Debates of Feb. 17th, 1994

Defence Policy

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

Before I recognize the hon. member for Labrador, the member for Fraser Valley West reminds me that like all new members in this 35th Parliament he has learned his lessons well in a very short period of time and that within one question there are many questions to the hon. member for Labrador.

Trying to respect the standing orders with regard to time limits of speeches in questions and comments, particularly in a debate such as this one which is of great importance to all Canadians, and wanting to give as many members as possible the opportunity to participate, I would ask the co-operation of everyone so that we might be able to get on the record the participation of as many members as possible.

[Bill Rompkey, Liberal, Labrador, NL]

Mr. Speaker, I take your point and will be brief.

On the last point, let me just say that I would foresee an increasing role for the reserves in the Canadian Armed Forces. We are committed to the total force concept, as was the previous government. We will be studying the comments the Auditor General has made on the inadequate integration of the reserves. However, suffice it to say that I see a continuing and increasing role for the reserves in the Canadian Armed Forces. Indeed, approximately 30 per cent of our people in Bosnia are reserves.

I take the point concerning locations of representations. I assure the hon. member that the committee will want to travel all across the country. The committee wants to hear from as many Canadians as possible, including those who traditionally have been part of the armed forces establishment and those who are simply interested.

With regard to the minister's comments this morning about the white paper following on from the committee report, if the member reads the blues, he will see the minister said that the government would not necessarily be totally governed by the report of the committee. He did go on to say, I think if the blues are checked, that the government would ignore the committee report at its peril.

I simply took that as the minister giving himself enough latitude to be the government, as is his role, but saying very clearly that this is a serious process and that we do want to hear recommendations and to hear policy formulated from the parliamentarians of Canada after listening to the people of Canada.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Verchères, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the government is inviting us today to a third debate on Canadian defence policy. Going against all logic, the government started this series of debates by asking the House to reflect on two special aspects of such a policy, namely the role of Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia, and the

testing of cruise missiles over Canadian territory, before letting us know the general direction of its intended defence policy.

Today, without any warning, the government is asking the House to debate the main thrusts of our new defence policy using as a base a vague and general document which has been handed out to members at the very last minute. Moreover, the government assumes that a defence policy can be considered independently from foreign policy, which is not the case. There again, the government carefully avoided to unveil its intentions regarding the direction it will give to this new foreign policy.

However, since we must accept the general format decided upon by the government for this debate, I will say that we first need to put this question in the general geopolitical context of the day, because it is this context which determines the choices Canada will have to make when defining its defence policy.

It might be useful to recall that at the end of the second world war, the world split in two distinct blocs, the western bloc and the eastern bloc, which set up two competing military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, that Canada joined in 1949, and the Warsaw pact.

At the end of the cold war, toward the end of the eighties, this polarized political situation changed drastically. The Warsaw pact dissolved, leaving NATO without any apparent rival. Therefore, western countries do not seem to be facing any readily identifiable threat. World stability is no longer the result of a balance of power between two groups. New nuclear powers are gradually emerging, and they often are politically unstable. Under such circumstances, it became difficult for Canada and its allies to question the collective security system which had determined their defence policy during the cold war.

On another level, the decreased influence of the east bloc countries and Russia on international issues had a direct impact on the political and military stability in several regions of the planet. Yugoslavia and the ex-Soviet republics are the most striking examples of that.

Some regions have also tried to take advantage of the new division of strategic powers to assert their political and military presence in their part of the world. The Persian Gulf war remains the most striking case, in line with the new configuration of global politics.

In response to the emerging political balance, NATO countries reviewed and then modified their defence policies. The same process went on in Canada and, in 1992, the government presented a new political statement to replace Perrin Beatty's white paper dating back to 1987.

The defence policy of western countries was readjusted in several ways. First, the most important measure in my view was to reduce the defence budgets; since exterior threats were no longer comparable to those that prevailed during the cold war, defence did not require as many resources as it did in the past. The armaments industry was affected directly by that readjustment because its markets shrunk considerably. In arms producing countries, hundreds of thousands of people were laid off and Canada was no exception.

Second, on a more strategic level, was the review of potential sources of outside threats. Under the new international order, the danger of an east-west conflict has greatly diminished. The new dangers, as identified by NATO members, stem from the regional conflicts which have been emerging in various parts of the world over the last few years. Canada shares this point of view, as attested by its 1992 policy statement.

Third, the political and strategic mandates of the major international organizations are being totally redefined. The UN and NATO are two cases in point.

The United Nations organization, through the Security Council, is increasingly being asked to take action in conflicts arising in various parts of the world. The latest ones, the gulf war and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, herald new trends which have a significant impact on the national defence policy of western nations.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for its part, seems to be willing to take on a much bigger role since the disintegration of the Warsaw pact. Originally designed to ensure the mutual defence of its member countries, NATO is now seeking to modify its defence mandate in the north Atlantic to become more closely associated with the United Nations organization, as its military arm whose role would be to enforce the mandates given the UN by the Security Council.

This trend is reflected in negotiations on the use of air strikes against Serbian troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

As a member of two major international organizations, NATO and the UN, Canada cannot and must not withdraw from discussions on these issues. The international situation is very unstable, and it would be extremely dangerous to renege on our international commitments.

As you know, Canada does not have the necessary resources to provide for the security and full defence of its vast territory.

This given has had a decisive factor in Canada's defence policy for several decades, as can be seen by this country's participation in joint security systems established through NATO and NORAD. It would also be unrealistic to think Canada is not affected by changes in the global political situation. We must realize that Canada can play a strategic role at the international level and, in return, rely on its international

alliances to guarantee the security of its territory. That was the gist of the 1992 policy statement.

The statement replaced the 1987 white paper which, as I said earlier, was drafted in a cold war context. The new defence policy was intended as an adjustment to the new international situation. It pointed out the risks that continued to exist from a strategic point of view, despite the collapse of the Warsaw pact, and perhaps I may quote the following:

The nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union remain sufficient to devastate this continent. At a time of ongoing instability in the Commonwealth of Independent States, prudence requires that we take these capabilities into account in the formulation our defence policy.

The size of our country, its strategic location, and the limited resources that we can devote to defence mean that, for the foreseeable future, Canada will maintain its long-standing relationship with the United States.

Until further notice, this policy statement is still the Canadian government's official policy on national defence. A few adjustments have been made, however, including the renewal of the Canadian-American agreement on cruise missile testing. Furthermore, with its contingent of peacekeepers, Canada has also helped redefine its role within our international institutions.

As far as strategy is concerned, we have seen that the geopolitical context is changing very fast. As I said earlier, this development should not necessarily be interpreted as a portent of a new era of peace. The carnage taking place in various parts of the world should give us some indication that is not the case.

It would be illogical to think that just because the world is no longer divided into east and west as it was after World War II, we should abandon our role within the joint security systems.

The concept of threat should not be perceived only as being inherently linked to the concept of territory. Should the conflict in the former Yugoslavia spread beyond its borders, for example, Europe and NATO would be directly involved. The catastrophic consequences of such a scenario are serious enough to make us realize how important it is to have a defence policy which is not only intended to protect the territory of Canada or Quebec, but also takes into consideration the security of our strategic and traditional allies.

During the last election, and many times since October 25, the Bloc Quebecois has reaffirmed its support for cuts in the budget of the Department of National Defence. Despite the international context I have just described, we believe that we could cut that budget by some 25 per cent without dramatically impairing the operations of that important department.

Reducing the budget of the Department of National Defence by 25 per cent does not mean that we should withdraw from our obligations. On the contrary. The Bloc Quebecois is not advocating the total elimination of all major equipment procurement programs, though we believe some should perhaps be abandoned.

These programs remain important if Canada is to live up to its international commitments, but the rapid changes on the political scene worldwide make it necessary for western countries to redefine their defence policies on an ongoing basis. Canada is no different.

A new government has been elected and it is now its responsibility to propose new directions, in terms of defence, that can adequately address these rapid and fundamental changes that are occurring throughout the world. In this regard, you will note that the Liberal Party of Canada had already stated some of its positions while sitting on this side of the House, in the opposition, and during the last election campaign.

But it is worth pointing out, Mr. Speaker, that this is not the first time that the Liberal Party sends conflicting and unclear messages about its defence policy. Let me just remind you that, in the early seventies, under Pierre Trudeau, the Canadian government tried at first to distinguish itself from its American neighbour, but later, in the early eighties, its positions got considerably closer to the Americans'. As evidence of this, it is interesting to note that it is the Pierre Elliott Trudeau administration that first authorized cruise missile testing on Canadian soil in 1983.

Let me also remind you that Prime Minister Trudeau had taken on an international peace mission while at the time increasing considerably national defence budgets and authorizing the purchase of sophisticated equipment in order to support Canadian defence policy. I am thinking, for instance, about the acquisition of CF-18s and the first order for new frigates intended for the Canadian navy.

While sitting in the opposition, the Liberal Party often blamed the Conservative government for being too conciliatory with the United States. It did not keep the Liberal Party from reaffirming its support for the cruise missile tests last January, even though many of the top members of the party had objected to such tests. It is not easy therefore to anticipate what the main orientations of the government will be on the issue of national defence.

Yet, on a political level, it is important that we make sure the government determines in the very near future the thrust of new defence and foreign affairs policies that will be credible, clear and feasible.

It is too late to go on listing platitudes like they have been doing in the red book until now. The Liberal Party is in office; it must act responsibly and stop pretending it is consulting people

in order to gain time. Consultation is definitely a good thing, but it does not relieve the government from its obligation to reveal its intentions and the general principles of the policies it wants to implement. Discussion is valuable only if it is based on solid grounds.

The House of Commons is now in its third emergency debate on issues that are not supported by an honest and concrete national defence policy. What is even worse is that those debates do not seem to lead to any well defined policy.

Such an attitude is totally inappropriate. At this stage of the discussion, we denounce resorting to emergency debates on a national defence policy when the government has not even presented its new white paper on the subject.

I also seriously question the creation of a joint committee of the House and of the Senate to study and define the direction Canada's new defence policy should take. I doubt it is pertinent and financially sound as an operating procedure.

Since there is already a House standing committee which has been given the mandate to study defence issues, we believe a joint committee would only duplicate its efforts, with all the expected drawbacks as far as efficiency and cost effectiveness are concerned. We think the government must avoid such expensive practices which only go to demonstrate that the Senate of Canada is useful and its existence fully justified. This inference alone should lead us to question the relevance of keeping this antiquated and archaic institution.

[Fred Mifflin, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a few comments on what the hon. member for Verchères had to say and pose a question to him.

He made reference to the fact that this is the third debate we have had in the House on the armed forces in a hundred days. He spoke of this in a negative sense. I suspect there are those in the country and many members in the House who would look on that fact as being very positive. Certainly members of the armed forces welcome a discussion on their business. Three discussions in a hundred days is more than we have had on national defence in the House in the last 10 years. I see that as positive.

The member says these discussions are about defence policy, that we are going to have a defence policy today. I remind him that in the case of Bosnia the fact that we have a peacekeeping capability and would peacekeep is defence policy. Whether we would continue to leave peacekeepers in a particular location is a national operational decision. It is not a policy decision.

On the business of cruise missiles the minister made it quite clear on February 3 when he answered a question that we had agreed to participate in the cruise missile testing, but on the understanding with the American government that future testing would be determined by our defence policy. It is unfair for him to do that.

I have a question for him. He says that we are buying time. The red book said that we would have a defence white paper by the end of this year. That is what we are doing. It was clear. It was telegraphed months ago, almost six months ago. By the same token he says this is all wrong because we cannot make policy in these decisions; we have to study it properly. Then he says we are just biding time and goes on to say that what we really need to do is to cut defence by 25 per cent.

Does the hon. member want a policy to decide what we want to do, or does he want to cut it by 25 per cent? He cannot have both.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Verchères, QC]

Mr. Speaker, listening to my hon. colleague, I hear a lot of things I never said. First of all, I would like to say that I went out of my way to point out that such a debate was highly desirable, and highly praiseworthy, but that we cannot have a discussion just for the sake of it. To have any productive discussion, we need a policy paper to give a direction to the debate.

When we had the debate on whether Canadian peacekeepers should stay in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia, and the debate on allowing further cruise missile testing in Canada, we, on this side of the House, criticized not the relevance of the debate nor its very nature, but the fact that the debate was going on before the government had presented its overall policy or the general direction of its defence policy.

My hon. colleague is quite right when he says that cruise missile testing and peacekeeping are part of Canada's overall defence policy. Consequently, as far as we are concerned, it is totally illogical to proceed backwards and, as I said before, put the cart before the horse by debating certain specific aspects of the defence policy before we even had a chance to discuss that policy as a whole.

In view of such criticism, we thought that the government had gotten the message. Obviously, it has not. It is back today with this debate on Canada's defence policy, without any policy paper or guidelines, except for this short paper we were given only this morning.

I think that we should have received this document much earlier so that we could have been apprised of the government's concerns and questions regarding defence policy. They only gave it to us this morning. How are we expected to have a

worthwhile debate under such conditions? What I was criticizing in this debate was not its relevance but the way it is taking place.

[Fred Mifflin, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, in my introductory comments on welcoming this opportunity to speak I said how great it was that we had three parliamentary debates on national defence in a hundred days which was more than we had in 10 years. Certainly I welcome that. I know members of the armed forces and members of the House welcome it. I see it as very positive.

The premise under which we are discussing today is that for the first time, certainly in my memory, parliamentarians are having a look at and listening to what the country has to say to determine what will be the defence policy. In my memory a white paper has not been written as a result of a parliamentary committee. I welcome that. It is the way it should be done. Instead of people behind closed doors putting together documents on premises that may or may not be right, I believe this is the right and proper way to produce a white paper.

By way of introduction I want to give some indication of how I plan to organize my thoughts today. I want to have a look at the traditional way we have gone about producing defence policies in Canada. Then I want to expand and have a look at some of the factors that have changed which may cause us to rethink our traditional way of producing our defence policies. Then I want to give some examples of those general discussions in the time I have.

To begin with, Canada's traditional approach to defence planning has been affected by many factors. Many of them cannot be changed. We have the country's political evolution and, to a certain extent, our post-colonial sense of dependence. This was thrown off at Vimy Ridge but it still remained for a few years after. We have our vast expanse and remoteness. We are the second largest country in the world. We have three oceans. We have the world's largest coastline. We have our physical contiguity with the world's most powerful state and, above all, our own peculiar political culture and the effect on how we govern ourselves.

The formulation of a clear policy in Canada is never a simple or easy matter. In my opinion Canadian defence policy has seldom represented a deliberately chosen course of strategic direction or a fully integrated element of national purpose and object.

For more than four decades the basic premise on which Canada's defence policy was based was the cold war. That was the background against which we defined our security interests. That was the reference point for the setting of priorities and the making of decisions.

The 1964 white paper was based on the view that if there were a war it would be nuclear and over quickly, thus precluding the practical use of conventional or reserve forces.

The 1971 white paper cut back military numbers but expanded their roles: protecting our sovereignty, defending North America, upholding NATO, domestic emergencies and UN peacekeeping.

The 1987 white paper considered nuclear powered submarines, new tanks, bases in the north and forward operating bases for F-18s as essential to our defence, at a time when the cold war premise was about to come to an end.

It also, incidentally, seriously considered the total force concept, calling up a force in reserve to complement forces in being.

The latest policy statement issued by the minister of defence in September 1991 represented a useful, but I believe long overdue clarification of a change in orientation. If one really views it in its pure terms, the document was more of a rationalization of incremental decisions that had already been taken more than a suitably thoughtful re-examination of the basis for future policy development and planning.

The premises have changed. It is now time to measure policy against those changes and on that basis work our way to decisions that will serve our national interest.

To begin with we are now living in a period of technological change that can justifiably be called a second industrial revolution. Advances in microelectronics, genetic engineering, materials, space and telecommunications have turned industrial planning upside down.

When we factor in the deeply embedded and substantive trends in the physical environment, human rights, demographics, trade and economic patterns, it suggests a climate in which the traditional business as usual view of defence planning is unlikely to work.

I believe also the concept of national security is changing. Today it must be recognized that military might does not wield the same amount of national power it did yesterday. Indeed, the relative power of countries is now determined by an increasing interplay of economic and military factors which together with the fragile disposition of modern political systems is a major consideration.

The emerging democracies in eastern Europe for example, in Latin America and elsewhere will only add stability to their respective regions if they are seen as capable of tackling their domestic problems.

National security in the future may be just as concerned with environmental issues and the ability of a nation to feed itself as it is with the size, nature and structure of the armed forces

shaped from the time honoured need of maintaining territorial sovereignty and security.

The Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska comes to mind. So does the collision early in this decade between a U.S. and a Russian nuclear submarine near Russia's Arctic naval base in which some experts suggest that had the submarines collided at a different angle, both may have sunk instantly before their nuclear reactors could have been shut down.

Economic and social developments, while traditionally considered important in determining national interest, have today taken on a new significance for military planning as states struggle for independence and to protect markets and access to resources vital to their domestic economies.

Interruption in the flow of oil out of the Middle East for example was a major consideration in Canada's going to war for the first time in 40 years in the Persian gulf in 1992.

Similarly, the concern of Atlantic Canadians, my own province and the Atlantic provinces, over the survival of their northern cod stocks may very well involve maritime forces responding to foreign overfishing on the nose and tail of the Grand Banks in a big way.

The hon. member for Labrador this morning spoke of this and other national and sovereign imperatives that we will have to consider. Therefore I will not cover that.

I now want to cast my eye internationally. At the end of World War II we ended up with 60 countries in the world-recognized entities as countries. As a result of revolutions and decolonialization, countries breaking up, today we have three times that many countries in less than 50 years.

In these 180 countries of the world, there are 4,000 languages and as many religions. What is interesting about the composition of the countries is it is responsible for the trend that we see today. That is that 60 of these countries have populations of one million or less and 40 of them have less than 200,000, less than most of the smaller provinces in Canada.

More important, and I think it is germane to the argument I am making, less than 10 per cent of these countries have a homogeneous ethnic population and less than 5 per cent have an ethnic group that accounts for more than 75 per cent of the population.

I believe what we are seeing is an explosion of nations downward and inward to the point where they are really comprising the smallest ethnic and religious groups.

In the last four and half years we have been involved in the world and in Canada in more peacekeeping operations than we have in the last 40 years. If we take the trend that I spoke of earlier and look at the increasing intolerance of religious, social and ethnic groups one for the other, it is my thesis that the demand for peace operations is going to increase in scope, in number and in complexity.

Let us look at some very simple examples. Political instability has us involved in Cambodia. The inability of Somalis to provide food for themselves had us involved there. Ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia has us involved there. Canadians are asking why, why? These are some of the things that our defence policy will address.

The simple answer is that Canada is a major trading nation with a multicultural make-up and it is in our national interest to invest our national resources to maintain a more stable world.

The traditional concept of national security is also affected by the uncertainty as to what might be a new pattern of world order to emerge following 45 years of a relatively stable cold war environment. I would suggest that history tends to work that way. History tends to work in pattern, certainly in my lifetime.

The most recent example I suppose I can quote is that after the end of World War II it took a few years for a pattern of the cold war to emerge and for east and west military and political alliances to polarize on either side of the iron curtain. We had the Warsaw pact versus the NATO alliance. The cold war is now over and the security systems that we have known all our lives are in question. We are waiting to see what will eventually replace them.

On top of that the traditional alliances, the Middle East order, has changed. Trade patterns have changed and we are not sure what is going to replace them. We are still getting used to the idea of a single superpower and what that means to the outcome of regional disputes, although the recent Persian gulf campaign does provide some tangible evidence of how future blow-ups may be managed.

What happens in the Middle East will in many ways impact on Europe and what prospects there may be for global order in coming decades. The same argument applies for Asia where the changing power balances are affecting the positions of China and Japan as well as the smaller economic tigers such as Korea and Taiwan.

Superimposed on all of that of course is the compelling need to refurbish the operating mechanisms of the United Nations. That I do not believe needs any elaboration in this House to the members present.

Until a clear pattern emerges which if we are to believe history it will in a few years, hasty decisions on defence services programs for a 15-year period based on an outdated defence policy of the past five years may prove very, very risky.

Another consideration comes to mind. It relates to the need in responding to these factors of change within the parameters of national pressures for immediately shrinking defence budgets. As identifiable enemies disappear we do not have an identifiable Warsaw pact, we do not have an identifiable Soviet Union; as a perceived identifiable enemy disappears, the constituency for defence cut funding in this country and in other countries will by natural order and natural trends diminish and the call for peace dividends and conversion will increase.

The Canadian Peace Alliance, for example, is already calling for the budget to be cut in half. I am still seeing editorials in national newspapers citing the importance of identifying the industrial parameters and the national imperatives related to the conversion of defence industries. Conversion of defence industries is a big thing in the United States and in the U.K.

They may not agree with them, and there are members in the House whom I see nodding and shaking their heads, but I believe they have to be addressed by proper defence policy review.

In summing up what I have said, let me repeat that this is a time when it is particularly important to base defence policy on a truly vigorous appreciation of the complex global situation, on the broader meaning of national security and on a focused effort to be prepared to dispense with the traditional methods in the interest of effectiveness. As I said earlier, the fact that the genesis for this white paper is coming from political committees, parliamentarians studying the issues, I believe is an indication that we have agreed and are prepared to digress from the age-old traditional methods.

Canada is committed to peace. That after all and above all is our national interest. Our national goal is to promote a more stable international environment as I spoke of earlier. The role of our armed forces is to defend this country and to contribute to the preservation of peace and stability throughout the world. Our defence policy must support these objectives.

To do this effectively it must be based on a clear-eyed perception, one that recognizes the achievements of the past but also the continuing dangers of the present.

Sir John Hackett, a very well-known and highly respected military person and author, once said: "When a society looks at its armed forces, it is looking in a mirror and if the reflection of that mirror is a true one, the face they see will be their own".

Our armed forces have always acquitted themselves admirably. Their reputation as true professionals is unsurpassed be it in NATO, peacekeeping, national efforts, search and rescue or any conceivable operation that is within the purview of the military inventory.

Our policy review must be correct in order that when our young men and women in uniform are committed to an operation and sent in harms way, as many of them are today, their government and their country will know that they need to be there and they have the proper equipment and logistics support to make sure that they will do their job as well as they can under the circumstances.

In conclusion the decisions we make about Canadian policy must be guided by commitment, by focus, and by prudence.

[Gilles Duceppe, Bloc, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened carefully to the speech of the hon. member. It seems he has disregarded an aspect of the national defence policy review and consequently of the Canadian Armed Forces, and that is the work language in the armed forces.

I know that the former Conservative minister, Mr. Masse, had deplored the fact that French language was rarely used in the armed forces and that few francophones got promotions.

I know that in my own riding some members of the reserve cannot take courses in French and, therefore, find themselves barred from getting promotions.

Therefore, I wonder if the government will consider this matter in its review of the general role of the armed forces, and consequently of the operations of the Canadian Armed Forces. I would like to know the government's position on the matter because the present situation appears quite deplorable.

[Fred Mifflin, Liberal, Bonavista—Trinity—Conception, NL]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the hon. member's question. Whether it has applicability and relevance to the particular discussion I just had I suppose is immaterial. I will grant him that it is an aspect of our policy we should be looking at. I did not mention it of course. He appreciates that in a 20-minute presentation we are all constrained to present factors determined by a number of things.

It is a fair question. What I will say to the hon. member is something the Prime Minister has not said. I am sure he would agree with what I am about to say but I have not checked it out with him.

There are no sacred cows. We have assumed nothing in that sense. Clearly there have to be parameters in what it is we do. I speak generally and from personal experience. Considerable progress has been made in that area. More progress has yet to be made.

One example for the hon. member of an ongoing project in his province is a centre of excellence for the naval reserve force. He is aware of course that the headquarters for naval reserves is in Quebec City. This centre of excellence will be used for training

reserves. It is meant to address the ability for naval personnel who tend to be posted to the east and west coasts to be given the opportunity to participate in their second language.

I use that as one example of the ongoing efforts by National Defence. However, the general answer to the member's question is that I am sure it will be addressed.

[John Williams, Reform, St. Albert, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence for his eloquent defence of the defence department.

At the edge of my riding are CFB Namao and CFB Edmonton. We heard the defence minister speak this morning about how there will be cuts. I understand that cuts have to be made. However, today we are debating the need for a defence review. I am quite concerned that the minister intends to make some serious cuts to the defence establishments.

Prior to the commencement of the review or right at the very beginning rather than at the end, CFB Edmonton now employs about 2,800 military personnel and quite a number of civilians in addition to that. It is the base for search and rescue for Canada's north. As I mentioned, there was the plane crash in Resolute Bay where there was loss of life because we were unable to get people in there quickly enough to save those lives.

Can the parliamentary secretary give any assurance whatsoever to me and my constituents, if the rumours are true that CFB Edmonton is perhaps on the chopping block, that their jobs are secure? This is a major defence installation. We cannot just say that all the things they were doing yesterday are now totally superfluous and just close the whole place down. This is the hub of the western forces in Canada and many headquarter facilities are there.

Can the parliamentary secretary give his assurance that CFB Edmonton will be maintained so that these people can be assured they are performing a vital role as they have been in the past toward the defence of Canada?

[Fred Mifflin, Liberal, Bonavista—Trinity—Conception, NL]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate that the hon. member feels constrained by this in response to his constituents. I would do the same thing and I appreciate his concern.

I would just like to repeat what the minister said this morning. I have heard him say it many times. That is that we have to be very clear that the infrastructure rationalization is separate from the defence policy.

The hon. member for Saanich-Gulf Islands will remember as I do that whenever cuts and reductions in the military force came up those of us in uniform would reach for a thing called the infrastructure study. We would give it to the politicians because we knew they would never cut back on infrastructure. It was politically dangerous to engage in infrastructure rationalization.

We-not just any side of the House, but all politicians and I am one of them-cannot engage in that any longer. We now have an infrastructure for 75,000 people that we had for 130,000. We may get away with plus or minus 10 or 20 per cent but we cannot get away with 100 per cent deficit. We have one building for every two people in the Canadian forces. We cannot rationalize that. We cannot agree with that and cut the operational edge of the armed forces. It would not be fair to our men and women in uniform.

We have an operational capability right now. That is essentially to send a task group to sea, to send two squadrons of fighter aircraft abroad and to send a battle group. We want to honour the commitments we have made in the red book but at the same time maintain our operational commitment until we decide in a defence policy review what we want that commitment to be.

The hon. member knows I am unable to comment on the question he has asked me. I hope the overall perspective I have given him will put it in the context of what we are discussing today and why the policy review will be in the future and infrastructure decisions will have to be made before that.

[Maurice Godin, Bloc, Châteauguay, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I have been listening for some time now to what the member opposite has to say about defence. I must say I have serious reservations about the need for such a new committee.

Earlier, some members told us how pleased they were because this is the third time the issue has been raised in the last 100 days. That, in my opinion, does not mean we will get better results. If we had been better prepared, we might have needed to address the issue only once.

Also, we have heard a lot about the way this government is doing things, about the way it consults before taking action. I agree that members should be consulted. However, when we are asked to set up a committee without knowing how much it is going to cost, we need to consider the proposal very carefully. Earlier, a member talked about the Charlottetown circus which cost, as we know, millions and millions of dollars.

What bothers me beside the costs of the project is the way they keep quoting the red book. It seems that the red book contains all the solutions needed to improve government management. If that is true, why not simply implement the red book; let the government implement it and we will be able to decide for ourselves. We might not need this committee after all, which plans to travel throughout Canada.

We also heard about cuts and streamlining measures. But what will we do? We will travel throughout Canada to gather suggestions without knowing whether we will get the money and the budget to implement them.

To sum up, I would like to ask my colleague how much he thinks this committee will cost us? What will we get from it? You have to remember that less than a week or 15 days ago, we, in the Bloc Quebecois, were suggesting that a committee be set up to review government expenditures, and that our proposal was turned down. Such a committee was not deemed necessary, because the government thought it had all the tools it needed to do that review.

I think that today the government is not looking just to set up another committee, but it also wants to travel throughout Canada to sound out public opinion. We just came out of an election. First, we should let the government implement the red book, and then, we can see what more can be done.

[Fred Mifflin, Liberal, Bonavista—Trinity—Conception, NL]

Mr. Speaker, I am going to run out of time. May I have the unanimous agreement of the House to answer the question? It will not take too long.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

There is some time remaining for the parliamentary secretary to respond. If he should go beyond the allowable limits we are prepared to take into consideration his request at that time.

[Fred Mifflin, Liberal, Bonavista—Trinity—Conception, NL]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member had a number of questions but I think the focus was why we need to have this committee. I have to presume he means the combined committee because I do not believe the hon. member would object to the defence standing committee studying the defence issue. I am going to assume he meant the combined committee.

I am not sure where the Bloc is coming from because I sat in this House a week or 10 days ago while the Bloc argued for a committee to look at issues the Auditor General had raised. On the one hand it wants some committees. On the other hand it now objects to the fact that a committee is struck for a substantive purpose, that is to look at what it is we are doing in defence.

The hon. member asks why we do not just apply the red book. That is precisely what we are doing. We are applying the red book. The red book says we are going to have a defence policy review by the end of the year. That is what we are doing. It should be no surprise.

The hon. member talks about preparation time. My gosh, people with the backgrounds they have should not need much time to prepare on such an issue as defence policy. God knows members spoke about it enough during the election so they should have enough preparation time to talk on the general subject. This is not a specific issue. Any member can get up and talk about anything on defence related to a defence review. I am not sympathetic to that problem quite frankly.

I will address the substantive issue. The substantive issue the hon. member has put to me is how the parliamentary secretary and the minister can support a combined committee. I will give him the answer; it is not that complex.

In the bad old days the traditional method I talked about in defence planning was relatively simple in the sense of how it was done. We asked: Who is our enemy? We looked across the ocean or up in the sky and we identified a potential enemy. Once we identified the enemy, we asked: Okay, what are his capabilities? There are satellites now that can hover 200 miles above and can read not only the licence plate number on a car but also can give the pigment in the paint. We knew more or less what the enemy had. We had the enemy identified and the enemy's capability.

The third aspect was: What is the intention of that enemy? Does he intend to surprise us by lobbing ballistic missiles? Does he intend to have a landing force in the Arctic? What are his intentions?

Determining intentions was more difficult than determining the capability or identifying the enemy. If a country had more armed forces than it justifiably and reasonably needed to defend itself, then it could be concluded it had an intention other than its defence. It had an offensive intention. Depending on how much excess defence capability it had could determine more or less how aggressive those intentions could be.

We cannot identify the enemy now. Therefore we do not know what his intentions are and we do not know his capabilities. When faced with that kind of situation as we are now that the cold war is over, we tend to fumble and do not know how to go about it.

However, what we are faced with, as many members in this House know, is the sitting down of reasonable men and women to take a look at a situation that is peppered with uncertainty. In a case like this the more people within the confines of an institution, in this case the parliamentary institution, we bring to bear, the better our judgment is likely to be.

In bringing two sides of the House together we not only get the perspective of members of the House of Commons, a certain age group, a certain philosophy and a certain commitment because of their requirement to campaign and be re-elected, we bring into call the upper chamber, the other place, which brings another dimension to those factors I mentioned.

The salaries are there anyway. On the cost of travelling, the numbers of dollars are so marginal as to be almost inconsequential.

[Jim Hart, Reform, Okanagan—Similkameen—Merritt, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to start by apologizing to one of my constituents. I came to this House today certain that we would get unanimous approval from all corners and every party in the House on this defence review. Therefore, I have to apologize to that constituent in Penticton who said: "I watch the CPAC channel but it is always so negative". I thought today we would have something positive. I hope to address this issue with some very positive comments because I am in support of it.

A review of Canada's defence policy is long overdue. Although emphasis and approach have varied from time to time, Canada's defence policy remains much as it did 30 years ago. Therefore, I support this motion.

I look forward to reviewing the guidance documents referred to in the motion that the minister tabled this morning to determine exactly the scope of what our review will be.

I would also like to commend the government for using the committee system to undertake such an important policy review. The effective use of committees is an important means by which an individual MP can represent the views of his or her constituents in developing national defence policy.

As a member of the standing committee on defence, I look forward to the task ahead of us with the wealth and experience including military, academic and business backgrounds of those who sit on the committee. I endorse the concept of combining it with the Senate as well. The reason for this is that while we have a large number of people on the committee from eastern Canada, we only have a few who will bring a western perspective to the committee. Hopefully, with the five Senate members there will be some representation from the western provinces.

The work of this joint committee will be extremely important. Three questions have come to my mind and I am sure many Canadians have asked themselves the same questions. First, are our current Canadian forces suited for the post-cold war era? Second, do our international commitments meet our military capabilities? Third, how effective is our current defence spending? These are questions to which all Canadians would like answers.

I am reminded of during the campaign when I was in the town of Keremeos in my riding. A gentleman stood up at the back of the hall and said: "I do not believe in having a military in Canada and I do not think I should have to pay taxes for such a thing as encouraging people to go off to war and fight". My question to him at that time was: "If you do not believe in a military, do you really know what it does? Do you know the role it plays? For instance, would you object if the military were a part of an exercise to capture people who were bringing in a shipment of cocaine off the coast into Canada to sell to our youth? Would you be against a military if you were capsized on the ocean and the search and rescue technicians from Vancouver Island came to your rescue? Would you be against the policy at that point? Or would you be against a military that made certain that our sovereignty and our natural resources were not taken away by other countries like we do with our fisheries patrols?"

These are the things I do not think Canadians really sit down and think through about what the Canadian military role is and the actual importance of the things it does. It is one of the downfalls that the Canadian forces really can accept some responsibility for because they have not communicated all of their roles to all of the people of the country. That is one of the things we have to look at. These are extremely important questions and the committee must deal with them.

I have a little background in the military. I spent some time in the Royal Canadian Navy in the early 1970s and I remember at that time the military experienced a time when we were not upgrading our equipment. We were dealing with the equipment that we had and did the best we could but the government was not spending money on upgrading equipment.

I remember one story when we were called out. I was stationed on a ship on the west coast in Esquimalt and we were called out because there was a Russian destroyer just off the coast of British Columbia and our task was to go out and follow it and make sure it did not get into any mischief.

During this excursion we went out and found that this destroyer was a vessel that was much more capable than we were. It was a very technologically advanced vessel. We could not even keep up with this particular vessel because of the ships we had at that time.

The captain of the ship turned to one of boatswain mates and told him to go down to the leading seamen's mess and get the bingo crank for playing bingo on board. Everyone wondered what he was talking about but he did it. He got this bingo cage that holds the balls with a handle on it. The order was given to hoist it up the mast. Of course, everyone was wondering what the captain of the ship was up to. He looked at it and was very happy with his accomplishment and he said that the destroyer would be taking pictures of it for the next two hours and for three weeks it would be busy trying to figure out what it was.

The point I am trying to make is that although our equipment was not always the best, we certainly adapted to the situation we were in.

One of the areas I would like to talk about today, and nobody else has talked about it too much, is personnel and how we are going to cope with the changing armed forces. In particular, I would like to talk about the total force plan, the concept introduced in 1987 which I understand the hon. member for

Bonavista-Trinity-Conception participated in which has made our reserves a key component of Canada's defence policy.

The total force policy concept aims to integrate regular and reserve forces to give reserves a greater role in military capability. The total force concept was also designed to allow Canada to maintain the same level of military capability while cutting costs. Reservists are paid only when they are on active service or in training and are therefore less of a drain on the public purse.

As a result of this policy's greater reliance on reservists the levels of regular troops have declined while the numbers of reservists have increased.

In 1990-91 Canada had 88,000 regular force personnel. These numbers are projected to decrease to 75,000 in 1995-96. On the other hand, today there are about 38,000 reservists and by the year 2000 this is projected to grow to 47,000.

Presently reservists play an increasingly important role in Canada's peacekeeping operations. Reservists make up a much greater part of the replacements going on overseas missions.

As we heard today, I think the latest rotation to go overseas was composed of about 50 per cent reservists.

Some serious concerns have been raised about the increased reliance on the reserves and I hope this joint special committee will look in more detail at these issues.

In the past few years some concerns have been expressed that we are placing too many demands on reservists, especially those who have not been trained to the same extent as our regular forces.

In his review of reserve forces in 1992, the Auditor General pointed out that as reservists move up in rank, and this is through no fault of their own, they lack the training and skills as compared with those in the regular forces at an equivalent rank.

He found that reservists lacked practical experience. As an example, when a combat arms officer reaches the rank of major, it amounts to approximately 750 training days difference that the two people have attained.

We must ask, therefore, whether we are placing reserve forces in situations for which they are not adequately trained. In response to these concerns the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs recommended in 1993 that in Canadian contingents deployed in dangerous UN operations such as Bosnia, the number of reservists be limited to no more than 10 per cent of the total force. So far, there has been no problem on the ground due to lack of training, and our troops have properly carried out the tasks which have been assigned to them.

I would like to say that everyone in Canada should admire the work and courage and dedication that these reserve forces have displayed in these dangerous operations.

However, we must ensure that we are not placing unfair demands on our reserve forces. Serious concerns have been raised about the readiness of the reserves. Also, in the 1992 report the Auditor General found that only one-third of reservists would turn out during an emergency and many of those who would turn out would not be properly trained to the necessary standards. This joint committee must ensure that Canada does not sacrifice its readiness.

One major reason why reservists do not receive enough training and experience is their lack of security in their civilian employment. It is extremely difficult and a risk for many reservists to participate in training exercises because they may lose seniority at their jobs, they may be subject to losing promotions or their vacation time and in some cases they may even lose their jobs to serve the country in the reserve force.

This is an issue that I am deeply concerned about. I have a tremendous admiration and respect for reservists who have put their jobs on the line to serve Canada.

This is also a very important hurdle for the effectiveness of a total force concept. The Conference of Defence Associations has recently pointed out that if the issue of job protection is not addressed it is doubtful the total force will reach its top level of effectiveness.

The Canadian Forces Liaison Council is concerned. It is currently trying to solve this problem by emphasizing to employers that the training and discipline the reservists gain will actually benefit the employer and will far outweigh the loss in employees' time.

We must consider the point and the viewpoint of business owners very seriously. After all they face additional costs and inconveniences when their reservist employees are called for training or active duty.

This may prove to be particularly trying to small and medium sized businesses. Everyone in this House has recognized that small and medium sized businesses are going to be the areas in which we create the employment in this country. Therefore, if we are looking at a defence review we also have to realize that a number of these jobs that are created through small and medium sized businesses will also have this additional strain that some of those people will probably be reservists.

The real test of this policy, however, is yet to come. Presently many reservists serving overseas are students who are willing and able to take the time off from their education. Replacements for many of these student reservists may have to come from employed reservists for whom it will be much more difficult.

This special joint committee will, I trust, consider ways to encourage employers to permit reservists to serve in Canada. In many other countries there are laws requiring reservists to be allowed time off to train and to serve, while preserving their jobs and their seniority. The problem is that this could discourage employers from hiring reservists. We ought to be very cautious about any legislation that may do that.

In this defence policy review we should also consider ways to protect the employment of reservists, whether called up for training or active service. At minimum, I would hope that we set an example for the private sector and take measures to protect federal employees who actively serve in the reserves. By addressing this issue we can show our support to the increasing role we are asking reserves to fulfil in our defence policy.

Canada's armed forces have a commendable history of providing a well run, effective military which has performed the many tasks required of it with distinction and with honour. Whether on cold patrols, fisheries patrols off our coasts or peacekeeping duties in the war torn corners of our world, the men and women who serve Canada so well deserve our admiration and support. The realities of the present day debt and deficits however mean we have to be concerned that we are getting the best value for taxpayers' dollars.

In his 1992 review the Auditor General stated that the problems related to the ability of reservists to respond when called up have reduced the savings possible under the total force concept. I hope the special joint committee will make this one of its primary focuses.

Finally I would like to take a moment to talk briefly about a program that is close to my heart and falls under the defence budget: our national cadet program. This program with which I have been involved for several years is a useful and productive program that instils a sense of civic responsibility and national pride in young Canadians. It does not matter if they are from Valcartier, Quebec, from Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan or Alberta, they all undergo the same training program. It helps to strengthen the unity of our country.

While the program grows in popularity its budget has been decreasing. I believe it comes back to the issue of effective government spending. How many inefficient projects are we saving at the expense of this program which trains 65,000 young Canadians in leadership, citizenship and physical fitness?

This is the type of program we should encourage. It is uniquely cost effective for the government because it is a partnership between the Department of National Defence and civilian organizations like the Navy League of Canada, the Army League of Canada and the Air Force League of Canada. In communities where they are located there are local organizations that also support them through funding. In my own community of Summerland, British Columbia, the Kiwanis Club is a supporter of the cadet program.

The government has expressed a concern for youth. In the national cadet program Canada already boasts the finest youth program in the world. Over the next year I will certainly make the joint committee aware of the important role the cadet program plays in the lives of Canadians.

These are some of the issues I look forward to addressing in the upcoming defence policy review. I support the motion and I commend the government for allowing the special joint committee to consult broadly in making recommendations. I am eager to hear the input of Canadians on the issue. I hope we will respect the views of all Canadians. Through public consultation we can have an effective review of our defence policy.

[Bernard Deshaies, Bloc, Abitibi, QC]

Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to thank my colleague from the Reform Party for his excellent and very instructive speech on the work of the Canadian Armed Forces.

Since he did not say why he had decided to support the government's proposal to create an ad hoc committee for this review and since there is already a parliamentary committee on National Defence, could he tell me why he thinks this committee is necessary? And how can he justify these additional expenditures? There is no doubt that with the creation of this ad hoc committee the regular committee will be free to study other issues, but why this ad hoc committee? Why would we allocate special sums of money for travelling across the country? It seems to me that the Reform Party has repeatedly asked that we cut spending. Why does the hon. member think that we should put extra funds at the disposal of this group of parliamentarians and senators to consider a new approach, a new Armed Forces policy? How can he reconcile this with his party's position?

[Jim Hart, Reform, Okanagan—Similkameen—Merritt, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I addressed that in my speech. I feel it is important because of the make-up of the House standing committee. We have two members on that committee who represent the views of westerners. My hope is that with the additional five members from the Senate we will see representation from all parts of the country. That is why I support it.

I do not look at it as a duplication. They have their committees and are doing some work. By putting the committees together there is an actual saving. We are talking about the things the member was talking about in making sure the right hand knows what the left hand is doing.

I do not want to cover any ground that I have already covered. However on the question regarding expenditures as far as travel in the country for consultation is concerned, the other member of the Reform Party on the committee and I will certainly make our views known that these trips in Canada must be justified. The work when we go on these trips will be work. There must be a reason for undertaking them. Otherwise we would be opposed to doing it.

[John Richardson, Liberal, Perth—Wellington—Waterloo, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the hon. member for Okanagan-Similkameen-Merritt on his positive attitude in seeking a resolution to the very serious problem presented to Parliament, the very serious debt crisis we face. The turn of events in the world requires us to assess our alliances and commitments to alliances and to look at how we have allowed our armed forces to be stretched from sea to sea in bases that no longer have relevance to their initial establishment. We will have to do some evaluation on a merit basis of whether they need to be done because this is a political decision.

The people in the armed forces can tell us about their needs, their training, their numbers, et cetera. Every time when it comes to making decisions the presentation from the Canadian Armed Forces has been that this is where we can cut without affecting our effectiveness.

These are some of the decisions we will have to make on behalf of the people of Canada so that we can keep our armed forces in a strong position to undertake the tasks the government always places upon them. They are spread thin because this is dictated to by the nature of the base policy the political decisions have made on.

Like the hon. member for Okanagan-Similkameen-Merritt I hope we will look at these situations. Some of the bases will stay and probably be enlarged. We do not know that. Certainly if we are to make decisions we need all the relevant information. As the hon. member said, in some cases we may have to go and look at them and when we speak we can speak with some sense of reality on behalf of the armed forces.

Again I would like to thank the member. We must keep in mind that if the armed forces were in need of overhauling, the decisions were delayed, delayed and delayed in this place. It was not the fault of Department of National Defence, because that was offered as a cut year after year after year.

[Jim Hart, Reform, Okanagan—Similkameen—Merritt, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his comments and I concur.

[Laurent Lavigne, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to know if we are still in the questions or comments period or if I am beginning a 20-minute speech.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Kilger)]

No. We are still in the period for comments and questions, with a few minutes left.

[Glen McKinnon, Liberal, Brandon—Souris, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I commend the previous speaker on his quality of presentation and his obvious knowledge of the subject. I would suggest that much work has gone into the preparation of his talk today.

Does the member opposite feel that militarily there was any advantage in looking at a possibility of having a consistent movement of personnel from cadet to reservist to regular force in terms of the armed force component of training?

[Jim Hart, Reform, Okanagan—Similkameen—Merritt, BC]

Mr. Speaker, under the current guidelines the cadet program follows they do not promote advancement to the regular force or reserve force. One main reason for that is that it encourages not only young people who are interested in a military career. It encourages young people who have an interest in aviation, leadership training, their communities and getting involved in civic responsibility. It is not just a military focus. I am not sure it would benefit the program if we added that element to it.

Right now many who have joined the cadet movement go on to many other careers. It has been a positive experience. The experience the cadets gain through participation is very important. It makes them better citizens no matter where they go.

I am not sure making advancement to the regular force or to the reserve force part of the program is the answer for the cadet program. It certainly is a positive experience wherever they go. Some do go on to the military.

[Fred Mifflin, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, by way of comment on that subject, the hon. member is right. The purpose of the cadet organization is not to induce young Canadians to join the Canadian forces.

Having said that, there is a natural affiliation. I regret I do not have the numbers, but several times in the last 10 years I have looked at military colleges, military units and officer corps. Without question if we go to one of these units, particularly the military colleges, and ask "how many of you have had cadet experience", we would be absolutely astounded by the number of hands that would go up.

I seldom get personal in the House, but my introduction to the navy really came directly as a result of being involved in my local sea cadet corps, RCSCC Matthew, where I was the chief petty officer. As a result of one of the annual inspections the inspecting officer had literature and discussed what we planned to do for the future. It was a direct result of my association with the cadet organization; it certainly helped me make a decision

to have a career in the military. It is important to make that correlation.

As a final comment, even if a cadet never goes anywhere near the recruiting office, the cadet organization in the country is one of the finest, if not the finest, youth organizations and one of the most unsung and unpublicized. Whether or not it is intentional most Canadians do not know about this tremendous program that is so responsible for making our young Canadian men and women much better citizens.

[Jim Hart, Reform, Okanagan—Similkameen—Merritt, BC]

Mr. Speaker, at the start of my speech I said I was hoping for a positive experience. I certainly am getting it in the House today.

As a former commanding officer of an air cadet squadron I have seen two of my cadets go on to Royal Roads Military College. I would agree there is that element to it.

There is no question that with a program that encourages unity in all regions from every spot in this country, every area has the benefit of a cadet program. Those cadet programs are of vital interest to the Canadian people.

People will I hope start to take notice and participate in the cadet program.