Transport Committee on April 15th, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

Monsieur Laframboise.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm going to come back to you, Mr. Mignault, because I didn't have time to finish my remarks earlier.

I am aware that you are defending the inspection system today, but I remind you that, in the context of the safety management system's implementation, when this committee questioned the fact that the government was cutting the number of inspectors, no one in the industry came to defend the pilot inspectors or the Transport Canada inspectors. So be it, but when you want an oversight service, you have to provide the required staff and the budget. The pilot inspectors and inspectors also have to receive training on the new technology.

Today I hope you will agree that there will have to be enough pilot inspectors and inspectors and that the budget will have to make it possible to deal with all the new technologies. Would you be in favour of that recommendation?

[Capt Jacques Mignault]

Mr. Laframboise, I'm not in a position to judge the number of inspectors required, but I can tell you that Transport Canada's oversight and inspection functions are still necessary. The nature of those inspections or of that oversight must adapt to developments in this new system. In other words, we're looking at how the system works rather than merely checking a flight in the context of an inspection. We manage to make oversight combinations. I'm saying you have to adjust to this new situation and adjust our oversight.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

Once again, they timidly say that they are aware there must be a balance and spontaneous checks to ensure that—

[Capt Jacques Mignault]

Absolutely.

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

All right. That was one aspect that wasn't clear four years ago. Things change and so much the better. The government, it has to be agreed, understood that we had to ensure the number of inspectors and budget were sufficient. The ICAO made the same recommendation. The safety management systems were implemented after September 2001 to reassure the public. That was an addition that was made. The problem, among other things, is that the former government thought it could save money on the inspection system, but that was not the way to go. You have to add a more substantial oversight level and make the business accountable.

In addition, you told me earlier, with regard to what the TCA people stated, that there were still reprisals. You said the system was evolving and attitudes had to be changed. In other words, there may have been reprisals, but, in the industry, you're trying to change things so that voluntary disclosures are part of the culture and that is well supported. The problem I'm dealing with as an elected member is that people tell us about the need to enforce an act such as the one in the United States to protect those people, a slightly more restrictive act.

[Capt Jacques Mignault]

Based on my experience, the framework for the entire implementation of the SMS, which is non-punitive, is robust enough to deal with eventual situations of conflict where the normal investigation process you referred to could not be followed. I can't comment on specific cases I don't know about, but I can tell you that the tools are currently in place to ensure confidentiality and—

[Mario Laframboise, Bloc, Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, QC]

The problem, Mr. Mignault, is that you represent all the businesses. You know that these are economic cycles. We've seen businesses, including travel agencies, shut down recently. There may be reprisals at businesses that are not doing so well, but we must ensure that passengers do not come to any harm as a result of that, and that's our objective. Yours is probably the same.

[Capt Jacques Mignault]

I'd like to make a comment in conclusion. This entire system is based on trust. It's important that we establish that within the business. That's why my mandate, as safety manager, is really to ensure that we maintain this framework of confidentiality and trust through which we can lead people to tell us about their concerns. I can assure you this is in the spirit of the SMS.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you.

Mr. Richards.

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Wild Rose, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to all of you for being here today. I'm sure that all of you share with Transport Canada and with all members of this government a common goal of continually improving airline safety.

During testimony we had from Transport Canada department witnesses last month, I particularly remember Marc Grégoire, the assistant deputy minister, informing this committee of the seriousness with which the department takes its oversight role. I believe he mentioned that three-quarters of the department's budget is dedicated to safety and oversight. He also noted how Transport Canada, as Mr. Barone of CBAA stated in his opening remarks, is considered a world leader in safety management systems.

When the department was here, Mr. Grégoire himself said something to the effect that the world is watching Canada on this issue of SMS and that other countries were inspired by our system. But one of the most interesting things he offered in support of his claims that day was, I thought, mentioned almost just in passing. He said that Canada's rate of 5.7 accidents per 100,000 flying hours in 2008 is our lowest rate in the last 10 years.

We know that one of the ways in which you can improve on what you're doing is to know what you're doing well and what you're doing right and to try to build on that and improve on that. My question is for any of you or all of you who would be interested in answering it. If that rate is going down, what, in your opinion, might be the reasons for that, and what can we do to build on them?

[Sam Barone]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Richards, SMS is not a complete removal of oversight; it is an extra layer. It is the promotion of a corporate culture at all levels, not only on the shop floor, but at very senior levels, strategically, and at CEO levels, to ensure.... But I would say that you don't rest on your laurels; that it's an approach of continuous improvement. As well, what's important is not only what you do know, but what you don't know, and you have to try to manage those risks at all times.

We're still proud of our safety record. However, one accident is one too many, in our view. We definitely think that SMS is a contributing factor because it has taken this away from just the shop floor and has made everyone throughout an organization accountable for aviation safety.

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Wild Rose, AB]

Thank you.

I certainly would agree with your assessment that one accident is one too many and that we always need to do more. We're doing a lot of work, I think, throughout the industry and through Transport Canada, but we can always do more to ensure safety.

I appreciate you being here today.

Did the other group have a comment?

[Capt Michel Chiasson]

I think we should be very proud of the record as it is, but even if the record is zero per 100,000, that doesn't mean that we can take time off to rest. It means that we have to continue in the pursuit of safety, because we have to be ever-vigilant. We can never rest on our laurels. All we can do is improve. I share with my colleagues the view that one accident is not acceptable. A zero rate is something to be proud of, but that doesn't mean we take a rest.

[Bernie Adamache]

I would just like to add to that. You asked why we are leading in this. I think it's because intrinsically in Canada we've allowed the companies or asked the companies to take on internal investigations, probably far more so than any other country has at this particular point. It's that path that has led us down to where our employees themselves.... Even the cleaner who's cleaning the hangar floor, if he sees something on the floor, he picks it up; he knows that it could cause an accident if it is not dealt with. I think it's that leadership that has taken us to where we are so far.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

As a small business owner, I know how difficult it is to change direction in a company. You often think that because it's small, it should be easier. I knew all my employees personally, and when we made a culture change, it quite often was a very long and time-consuming process. I share, I think, some of the challenges you may be going through in trying to implement these kinds of changes.

I wish you well in the future as you proceed. Thank you very much for attending today.

We're going to take a short two-minute break and invite our next guests to the table.

Have a good day.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Welcome back.

We now have joining us, from the Canadian Federal Pilots Association, Mr. Daniel Slunder, the national chair. He knows the way the committee works, so I would ask him to please proceed.

[Daniel Slunder, National Chair, Canadian Federal Pilots Association]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning. My name is Daniel Slunder. I'm the national chair of the Canadian Federal Pilots Association. I'm here to provide you with an update on the status of SMS from the perspective of licensed pilot inspectorate professionals, who once conducted inspections, audits, and enforcement actions, but who now do mostly paperwork involved with SMS assessment in program validations.

At my last appearance before your committee, I presented the results stemming from the lack of traditional inspections and audits. The issues we identified occurred because inspectors had been forced to focus exclusively on SMS assessments and validations instead of audits and inspections. In short, aviation inspectors have not been watching the safety practices of the aviation industry as they once did. In our opinion, and in the view of many outside experts, the absence of traditional safety oversight represents a serious risk to the travelling public.

Following my last presentation to your committee, we met with Transport Canada officials. The department wants to work cooperatively to resolve some of the pressing safety issues we identified. We're encouraged by this turn of events, and cautiously optimistic, particularly given Minister Baird's recent decision to return business aviation to direct Transport Canada supervision. There are, nevertheless, formidable safety concerns that remain.

Aviation safety incidents reported through CADORS, the civil aviation daily occurrence reporting system, continue to increase every year. They have increased from a reported 4,000 incidents in 2000 to 14,000 incidents last year. This is troubling, as CADORS incidents are generally precursors to or indicators of a larger safety issue. Traditionally, many CADORS incidents were investigated, resulting in enforcement action, yet when we searched the records for the last two years, we find no record of any enforcement action against large operators. Let me repeat: there have been zero enforcement actions against large operators during the past two years.

Transport Canada has always insisted that SMS is an additional layer of safety over traditional oversight. In the interests of public safety, there is an urgent need to reinstate a traditional oversight program that has atrophied during the introduction of SMS.

Transport Canada officials made some encouraging announcements. They testified on March 30 that their goal is to assign 70% of the inspectors' time to SMS validation and 30% to the traditional type of inspections.

The principle behind this announcement is welcome, but the reality is far less encouraging. As you've already heard, the latest version of TC surveillance policy requires that 100% of SMS assessments and validations must be completed before inspectors are free to conduct traditional audits or inspections.

For inspectors, Transport Canada's number one priority right now is to roll out SMS at airports. Next will be the hundreds of small 703 and 704 operators. Today it is impossible to accomplish all SMS tasks; therefore, we will continue to turn a blind eye to safety concerns in aviation operations. Even though SMS assessments and validations are largely a paper exercise, they take an extraordinary amount of time.

CFPA members report that it used to take one week to conduct an audit of a typical operator. Under SMS, there is one week spent preparing for a validation; the site visit requires two or three days; and the validation report takes a week to produce. It easily requires twice as long to assess and validate a company's SMS. Meanwhile, inspectors are reporting to me that scheduled surveillances and inspections are being cancelled.

Before Transport devolved business aviation in 2005, there were five person-years assigned to monitor 150 certificate holders. Now, with business aviation under regulatory surveillance, inspectors will have, as you've heard, up to an additional 400 certificate holders to review and monitor.

Perhaps you've heard that Transport Canada is hiring inspectors. This is a step in the right direction, but it amounts to a band-aid gesture when major intervention is required to restore traditional oversight to the much-vaunted additional layer of safety for the travelling public.

Consider that the professional pilot inspectorate represented by the CFPA has reached near historic low levels. Approximately 100 positions are currently vacant. At the supervisory level, there are 40 vacancies. Like cascading dominoes, this has the effect of pulling working level inspectors away from their day-to-day responsibilities to backfill supervisory jobs for which they were not trained.

Transport Canada has hired 20 working level pilot inspectors in the last year, ending in February; during the same period, 27 inspectors left Transport Canada, for a net loss of seven front line pilot inspectors. This puts into proper context Transport Canada's plan to hire 100 additional inspectors, the majority of whom will not be professional pilots. Even after these new hires, it will be impossible for inspectors to complete their SMS assignments while devoting 30% of their time to traditional oversight activities.

In order to achieve the additional layer of safety concept, Transport Canada needs to restore the working pilot inspectors to the pre-SMS levels of approximately 500, then add 30% more inspectors, for a total of 650. This task will not be easy given the demographics of the professional pilot inspectorate at Transport Canada.

In 2008 the CFPA commissioned the well-known demographer, Dr. Linda Duxbury, to study the licensed pilot inspectorate. Professor Duxbury concluded that we face a crisis in aviation safety oversight, arising from an aging workforce. More than half of this workforce is eligible to retire starting next year, taking our most experienced professionals out of the picture. With no effective program to retain inspectors or recruit replacements, Duxbury said that we are heading for a “very high potential for a shortage, a huge and profound shortage”.

I have circulated a backgrounder to give you a sense of our conclusions. Transport Canada officials testified to your committee that they must shuffle internal departmental resources to make ends meet in the civil aviation directorate. TC seems to be doing the best it can with available resources, but it's not good enough. To protect the travelling public and achieve the much-touted additional layer of safety, which requires the restoration of traditional oversight, Transport Canada needs a significant infusion of resources. That decision rests with elected officials like you.

The absence of traditional oversight is not the only problem with Transport Canada's SMS. You will recall from my previous appearance that I told you about a troubling incident with an Air Canada flight. Due to a number of circumstances that piled up one on top of another, a number of serious violations of Transport Canada's safety regulations occurred, including refueling with engines running, which placed passengers at risk.

This incident became public only because an experienced pilot on board as a passenger reported it to me. In addition to the hot refuelling, he was concerned about the presence of ice on the wings. The concerned passenger/pilot reported this incident to Transport Canada and, under SMS, it was referred back to Air Canada to address. Even though serious infractions of the safety regulations occurred, no TC action was taken, and Air Canada has full responsibility to address the incident and no obligation to report their actions.

We'll never know what action Air Canada has taken to address this incident because TC's SMS provides airlines with immunity from enforcement action and complete confidentiality for self-reporting. This amounts to a veil of secrecy. So you and the public will never know.

To end on a positive note, I'm happy to report to you that Transport Canada has listened and recognized that SMS training for inspectors is an issue and must be addressed. There is a plan to introduce a revitalized course in September. Overall, senior management at Transport has improved communications with us and is attempting to address issues that were previously highlighted.

Thank you for giving me the time to present this.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Volpe.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Captain, thank you very much for coming before the committee again. I recall the last time you came and your concerns at the time; this time, I think you're even a little more direct. It's troubling, actually, not because you're direct, but because of what you have to say.

I'm sure you chose your words very carefully, but in your presentation you said that “the absence of traditional safety oversight represents a serious risk to the travelling public”. In another committee hearing having to do with vehicles, as opposed to air equipment, I made the very serious statement that, in the face of these kinds of statements and backed up by evidence, the minister's or the regulator's indifference to these facts verges on negligence bordering on criminal negligence.

If we're talking about the safety of travellers, once a plane is up in the air and there's a problem, that problem usually translates into a fatality. Now, because you said this very deliberately, I'm just wondering whether it was your intention to shock everybody into that reality.

[Daniel Slunder]

My members have been reporting to me that in some areas they're now being told that they're not going to look at the 703 and 704 operators the same way they did before, mainly because they're so short-staffed and everything is focused towards implementing SMS at airports. This is the stepping away that we're noticing now.

In other areas, I'm told that despite being told to pull back, the managers have taken it upon themselves to continue and add a certain element of traditional inspection. That's not listed in any of the documentation that Transport Canada provides to the inspectors on how to conduct inspections.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Captain, as you know from past appearances before this committee and from—I'm sure you've monitored—the presence of Transport Canada, along with that of some of your colleagues from the industry a few moments ago, we've talked about establishing a different culture, a culture that focuses on safety first, for the client as well as for those who provide the service. I think you probably heard a few moments ago that it's “corporate safety” rather than flight safety.

In my mind, if you're going to establish a different culture, you're going to have to recognize new conventions, but those conventions have to be identified. The processes have to be constantly reinforced.

I'm getting from your presentation that not only are those conventions not identified, but when they are, they're not reinforced. That's an accusation that you make on the second page of your presentation. In fact, you're even more blunt than I would be accused of being. You've said that “we will continue to turn a blind eye to safety concerns in aviation operations”. That's not a rosy picture like the one I heard a few minutes ago.

[Daniel Slunder]

In fact, we're not looking; that's the difficulty. So we may as well be blind, because if we're not looking at what's going on in the industry, the result can be somewhat significant.

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

I appreciate that, Captain, but.... You use another word here...the fact that we're giving some of the big carriers “immunity from enforcement”. But softer language is where we say “no whistle-blower type of information gathering”, so in other words, there are no penalties associated with reporting issues.

But once those issues are reported, something has to happen with them. By suggesting that there has to be an “enforcement”, there's a punitive component to that. Don't you see a dissonance between non-punitive reporting and the request to ensure that you have enforcement mechanisms in place?

[Daniel Slunder]

Transport Canada still maintains that they can enforce and they can apply punitive measures. It's still a tool that they say is available to them, but they're not using it.