Evidence of meeting #38 for Public Safety and National Security in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was data.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

Members speaking

Before the committee

Nadeau  President, Barreau du Québec
Lefebvre  Chairman and Co-founder, Crypto Québec
Dufresne  Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Offices of the Information and Privacy Commissioners of Canada
Marchand  Member, Criminal Law Expert Group, Barreau du Québec
Le Grand Alary  Lawyer, Secretariat of the Order and Legal Affairs, Barreau du Québec
Neuenschwander  Senior Director, User Privacy and Child Safety, Apple Inc.
Israel  Director, Privacy, Surveillance and Technology Program, Canadian Civil Liberties Association
Patell  Director, Government Affairs and Public Policy, Canada, Google
Charlet  Senior Director, Privacy, Safety and Security, Government Affairs and Public Policy, Google
Van Laer  Retired Staff Sergeant, Reservist, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Thomas Carrique  President, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police
Brown  Mayor, City of Brampton
Smith  Senior Vice-President, Canadian Telecommunications Association
Ullock  Board Chair, Ontario Child Sexual Exploitation Investigators Association
Chief Nick Milinovich  Deputy Chief of Police, Peel Regional Police
Murray Rankin  Barristor and Solicitor, As an Individual

6:50 p.m.

Mayor, City of Brampton

Patrick Brown

I would just add that I believe the reason this bill is in its current form is that there was concern that the strong borders act, which was the first iteration of this, went too far. They wanted a more targeted, carved-out focus on criminality. I believe this bill is that attempt to pause and put forward new legislation targeted toward criminality. At least that's the feedback I've heard from the local Peel police, who have been consulted on the legislation.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

I'm sorry to interrupt, MP Caputo and everyone else.

Let me turn to MP Ramsay for five minutes, please.

Jacques Ramsay Liberal La Prairie—Atateken, QC

First, I want to thank the three witnesses.

They were very eloquent. I had several questions, and they answered them. However, I would like to return to one of those questions to clarify things.

There is a sense that we are rushing things and that everything is a bit improvised. I think you have all clearly demonstrated that the provisions of the bill are quite well thought out and that they address very specific needs.

People often try to give the impression that the government has embarked on a hunt for all kinds of information regarding metadata. However, I think it is important to clarify one thing. To my knowledge, the metadata covered by the bill is as follows:

Internet transmission data, tower signalling data, signalling data for VOIP calls and vehicle manufacturer telemetry data.

That is all there is to it. It is specific. I think that instead of arguing, we should acknowledge that Bill C‑22 actually clarifies the scope of the data and prevents a witch hunt.

I would like to hear your opinion on this, Commissioner.

Commr Thomas Carrique

Thank you very much, member of Parliament. I would be happy to weigh in on this.

I agree with you. It is very finite. In my comments, I indicated that it be the bare minimum of information that could assist investigations. There are no fishing trips or fishing expeditions here. We would still require judicial authorization to access any of that metadata. I agree with your comments wholeheartedly.

Jacques Ramsay Liberal La Prairie—Atateken, QC

I am very pleased to hear that.

One of the witnesses from the Barreau du Québec even seemed to claim that with an IP address, one could access our dreams. That’s a bit of a stretch. It’s a bit of nonsense. The IP address remains basic information that will allow police, with a warrant, to go and get the information they need.

The other point we discussed is the famous three-month period, which might be insufficient. What I gathered from all three of your testimonies is that investigations often begin after crimes have already been committed, and we can’t know in advance what information we’ll need. So, we can’t say we’ll just keep a specific piece of information because that’s all we’ll need. That’s not how it works.

Mr. Van Laer, what are your thoughts on this?

6:50 p.m.

Retired Staff Sergeant, Reservist, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Mathias Van Laer

Thank you for your question.

I agree with you.

To answer your first question, I’d like to comment on the IP address, if I may. You’re absolutely right: We don’t have access to everyone’s dreams through an IP address. So, I’m glad that this has been taken into account as a factor. It’s important that the people here, around the table, can develop laws based on real activities or processes—that is, things that are actually possible. It’s impossible for anyone to identify someone based on an IP address without going through a judicial process. So, that’s important.

To answer your second question, I would say yes.

I hope that answers your questions.

Jacques Ramsay Liberal La Prairie—Atateken, QC

My third question concerns the reason to “believe” as opposed to the reason to “suspect”.

It is clear that, in this case, we are talking about a reason to suspect someone, because we are seeking information that will not serve as evidence per se. An IP address, or a telemetric address, is not evidence to charge someone or find them guilty. So that is why the legislature wanted a significant and recognized legal standard, which is the reason to “suspect” rather than the reason to “believe.”

Commissioner Carrique, what do you have to say about this?

Commr Thomas Carrique

I agree. Reasonable grounds to suspect is the appropriate standard, as I've stated earlier.

Let's compare it to a previous time when we were operating under landline phone lines. You could go to a phone book, look up a name and get a phone number—not only a phone number but the address of an individual. There was a lot more private information available in a standard phone book of years gone by, as opposed to requiring reasonable grounds to suspect a crime has been committed simply to get an IP address to commence an investigation, which will then require more substantive evidence before you have reasonable grounds to lay a charge.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Thank you very much for these remarks, Mr. Ramsay. This brings us to the end of this important hour of discussion.

We thank the three witnesses for their time and the quality of their remarks. We wish them a good rest of the day.

For everyone else, we will suspend the session for a few minutes.

7 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

We are resuming the meeting.

I welcome the members back and greet all the witnesses.

We shall resume the meeting by welcoming our distinguished guests: the Canadian Telecommunications Association, represented by Mr. Eric Smith; the Ontario Child Sexual Exploitation Investigators Association, represented by Andrew Ullock and Lisa Henderson, both participating via video conference; the Peel Regional Police, represented by Mr. Nick Milinovich; and Murray Rankin, a highly esteemed colleague whom we have missed for a very long time and whom we are fortunate to see again today among us in person.

We will begin by hearing a five-minute statement from each person.

Mr. Smith, you have the floor.

Eric Smith Senior Vice-President, Canadian Telecommunications Association

Thank you, Chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the Canadian Telecommunications Association.

Our association is dedicated to building a better future for Canadians through connectivity. Our members include service providers, manufacturers and other organizations that invest in, build, maintain and operate Canada's world-class telecommunications networks.

Having listened to the discussions before this committee, I will say it is clear that there is broad agreement on two important principles. First, Canadians' privacy rights must be protected. Second, law enforcement and national security agencies must have the ability to access information through lawful processes to support legitimate investigations and protect public safety.

The central question, therefore, is not whether these objectives matter: It's how to appropriately balance them. That balance is critically important because Canadians use digital services every day with the expectation that their personal information will be handled securely and that any access to that information will occur within a clear, proportionate and accountable legal framework.

We appreciate the efforts of government in consulting with stakeholders and making Bill C-22 an improvement over the earlier proposals in Bill C-2. To be clear, we are not against the bill. However, we have remaining concerns, which are set out in a written brief that has been provided to the committee. I'll touch on three of them.

One item that hasn't been mentioned before deals with part 1 and the requirement that confirmation of service demands must be responded to in as little as 24 hours. While most service providers have processes in place to deal with urgent requests from law enforcement, treating all confirmation of service demands with the same level of urgency and a 24-hour turnaround time is impractical and unrealistic.

The number of requests, the complexity of searches and the fact that not all service providers have staff available on a 24-7 basis make an across the board 24-hour response time near impossible to facilitate. A more workable response time would be no less than three business days, which would be suitable for most situations and would not prevent service providers from responding to truly urgent requests in a shorter period, as they do today.

The second concern is the requirement to retain broad categories of metadata for as long as one year. You've already heard from other witnesses about the privacy concerns this requirement raises. We are also concerned about the security risks as well as the lack of guardrails around the use of metadata. The metadata provisions of Bill C-22 should either be removed or substantially restricted, both in retention time and purpose.

Finally, there is the issue of reimbursement for the substantial cost of providing lawful access services. These are state-mandated tools and services created for the exclusive use of law enforcement and security agencies and are not part of normal commercial operations.

In a previous government consultation on lawful access, law enforcement agencies submitted that communication service providers “should be able to recover reasonable costs incurred in providing court-ordered assistance”.

Likewise, the lawful access advisory committee established by the RCMP and CSIS has as one of its key principles a commitment to a cost-neutral and fair compensation model. Again I will quote:

The lawful access community acknowledges that [communication service providers] are private or semi-private companies and deserve fair compensation for the effort required to develop, maintain, and operate capabilities that is not part of their normal business processes.

These economic realities are recognized in other jurisdictions, such as the U.K., which reimburses telecommunication providers for both capital and operational costs associated with the creation of intercepting capabilities and the production of communications data. This concept should be included in Bill C-22.

Reimbursing service providers reflects the philosophy underpinning U.K. law that while private companies have a statutory duty to assist with the implementation of warrants, they should not be expected to act as an uncompensated arm of the state. Government funding also helps ensure market fairness and competitiveness, mitigates financial impacts on smaller businesses, provides oversight over the quality, standards and security of intercept capabilities, and prevents citizens from facing increased monthly bills to pay for law enforcement investigation infrastructure.

In closing, we understand the need to update Canada's lawful access framework. With targeted refinements, Bill C-22 can provide a framework that balances the interests of privacy and public safety, and that is proportionate, accountable and does not pass the costs to Canadian consumers.

Thank you. I'd be pleased to answer your questions.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Mr. Ullock, you have the floor for five minutes.

Andrew Ullock Board Chair, Ontario Child Sexual Exploitation Investigators Association

Good evening.

Thank you for giving us the opportunity to share with you the perspective of the Ontario Child Sexual Exploitation Investigators Association, or OCSEIA, on Bill C-22. OCSEIA is comprised of police officers, former Crown prosecutors and members of the private sector who work together to advocate for those who work to rescue children from online child sex offenders.

My name is Andrew Ullock, and I volunteer as the chairman of the board for OCSEIA. I am an officer with 28 years of experience, 14 of which was in the field of online child exploitation. I have worked both as an investigator and a supervisor of officers in this field.

Joining me is fellow OCSEIA board member, Lisa Henderson, who recently retired after working for over 30 years as a Crown prosecutor. Since the early 2000s until her retirement, Lisa worked both as the chair of the Attorney General's task force on Internet crimes against children and also as the provincial Crown coordinator for Ontario's provincial strategy to combat Internet crimes against children.

The law must create a proper balance between protecting privacy and protecting the public from crime. As technology continues to evolve, the challenge of striking this balance becomes more and more complex. One of the bedrock foundations of criminal law in Canada is that the burden of proof falls to the state, exercised through its agents in law enforcement. The state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is guilty of a crime, an essential safeguard that cannot be compromised. That being the case, if law enforcement is tasked with the burden of meeting this necessarily high threshold, then the law should have within it reasonable tools that make it possible for the police to accomplish this objective.

Since the creation of the Internet, there has been very little change in statutory law to regulate the manner in which police obtain evidence of criminal offences, be it online or in computer data stored on devices. Without updates from Parliament, the courts are forced to adapt by filling the legal gap with a patchwork of decisions that can be confusing, inconsistent and redundant. This patchwork amounts to what OCSEIA calls legal inflation, where the number of steps and authorizations that police must go through to complete an investigation increases over time but never decreases.

Time is a finite resource for law enforcement. There are simply only so many hours a single officer can work in a given year. As the amount of time required to complete an investigation increases, the number of investigations that police can complete simultaneously decreases. The objective of privacy laws should not be to create redundant obstacles or barriers that are impossible for the police to overcome. Sensible limits on the investigative powers of police protect the privacy and dignity of citizens; insensible ones protect crime.

Bill C-22 has inspired a lot of discussion regarding the privacy rights of Canadians. OCSEIA agrees that this is an important debate and appreciates the contributions made by privacy advocates. However, on the topic of privacy, OCSEIA wants to ensure that the discussion is a complete one that considers all facets of this issue.

Behind each statistic or police report regarding online child exploitation is a real child who has suffered immense abuse at the hands of a predator. These children are equally entitled to have their privacy considered in this debate, since it is their privacy that is violated in perpetuity in the most horrendous way imaginable. Once an offender creates and then shares an exploitive image of a child, it becomes a permanent part of the Internet. From that point forward, that child's privacy rights get trampled upon each time a new offender consumes or shares that image.

The best way we as a society can respond to these violations of privacy is to find and hold accountable those who thrive on the abuse of children. To do that, law enforcement needs the right tools. OCSEIA believes that there are a lot of reasonable tools that can be brought about to accomplish this.

Law enforcement in Canada should not have to obtain a mutual legal assistance treaty order instead of a production order to obtain content data from online service providers who are physically present in Canada, just because they are international companies.

Law enforcement should not have to obtain a second redundant search warrant to analyze a computer device simply because it was seized from a person's hand or pocket during the execution of a residential search warrant that already authorized the seizure and analysis of any device found in that place.

Law enforcement should not have to obtain prior judicial authorization to seize an IP address that is being broadcast in plain view to millions of other users over a peer-to-peer file-sharing network.

Law enforcement should have the ability, through prior judicial authorization, to obtain Internet subscriber information for longer than 30 days after an offender has exploited a child, thereby allowing them to find that offender and, in some cases, rescue a child being abused.

To be reasonable, investigative authorities for law enforcement must not unreasonably intrude on the privacy of citizens. On that, we can all agree. However, they must also be capable of accomplishing their intended purpose. It is not reasonable to expect law enforcement to protect society from crime a quarter of the way through the 21st century using search and seizure laws drafted in the 19th and 20th centuries.

OCSEIA believes that our input and recommendations will go a long way in assisting Parliament to find the right balance.

We are happy to take any of the committee's questions.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Thank you, Mr. Ullock.

Mr. Milinovich, you have the floor for five minutes, please.

Deputy Chief Nick Milinovich Deputy Chief of Police, Peel Regional Police

Chair and members of the committee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak about Bill C-22, an act respecting lawful access. This discussion sits at the intersection of two priorities that Canadians care very deeply about—public safety and privacy interests. As police leaders, we support both.

Crime has evolved significantly over the last decade. Organized crime groups, extortionists, human traffickers, fraud networks and—as we just heard—child exploitation offenders operate primarily through digital platforms, whereas many investigative authorities were developed for a much different technological environment.

The objective of Bill C-22, from our perspective, is not to weaken privacy protections or to expand unchecked government authority. It is to ensure that investigators can continue to lawfully obtain critical evidence in serious criminal investigations while remaining subject to judicial oversight, legal thresholds, accountability and charter protections.

Today, I would like to share the perspective from our front line, our investigators and our community, which has been affected deeply by crime. They have a vested interest in this topic. On their behalf, I urge the swift passage of Bill C-22, the lawful access act.

Our current investigative laws were built for a pre-digital world. Today, criminals are actively taking advantage of that lag in high-growth regions and diverse regions like Mississauga and Brampton. We are seeing tech-facilitated crime move at an entirely unprecedented rate.

Our teams are hitting systemic and artificial walls. We are watching active threats disappear into digital shadows, simply because our legal framework forces us to investigate 2026 digital sophistication with outdated analog tools.

Yesterday, our service announced the outcomes of one of the largest extortion investigations in our community. It started with a threat that was delivered digitally from an encrypted platform in November 2025. If Bill C-22 had been in place at the time, it would have resulted in a more effective and efficient investigation and the closure of those extortion threats.

In Peel region—and in Canada—police are combatting a highly disruptive rise in extortion rackets, human trafficking, child exploitation and a variety of other transnational crimes. Almost every single one of these cases shares an identical pattern. It starts with digital communication, an encrypted message and an online profile or anonymous IP address, before escalating into real-world violence on our streets and impacts for our community.

Right now, when a digital tip comes in, identifying the telecommunications carrier or provider that hosts that suspicious account can take weeks of bureaucratic back-and- forth. By the time we navigate that maze, the trail can be cold, data is deleted and evidence is lost. The reality is that criminals are continuing their activities and continuing to prey upon our communities.

I believe that Bill C-22 introduces the necessary measures to radically shorten our investigative timelines. It allows us to narrow down suspects and stop a series of criminal activities before they turn violent. It will allow us to prevent victimization and crime in our communities.

As law enforcement professionals, we swear an oath to uphold the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We do not want arbitrary surveillance capabilities in our community. Privacy and public safety must and can coexist, and I believe Bill C-22 strikes that balance.

As I mentioned, we recently arrested 17 people who were targeting our South Asian business community. This investigation, again, has taken seven months to date, and it is continuing. During that time, we believe that this group was responsible for firing over 320 rounds in our community. That's more than half of the rounds fired from illegal firearms in our community this year.

We are very pleased with the results, but as I mentioned, I believe it could have been quicker and more effective, and we could have prevented more victims of crime.

This is the case, again, for extortion investigations, but it's also been the case for homicides, national security investigations, human trafficking and, as we've heard, child exploitation, as well as a variety of other transnational crimes we are beginning to experience very locally in our communities.

Timely access to digital evidence has to be non-negotiable if we want to better locate victims and prevent community harm. I believe Bill C-22 provides the precise, transparent and judicially overseen tools we need to better do our jobs. We ask for your support to pass this vital legislation.

Thank you. I'd be happy to answer any questions.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Thank you, Mr. Milinovich.

Mr. Rankin, you have the floor for five minutes.

Murray Rankin Barristor and Solicitor, As an Individual

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to appear today. I'm pleased to be here to discuss Bill C‑22.

This is an important, complex and sensitive piece of legislation. It touches on public safety, privacy, cybersecurity, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the actual ability of police officers and members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to do their jobs in a digital world.

This debate is not merely technical; it's a societal debate. How do we protect Canadians from child sexual exploitation, fraud, extortion, terrorism and espionage, while safeguarding the fundamental rights that define our democracy? In my view, these objectives are not contradictory; they're complementary. Government access to information must be lawful, necessary, proportionate, clearly authorized and subject to effective accountability.

I served as the first chair of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, and that experience left a deep impression on me. It taught me two things. First, security and law enforcement agencies need modern tools. Second, these tools must be governed by clear legislation, an independent oversight body and Parliament.

That is why I strongly support the need for a lawful access bill. The digital world has changed the nature of investigations. Criminals, hostile states and sophisticated networks use technologies that simply didn't exist when many of our investigative tools were designed. Canada desperately needs a modern legal framework, but it must be a Canadian-made framework. It has to be compliant with our charter, privacy-protective, technologically realistic and subject to meaningful oversight.

I was pleased to assist in the consultation process following Bill C-2. I met separately with stakeholders from law enforcement, national security, industry, civil society, academia and privacy communities. In my view, bringing them together in one room was a very positive experience. People disagreed, sometimes strongly, but the process was meaningful. I believe my report reflects the range of perspectives accurately.

I was also pleased that the vast majority of my recommendations found their way into Bill C-22. The bill is now stand-alone. The information demand has been narrowed and reframed as a confirmation of service demand. The bill includes greater attention to oversight, transparency, cybersecurity and parliamentary review. That does not mean the bill is perfect. No bill ever is. The minister has said he is open to amendments, and I take that seriously. As a former member of Parliament, I have great respect for the work of parliamentary committees like this one. This is where legislation can be improved and made more durable.

In my respectful view, the task before you is not to choose between privacy and public safety; it's to insist on both. The bill should preserve operational effectiveness while protecting privacy, charter values and cybersecurity. It should protect privileged, medical and highly sensitive information. It should ensure that any new powers are used properly, by properly trained officials, and reviewed after a reasonable period.

I would particularly encourage this committee to focus on five issues: the clarity of the confirmation of service demand, the definition of systemic vulnerability, the role of the intelligence commissioner and NSIRA, transparency and annual reporting, and a mandatory parliamentary review after three years.

Finally, I believe the purpose of this legislation should be made plain. State access to information for investigative purposes must be lawful, necessary, proportionate and subject to effective authorization and accountability, consistent with the charter and Canada's privacy laws.

Thank you again for inviting me, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos

Thank you very much, Mr. Rankin.

Ms. Kirkland, the floor is yours for six minutes.

7:25 p.m.

Conservative

Rhonda Kirkland Conservative Oshawa, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you all for being here.

I would be remiss to not mention again that I feel like I'm drinking from a fire hose, as the phrase goes. There's so much information here. There are five different people. I would love to spend all of my time delving into each one of their opening testimonies, but frankly, we don't have the time to do that, which is unfortunate.

I know that you all appreciate the role of members of the opposition, specifically you, Mr. Rankin. I appreciate your being here. You were an opposition MP for a number of years, so you understand that sometimes in opposition it looks like you're just opposing when that's not the case. Those of us who are looking very closely at this want to get this right. I'm nervous that the role of MPs in opposition is being negated a little bit when we rush through legislation. Words like “dither” were used earlier, which I didn't appreciate, simply because we want to look at this in depth. It deserves to be done right.

In 2012, a Conservative government tried to do this and ended up having to back off because the Liberal public safety critic at the time had a real problem with it. This bill actually takes things a little further.

I got into a bit of a preamble, but there's so much I really want to dig into. I know I can ask you all privately, but that wouldn't allow Canadians and Quebecers to hear what they need to hear openly and in public.

Mr. Rankin, you mentioned the process you went through and the round tables. I'm really happy to see you here. I'm happy we did get a version of the report. It might have been redacted somewhat, but at least it's something. This was something I asked for, so I'm very happy to see it here.

How long was the process that you spent on this? If you were to put it in hours, would you be able to give that number, approximately?

7:25 p.m.

Barristor and Solicitor, As an Individual

Murray Rankin

Thank you so much, MP Kirkland.

Thank you for the reference to being an opposition politician and for the recognition that it was the role I played here. I respect very much what you said about not simply opposing but about an effort to make things right. Getting it right is critically important for a bill like this.

I think we have an opportunity, and it starts with the 2025 NSICOP report. All parties came together in that report to understand the need for lawful access. It was a very thoughtful report. That gives us an opening.

Some people say this is the seventh time we've tried. Some people say it's the ninth time. You referenced one of the Conservative efforts. It's just one of many. It's overdue. You've heard from all sorts of witnesses. I've listened to them talk about the fact that they're handicapped by not having the tools they need in a digital world.

7:25 p.m.

Conservative

Rhonda Kirkland Conservative Oshawa, ON

I'm sorry. I don't want to interrupt, but my time is limited.

You mentioned the round tables. Do you know how long you spent...?

7:25 p.m.

Barristor and Solicitor, As an Individual

Murray Rankin

I was coming to that. I would think it was between 20 and 30 hours. I'm just guessing.

7:30 p.m.

Conservative

Rhonda Kirkland Conservative Oshawa, ON

It was between 20 and 30 hours.

7:30 p.m.

Barristor and Solicitor, As an Individual

Murray Rankin

We had separate meetings with each stakeholder group and then a group meeting.

7:30 p.m.

Conservative

Rhonda Kirkland Conservative Oshawa, ON

That's good. In this process, our committee is getting between eight and 10 hours. I would love to get 20 to 30 hours to fully understand this.

I know you'll probably revert to some of the things you were saying. Were there any major concerns raised during the consultations that you believe could have been better addressed or that were not fully addressed or incorporated into the final legislation?