Public Accounts Committee on June 5th, 2008

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

I'm going through you, Mr. Chair, to the department officials. If a number of years are accident-free and then we enter 2008 and there is loss of life, in the past that would have triggered a safety audit of the company. What I hear you saying, Mr. Preuss, is that there has been no safety audit. This accident happened in March. No safety audit has been done. Is that correct?

[Merlin Preuss]

If the assumption is that we would automatically do a safety audit after a loss of life, then I would have to disagree with you on that point.

The process is that we take a look at each individual occurrence and decide on appropriate action. At this point we are reviewing this accident with the association, and we are also participating with the safety board as they go through their process.

[Marc Grégoire]

I have to add something, though, because you have made the assumption, Mr. Julian, that we are doing a safety audit or that there will be zero accidents. I think people would be wrong to think there will be zero accidents. This is just not possible. It's all about risk management. Accidents will continue to occur, it's obvious, but the reason we want to implement SMS in aviation and in the rail sector is to reduce the rate of those accidents--in other words, to save lives in the future.

So that's why. But we can never say zero lives will be lost. It's just not possible.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

Coming before Transport last year, you were very specific. Department officials were very specific about the fact that we had had essentially accident-free years in business aircraft. That is no longer true, so the accident rate has skyrocketed from a very safe record to a record where there are definite problems now. It concerns me greatly that there was a high-profile accident with loss of life three and a half months ago and there was no safety audit. That is I think a matter of concern for all Canadians.

What would that mean for commercial aircraft? The same kind of thing, where essentially a fly-by-night aircraft carrier has a high-profile accident and there's no safety audit? I'm not asking you a question; I'm making a comment.

But I would come back to the issue that Mr. Ranger--

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Mr. Julian, just a very brief question. You're out of time. We'll come back to you.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

I'll just ask my question.

How many unfilled flight inspector positions are there in the country right now?

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[Louis Ranger]

The quick answer is that the Auditor General has identified 8%. I will only qualify this by saying....

[Marc Grégoire]

She said an 8% increase in the number of vacant positions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

If you can't give an exact answer, you can get back to him, let's say, within two weeks, Mr. Ranger, to give exact information and to lay out what the statistics are.

[Marc Grégoire]

On that point, if I may, we are in a constant staffing process. So we are staffing people every week, everywhere, at any given time in the country.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Mr. Bélanger, you have seven minutes.

[Mauril Bélanger, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

For the officials of the department, can one make the following assertion: the purpose of safety systems is basically, first, to mitigate, to try to reduce the risk to the travelling public, and secondly, to learn even further? If I make that assertion, would you be okay with that?

[Marc Grégoire]

Yes.

[Mauril Bélanger, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Okay.

I want to zero in on one chapter of the report of the Auditor General, which for me is the most problematic. I'll quote a good part of it here. It's paragraph 3.30, and I'm sure you focused on it too:

Each region, however, uses different risk management techniques and processes to assess risk. Managers do not always analyze all of the risk indicators listed in the Frequency of Inspection Policy Document and may use other indicators that are not listed. Methods range from formal to informal: Some regions have created their own risk indicator databases, some document the decisions made in the risk analysis process in detail, and others make decisions without documenting details, such as the rationale.

The last sentence I want to quote is the most troubling one:

The use of different indicators and methods increases the likelihood of reaching different conclusions for similar situations.

Now, you've responded to that and you have agreed. I'm very glad you have. You've also said that you created the working group in May of 2007 and it has to have a final report in April of 2008. My first question: is that report completed?

[Marc Grégoire]

The report has been submitted. First of all, we--

[Mauril Bélanger, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Is that the one submitted to Treasury Board?

[Marc Grégoire]

No. It has been submitted to Merlin and is now under review. It will be finalized soon after it has been reviewed.

[Mauril Bélanger, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Once finalized, will it be available to this committee, or even before it's finalized? Can we see what has been done?

[Merlin Preuss]

Certainly. That's not a problem. The documentation is there; the review is there.

[Mauril Bélanger, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Good. Then I expect we'll get to see it.

To bring you back, though, if the purpose is to mitigate and to learn, then I really have a hard time understanding how the department can allow, when it's trying to implement an SMS, a safety management system, over top or underneath--whichever--the regular inspection capacity of the department...how can it allow for this kind of variety across the country?

If you've agreed with the criticism that it's right, that it shouldn't be the case yet we did it, how can that be? How do you explain, Monsieur Ranger, that we have different methods of evaluation of the risk factors in different parts of the country? It boggles the mind a bit that when the department would set out to implement an SMS, a safety management system, throughout the industry to further mitigate risk, it would allow a situation where one could draw different conclusions from the same set of circumstances. It simply doesn't add up.

[Marc Grégoire]

We're talking about--

[Mauril Bélanger, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

No, no. Monsieur Ranger.

[Louis Ranger]

I accept the findings and the recommendations, and we are acting on that. I'm not going to say here that I don't take that seriously, but I think we need to be cautious about any suggestions that we've proceeded with SMS in a cavalier way. This is well documented here.

We announced our intention in 1999 and waited until 2005 to introduce regulations. During that time we did pilot projects, and I think the report observes that this was done reasonably well.

We didn't go into this saying, “Okay, now we're ready; thousands of companies are subject to that.” We picked 74. Not any 74, but some of the most mature companies in the country--ceux qui ont déjà fait leurs preuves--those who already have a record, and we then phased that over four phases. And we're not at the end of that.

So I think it's fairly prudent. I acknowledge that there were discrepancies for one reason or another. I am taking that seriously and we're addressing that.

[Mauril Bélanger, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

In the planning stages, was it not concluded, was it not obvious that the criteria for assessing risk should be the same across the board? Similar circumstances should yield a similar conclusion. The laws of physics and thermodynamics will apply the same way, presumably, to the same claim and the same circumstances.

Yes, different claims, different applications, and that's why you'd have the range of 6 months, 36 months, or whatever, because of different circumstances, but under similar circumstances, if our inspectors cannot draw a similar conclusion, then we have a mishmash.

[Louis Ranger]

Maybe Madam Fraser wants to comment on that. We accept the findings, but I don't think the Auditor General is suggesting that this is widespread and that this is the rule rather than the exception. There are cases, indeed, and I don't contest it, in which some indicators were unique to a particular region, but I don't think the suggestion is that this is a widespread situation.