National Defence Committee on Oct. 7th, 2025

[Robert Huebert]

There's no question we have to be paying attention.

I sat on the air force board back in the 1990s, and they were desperately trying to get funding to support that type of research. It was a question of what type of drones we had. Again, because of political decisions not to take it seriously—once again, this is bipartisan, I saw it occur over both—it did not go forward.

The more critical point to your question is how we pay attention to the adaptivity of new forms of warfare. In other words, drones right now are a critical element in the context of Ukraine for a whole host of good reasons. The question we need to be asking is how we think about these new adaptations. It's not simply saying we get fixated on hypersonics, fixated on drones, but we really have to get back into the mindset of what war is and how we adapt to the war. What are the technologies China is now developing that go beyond?

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

With regard to that, you've written about our lack of undersea capability when it comes to drone technology. Do you want to expand on that just a bit?

[Robert Huebert]

Absolutely.

Part of the problem, of course, is that we haven't taken seriously the fact that, as Madeleine has brought forward, there are going to be all sorts of targets of necessity, if, in fact, we go get the infrastructure we need to support the NORAD modernization. The undersea cables she talks about are absolutely essential, but if you look at our capability of defending against the type of threat that, say, the Danes, Finns and the Swedes have to defend from in the Baltic Sea, we don't have that capability. We haven't had a capability of protecting our own cables, let alone in terms of cables of any allies in this context.

It's tied into that capability of having submarines. That's where you're going to be able to have it. We know we've had the challenges with the Victoria class. I do believe those were good boats, but we simply let them sit in the water for too long, and in terms of the prepurchase, you need to be getting that technology now.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Thank you.

This question is for Richard Shimooka.

I remember back in the nineties when I was in grad school the helicopter debate we had, and that was quite something. The problem there was procurement is very politically driven. Is that still the case now?

[Richard Shimooka]

It depends on which program.

Certainly, if we think about the F-35, it is arguably the number one reason why we're at this state today. As my previous comments alluded to, the current pause or reassessment is completely politically based. I think, given we've already bought 16 aircraft, and we are in the process of training for this aircraft, to divert from this path at this stage.... Also, given the fact the air force has built much of its modernization of its data processing, its networking capabilities, it's pure folly in some ways to divert at this stage, and this is arguably for political reasons.

For other programs, it's less so, I think, but there are greater challenges with how we have set up the bureaucracy to avoid any sort of assumption of risk by the government, which basically adds more layers of processes and whatnot that are delaying systems. In some ways, you could argue there too that there's some politicization of this just to avoid any negative consequences.

[Scott Anderson, Conservative, Vernon—Lake Country—Monashee, BC]

Thank you very much.

We've heard from several of you arguing for infrastructure. We're starting from ground zero here. We have to start the infrastructure and complete everything else in a very short time period because of the changing world situation. We've just moved about 10% short of the shortfall, between 1.4% that we're supposed to spend and 2%, and we've already spent 10% by moving the Coast Guard under DND with no enhancement of capability.

Is this the time for that? The whole process is back-end loaded, should it be front-end loaded instead?

I'll direct that question to Robert.

[Robert Huebert]

I'm chuckling a little bit, because remember, we first had an observation of what countries do when they get so fixated on just the percentage when Japan moved a whole bunch of their defence act acquisitions outside of it so they remained under 1%.

The addition of the Coast Guard was necessary. I think the security requirements of what they have to do within DND, rather than continuing to operate under DFO, are completely necessary and required. But we get into the issue of did we do it because of the strategic purposes we need to do, or did we do it simply for the political theatre of saying that we're going to get close to the 2%?

Having put them into the DND, we now have to figure out how we integrate what the Coast Guard is going to be able to offer, particularly in terms of as a platform and as a surveillance, and that is going to require some very significant expenditures and a different way of training. This is something, again, that follows through. It goes to a point Jessica was making that it's fine to have the infrastructure, but you also have to have the follow through to actually utilize it. That is what's going to be happening with the Coast Guard if we're doing what we say we're going to do, as opposed to simply having it as a means of meeting that 2%.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Mr. Huebert.

I apologize, but your time is up.

We'll go over to Parliamentary Secretary Romanado.

You have five minutes.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and through you, I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here.

Professor Hickey, you spoke about Longueuil. As the member for Longueuil—Charles‑LeMoyne, I'm quite pleased to see that the city of Longueuil is represented.

I want to follow up on that last conversation with respect to the Coast Guard. Currently, the NORAD agreement is for aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning. It does not include maritime control.

Robert, if the Coast Guard is used for the capability to enhance and amplify the surveillance capabilities of maritime awareness, would you agree it's a good idea to incorporate them and move them with that intent of making sure we're bringing that augmentation—that is the word I would use—of maritime surveillance?

[Robert Huebert]

The timing is very good, because remember, we're finally getting to the point of reinvesting in the Coast Guard. We're building the four icebreakers. I'm throwing in the two AOPS the Coast Guard is being given to keep the Halifax shipyard going until it starts building the River class destroyers. The Coast Guard is getting two AOPS. You're getting those two; you're getting the ship that's being built in Vancouver and you're getting the one that's being built both in Finland and in Quebec.

Now is the time to be thinking about how we go to the pan-domain awareness so that we have the communication systems. We have the training, and we have the ability to take the helicopters that the navy has in the context. Just as an aside, of course, the navy has had all sorts of difficulties with that helicopter as part of that agony of the helicopter decision. It sees the long-term impacts of the politicization that Richard was talking about earlier. All of this should be thought out right now.

Therefore, this is how we basically go into a ready-made capability, but it gets back to a point that Jessica was making about the fact that all of our science and all of the Coast Guard, of course, is being focused on climate change. This is going to require a real mindset to say you can still do the climate change, but you're going to also have to be playing this role in terms of a security requirement. That's something that's going to take money and it's going to take determination.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

On that note, we talked about our capabilities in the north, and part of our investment of $40 billion in NORAD modernization included the Arctic over-the-horizon radar system. We announced that the receiver and transmitter sites are going to be located in southern Ontario and should be operational by 2029.

With the move of the Canadian Coast Guard into the Department of National Defence in tandem with this investment and, of course, conversations about whether or not we should be expanding NORAD to include cyber, to include intelligence, and Canada's change in position with respect to our participation in ballistic missile defence, which was something we announced this summer, do you feel that we are now in a position to move the needle on Canada's contribution to NORAD?

I believe we are. I believe there's a very significant willingness and demonstration of our commitment to NORAD in ensuring that continental defence is taken as seriously as possible given the new threats we are facing.

[Robert Huebert]

We're in an entirely different environment in terms of planning. The challenge that I face as a long-term observer of Canadian defence policy is that we've often had very good plans. The question becomes: What happens in the three- to four-year period in which the political attention is no longer on?

We had a very good plan coming from Joe Clark in terms of Arctic sovereignty when we announced it back on September 10, 1985, in Parliament. That was a great plan, but we're only seeing bits of it being implemented today. For example, the AOPS, Arctic capability and getting the icebreakers were all promised in 1985.

My concern is that the moment we convince ourselves we are safe—and we are not going to be safe—all of a sudden we'll say we really don't have to follow through on this. The plan, as you've isolated, is great. It is a great plan and we see significant movement in actual monies flowing. Can we sustain it? That's my biggest worry.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

On that note, we've seen all-party support, I believe. I think we can agree that all parties right now in the House of Commons are in agreement that we must be investing heavily in national defence. I think Canadians are there. I also think the creation of the defence industrial agency is a demonstration of our willingness to work closer with industry.

I know the issue was brought up earlier of the importance of engaging Canadian industry and investing in the talent as well. It's one thing to invest in assets, but one of those assets is human assets, so there is the importance of investing in research, in post-doc, in training and so on and so forth.

Would you agree with that?

[Robert Huebert]

Absolutely. A critical point is will you as decision-makers all around—all parties, as you say—sustain that effort? I think that each and every one of you can see the moment—

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

I'm going to intervene because I know I'm just about to be cut off by the chair.

I'm just going to mention that I have three kids in the military. I can guarantee they are making sure that my decision is there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you for the interchange.

I have Mr. Savard-Tremblay.

You have two and half minutes.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My next question is for you, Mr. Huebert.

I believe that, in one of your books, you point out that the expansion of defensive capabilities could trigger a new arms race.

How can we reconcile the modernization of NORAD, which everyone agrees is necessary, with a foreign policy focused on de‑escalation and regional stability?

[Robert Huebert]

I think in that particular article I was saying that it could be perceived as an arms race. There's a difference in terms of understanding an arms race. An arms race is creating a conflict when neither side has intent of offensive action against the other. You start buying equipment, and then the other side thinks, “I don't know what they're thinking about. I better buy those battleships or aircraft carriers myself.” That facilitates and creates a tension of its own.

The difference, I would argue now, is that we are facing an aggressor state. In other words, we know that the Russians have utilized military force in putting down the Chechen effort to get self-rule. We know that the Georgian war occurred in 2008, and we know about the Ukrainian war. In other words, what we are doing is responding to the actions of what the Russian state has done. It's not an arms race but rather trying to develop that capability of deterring an aggressor. It's different from World War I, when the Germans entered into that arms race with battleships and other contexts. It didn't necessarily want to have World War I as opposed to World War II, when the Germans were clearly the aggressor state and we needed to build up. We did not have an arms race in World War II, even though we were trying to build up.

That's the difference, I would say.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot—Acton, QC]

You can interpret my words however you want. However, I gather that this marks a return to the mutually assured destruction of the Ronald Reagan era. In other words, it's a type of arms race that would also serve as a de‑escalation, since each side would be afraid to attack the other.

Is that right?

[Robert Huebert]

Absolutely. That's what an aggressor state wants to achieve. An aggressor state wants to have such a series of weapon systems that its opponent says, “These are so overwhelming, I will give you what you want. Just leave me alone. Take what you want in terms of territory.” Where they would be acting is in trying to divide the alliance. In this case, it's NATO basically trying to have each say, “Maybe if we don't do anything, they won't notice us.”

To your point, the critical situation we are in now is the protection of collective security. That's what we're trying to do.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Mr. Savard-Tremblay.

I noticed, Ms. Shadian, that you had your hand up a number of times. Do you want say something?

[Jessica M. Shadian]

Madeleine does as well.

I want to say one thing very quickly.

Rob was mentioning that this is real, that this is a potential war. The golden dome is a lot taken off of what Israel's iron dome was about. That has a lot of autonomous drones and all these kinds of things.

I would say it's not just a war; it's how to fight a war in cold weather. I also think there's a whole dual-use aspect to this. There are these other pieces that happen when you get yourself ready to be able to defend and protect yourself. Look at both United States and Israel. They are world leaders in innovation. Instead of being reactive and getting drones, missiles or hypersonics, we need to be thinking about what we need and how we protect and defend ourselves in the Arctic if there's going to be a war in that region.

Also, I would say that already China and Russia are thinking like that. Their technologies are equipped for cold weather. They are thinking in those terms. You see it through all of the ships and everything else that China is building. I think we also just need to think about a war and what it means in our north.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

I appreciate that.

Do you want to speak very quickly? I'm trying to respect the time for the members here.

[Madeleine Redfern]

Very quickly, to Madam Lapointe's comment from earlier, I believe procurement is a security risk in Canada. It is too slow. The people involved aren't necessarily trained in the way they should be, especially in the area of security.

I also wanted to add to what Jessica had said about ownership control and access matters. We have the issue of the CLOUD Act. We have more people recognizing that Canadian data, if it touches anything with respect to the United States...and, of course, we are very aware that we're never quite certain where the United States is right now. Also, hardware is software and software is hardware. The possibility of not having control of not only your telecommunication systems but your digital infrastructure, which is connected to your energy systems, which is connected to your transportation systems.... If any one of those goes down, we are at immense risk.

Many of us remember when the Rogers network went down. That was one big telecommunications company, and almost every single customer on all the other networks had no access to the economy or to telecommunications.

We are literally extremely vulnerable. I want to use the words “tech security”, because it's more than cybersecurity.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Ms. Redfern.

Mr. Zimmer, welcome to the committee. You have five minutes.