Madam Speaker, as I said earlier in my question and comment, I am pleased to participate in this debate. It is an important debate and I welcome it.
In my presentation I am going to relate to the main purpose of the motion. It essentially addresses morale and leadership, and also concerns by its very nature the ambience of the times, the kind of times we are in and how they develop.
Since this is the 50th anniversary of the victory over in Europe by the allied forces, it is appropriate to go back to look at a 50-year parallel. I am not a military historian. I have not been around long enough to be able to give firsthand 50 years of military evolution. However I have studied the business and I have been part of it for a long time, as have other members in the House.
I would like to share with the House a parallel which I believe we are seeing now in this day and age. Again, if I could take some licence, I am more familiar with the naval aspect, but I think what I say for the navy could also apply to the army and the air force.
Let me take the House back to 1945, when we had the third largest allied force. How that developed is important as well. Let me take it from the navy perspective.
Canada started into World War II in 1939 with 10 ships and 2,000 people. By the end of the war, which for the sake of rough calculation was close to 2,000 days if we take the lead up to the beginning and the aftermath at the end, the navy finished up from those 10 ships and 2,000 people with 400 ships and 100,000 people. That is 50 people a day and one ship every five days. A tremendous expansion.
At the end of the war there was a demobilization. Those people who joined to serve their country in many cases had no intention of staying in and were quite happy to demobilize.
Another important aspect of this should not be lost. Between 1945 and the early 1950s history was in the making. The strategic planners had run amock. It was not their fault. There was no route; the hot war was over. Between the hot war in 1945 and the cold war in 1951, defence planners were in great difficulty in providing direction to people in uniform.
To use a navy example, in 1949 a series of undesirable incidents occurred on our capital ships of the day. This resulted in the three man Mainguy inquiry. The inquiry was designed, developed and commissioned purely to investigate the undesirable specific incidents. The findings of that inquiry led to a fundamental change in the way the navy went about its business in the late 1940s, the early 1950s and on.
The difficulty in planning and in providing direction led to some perturbations in the naval service and perhaps in the army and air force as well. It led to an inquiry, which led to better working conditions, better leadership and better direction. It also happened that in 1951 we had what was called the cold war.
Since that time Canadian forces have been reducing in size, reducing in mobility, and reducing in posturing in bases abroad. The funding has been reduced as well. Is that surprising? It may be undesirable for those who want to see more military expenditures, and I happen to be one of those from time to time. The whole world is reducing. We are now going from a cold war to what perhaps is developing into a hot peace.
With the exception of the interregnum in the Korean days from the early 1950s until about the mid-1950s, the forces continued to decrease. I have a certain amount of sympathy for the defence planners of those days, but we did have a recognized enemy. We did have a recognized capabilities and intentions method of defence planning.
In 1987 the government of the day provided a white paper which was hailed to be the be all and end all. It was lauded by those in the military, by defence planners and other defence organizations, both allied and the other side. It provided things like nuclear submarines for the navy, more aircraft for the air force, more soldiers for the army, a completely new command structure for the army, more reserves, and a further determination to make the total force concept, that is the amalgamation of the regulars and the reserves into one force.
That document lasted three years. We all know the cold war finished in 1990. We ran into the problem in the standing committee on defence. We ran into it in the joint committee. It is not as simple as perceiving an enemy, deciding what that enemy may do and then planning a force structure to counter it.
Who is the enemy today? I am not sure who my enemy is. What are its plans? If you do not know who the enemy is, it is very difficult to figure out what its plans are. What do you do? You do not stop planning. I disagree very strongly with my hon. colleague from Calgary Southeast who says there is no plan.
There was no plan from 1987. I cannot blame that on the government. It did not cause the cold war to stop. From 1990 until 1993 the Canadian forces were essentially without a white paper. That was very serious, considering the tremendous changes that had taken place in those years.
Every year there was an effort to reduce the budget and to reduce the people. This was even accentuated after 1990 when peace groups start asking Canada, where is your peace dividend? A lot of us would say that we had our peace dividend when we were paying 2 per cent of our gross national product for defence in the last 20 years of the cold war, 1970 to 1990, when most of our NATO allies were paying 5 per cent. I am not blaming that on anybody. We happen to be in a very unique geo-strategic position and perhaps we should not have been spending more than 2 per cent.
In the years 1987 to 1993, the cry was that we should have a good planning base. In that way deputy ministers, chiefs of defence staffs, commanders and senior planners would know what was in the budget and what was in the defence program, not next year but five years from now. How can you plan for a force when you do not know how much money is going to be there?
We are five years into this hot peace, as I like to call it. A little over two years ago we had 4,700 peacekeepers committed in a force that was shrinking. Since 1987 the Canadian forces have
gone through a reduction of $21 billion, in capital expenditure mostly, a reduction of 26,000 people in uniform and 16,500 civilians. The reserve force that had such grandiose plans in 1987 will be reduced to a lot less than was planned, to 23,000. In any organization you cannot have such a shrinking philosophy without it causing an effect on those people who serve.
I recognize there are difficulties. The minister recognizes there are difficulties. There are always going to be difficulties in an organization of 60,000 or 70,000 or 80,000 people. If you have 10 people you are bound to have a problem with one or two. That should not be surprising.
The Minister of National Defence announced the broadest inquiry, certainly since the Mainguy commission in 1949. I want to dwell on that for a few minutes. That commission was set out to look at specific incidents in the navy, but it resulted in a fundamental change in how the navy did its business.
While in no way, shape or form would I preclude what kind of findings the commission of inquiry into the Somalia affair will conclude, the calibre of the people and their backgrounds would lead me to believe that any of the recommendations and findings of the commission certainly would have application not just to the Somalia inquiry but to the downstream leadership, modus operandi and maybe even the structure of the Canadian forces.
There is not much we can do after the fact but we can learn lessons. I am not going to get specific about the inquiry, but having read the 19 specific subparagraphs, it is very clear to me that the whole range has been covered. It states in the preamble that notwithstanding what is said in the general sense and what is said in the specific sense, the inquiry has a pretty broad range of matters it can look at. I take some comfort from the fact that the problems are being addressed.
The hon. member for Saanich-Gulf Islands and I, with other members, addressed in the joint committee on defence the issue of morale. It was not an issue because members of the Canadian forces were not appreciated by their fellow Canadians. It was not an issue because members of the Canadian forces were dissatisfied with the military reaction to the way of life. That is in the report. More specifically, they were not dissatisfied and morale we felt was not an issue not because of poor leadership specifically. As the report went on to say, the excellence of the senior ranks was evident as we went from bases to stations to ships, operational forces, logistic forces and administrative forces. That conclusion was reached on October 31.
I have difficulty understanding what could have changed so drastically to lead one to conclude that we have command and control shortcomings, deteriorating morale, poor leadership and that kind of thing.
The chain of command is fundamental to any organization. We all agree on that. I can assure the House that from my knowledge of the hearings the last 10 months and my subsequent involvement with the Department of National Defence, the chain of command is there. However, it is like all chains, some links are stronger than others. We have had incidents and happenings in the last two months that indicate that.
On the business of leadership, I have talked about the shrinking force. It started in 1945 and is still going on. What kind of leadership does it take to keep the Canadian forces in a good state of morale with all the things that are happening that we have discussed here today: reduction in capital programs, reduction in the size of the force?
For the last 10 years the Canadian forces have acted in many ways like the social laboratory for some of the things that have been happening, for the good of the country, but it is the law of the land. I mentioned the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Privacy Act earlier in my comments. All these things have happened in less than a decade. If there was not good leadership what would have happened to the Canadian forces?
One of the things we discovered in our deliberations was that members of the Canadian forces were held in the highest respect. That was not yesterday, that is today, last year and the year before. Notwithstanding the shrinking size of the Canadian forces, notwithstanding the tremendous pressure on the senior and junior members of the Canadian forces, the unpredictability of budgets and not knowing from year to year what is really going to happen, and notwithstanding the tremendous complexity of equipment in the last decade, the Canadian forces continue to operate with the highest esteem of their allies and their compatriots in other countries. On top of all this, I do not know of any time in the history of the Canadian forces where the people who serve in uniform have been under such scrutiny from the media.
I wonder if I could be permitted perhaps a minute or so on this perspective. We recently had a program on our new Halifax class ships. It was an investigative type of presentation. The tenor of the program was to castigate in every way a ship that is considered to be one of the best in the world.
I will take a personal side. One of the questions that was asked of one of those who was castigating this class of ship and how it was being brought into service, was asked by one of the commentators: "Would you send you son to sea in one of these ships?" He said no. If I had been asked the same question I would have said yes.
I have a son who has served and is still serving in one of those ships. He left in August of last year and spent five months in the Adriatic in HMCS Toronto as the combat systems engineer in an organization that was enforcing the arms embargo in a 21-ship organization representing 15 countries.
One of the commanders of that group, the commander of the standing naval force, Rear Admiral Jim Stark, U.S. Navy, spent a lot of time in HMCS Toronto , not just to visit but as his command ship. The facilities of that ship allowed him an ease in command and control that is a matter of public record for the navy. In the five months that Toronto was in the Adriatic Sea she was involved in 370 hailings of ships and 56 boardings. We have seen what sort of traumatic experience is involved in boardings in the recent capture and arrest of the Spanish vessel Estai on the ninth of this month. They had one of those every three days as well as other sightings and deflections.
I use this example to add to the kind of scrutiny that members of the Canadian forces are under. I hope they are in the process of being addressed. I am not going to repeat what I said about the inquiry. I take comfort from knowing that the inquiry is under way, who is serving on it and its terms of reference. I take comfort from the fact that after six years of not knowing what is happening for members in the Canadian forces, there is now a bottom up study, that has been referred to many times here this morning, in the standing joint committee and a white paper which gives in output terms what the Canadian forces are expected to do.
We have to look at this debate in the context of our own society, in the changing times. We have been living too rich for our own good. We are all cutting back. The Canadian forces are no different. All government departments are cutting back.
We have gone from a hot war to a cold war, from a cold war to a hot peace. We have more Canadian people, young men and women, in the line of fire than we have had any time since the Korean war and World War II, yet our young Canadian men and women continue to provide the very best. They honour us every day by their actions as peacekeepers. So do their regimental sergeant-majors and their commanders and their admirals and generals by their leadership.
It should not be surprising that a senior officer in a base that has been targeted with the kind of scrutiny and difficulties that they have had would comment on morale. He would be expected to do that but twice in his internal letter, which was meant essentially for the chief of the army, he said morale was good. That is a reflection of his leadership and the leadership of others.
There is need to look at morale. These issues are being addressed and debates of this nature will lead to the resolution of some of the difficulties we recognized in the report and which the minister recognizes. Hopefully when these things are put together everybody will be better off as a result.