Evidence of meeting #25 for Status of Women in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was caf.
A video is available from Parliament.
12:20 p.m.
Bloc
Andréanne Larouche Bloc Shefford, QC
My next question is for Mr. English.
You talked about your objective for 2026 in your presentation. How can it be ensured that this objective is worked on and improved? I would like to hear you expand on recruitment and retention issues.
12:25 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of History, Queen's University, As an Individual
I based most of my comments on that on the 2016 Auditor General's report on recruiting and retention. That's the one to look at, I think, because it goes into great detail on all of the things that are broken with the Canadian Forces' recruiting and retention system.
It also says we've been reporting on these same problems since 2002, and they haven't been changed. This is why I think external oversight is critical. The forces keeps promising to change, but without any external oversight the changes aren't made, and the Auditor General just makes recommendations. He recommends, but nothing gets done. Right now with the latest figures I have, in 2020, according to the target that was set in 2016, the Canadian Forces should have been up to 19% women. It's at 15.8%—say, 16% now. They're 3% behind, and with a broken system and no plan and no strategy, the Auditor General doesn't think they're going to get there.
12:25 p.m.
Bloc
12:25 p.m.
Conservative
12:25 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Thank you so much.
In the testimony that we just heard in the previous session, I'm a bit concerned because the brigadier-general from the provost's office consistently said that he was entirely independent, that his office operated independently from the command structure, and there seemed to be no sense of a need to change that.
However, repeatedly, from Madame Deschamps, from all of the studies that we've seen from the Auditor General, from you both here today, we've consistently heard that independence is key. Can you comment on the disconnect between what we just heard and what we've heard during this entire study—and what we heard from you today—in terms of that independence of the one group within the CAF that could actually lay charges, that can do those criminal investigations on sexual misconduct?
12:25 p.m.
Professor, Department of Defence Studies, Royal Military College, As an Individual
Madam Chair, if I may, I'll start and then let my colleague join in.
Based on the testimony that was given by the previous witness, I think we need to recognize that these things don't happen in isolation. When incidents occur, there are commonly other witnesses. There are people that friends talk to. When an individual makes the decision to formally lodge a complaint, it can commonly be with the chain of command. There's knowledge and awareness of an incident prior to it going to CFNIS and a formal investigation.
We also recognize that once investigations get started, despite the caution that investigators may give to individuals, they may be talking to others as a result of an interview. One of the problems in all of this is the rumour mill. These things can never remain completely isolated.
I wouldn't suggest that the issue is the internal processes. I know a lot of work is being done by the military police to ensure they conduct very professional investigations, but I think we need to recognize that they don't happen in a vacuum. I think the broader context of colleagues and superiors who may have some knowledge, who are prepared to talk about things.... I would say, quite honestly, we've seen over the last three months that there's been significant speculation in the public domain about senior officers, despite the fact that an investigation has yet to be completed.
We need to put it in a broader social context, and we go back to culture. Part of the culture needs to be a respect for confidentiality. There need to be people who recognize that it's inappropriate to say anything. When I hear a juicy rumour, I'm not going to pass it on to my friends and post it on Facebook. It's that kind of respect for colleagues that needs to be built into the culture so that we can minimize the harm that is created when people speak up and speak out.
Thank you.
12:30 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of History, Queen's University, As an Individual
We have to remember that everyone in the military culture is influenced by this informal culture, including the military police officers, military judges, prosectors, everyone. There's so much discretion in the system, in the rules and regulations, commanding officers' discretion, investigators' discretion, supervisors' discretion. If their discretion is influenced by their own lack of belief in the problem, then they're going to exercise that discretion in ways that may be harmful to the complainant.
12:30 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Ultimately, they are within the command structure entirely. Even though they say they are entirely outside of the command structure, they cannot be separated. That's what you're....
12:30 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of History, Queen's University, As an Individual
They may be outside of the command structure, but they're not outside of the culture. They live and breathe in that culture, and they get ahead or don't get ahead in that culture. That is more influential than any formal wiring diagrams or chains of command.
12:30 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
One of the things that we heard from Ms. Stéphanie Raymond was the belief and the understanding that those who rise up through the ranks become very popular. They are protected. They are given a great deal of.... We talked about power today, but that power just continues to grow. That's seen from the bottom right through to the very top. As CDS, someone has, one would expect, the most power, the most popularity, and those around him—or, hopefully one day, her—are protected entirely.
You said that there are the formal and the informal cultural influences. Leaders are supposed to speak to at least the formal, but when they don't take that responsibility, what occurs? I'd like to expand that, actually, to political leaders not taking responsibility for some of these actions.
Could you comment on that, both of you?
12:30 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of History, Queen's University, As an Individual
I can start with the formal and informal. I'm not an expert on political leaders, so you might want to talk to political scientists about that. I'm just going to speak about the military.
In the military, there's also formal and informal leadership, and a lot of the attributes that popular leaders exhibit are ones that conform to the culture, so if you have a toxic, misogynist culture, people who behave that way get ahead and are admired.
Until the culture is changed, unfortunately, with those same kinds of influences, people look up to these leaders. We've had lots of examples where the survivors are intimidated. For the right or wrong reasons, people admire the leaders and they follow them. Until the culture is changed, not much else is going to change, I don't think.
12:30 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Marilyn Gladu
All right. We'll go to our second round of questions, beginning with Ms. Sahota for five minutes.
12:30 p.m.
Conservative
Jag Sahota Conservative Calgary Skyview, AB
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses as well.
You talked about changing the culture. My question is in line with that. We have heard through the media and testimony at this committee and the national defence committee that unresolved sexual misconduct and abuse of authority allegations remain against serving generals and admirals. You cited the overwhelming power of the hierarchy.
In your opinion, Dr. English, would future CAF culture change attempts be at risk if current senior leaders are not held accountable for past offences?
12:30 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of History, Queen's University, As an Individual
That's a tricky one. I think I'll speak more to culture change. I think certainly one of the key ways to deal with culture change is to change the demographic. That's the idea of bringing the number of women up to 25% and to change leadership.
It's a long process, and the armed forces are very good at short, sharp activities and not very good at long-term activities like culture change. That's why I think you need an external body to hold these leaders to account. If they say one thing and do something else, the external body should be right there saying, “Oops, you didn't do that,” and be able to tell them—not just be able to report it and have them say, “Sorry. We didn't really mean that. We'll try again.”
That gets us back to, if you have effective, independent external oversight with authority to actually compel change, then you might get somewhere.
12:35 p.m.
Conservative
Jag Sahota Conservative Calgary Skyview, AB
Dr. English, you mentioned in previous testimony—and I'm picking up where my colleague MP Wong left off—that leadership “buy-in” is essential to Operation Honour succeeding. You also mentioned that “lack of acceptance” permeated throughout leadership in the CAF. Given the testimony of other witnesses, both at national defence committee and here—specifically the ombudsman—it would appear that a lack of leadership “buy-in” and acceptance is not limited to just the CAF. The Minister of National Defence has staunchly refused to accept any responsibility relating to the endemic culture of sexual harassment in the CAF and has gone so far as to deflect blame onto bureaucrats, which is in stark contradiction to other testimony.
Dr. English, how important was it for the Minister of National Defence to buy in to the recommendations made by Justice Deschamps and be part of “guiding strategy” as it relates to Operation Honour? What issues arise when the minister refuses to accept responsibility for failures under his watch?
12:35 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of History, Queen's University, As an Individual
I'm going to speak as a historian. We deal with the past. I'm not very good at the present, so you might want to ask my students in 20 years when all the documents are available.
One of the methodologies of historians is to deal with the complete record. Unfortunately, what we often have right now are incomplete accounts of what's happening. Let me just go back to the one time when there really was effective change in the Canadian forces with external oversight. That was after the Somalia affair.
The minister took direct involvement in making change, and he got a lot of resistance from the senior leaders of the armed forces. He brought in a minister's monitoring committee, some of whom had been members of the Somalia commission, and they advised him directly and he directed change. From a historical example, whether it's the minister or some other external body—and maybe that's why it should be entirely external from DND—someone with an interest in making change, historically, has been the kind of person who's made the change.
12:35 p.m.
Conservative
Jag Sahota Conservative Calgary Skyview, AB
What we've seen so far from the top, including the minister, are platitudes and policies that don't attack the root cause of sexual misconduct. Of course, the minister's in charge of the management of the entire Canadian forces.
Dr. English, could you comment on what should be done at the most senior management level?
12:35 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of History, Queen's University, As an Individual
Again, I'm a historian, and as a historian we just don't have enough information on that. Again, you might want to talk to a political scientist. For me that's current affairs, and I don't do current affairs. I'm sorry.
12:35 p.m.
Conservative
12:35 p.m.
Liberal
Anita Vandenbeld Liberal Ottawa West—Nepean, ON
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I want to start by echoing the role of historians. I did my doctoral studies with Dr. Bercuson and Dr. Granatstein back in the day, so I'm a historian myself.
My first question is for Professor English.
You've talked a lot about the chain of command and about power disparities. We have heard testimony in this committee that it is really hard, that it is incredibly complex, when you are reporting a sexual assault and the perpetrator, the aggressor, is a superior. I wonder if you could give some of your recommendations that would allow for a better environment for people to be able to come forward.
12:35 p.m.
Associate Professor, Department of History, Queen's University, As an Individual
That's one that I'm not expert on, but let me just say that this is not a problem unique to the armed forces. There have been many examples in the news of other organizations where people are bullied, harassed and prevented from coming forward.
I think the key in this is to have a body that's completely external to the organization to make a complaint to. If you can do that and if that body can actually influence what's going on in the organization, then I think you have a way of making change. That's about all I'll say on that.
12:35 p.m.
Liberal
12:40 p.m.
Professor, Department of Defence Studies, Royal Military College, As an Individual
Thank you. I would offer two comments.
One of the things that I think is important to do is a bit of a differentiation between formal investigations of sexual misconduct—and I think there have been some clear recommendations suggesting there needs to be greater independence in those processes—and the other part we've talked about, which is the culture piece.
Putting in place mechanisms to allow members of the military, and particularly junior members, to flag that “there's something wrong here”, whether it's toxic leadership, a poisoned workplace or an unhealthy work environment.... Giving people an opportunity to flag that “there's something that isn't right here” and to say “come in and take a look at it” gets at the root causes and actually can get us to the stage where we can prevent the harm in the first place. Then there are other things that can be done and that I think can increase the confidence of victims to come forward and report.
12:40 p.m.
Liberal
Anita Vandenbeld Liberal Ottawa West—Nepean, ON
Thank you, Professor Okros.
How important is it to have an independent body of trauma-informed counsellors who can advise the victims, the survivors, through the reporting process?
12:40 p.m.
Professor, Department of Defence Studies, Royal Military College, As an Individual
I think those individuals are critical and, as I think was mentioned in the previous testimony, I would suggest that it's not only supporting the victims. This is the part that I think is critical of the education program that is required across the military. Again, my comment was on people who have become ethically numb and morally mute. They're not aware of the consequences of trauma. They don't understand where people are living and what they're dealing with.
I think there needs to be a significant education program down through the chain of command to sensitize people so that they understand the harm and the damage. That's why I referred to it as a “moral injury”. That, I think, is an important part of the education that really needs to be conducted.