple reality is that Canada is unlikely to have a sovereign submarine detection capability in the Arctic. Dating back to the 1970s, we have worked with the United States to develop that capability, and we have developed that capability. That's simply part of continental defence. It's something we can do, and have done, in partnership with the United States.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

There were a few hands up.

Did you want to have an opportunity to respond, Mr. Boutilier? I think your hand was up initially there.

[James Boutilier]

Yes, I did wish to respond, if I may, Mr. Chair.

I'd just like to underscore the fact that the Chinese are dispatching vessels on a regular basis to the Arctic. They travel entirely across the Arctic. While they would announce publicly that this is scientific or hydrographic research, I think we would be naive in the extreme if we did not imagine that it has profound security implications in terms of subsequent Chinese and/or Russian submarine and surface actions.

Thank you.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

I see that Mr. Henderson has his hand up.