National Defence Committee on Oct. 9th, 2025

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number seven of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.

Pursuant to the motions adopted on September 16 and September 23, the committee is meeting to continue its study on the modernization of NORAD.

Today's meeting is taking place in hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

Before we continue, I ask all in-person participants to consult the guidelines on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio feedback incidents and to protect the safety of all participants and interpreters.

For the benefit of the witnesses and members, please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating via video conferencing, click the microphone icon to activate your mic and please mute yourself when you're not speaking.

For those on Zoom, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair. If you wish to speak, please raise your hand, or if you're on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can. We appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

I would now like to welcome the witnesses: Dr. James Fergusson, senior research fellow from the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba; Dr. Whitney Lackenbauer, professor and Canada research chair in the study of the Canadian north, Trent University, via video conferencing; Dr. Tom Karako, director, missile defense project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, also by video conferencing; Dr. Gaëlle Rivard Piché, executive director, Conference of Defence Associations Institute; and Christopher Coates, director of foreign policy, national defence and national security for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

I'll now invite Dr. Fergusson to make an opening statement, followed by the rest. You have five minutes each.

Dr. Fergusson, the floor is yours.

[James Fergusson, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, As an Individual]

Good morning.

On July 15, the Minister of National Defence lifted all restrictions on air and missile defence. It's puzzling. I didn't know there existed any restrictions on air defence to lift, save a set of certain capabilities that are central to Canada's NORAD modernization program announced in 2022.

More puzzling is the lifting of restrictions on missile defence. As a function of the 2005 non-participation decision, I assume that Canada is now signalling to the United States an interest in participating in the U.S. continental ballistic missile defence initiative, now conceptualized as the “golden dome”.

Note, however, that the minister did not employ the term “ballistic”, so exactly the scope of the new policy remains somewhat ambiguous. Perhaps, then, President Trump's recent statement that Canada has expressed interest in participating—putting aside his 51st state rhetoric as vacuous rhetoric—is simply a response to this signal. Whether some direct expression of interest in participation at the senior level has been made remains open to speculation.

Regardless, it is highly unlikely that the government has entered into formal discussions with the United States as occurred in 2003, which led to failed negotiations in 2004. Even so, I would expect that Canadian defence officials at different levels are engaged with their American counterparts to acquire as much information as possible on the golden dome. Certainly NORAD is also exploring its implications.

In addition, I have no doubt that internal discussions are under way on the golden dome, its implications for Canada and possible areas for a Canadian contribution under the umbrella term “integrated air and missile defence”.

However, engagement inside or outside of NORAD will depend on the willingness of American officials to disclose highly classified information on the golden dome. Even more, the golden dome has been assigned to U.S. Space Command and thus access as a function of the relationship between NORAD and U.S. Northern Command is circumscribed. Regardless, the past on the ballistic missile defence file suggests that Canadian access will follow only after Canada formally negotiates participation—a policy conundrum that has long plagued Canadian policy-makers.

Regardless, two key points stand out. First, the primary threat to Canada and North America is missiles—long-range air-, ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. They are likely to be joined by supersonic and nuclear-powered capabilities, hypersonic glide vehicles and a range of ballistic missiles—not just ICBMs. All can be dual-capable, equipped with conventional or nuclear warheads.

Canada possesses, or plans to acquire as part of NORAD modernization, new capabilities, but these are limited to cruise missile defence. There is no clear indication of future acquisition plans to acquire, obviously in conjunction with U.S. capabilities, defence against hypersonic and ballistic missiles. Even within the cruise missile domain, the need for a layered point defence with ground and maritime capabilities is vital, including the defence of forward operating locations in the north.

Second, in the absence of clear indications, beyond subtle references to future ground-based systems for the defence of Canada, one becomes concerned that the government and National Defence might believe that NORAD modernization is one and done. Of course, there are many reasons for an absence of clear indications, especially in the current political climate, which makes any public discussion of next steps in co-operation with the U.S. very problematic.

Nonetheless, Canada needs to take the next step forward in NORAD modernization to engage directly in contributing to the entire range of missile defence requirements with the objective to place NORAD as the command authority for the integrated air and missile defence, including hypersonic and ballistic, for North America.

As a function of integrated, centralized command and control requirements, it also includes seeking and negotiating expanded NORAD terms of reference to go beyond its current outdated Cold War box. To do otherwise, and there is no guarantee of success, especially without a meaningful contribution, NORAD will be marginalized, kept in a box or operationally subordinate to a U.S. command, with the hypersonic and ballistic missile defence of Canada ceded to the United States. Canada will be in the dark.

I look forward to elaborating on my comments and answering any questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you, Dr. Fergusson.

Dr. Rivard Piché, you have five minutes.

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations Institute]

Thank you.

Mr. Chair, vice-chairs and members of the committee, it's a pleasure to be here today.

It is my pleasure to be here today to testify. Before I go any further, I’d like to note that although my presentation will be in English, I would be happy to take questions and engage in discussion in French afterwards.

Today I will focus my remarks on two things: first, the rapid evolution of the threat environment that Canada faces; and second, why NORAD modernization is essential, not only to safeguard our sovereignty and continental defence but also to ensure that Canada remains a credible and capable ally. That's something I'd be happy to expand on during the Qs and As.

To put it simply, our ability to monitor and control our territory, our continent and its approaches has not kept pace with the evolution of the threats we face. We lack the full range of capabilities needed to defend Canada against increasingly complex and sophisticated challenges. In the words of General VanHerck, former commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, we now face a global, multi-domain operating environment. Threats to North America are no longer only conventional or strategic. They occur below the threshold of armed conflict and across multiple domains from land, sea and air to cyber and information operations.

What happens on the other side of the world has direct implications and repercussions here at home. Our adversaries can undermine Canada’s national defence and security without even setting foot on our soil. Geography, once our greatest advantage, no longer guarantees sanctuary. Our adversaries, notably China and Russia, have learned to circumvent traditional deterrence by developing alternative tools and tactics to advance their interests at our expense. Russia’s military reconstruction and China’s rapid military buildup are outpacing western investments and eroding U.S. military superiority. They now have the capability and capacity to threaten all of North America with a range of advanced nuclear, conventional and non-kinetic systems.

While the risk of a direct military attack remains low, we are increasingly vulnerable to hybrid threats where adversaries blend military and non-military means, both overt and covert, to weaken and destabilize their targets. What we see in Europe today could very well happen here tomorrow. Just in the past month, Russian fighter jets have violated Estonian airspace. Drones have flown over military installations and disrupted major airports in Poland, Denmark, Norway and Lithuania. Last summer, Operation Spiderweb, by which Ukrainian security services smuggled drones on transport trucks deep into Russia and conducted successful strikes against five Russian air bases, illustrated how easily adversaries could use commercially available technology and civilian infrastructure to cripple Canada’s most strategic assets.

Closer to home, in the North American Arctic, China is conducting research activity that has direct military implications, including for submarine operations. Over the past four years, we’ve also seen Chinese research devices entering Canadian airspace and water, underscoring both the urgency of protecting our sovereignty and the difficulty of maintaining constant awareness and control in our vast and remote northern regions. Climate change only compounds these challenges. Melting permafrost and changing ice and weather patterns affect our ability to both develop military and civilian infrastructure and sustain a Canadian Armed Forces presence across the Arctic and northern regions.

NORAD modernization and increased defence spending are welcome critical steps, but the real questions are how quickly these investments will materialize and, crucially, which capabilities they will prioritize. The timelines outlined in the 2022 NORAD modernization plan do not match the speed of the evolving threat environment. Many projects are not expected to reach full operational capability until well into the 2030s, which may simply be too late given the pace at which our adversaries are advancing and global instability is growing.

At present, our national security and defence apparatus does not yet have the capabilities—understood as hardware, personnel, policies and authorities—to proactively deter, detect and counter the wide range of subthreshold and hybrid challenges undermining Canadian sovereignty and security.

In short, Canada must move with urgency. Our adversaries are acting faster than our current defence and security systems are being upgraded. To safeguard our sovereignty, we need to accelerate NORAD modernization, strengthen our capabilities across national defence and national security, and ensure that Canada remains a reliable and credible ally.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

Mr. Coates, you have five minutes.

[Christopher Coates, Director of Foreign Policy, National Defence and National Security, Macdonald-Laurier Institute]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to share some of my perspectives on NORAD modernization.

I want to start by briefly saying that Canada’s potential adversaries have developed and are continuing to develop increasingly advanced aerospace systems that can attack, from above, targets in Canada. In my view, with our current capabilities, Canada has limited or no ability to defend itself from many of these new threats.

In this context, I see it as a duty of government to do two things—to be able to defend the country, its population and its critical infrastructure from potential threats; and to deter adversaries from threatening or attacking Canada. That is the reason for NORAD modernization. It's to protect Canada by defending and deterring from potential threats that can attack the population and the nation’s critical infrastructure.

The elements of NORAD modernization that have already been detailed by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are certainly necessary. To the degree possible, Canada must accelerate their delivery or should provide interim capabilities until the planned capabilities can be delivered. This would help protect Canada, would deter adversaries who are now acting more and more aggressively, and would demonstrate to our NORAD partner, the United States of America, Canada’s serious commitment to defence. Furthermore, Canada should immediately and clearly articulate its support for participation in the current United States ballistic missile defence, the ground-based mid-course defence system.

However, while necessary, these steps will not be sufficient to protect Canadians from the full range of aerospace capabilities that adversaries could employ to threaten Canada. Additional capabilities will be needed to defend against and deter new and emerging threats, such as various types of unmanned aircraft, or drones, and hypersonic cruise missiles already being used in conflicts around the world.

The American golden dome program is envisaged to address the full range of aerospace threats through the integration of existing defensive capabilities and the development of new ones. If NORAD modernization as currently programmed is just the first step for Canada, then the golden dome would be subsequent steps. Canada should declare its intention to partner with the United States on the development of an integrated air and missile defence system for North America, perhaps the golden dome.

The advanced and emerging threats that I’ve described apply as well to all of Canada’s allies, NATO and elsewhere. Some of those allies are responding now to recent threats in their airspace as they develop a drone wall. Canada is currently very exposed to these same types of dangers. To protect itself, Canada needs to develop the necessary systems to maintain surveillance of any desired area of the nation in order to understand what is happening in its airspace. There is a need to develop the automated, artificial intelligence, and machine learning-enabled command and control systems, and to acquire and deploy effective means to defeat threats. There is a need to develop the procedures and protocols to coordinate and meet defence, security and safety requirements over all of Canada’s territory. Overlapping systems and responsibilities, civilian and military, need to be integrated to eliminate gaps and seams and to respond effectively in a timely manner. No nation does this today. This is an opportunity for Canada to be a leader, demonstrating how to solve difficult aerospace challenges.

While NORAD might not be in actual crisis, the idea that one should never let a good crisis go to waste seems to apply to Canada’s current NORAD challenges. There is much to be done. This is an opportunity for Canada and Canadians to demonstrate leadership.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you. I appreciate that as well.

Dr. Lackenbauer, by video conference, you have five minutes.

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual]

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee to discuss NORAD modernization.

I want to begin by briefly tracing how we arrived where we are today. In August 2021, then–minister of national defence Harjit Sajjan and then-U.S. secretary of defence Lloyd Austin approved a joint statement to guide co-operation between Canada and the United States in strengthening NORAD against evolving threats. The statement reaffirmed that NORAD must be able to detect and respond to threats earlier and more decisively, particularly those transiting our northern approaches.

The statement identified four priority areas.

The first was enhancing “situational awareness, especially in the northern and maritime approaches” through a “system-of-systems” network integrating “sensors from the sea floor to outer space.”

The second was modernized command and control systems to fuse data from all domains into a single operating picture for faster, better-informed decision-making.

The third was improved capabilities to “deter and, if necessary, defeat evolving aerospace threats”, supported by upgraded northern infrastructure.

Finally, the fourth was research, development and innovation to sustain technological advantage.

Building on that foundation, in June 2022, then-defence minister Anita Anand announced a once-in-a-generation $4.9-billion investment over six years to upgrade Canada’s continental defence systems.

This initiative will provide Canadians with four overlapping layers of situational awareness to detect and track threats approaching through the Arctic toward southern critical infrastructure.

Key elements, which we're probably all familiar with, include an Arctic over-the-horizon radar, OTHR, system providing early warning from the southern border to the Arctic Circle. The second is a polar over-the-horizon radar system extending surveillance beyond the Canadian Arctic archipelago into, and perhaps past, the central Arctic Ocean, and then a new Crossbow system of sensors and communications infrastructure distributed across the High Arctic.

Together, these systems will be synchronized with satellite capabilities to deliver a clearer global picture of potential threats.

Because these new systems will generate enormous amounts of data, the second major component of NORAD modernization is technology-enabled decision-making using AI, machine learning and quantum and cloud computing to process data and achieve what former NORAD commander general Glen VanHerck called “decision superiority.”

We have already seen Canadian announcements of over-the-horizon radar systems, enhancements to forward operating locations and northern operational support hubs. From my observations on Arctic operations with the Canadian Rangers over the past year, some of these initiatives may be advancing faster than publicly disclosed.

Fast-forward to this week and President Trump’s statement that Canada and the United States will “be working together on a Golden Dome”. In my view, this golden dome is not a radically new departure from NORAD modernization. Rather, it represents the next step in a long-term American effort to develop a next-generation missile defence shield, an initiative that NORAD leaders have been discussing for nearly a decade. The concern is clear that ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer or rogue adversaries pose a growing threat to North America. Deterrence by punishment—relying solely on the threat of retaliation—is no longer enough. Deterrence by denial requires us to detect and defeat threats before they reach our shores.

Now that President Trump has made this a priority, Canada must decide how we want to contribute and, crucially, how to explain this to Canadians.

Yesterday’s Globe and Mail story by Gavin John laid out the key issues. In response, Minister McGuinty referred to a “continental shield,” and senior Canadian Armed Forces officers have mentioned a “Canadian shield,” yet it remains unclear whether these refer to Canada’s contribution to NORAD modernization, participation in the golden dome or something distinct.

Whatever the case, Canada needs its own narrative—a clear public explanation of how NORAD modernization and a “Canadian shield” fit into our national defence strategy.

Canadians deserve a clearer explanation of the role that these generational investments will play in protecting our country, in bolstering NORAD and in strengthening continental defence more broadly.

We cannot simply rely on the United States to define that narrative. This is about ensuring that Canada remains a credible, capable and indispensable partner in the shared defence of North America.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you very much.

I am going to pass it over now to Dr. Karako by video conference. You have five minutes.

[Tom Karako, Director, Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies]

Chair Sousa, Vice-Chairs Bezan and Savard-Tremblay, and members of the standing committee, our topic today is a timely one.

Missile threats are no longer niche or boutique problems, but certainly weapons of choice. Today’s landscape is accompanied by the advent of a new missile age, one defined by a surge in the global supply and demand for a broad and diverse spectrum of strike capabilities and the means to counter them. Thus, long-range strike and air and missile defence are the top modernization priorities for both Australia and Japan, and are the two capabilities for which Ukraine requests most for its defence.

In past decades, ballistic missile defence understandably received outsized attention, given the threat of rogue state ballistic missiles. Today, however, non-ballistic missile threats are particularly growing in salience and number. Cruise missiles fired in Ukraine far outnumber ballistic missiles. Even so-called ballistic missiles are becoming less so, inasmuch as more manoeuvrability is being introduced for less predictable trajectories.

The particular salience of the cruise missile threat should come as no surprise. We've seen it coming, as was said, for over a decade. It is, therefore, unfortunate that the air and missile defence for these kinds of threats has taken a backseat for so long, and that NORAD’s legacy capability and focus has been on other problems.

The jointly operated North Warning System has been the mainstay for providing sensor coverage for incoming threats to North America. While this architecture is critical for detecting medium- and high-altitude aerial threats, it's not as well suited for those travelling at lower altitudes.

As the Department of National Defence notes, existing “radar capabilities are becoming increasingly challenged by modern weapons technology, including advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons”, because using their non-ballistic trajectories exploits the gaps in radar coverage.

In July 2022, the CSIS missile defence project put out “North America is a Region, Too”, a report on air and cruise missile defence of our continent. The title reflects the argument that air and cruise missile threats are no longer just a regional problem “over there”, but a problem closer to home.

The past perception that air and cruise missile defence of North America is unnecessary stems from the outdated assumption that air and cruise missile threats to the homeland are a lesser included set of strategic nuclear attacks deterred by the threat of retaliation. As was just said, deterring these kinds of attacks requires deterrence by denial.

In light of all this, it is gratifying to read the 2024 Canadian defence policy review's commitment to build on past investments for NORAD modernization and to explore a “more robust approach to integrated air and missile defence.”

Forward-based sensing from the high north is an especially critical asset, and it is gratifying to see the announcement in July about removing restrictions on air and missile defence.

Numerous other allies and partners are making similar pledges to address the yawning gaps in capability. The United Kingdom’s strategic defence review pledged one billion pounds. Both Japan and Australia list these, as I've said, as their top priorities.

NATO Secretary General suggested the alliance may “need five times as many systems” for air and missile defence.

The U.S. golden dome initiative is a long-overdue effort to counter this spectrum of threats. If sustained on a combined and bipartisan basis, it could become the beginning of a generational opportunity to counter them. So far, limited details about the architecture have been publicly released. When more becomes available, I expect it will be recognized as a necessary and quite tractable approach.

As the Canadian government explores the potential for improved air and missile defence capabilities, it may be worth paying particular attention to sensors. If one cannot see a threat, one cannot kill it.

The first area of improvement is, of course, the North Warning System. Canada’s investment and momentum on over-the-horizon radars is another especially important step. While OTHR may not provide fire control quality tracks, it can nevertheless provide cues.

Another area ripe for exploration is how space sensors will contribute to non-ballistic threats. I'm thinking here of air moving target indicators, AMTIs. As noted in our past reports, future architectures should consider space-based AMTI when mature. To be sure, it will not, and should not, undercut terrestrial OTHRs. Low- and slow-flying targets, with cool heat signatures, remain difficult to detect and track.

Additional investments in modernizing capabilities include air-to-air missiles, communications infrastructure, and fuel depots and runways in the high north to get after all of this.

A final topic of potential consideration might be the development of, and the thinking about, limited area defence zones for command and control, infrastructure nodes and perhaps the capital.

Working through what one wants to defend is often a timely consideration.

Thank you for the opportunity to join you today. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you all for your opening remarks. They were very enlightening.

We're going to our first round of questions. Each member's going to have six minutes to start. I'll try to maintain the clock to give everybody the opportunity to speak, but I'll be flexible if you have good answers, of course.

I pass it over to Mr. Kibble to start us off, for six minutes.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of our panel members for being here. This is such an important topic that I wish I had significantly more time to ask questions. I certainly appreciate the insight in the opening statements. I'm not really sure where to begin. There's so much to go through.

I'll start with Dr. Piché. In terms of modernization that we need to see happen for NORAD, what would you say needs to be implemented to deal with the hybrid threats that you mentioned in your opening statement, and how quickly do you feel that this needs to happen?

[Gaëlle Rivard Piché]

I think that NORAD modernization is also about understanding that those new capabilities that we're discussing are not being developed and implemented in a vacuum and, therefore, our adversaries can target the development and implementation of those tactics.

I think what we need is a whole-of-society and whole-of-government response, with increased investments in the national security apparatus to better support NORAD modernization. That goes with the protection of research and development, science and technology, as well as investments in domestic intelligence to make sure that those are protected.

As well, I would say that investments in cyber and in the space domain for sovereign capabilities are going to be important in making sure that we can protect our own capabilities through NORAD, as well as positioning ourselves properly, considering what our adversaries are currently developing in terms of counterspace technology.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much.

Dr. Lackenbauer, I think your idea for a narrative is excellent, and deterrence by denial should perhaps be integrated into that. You used the term “Canadian shield”. What are the risks of a Canadian shield versus an integrated North American system?

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

It certainly is a cost issue. I think there are lots of disincentives for either Canada or the United States to think, in defending our shared continent, that we want to do things independently of each other. We have a long history, certainly most clearly demonstrated through NORAD, of working together. We realize we achieve a lot of equities and can also make investments in strategic redundancies together that we can't do if we're just doing things on our own. Let's face it, the cost of doing things on our own is probably going to be insurmountable or, at least, unrealistic in the short term, never mind gaining access to the technologies.

Again, I see a Canadian shield as something that has not been elaborated upon. It's been dropped as a teaser by some senior officials. I'd love for them to flesh that out more, but I see that Canadian shield, really, as being the bedrock of our contribution to this overall integrated continental effort.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much. I appreciate your comments.

Mr. Coates, I had the pleasure of sailing with your brother many years ago, so it's a pleasure to have you here. You've been quoted as saying, “Canada cannot afford to be seen as holding back the U.S.” and that, if Canada fails to step up to the plate, the umbrella of security America presently presents and offers to us as the northern neighbour, “will be quickly undermined”. What steps do you believe we need to be taking for NORAD modernization to ensure that we're seen as stepping up?

[Christopher Coates]

I think there are a couple of ways to look at that. One would be from the military side. As Dr. Rivard Piché and I mentioned in opening statements, it's to accelerate those aspects of NORAD modernization that are possible to accelerate. I don't think we should, as we approach NORAD modernization, stick to business as usual. This is a time to demonstrate that we're very serious about addressing the threats, and that we look for new and effective ways to bring projects forward. Things shouldn't be taking the kinds of timelines that were described earlier.

Secondly, I think there is a policy aspect to this that needs to be addressed. There are parts of our policy apparatus that slow down the ability to respond. The hybrid threats today operate in the seams between what's military and what's security. We have to find better ways to address those. The way that NORAD has to operate, splitting its response to certain types of threats between the way they're addressed in Canada and the way they're addressed in the U.S., creates friction and a seam that can be exploited. I think, if we were to reduce those policy differences, that would be another way to accelerate it.

[Jeff Kibble, Conservative, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much.

For Dr. Karako, we're still waiting on an F-35 review. In your opinion, how important is it to upgrade to a fifth-generation aircraft for operations in terms of the missile defence system that we need under NORAD?

[Tom Karako]

I'll just say as an observer that I was very gratified to hear the interest in the F-35. The fifth-generation aircraft is going to be pretty useful when you're contending with fifth-generation threats like from Russia, for instance.

There are a couple of things that come to mind there. One is, of course, the sustainability and the co-operation in runways and the operations and sustainment to be working together, and it's supposed to have a multiplicity of aircraft. Another thing includes just the sensing. It's not necessarily the best way. We've heard a lot about the need for broad sensing, over-the-horizon radars, ground-based radars, looking out the window of an aircraft or having the sensors of an aircraft look for cruise missiles. Those are a useful supplement to all that, whether it is in terms of engaging incoming aircraft or, perhaps, again, looking for cruise missiles coming in or UAVs.

I think the sensor package on the F-35 is what jumps out to me as much as anything.

[The Chair, Liberal, Charles Sousa]

Thank you.

Monsieur Malette, you have six minutes.

[Chris Malette, Liberal, Bay of Quinte, ON]

Thank you.

Dr. Lackenbauer, I should mention that my youngest daughter was the captain of the Trent University women's rugby team, so “Go, Trent!”

How can modernization efforts respect and incorporate indigenous knowledge and presence in the Arctic? I think this is quite often neglected in some of our deliberations on this.

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

I think it already is. There was an operation, and it didn't receive a lot of media fanfare, but there should be a story coming out in the next couple of weeks about Operation Nanook-Tatigiit, which had three legs to it. It was in the High Arctic this July and involved small groups of Canadian Rangers who were deployed beyond the main population—in fact, beyond where there were any civilian communities—to look at potential locations that presumably would be using some of the infrastructure that could be part of this overall sensing package that we're developing. I think when it comes to siting different systems, we're going to be relying upon that northern knowledge.

There's also a lot of expertise that resides in indigenous development corporations and indigenous businesses that are very much being encouraged to contribute to this overall architecture. That's not just in terms of developing and deploying the technology; it's also supporting those who are developing it and providing the logistics. There's a tremendous amount of logistics expertise resident in the Canadian north.

It's also remembering that people who live on the land in a homeland and know it intimately are also sensors; they're human sensors, and if we figure out improved ways of their being able to share their identification of changes or potential anomalies in their backyard and, if that could be fed into this whole system and fused with other information, that would allow us to respond at the speed of relevance with more agility and effectiveness.

[Chris Malette, Liberal, Bay of Quinte, ON]

I'll stay with Dr. Lackenbauer, but I'm going to ask the same of Dr. Karako as well.

You mentioned deterrence by denial. Can you expand on that, please?

[P. Whitney Lackenbauer]

Yes, absolutely, I'll try give you my take on it, and Tom will probably do a more eloquent job than I do.

The conventional approach to North American defence has been deterrence by punishment. That's the notion of mutually assured destruction. If anybody were to be silly enough to attack the United States or key allies like Canada, it would bring about a second strike, a retaliatory strike, that would incur costs and harm to that adversary much more than any benefit they would get from attacking us. The idea is that they would be fearful of attacking us. Deterrence by denial is convincing an adversary that we are able to detect, defend and, as necessary, defeat whatever they are sending our way, which makes it very disadvantageous for them to even think that they would attack us in the first place.

What golden dome is presenting is an image of being able to defend the United States from potential missile strikes or other types of aerial attack sufficiently that no one would be silly enough to try to mount that attack against the United States.

[Chris Malette, Liberal, Bay of Quinte, ON]

Dr. Karako, can you expand, perhaps?