Public Safety Committee on June 16th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

I call this meeting to order.

Good afternoon, everyone.

Thank you for being here for meeting number 44 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

As you know, we're meeting pursuant to the House of Commons order of reference of April 30, 2026, and the motion that we adopted on April 30, 2026, to study Bill C‑22, an act respecting lawful access.

Welcome back to our distinguished witnesses. As we said last time, we're getting to know them very well. They must be getting to know us well, too.

From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Ramzi Nashef and Juanita M.

From the Department of Justice, we have Kimberly Gibner and Norman Wong.

From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Richard Bilodeau, Shannon Hiegel and Fenton Ho.

From the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, we have Chief Superintendent Richard Burchill and Sergeant Aaron Gilkes.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you again for being with us. We still have a lot of work to do today. As I've done a few times recently, I will encourage all members to be as efficient as possible when asking their questions.

According to my calculations and those of the clerk, we've spent 26 hours and 52 minutes studying Bill C‑22 so far, and only 10 and a half hours of that was devoted to clause-by-clause consideration. By my basic math, since we covered seven amendments during those 10 and a half hours, we would need another 270 hours of clause-by-clause consideration to complete our study of this bill. That would take us to the end of 2028.

I highly doubt that we want to continue debating this bill until the end of 2028, so I encourage all members to be efficient and disciplined during the proceedings so we can move forward as quickly and smoothly as possible.

(On clause 6)

That said, I would remind you that, at the end of our last meeting, we had finished consideration of BQ‑4 and CPC‑3. That brings us to BQ‑5.

Mrs. DeBellefeuille, would you like to move BQ‑5?

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Certainly, Mr. Chair.

I want you to know that I usually appreciate your sense of humour, but I think you went a bit too far when you speculated that, based on how much time we've put in so far, this study would go on until 2028.

Of course, if we had genuine co-operation among all parties, we could have done this in less time. However, I don't think there's really any room for discussion or debate when the government isn't necessarily willing to listen to our arguments or amendments.

I just want to put your humorous remark and tone into perspective. They did not sit well with me, as an opposition party member. I would have appreciated a bit more sensitivity from the chair.

Regarding amendment BQ‑5, this proposal stems from the brief submitted by the Barreau du Québec. As I'm sure you understand, the Barreau du Québec is, in my view, quite an important and credible witness. Amendment BQ‑5 reflects one of their recommendations. They propose changing the standard for making an order to disclose subscriber information from “reasonable grounds to suspect” to “reasonable grounds to believe”.

I actually supported the first part of the argument for “reasonable grounds to suspect”. I no longer recall which amendment it was, but I agreed with the government. However, this time, I think it would be more reasonable to introduce an amendment and change the threshold for obtaining the data.

With respect to this specific clause, I would like someone to explain to me how changing the threshold for accessing data and replacing “suspect” with “believe” in the context of the production order would hinder police work. This change would take us to a whole new level of accessing information and data. Why are you so attached to leaving it as is?

If my amendment is adopted, would that be the end of the world for police work?

Sergeant Gilkes, you're so good at explaining things clearly. Can you try to help me understand why the amendment proposed by the Barreau du Québec isn't a good idea?

[Aaron Gilkes, Acting Officer-in-Charge, RCMP Lawful Access, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

Thank you for your question.

The best way to explain this is to say that we usually make this type of request when we're at the beginning of an investigation. When we're further along in an investigation, we have tools, such as the general production order, that we can use to obtain information. I'm thinking of the contents of the records kept by the company itself.

At the beginning of the investigation, we usually try to find connections, whether it's a statement of some kind, an account or an activity. Normally, this is a period when we try to expedite the exoneration of an individual.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Do you mean “indict”?

[Aaron Gilkes]

No. I mean “exonerate”, that is to say, remove the individual from the list of suspects.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Okay. Sorry.

[Aaron Gilkes]

This isn't about incriminating the person. We can conduct some sort of verification and find that, in the end, there is a connection to one person rather than another, which will allow us to remove that person from the list of suspects and move on to another person on the list, for example.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

The question on my mind concerns the moment you gave me the same explanation, saying that all you want to know is whether or not the subscriber is receiving service. You told me that, at the beginning of the investigation, you just need grounds to suspect someone and that, based on that, you'll be able to continue your investigation.

Now, however, you're using the same argument to request an information production order. In my opinion, if you're requesting that type of order, it means you've progressed a bit further in the investigation. I'm not a police officer or a lawyer, but I can picture the situation. I agree with you. You've convinced me enough with your first argument.

Now, this is another tool for your investigation. It seems to me that you're exaggerating a bit when you say that you still just need to suspect someone, because you're at the beginning of an investigation. You're making the same arguments. You'll have to explain this to me, because I really want to understand.

[Aaron Gilkes]

As I mentioned regarding the confirmation of service, we need to identify the service provider to issue a warrant to obtain further information. This is one of our requirements for obtaining a standard production order.

Thanks to the confirmation of service, we can confirm that a specific company provides services to a specific telephone number or IP address, but we still don't know who the customer using that service is. We also don't know if there are other services available or offered by the company to the same person.

Normally, we use basic information—such as details that identify the person—to charge someone who claims they didn't access a particular account. If we confirm that company X is providing the service, we will then request information that supports the suspicion regarding the customer.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

You do mean “suspicion”, is that right?

[Aaron Gilkes]

Yes, I'm sorry.

Next, we'll request customer information to confirm that the person associated with this IP address is the person who made the report or complaint, or to confirm that it's a completely different person and that we need to pursue another lead. This allows us to determine whether the person who filed the report is not necessarily the person associated with the IP address.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

As I understand it, you want to keep the threshold as low as possible until you've linked the name to the right person, and then obtain a warrant.

As for linking the person to a telephone number, let's say I call you first. You ask me if Claude DeBellefeuille is a customer of the provider. The provider says yes or no to you. If they say yes, then you know my telephone number but not my name, and you continue investigating. However, by that point, it seems to me that you already have a pretty good idea.

If I add that you must have a good reason to continue the investigation—by having “reasonable grounds to believe”—are there currently any investigations where you tell yourself that if I don't give you that information, the investigation will end there?

I think you still have opportunities to obtain the information based on “reasonable grounds to believe” rather than “reasonable grounds to suspect”. Right now, you need “reasonable grounds to believe”, so you want to lower the threshold.

[Aaron Gilkes]

Yes, we want to lower the threshold, but the information that is available is also limited by the threshold. We're talking about a production order signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, so ultimately, it's a third party who will review the warrant and verify whether the request meets the threshold.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

At the lowest threshold?

[Aaron Gilkes]

If it is met.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

How could a lower threshold not be met if it's so low? It seems to me that with reasonable grounds to “suspect”, it's almost impossible for them to deny you that, isn't it?

[Aaron Gilkes]

It depends on the information being requested, and the information must be directly related to the information we've already collected.

As I mentioned, we're usually at the very beginning of the investigation and we have only one person's statement saying that a certain incident occurred. We have to build a case before presenting it to the judge.

We can't just say we believe it's true, simply “because”. We have to start conducting verifications. For example, we have to state that we've confirmed that Mr. So-And-So is a customer of a certain provider. We can then state that a certain individual is associated with a certain account. We then have reasonable grounds to suspect that this person may be involved in the investigation.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

You would have access to the data, since I don't see any reason why you would be denied that.

Basically, as we speak, you need to have “reasonable grounds to believe” before moving on to the next stage of your investigation. You want to lower the threshold to make it easier to obtain data to continue your investigation.

What surprises me is that it's a bit like the lawyers versus the police. All the lawyers, the Barreau du Québec, the Canadian Bar Association and many experts have told us that giving you this ability would be the wrong way to go.

I'm sure you're an honest person, an honest police officer. You have a flawless track record. However, we know that no one is infallible. We know that there have been corrupt police officers. We know that there have been police officers who have been infiltrated.

We have some questions. Lawyers in Quebec and Canada are recommending that we don't go down this path, and what you're giving me as testimony right now is not convincing me to withdraw my amendment.

I know that my amendment will be defeated, but that doesn't make me want to withdraw it. Honestly, if I felt I was on the wrong track, I wouldn't be embarrassed to withdraw it, because I'm not an MP who plays politics. I'm genuinely interested in the content, and I want to improve the bill. However, your examples aren't convincing me. If you have any others, I encourage you to share them with us, because right now, I'm not convinced of the merits of having such a low threshold to access that data.

Do you want to give me another example?

[Aaron Gilkes]

Yes, I can provide you with one.

We're in the process of building a case to eventually secure charges. The information we receive at the very beginning of the case is information that has to be corroborated afterward for charges to be laid. For example, even if we have an IP address, we have to link it to a device. We have to then link that device to a person, and we have to then confirm that the person linked to that device is the one who was behind the keyboard or is indeed the person responsible for the crime.

The information we seek at the very start of the investigation is all information that we have to then corroborate through other methods and other information, which we have to seek through other orders, other warrants or other interviews.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Mr. Gilkes, I'm going to conclude with this, because I wouldn't want to be accused of filibustering.

I know that, after conducting an investigation, you successfully charge people. The investigators are good, and they manage to secure charges. However, today, it's as if you're telling us that you can't catch criminals with the tools you have. However, I know that your success rate is quite significant. I believe in your intelligence and your experience. According to your testimony, it's as if it were a life and death situation.

You aren't telling me that you're currently doing a good job, that you're succeeding in catching criminals even though the threshold is a bit higher, but that it would be easier if the threshold were lower. To me, that isn't necessarily a good argument. What I always have in mind is that there has to be a balance between security and privacy. What I'm hearing right now is that it would be easier, but it isn't impossible, since you're already doing it. Your success rate isn't 0%. You're successfully catching criminals.

I don't want to belabour my arguments, but I have to say that I remain skeptical. Perhaps my colleagues will ask questions that will enlighten me more. I remain skeptical, but I don't want you to think that you haven't answered my questions well.

I'm wondering if this is a case of looking for an easy option. Basically, you're already doing your job very well, and you're asking the provider for confirmation. Why do you need a lower threshold to continue the investigation? I remain skeptical.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you for that excellent exchange, Mrs. DeBellefeuille.

Ms. Cody, you now have the floor.

[Connie Cody, Conservative, Cambridge, ON]

Thank you.

I really appreciate this time to ask some questions so that I'm a little bit more informed. I'm kind of new here with the bill. With my systems background, I'm going to have a lot of questions based on IT and such.

Bill C-22 contains two distinct parts. The second part, the supporting authorized access to information act, or SAAIA, is where the broad interception obligations, the ministerial powers and the electronic service provider requirements all live.

When we talk about the risk in this bill, we are largely talking about the SAAIA. Is that a fair characterization of where the most significant new authorities in this legislation are found?

[Richard Bilodeau, Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security Branch, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

I think both part 1 and part 2 are equally important to the lawful access regime. Obviously, from a technical and complexity perspective, part 2 is probably a little bit more complex and technical. However, I would say that both parts operate together to help give law enforcement the ability to gather the information they need to advance investigations.

[Connie Cody, Conservative, Cambridge, ON]

The government has repeatedly assured Canadians that this bill will not create systemic vulnerabilities. That assurance is carrying a lot—

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.