Mr. Speaker, I draw your attention to identical provisions which appear in three bills recently tabled, namely clause 18 in Bill C-46, clause 17 in Bill C-52 and clause 8 in Bill C-53.
In Bill C-46, the provision reads as follows:
- (1) The Minister may, subject to any regulations that the Treasury Board may make for the purposes of this section, fix fees that the Minister considers appropriate in respect of products, services, rights, privileges, regulatory processes or approvals and the use of facilities provided by the Minister, the Department or any board or agency of the Government of Canada for which the Minister has responsibility.
Once in effect, this clause will reduce Parliament's control over increases in government revenues. Although the process is not new, the enactment of such measures will result in greater powers of taxation.
It is important to note that, in 1991, some very controversial amendments to the Financial Administration Act considerably increased the power of the executive branch of government to impose fees and costs through legislation.
These amendments are found in Chapter 24 of the Statutes of Canada, 1991. Although they are questionable in some respects, the clause contained in Bill C-46 is even worse. Indeed, that provision allows the minister, or an official authorized by the minister, to fix discretionary fees within the department.
Sections 19 and 19.1 of the Financial Administration Act already provide sufficient authority to the Executive without making it necessary for Parliament to once again increase its power to collect more money.
At the time, members opposite fought tooth and nail against those amendments. I guess times change.
Clause 18 in Bill C-46 allows the minister to impose fees or increase those already applicable, without having to resort to any legislative instrument that would have to be registered and published under the Statutory Instruments Act and that could be reviewed by a competent parliamentary authority such as the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations. This is due to the fact that the clause allows the minister to set the costs but not to do so by order. The words "by order" were omitted from the bills now before the House. Those words are very important in the British parliamentary tradition, as they have always transferred to the executive power, that is, the Governor General in Council, the enforcement of all legislation.
I find this process unacceptable. If ministers can increase public revenue as they see fit, it would be logical for the relevant documents to appear at least in the Canada Gazette , which is accessible to all Canadians.
One of the main functions of this Parliament is to ensure fair and equitable taxation. Let us try to imagine what the Auditor General of Canada must do, in preparing his annual report, to find out if taxpayers really paid what they owe the government. The question would be: how much do they owe? The rule of law, a principle treasured by our constitutional monarchy, is being superseded today by the rule of the minister. An important point is the extent of the discretionary power that the minister gives himself in this clause.
This government's usual approach is to entrust its ministers with highly discretionary powers totally inconsistent with the most basic principles of sound fiscal management. Clause 10 of Bill C-22 concerning Pearson Airport, so strongly denounced by the Official Opposition, is a good current example.
The minister's authority is not limited to setting costs or charges appropriate in respect of goods or services.
Under Section 19(2) of the Financial Administration Act, the minister does not have to prescribe an amount up to the real costs in respect of a service provided. The use of these very subjective terms means that, from now on, the minister has the discretionary power to set costs above the real value and, secondly, that these discretionary decisions will not be subject to any kind of legal review.
I find it extraordinary that Parliament can delegate to a minister the power to decide by how much he will increase public revenue other than through taxes submitted and debated in the House of Commons.
Canadian courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have recognized the principle of domanial duality in administration. For those not familiar with this notion, it can be explained as follows: a truck used to move government household effects is government property, while a bridge is public property but useful to the general public. That is the distinction. That is what the courts call domanial duality.
The government could, for example, charge $20 an hour by ministerial order for the use of its truck without advertising or enacting regulations, but it could not charge a passport applicant for the full administrative cost of issuing the passport. The cost could vary depending on whether the application was sent to officials working in a run-down building in Montreal or in luxurious quarters in Toronto.
Finally, I am troubled by the description of the items for which the minister will be authorized to impose service charges and user fees.
This concept was picked up in the Financial Administration Act and was one of the main points of the Liberal opposition when it proposed amendments in 1991 concerning the power to charge fees for rights. You will see how the Liberals argued then.
I find it wrong for Parliament to say on one hand that a citizen has a legal right, or is entitled, to receive certain benefits and on the other that it authorizes the executive to charge a fee to have this right or benefit recognized. A right is a right; it is not something that an individual has to buy from the government.
I am trying to understand this new power to ask people to pay for regulatory processes. That is the term used in the clause in question: regulatory processes. This expression is so vague as to be meaningless.
What is a regulatory process? The clause itself rules out any recourse to the regulations. Or is "règlement" used in the French sense of reaching an agreement? By giving the word "règlement" this common meaning, agreement, the English version of the same clause would be meaningless, since it also uses the term "regulatory process". But what is it?
Also note the extended opportunity to collect funds through permits and licences and by other means.
In this context, it is clear that regulatory consent is similar to a licence or a permit. However, that is not the case with clause 18. The Financial Administration Act and this clause can lead to abuse.
It is plausible that a minister facing a deficit may increase his revenues by charging fees for every consent he gives; this will just lead to a new regulatory scheme to impose a basis for collecting new charges.
It is true that the power granted by clause 18 would be subject to the regulations that Treasury Board could make for this purpose.
Since it is not certain that Treasury Board will exercise this authority or, even if it did, that it would impose restrictions on the minister's discretionary authority, it is quite logical to think that the public's concerns are justified.
The citizen cares little whether what he is paying is called a tax, a charge or a fee: it is disguised taxation. Mr. Speaker, you will agree that this new Liberal tactic of collecting public funds by all sorts of devious means is much more like highway robbery in the last century than the forthright collection of fair charges related to a particular expense. They are changing the maxim from "ignorance of the law is no excuse" to "guess right".