Thank you for that, Sergeant Gilkes.
I guess I'm having a bit of trouble with the idea that we shouldn't include this because there's sufficient supervision. You mentioned a judge. These will not just be issued by judges. They may be issued by justices of the peace who may have no legal training at all, so we could have a discussion about the level of supervision.
Leaving that aside for a moment, we're always reviewing this after the fact. Whether it's a confirmation of service demand or a production order, “Was it done correctly?” is always going to be asked after the fact. If the information violated solicitor-client privilege, that would be a basis to appeal, but it's up front to make that signal.
I want to provide another example.
In other circumstances, at least in terms of what I was able to find, this is specifically laid out in legislation. In the CSIS Act, there's a specific provision with respect to orders. It allows a judge to revoke or vary an order if they're satisfied that it would disclose privileged information. That's the same situation—a production order or getting information—but it's in black and white to make sure it's clear that information subject to privilege should be protected.
Why include it in some, such as the CSIS Act, but not in Bill C-22? We've already included it in another provision. I always look at an act and say, “Well, if Parliament says something in one section but doesn't say it in another section, that means something.” I would prefer to be consistent. I think we can all agree. I'm not going to talk about medical information because I don't have enough knowledge, right now, to speak to that, but I don't think there is disagreement that solicitor-client information should be protected under a production order or a confirmation of service demand.
The bill says that this would be protected under the confirmation of service demand itself, so why not be consistent?