Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by introducing my two colleagues. I have with me Mr. Andy Ellis, the assistant director of policy, and John Dunn, who is the service's director general of communications.
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the committee with a view to clarifying a number of issues that have arisen as a result of remarks I made during the CBC special on CSIS. I propose to take the few minutes available to me to comment on the following: one, CSIS's decision to be more open to the public; two, the nature and scope of foreign interference in Canada; three, an explanation of how I came to mention the possibility of two specific foreign interference cases; and four, the extent to which anyone outside the service was aware of foreign interference in general and the two cases specifically.
Let me start with why I believe Canadians should be more informed about the threats Canada faces. While the CSIS Act has set up a comprehensive package of accountability, oversight, and control over CSIS, involving the minister, the Federal Court, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and the Inspector General, the activities of CSIS and especially the threats it must deal with are relatively little known, or to the extent they are known, these threats and activities arise in the context of specific cases or inquiries in which it is often difficult for the service to set out its perspective as the principal Canadian agency designated to protect the national security.
With the exception of the horrific case of the Air India attack, a few other terrorist attacks, and some instances that were successfully prevented, for example the Toronto 18, we have not seen much terrorism on Canadian soil. And we do not, as a country, often reflect on threats relative to espionage, terrorism, and foreign interference. I would argue it is good public policy for Canadians to be more attuned to the threats the country faces.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment and explain to the committee how the most controversial part of the recent interview came to be in the public domain. I am referring to the cases of foreign interference. I made these remarks during a question-and-answer session following a speech I gave at the Royal Canadian Military Institute on police appreciation night. This took place on March 24 of this year. As part of an agreement between the service and the broadcaster to develop a special broadcast commemorating the 25th anniversary of the service, we agreed they could film my visit to the RCMI.
I thought the filming was limited to my speech, so in answering a question I provided a degree of granularity, or detail, to an audience of police, intelligence, and military experts that I would not have provided to the public. Confronted by the broadcaster in late June with the substance of the remarks recorded three months earlier, I felt I had little choice but to address them in a forthright manner. I agree that this was not the optimal way in which to have this matter raised in public, and I wish it had turned out differently.
Mr. Chair, let me make two points: my comments did not in any way threaten national security, and was purely an oversight on my part that the information was made public. I do not agree with all the criticism voiced, but I regret any distress I might have caused and would not provide such detail again. Having said this, I stand by my general message on foreign interference—it is a concern and a threat, it is more common here and elsewhere than many think and it is desirable that this threat should be known and discussed. Actually, as I will point out later, this matter is not new and has been raised in many of our recent public reports, available to all Canadians.
As I mentioned a few moments ago, the examples I gave did not, and do not today, meet the criteria for us to consider them to represent immediate threats to the security of Canada. That is why the Minister of Public Safety was not informed about it, although he is generally aware of foreign interference in Canada. The same applies to the Privy Council Office.
Since that part of the interview that raised the most questions was the issue of foreign interference, let me take a few minutes to discuss its nature, scope, and extent.
Parliament clearly recognized the existence of this problem at the time the CSIS Act was passed in 1984, that CSIS has a clear mandate to investigate foreign interference as a potential threat to the security of Canada. I say “potential” because unlike cases of terrorism or espionage, where the threat to national security is more immediate and where the ramifications can be extremely serious--for example, loss of life or loss of serious national secrets--foreign interference operates on a range of seriousness, and it is only the most serious cases that constitute clear threats to national security. I'll provide some examples in a couple of minutes.
First, what is foreign interference? Simply put, it is an attempt by agents of a foreign state to influence the opinion, views, and decisions of Canadians with the aim to obtaining a political, policy, or economic advantage. The CSIS Act talks about the threat of foreign influenced activities as
activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,
This is, of course, a broad definition that could involve many facets of behaviour, but it's important to note that for behaviour to be considered as true foreign influence, it must be directed against the interests of Canada and must be deceptive in nature.
It is also important to note that, unlike espionage and terrorism that can result in more immediate damage to our national security, foreign influence is really more of a process of relationship-building.This is not a simple, binary, black and white issue. We are dealing here with a spectrum of behaviour by foreign entities that often start out innocently but later veer toward something that actually harms Canadian interests. This is a very subtle process.
Central to our concerns with true foreign interference is the strong belief that decisions about Canada must be made by Canadians for Canadian reasons. And that means by those who are loyal to Canada—whether they have been here for generations or whether they were granted their citizenship last week.
We realize that citizens are sometimes caught in this process of foreign interference unwittingly, and we assume from the outset that citizens are loyal. Our central concern is with what foreign powers are trying to do in Canada and why.
Our service also understands that most Canadians have links with homelands, whether real and recent or as remnants of our past, as we are a remarkably diverse country. This is normal for a country that plays such a large role in the world and whose citizens literally come from everywhere.
For our purposes today, I'll limit my remarks to foreign interference in the Canadian political process. A couple of explanatory points, Mr. Chairman. Unlike terrorism or espionage, there is not always a breach of the law. Like terrorism or espionage, however, at least some of the influence is covert or secretive. Unless the Canadian being influenced commits a specific violation of Canadian law, the issue of concern to CSIS is Canada's democratic process being affected secretly and by a foreign state.
CSIS's objectives are threefold: to identify the foreign agent and to cause the influence to be stopped; to identify the person being influenced, with a view to making the appropriate authorities aware; and to generally protect Canadians from this sort of pressure. The persons being influenced are often Canadians with whom the foreign agent can relatively easily develop a relationship.
Having set out the essential characteristics of foreign interference, let me try to illustrate the range of seriousness I mentioned earlier. Regular and overt diplomatic contacts typical in the business of international affairs do not constitute concern unless they become part of a longer-term plan or spectrum of behaviour that is detrimental to the interests of Canada.
Let me skip through a range of intermediate examples and set out one at the other end of the spectrum. Thus, a case that would be of interest to CSIS would involve an agent of a foreign power providing a Canadian, over months or years, with various benefits, which become increasingly significant yet less and less open over time. This relationship includes an extensive exchange of views, opinions, and information slanted toward what the foreign state is interested in. At some point, consciously or not, the Canadian's views are changed and he or she begins to push or advance them as his or her own, thus potentially affecting decisions with which he or she is involved. The very important point is that foreign interference is intrinsically objectionable to Canada, whether or not it succeeds in attaining the objective of the foreign state, because such activity becomes detrimental to the interests of Canada.
I would like to leave you with the following points, Mr. Chair.
First of all, national security is not always directly or immediately involved in cases of foreign interference, but, where the possibility exists that there is harm to national security, and we have reasons to suspect this is true, we must investigate.
Second, CSIS' mandate is to protect Canadians and our democratic process from covert and deceptive influence.
Third, the Canadians identified to be influenced can be anyone with the potential to affect decisions in a manner favourable to the foreign state.
While I cannot discuss in any detail the two examples that emerged during the CBC special, I'd like to make three additional points. One, there was and is no immediate threat to the national security, so we are taking the time to complete our analysis before reporting to government. Two, given this, there was and is no need to brief the minister until such time as CSIS has completed its analysis and discussed it interdepartmentally. Three, only when these consultations are complete will the service brief the Minister of Public Safety and make recommendations on how to proceed.
Since various media reports have gone to air, one aspect of the discussion on foreign interference that has surprised many in the security and intelligence community has been the general shock at the existence and extent of foreign interference in Canada and elsewhere. I would not wish to belabour the point, but as I indicated earlier, CSIS has been informing successive governments of the threats since its creation. Its last five annual reports have referred to it, and Parliament has annually granted funds for us to investigate foreign interference. It is a threat that is not unique to Canada. Our close allies are also targeted, and it is probably worth noting that our two review bodies have over the years regularly looked at and commented on our foreign interference investigations in the same manner in which they review, for example, our terrorism cases.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by summarizing a few of the points I've tried to make this morning. One, we do believe there is merit in Canadians' being more informed about the threats to our national security. Two, foreign interference as set out in the CSIS Act is a threat in Canada, and a threat of which Canadians should be aware. Three, CSIS's principal interest in foreign interference is protecting Canadians in Canada against the efforts of foreign powers. Four, anyone can be the subject of foreign influence, and often they are initially unwillingly or unwittingly so. Five, foreign influence is not always a direct or obvious threat to national security but rather a process that over time can covertly influence our democratic processes. Six, in respect of the two examples I gave, neither my minister nor the Privy Council Office was briefed on the cases, although they are generally aware of the threat of foreign interference.
Mr. Chairman, I hope these remarks have been helpful. They have been drawn together on the basis of public and parliamentary comment, but I should be pleased to try to answer questions on any other matter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
