Science and Research Committee on April 23rd, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 33 of the Standing Committee on Science and Research.

We are meeting today to resume our study on the implications of the Canada-China preliminary joint arrangement on Canada's electric vehicle sector.

As a heads-up to all members, I'll be saving a few minutes at the end of our meeting to discuss some committee scheduling.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of all witnesses and members. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

With that, I would like to welcome our witnesses for our first panel.

We are joined by Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, senior fellow at the University of Ottawa. She's here in person. We are also joined by David Shipley, chief executive officer and co-founder of Beauceron Security. Our third witness for this panel is Rachel Doran, executive director of Clean Energy Canada. She's joining us by video conference.

All of the witnesses will have five minutes for their opening remarks, and then we will go into our rounds of questioning.

With that, I'll ask Madame McCuaig-Johnston to start.

You have five minutes for your opening remarks. Thank you.

[Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, Senior Fellow, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

In my positions with InnovAction, the science strategy, the Prime Minister's national advisory board on science and technology, advanced manufacturing technologies and ADM positions at the Department of Finance, NRCan and NSERC, my career has focused on science and technology policy, programs and funding, including initiating Canada's technology road map for electric vehicles so that Canadian companies could be major players in the sector.

I have a master's focused on China and have spoken Mandarin since 1979, so I was often asked to lead delegations to China and help them build their R and D capacity. I therefore see China through the lens of technology. As I've focused in recent years on China's surveillance technologies, I've seen clearly the risks they pose to people in China as well as to Canadians. That's why I'm concerned with the prospect of Chinese EVs coming here.

I'd first like to address the serious risks posed by the Baidu software in the vehicles that are to be imported, including Teslas and other western cars made in China. Simply put, the data from the microphones, cameras and GPS are stored in China, where they can be reviewed by Chinese officials using algorithms. In addition, any firm or individual in China must spy for Beijing if requested.

We've seen that vehicles can be remote-controlled from China. A U.S. Department of Energy report says that a surge through the cars while they're charging would destabilize the electricity grid and cause brownouts. We simply can't have such vehicles on our roads. Any that arrive must use QNX software by BlackBerry with data stored in Canada. While QNX is used in some Chinese vehicles, Chinese authorities there require that their data be stored in China. This is not acceptable for cars coming to Canada.

Furthermore, I've done a six-year study of dozens of Canadian technology company joint ventures with Chinese partners. All of them have had problems, most of them serious. If we have joint ventures here in auto technology, we should have technology transfer to Canadian firms, but their foreign investment law says Chinese authorities are not permitted to require a company to share its IP with a foreign firm. Chinese officials may say they will try to do that, but in the final analysis they will say that their hands are tied. Also, there is a strong business culture in China that no technology must be shared outside the firm, so we shouldn't be expecting that to happen.

I've spoken elsewhere about the risks of the aluminum in the vehicles as coming from unpaid Uyghur forced labour. With increased attention being devoted to that issue, I and several others wrote a constructive letter to the Prime Minister about the gaps that Canada has in 2026 regarding its forced labour policy enforcement, in contrast to what it was doing just last year. Canadians don't want to be driving cars made by slaves.

In addition, it's critically important that we be in a strong position to defend our enforcement of forced labour policies in the face of the U.S. section 301 investigation that will assess Canada's current practices. If they determine that we've dropped the ball, all Canadian products entering the U.S. could face tariffs of 25%.

Worse, while we've called for verifiable transparency in supply chains, Beijing brought in a new national security regulation on April 7, after our letter to the Prime Minister was sent, that prohibits anyone in China from revealing any information on their supply chains. Executives of foreign firms asking whether products come from Xinjiang could be banned from leaving the country, or worse. Why would Beijing pass such a regulation? It is because they don't want anyone to know.

Now we're left to accept that the aluminum is made with forced labour, but importing products made in whole or in part with forced labour into Canada is illegal. Given that, I don't see how we can import the cars at all. However, we know a consequence could be Beijing punishing our canola farmers for the fourth time. We should be diversifying our canola trade away from China as a top priority or find that every Canadian foreign policy is subject to Beijing's approval.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

Thank you.

With that, we will now go to Mr. Shipley.

You will have five minutes for your opening remarks. Please go ahead.

[David Shipley, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder, Beauceron Security]

Thank you so much, Chair and committee members.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear again to talk about this issue.

I want to begin with a simple truth. The issues I'm going to speak to are not about Chinese vehicles only, and they are not limited to electric vehicles. I'm going to focus on the issues around connectivity. I've provided images to help you understand what I mean. Unfortunately, I can't share them by screen, but the clerk has sent them to your emails.

Exhibit A is a photo that shows the display of the modern software-defined car that comes from Hyundai's user experience lab in Seoul, which I recently visited. Exhibit B shows a modern steering wheel. It's important to note that there is no mechanical link to the front wheels. It's drive-by-wire. Software controls the steering. Exhibit C is the wireless connectivity functionality and secure gateway systems in this computer on wheels. Exhibit D is the fuse box, which is the last, best opportunity to intervene for safety and privacy.

The architecture that I have shown you in those images isn't unique to Hyundai or electric vehicles. It's in almost every new Ford, Toyota and Honda in Canadian driveways. An F-150 is just as much a computer on wheels. So is a Civic, and so on. If someone can connect to them, they can find ways to hack them.

In 2015, security researchers remotely took over a Jeep Cherokee on a highway, with a Wired magazine journalist behind the wheel. They cut the transmission at speed, and later demonstrated control of the steering and brakes when the car was in a parking lot. One vulnerability forced the recall of 1.4 million vehicles.

Little has changed in vehicle cybersecurity over the past decade.

Last year, researchers at Black Hat Asia demonstrated how they compromised a 2020 Nissan Leaf through its Bluetooth connection, pivoted through the internal network and set up persistent remote access over the cellular modem. From there, they controlled the doors, the wipers, the horn, the camera, the in-cabin microphone and the steering wheel, including while the car was in motion. It took Nissan more than 18 months to resolve that.

Earlier this year, a cyber-attack took down a Russian alarm system provider serving multiple car brands. Thousands of drivers could not unlock their cars or start their engines. Some reported engines shutting down while they were driving.

If anyone on the committee believes that the hardware and software designed outside of China are immune to their advanced, state-sponsored hacking teams, the examples I provided show evidence to the contrary. All software can be hacked.

Banning Chinese-branded cars will not stop China's advanced hacking teams. They will redirect their efforts. They will look for holes in every other manufacturer. They will look for holes in the cloud platforms that every automaker now runs, and they will find them.

The risks are not unique to Chinese EVs, and it would be a catastrophic mistake to think they will not hack other cars to achieve the same objectives. China has demonstrated the capability and the audacity to hack into even the most sensitive government systems. They can and will hack connected cars.

Last year, we learned that a Chinese state group called Salt Typhoon lived inside AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile and at least six other American telecoms undetected for three years. They compromised the very wiretap systems the U.S. government built for itself. Canada's own cyber agency co-signed the public warning. They broke into those same systems again this March.

By the way, China did not invent this playbook. The Snowden disclosures showed that western governments have pressured companies to compromise technology in the interests of their states. If we are going to take this entire issue seriously, we need to take it seriously for every vehicle on Canadian roads, from every jurisdiction.

Now I want to focus on what keeps me up at night. Espionage and privacy are real risks. They are serious, but they are not at the top of my list. Physical safety is. A compromised phone can leak your location or listen to conversations. A compromised car, at 100 kilometres per hour, is a two-tonne weapon.

The pool of people who could wield that weapon is widening. State services are no longer our only concern. Concerns now include a domestic abuser tracking a partner through a vehicle app, a grievance-driven misanthrope egged on by online radicalization groups like “The Com”, and a ransomware crew. Apps and AI tools are lowering the skill floor for exploitation, and Canada does not have a framework to detect, deter or respond effectively to any of this. We are behind, and the risk grows every day—not only from the PRC.

I made recommendations earlier this year to the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology that would help us address these risks.

The first is a physical disconnect requirement. Every connected vehicle sold in Canada should include a clearly identified hardware switch or fuse—a real one, not a software toggle—that can sever cellular and wireless external communications at the owner's discretion. This power-down is the last, best option. No, AI can't override physics.

The second is a connected car bill of rights—

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

I apologize for interrupting. Can you quickly wrap it up, please?

[David Shipley]

Sure.

Have a connected car bill of rights so that people can have guarantees around security.

The third is security as a baseline regulatory requirement. We would never allow a car on Canadian roads with defective brakes. We should not allow cars on Canadian roads with known defective cybersecurity.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

We will now go to Madame Doran. She's representing Clean Energy Canada.

Please, go ahead. You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

Thank you.

[Rachel Doran, Executive Director, Clean Energy Canada]

Good morning, members of the committee and Madam Chair.

Clean Energy Canada is a national think tank at Simon Fraser University that is focused on advancing the country's energy transition.

I want to acknowledge, as the other speakers have spoken to, that this committee is studying a complicated issue involving geopolitics, security and a technology shift. These are issues that attach to much of the relationship and trade between Canada and China, as China is Canada's second-largest trading partner.

To zoom in on electric vehicles for a moment, there are a few key facts.

Electric vehicles will save Canadians money, period. Electric vehicles reduce carbon emissions over their lifetime versus a fossil fuel-powered vehicle, period. Electric vehicles are at the bottom of a long ladder of technologies that we can electrify to improve efficiency and affordability in people's lives, which is why they're the first technology to kick off a global shift to electrification, period.

The last period is this: The global auto sector is undergoing a rapid transformation. EVs are expected to make up 30% of new sales worldwide this year, and 40% by 2030. China is poised to see a sales share of around 80% by this time. China bet on electric vehicles almost two decades ago and now has a head start in technology, producing cost reductions and exports that can dominate global markets. You can't have a strategy around the future of transportation without having a China strategy, period.

In the summer of 2024, when Canada first announced the 100% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles, we noted that the federal government had had an opportunity to take a measured approach that balanced the priorities of traditional automakers in Canada's local industry with the needs of affordability-constrained Canadian consumers and our climate. Instead, Canada started with a 100% tariff approach—one that mirrored only the U.S. at that time—while Ethiopia, Australia, Brazil, the U.K. and Nepal gained access to lower-priced Chinese EVs and experienced the massive savings that come with these vehicles. Our recent analysis shows that in Canada these savings can be between $23,000 and $32,000 over 10 years of vehicle ownership. This year, we ran those vehicles that are currently on the market in a comparator of two popular Chinese models—without the federal rebate—that could make their way to the Canadian market potentially. These figures were before the recent hikes in gas prices.

To be clear, Clean Energy Canada does not support fully opening domestic markets to Chinese EVs at this time, but if Canada wants to have an auto sector in the future, let alone a competitive one, we need to be able to produce high-quality, affordable EVs and the parts and materials that go into them. “Technological and production cost reduction advancements by Chinese automakers and battery manufacturers present an opportunity for Canada to diversify its electric vehicle supply chains through strategic partnerships.” That's not Clean Energy Canada. That's the chief economist of TD Bank in 2025.

While unrestricted exposure risks wiping out domestic industry, controlled competition forces domestic manufacturers to step up their game and learn. Joint ventures can help bring technology and know-how to our manufacturing base. This can all drive innovation and productivity gains, while leading to better cars for consumers. Take the EU, which reached 27% new electric car sales in 2025. It maintains tariffs on Chinese EVs, but these are lower and more flexible tariffs. It has over 20 EV models available at sub-$40,000 Canadian price points. Only seven of those are from Chinese brands and 10 are European.

Chinese EV manufacturing plants have led to investments up the supply chain for local suppliers. Last June, BYD announced that Voestalpine, an Austrian steel manufacturer, will supply their $6-billion EV plant in Hungary. Similarly, Forvia, a French car parts supplier, has signed a deal with BYD's second EV factory in Turkey. Some local suppliers have cited falling demand from existing automakers as an issue that Chinese automakers can make up for.

A two-pronged approach of selective exposure to Chinese EVs and opening the market simply back to 2023 levels, or below 3% of the market, plus preferential market access for domestic producers, is a better path for Canadian auto sector competitiveness into the future.

At the end of the day, the Canadian government also needs to be standing up for Canadian consumers. Canadians want these vehicles and believe they'll be of high quality. Our January 2026 polling shows that more than one-third of Canadians are open to buying a Chinese EV. Among the 50% of Canadians who are interested in an EV generally, 70% expressed varying levels of interest in getting a Chinese one.

By allowing the sale of a limited number of Chinese EVs into Canada at a lower tariff rate, and by reserving a rising portion of this quota for EVs with an import price of less than $35,000, Canada is making the right choice. It's focused on creating the affordable EV segment we've been missing, while setting us up for success in a swiftly changing global market.

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

With that, we will now start with our first round of questions, with six minutes each.

We will begin with MP Baldinelli for six minutes.

Please go ahead.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today.

Ms. McCuaig-Johnston, I'm going to begin with you, if I could.

The Liberal government wants to call importing Chinese EVs an affordability measure.

Do you think vehicles made with forced labour and that collect and transmit Canadians' personal data and information back to Beijing undercut our Canadian auto sector, which employs hundreds of thousands of Canadians in good-paying jobs? Do you think this could ever be considered a good affordability measure for the Canadian public?

[Margaret McCuaig-Johnston]

I don't, and I'm very concerned about our auto workers.

There was no consultation with our Canadian auto manufacturers in the course of these negotiations. You see this by the fact that they weren't aware of things they should have been aware of—things like forced labour for vehicles and software risks with vehicles.

I will mention, specifically, the EU tariffs, if you're talking about affordability. The EU tariffs have been up to 35% lower, but the EU has found that this is eating into not just comparable competition among EU vehicle manufacturers but also, even, combustion engines and used car sales. They're getting rid of the tariffs. Vehicle manufacturers in China can opt for them, if they want to. SAIC has opted to keep its 35% tariff. The others are negotiating prices that will be at the same level as the competition.

What we're doing here in Canada is the reverse. We're going way below the competition. When I say “competition”, we've heard that Chinese EVs will be just 3% of the Canadian car market. Well, look at electric vehicle sales. You heard the number at this committee of 30% of electric vehicle sales. That's if you include buses and electric vehicle trucks. I asked the president of Electric Autonomy to cut the numbers for me in order to carve out the autos and SUVs. The number of sales in 2025 was 123,000, so 49,000 of that would be 46%, not 30%. That rises to 70% quickly, and that's way more than half—57%. Chinese EVs, within a couple of years, would be getting way more than half of all the EV sales in Canada last year.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON]

To follow up, during your most recent appearance at the industry committee, a Liberal government member questioned your credentials and expertise as an expert witness who can credibly speak about forced labour taking place in China. I'd like to give you an opportunity to comment on that.

Also, a recent United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights release, issued in January, is entitled “UN experts alarmed by reports of forced labour of Uyghur, Tibetan and other minorities across China”.

That release says:

According to the experts, forced labour in China is enabled through the State-mandated “poverty alleviation through labour transfer” programme, which coerces Uyghurs and members of other minority groups into jobs in Xinjiang and other regions.

I'd like to get your comments.

[Margaret McCuaig-Johnston]

Thank you very much. I appreciate the member's question.

I also appreciate the fact that this has raised the issue of forced labour sky-high. A group of us has taken the opportunity to write to the Prime Minister to propose areas where we think Canada has backtracked this calendar year on its enforcement of forced labour, and what we can do to get back to what we were doing just last year. This is really important if we're going to be successful in the section 301 investigation.

I must say that the member who took me to task at the last meeting was lauded in state media in China. The story went all across social media in China. He's a hero and I'm a zero. That's a problem for me because I have a lot of friends and former colleagues in China with whom I can't communicate now because I'm sanctioned. I can't tell them what happened and what the impact has been here. I've been hearing from a lot of Han Chinese. They've been saying that they, too, have been subject to forced labour in China. That's something I'm going to be responding to.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON]

Could you table with this committee the letter that you've written to the Prime Minister?

[Margaret McCuaig-Johnston]

Yes. I've given that to the clerk, and it's being translated by the industry committee.

[Tony Baldinelli, Conservative, Niagara Falls—Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON]

I don't think members of the public are aware of the U.S. investigation under 301. It's an investigation with regard to forced labour and is investigating, I think, up to 60 countries. What is the impact of that, and what could the impact be on our CUSMA negotiations?

[The Chair, Liberal, Salma Zahid]

I'm sorry for interrupting. Maybe you can come back with those answers in the second round. Time is up for MP Baldinelli.

Now, we will proceed to MP Noormohamed for six minutes.

Please go ahead.

[Taleeb Noormohamed, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

I want to thank all the witnesses for being here.

I want to begin by saying that I have, for a very long time, like others from all parties, been deeply concerned about workers' rights—not selectively. I think issues that many have raised in China and other parts of the world are real concerns that we should be mindful of in the agreements that we strike and in the way that we position conversations that we have.

I'm sorry, Professor McCuaig-Johnston, for the challenges that you are now dealing with.

I want to bring us back to the conversation that we are having here about domestic issues related to Chinese EVs and their sale in Canada. I also want to talk a little bit about the broader question of data, because you and a couple of other witnesses have mentioned data, the ability of cars to be taken over, and so on and so forth. We've heard from Mr. Shipley about the issues related to cars being taken over and these challenges.

Professor McCuaig-Johnston, are you concerned about Polestar 2s that were sold in Canada prior to 2025?

[Margaret McCuaig-Johnston]

I haven't looked into that particular brand.

[Taleeb Noormohamed, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

The Polestar 2s were manufactured in China and were sold in Canada prior to the 100% tariffs and then were no longer sold in Canada as part of the agreement or the JV with Voler and those cars. Should we be concerned about cars that were manufactured prior to 2025 as well?

[Margaret McCuaig-Johnston]

I would say that it entirely depends upon the software that's used. If it's Baidu software, then yes. If it's QNX, then I would want to double-check that the data is being kept in Canada.

[Taleeb Noormohamed, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

Digging into the question of data, given the complexity of Canada's relationship with the U.S. right now, given the ownership structure of Tesla and given Elon Musk's relationships, for example, with the U.S. government and with U.S. government decisions in respect to data that is stored in the U.S., should Canadians be equally concerned about information that their Tesla might be gathering that will then be living on U.S. servers that the U.S. government could access, if it so chooses, under the CLOUD Act?

[Margaret McCuaig-Johnston]

Certainly, the Teslas that will be coming—and some have already come—from Shanghai use Baidu software, so that's Chinese—

[Taleeb Noormohamed, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

I'm talking about the ones that are already in Canada. That Tesla data is stored on U.S. servers.

[Margaret McCuaig-Johnston]

I wouldn't be as concerned because we have seen China's malign intent towards Canada in a much larger way than we have from the U.S. I know that we have a very erratic U.S. President right now, and I know that there's a significant concern about U.S. fighter jets that store their data in the U.S. and that data must be controlled and updated from the U.S. as a condition of sale.

It's a good question. I would want to look at what might be done with the QNX software and with BlackBerry keeping it in Canada. If we're going to do that for Chinese EVs, then we should do that perhaps for U.S. EVs as well. That's not a bad idea.