moved that Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and to enact An Act to change the names of certain electoral districts, 2026, be read the second time and referred to a committee.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to address the House of Commons today to speak to Bill C-25, the strong and free elections act. Bill C-25 introduces amendments to the Canada Elections Act that would bolster the strength and resilience of Canada's electoral system. As we all know, one of the cornerstones of our democracy is our electoral system, and at the foundation of that system is the Canada Elections Act. Canada's democracy is one of the most stable and strongest in the world, but it would be unwise to take this for granted. We must always be on guard for threats that could call into question the validity of our elections.
As we all know, the world in 2026 is much different from just a few years ago. The world has changed, and we, as guardians of Canada's democratic system, must change with it. The Canada Elections Act is already recognized worldwide for its robust administrative procedures, strong political financing regime and strict spending limits, but we know that no democracy, including ours, is immune to growing threats to elections that attempt to undermine confidence and erode trust in our democratic electoral processes. Malicious actors can seek to disrupt our democratic processes and elections from anywhere in the world at any time.
Despite these challenges, the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions confirmed that our elections remain secure. However, we must continue to ensure that Canada's democracy remains one of the strongest in the world and that it continues to be protected from ongoing threats wherever they arise.
That is why, in accordance with the long-standing tradition of proposing ongoing improvements to the Canada Elections Act, our government has proposed priority amendments to deal with these threats.
I want to take a moment to salute other parties in this House. I think the process that has led to the introduction of this bill has been a model. I am grateful for the input and look forward to the participation in the debate of my colleagues from all parties in the House. In fact, that reflects our shared responsibility, all 343 of us in this chamber, to protect, safeguard and cherish our democracy. This is perhaps our most solemn and important role.
It is essential that we build upon the knowledge and experience of experts when proposing changes to our democratic electoral system. Through Bill C-25, our government is acting on recommendations from the public inquiry into foreign interference, the Chief Electoral Officer and the commissioner of Canada elections. Bill C-25 will further strengthen and secure Canada's federal elections through several new measures.
Allow me to give a few examples. First, the bill will protect electors from unlawful attempts to influence their vote, not only once an election is called, but at all times. Second, the amendments will protect nomination and leadership contests from threats, including undue foreign influence, bribery and intimidation. Third, we are closing potential channels for foreign funding in electoral processes. Fourth, the bill will ban sophisticated deepfakes of electoral actors and officials that intend to mislead Canadians. Fifth, the amendments will mitigate long ballots, which challenge the administration and accessibility of federal elections for voters, candidates and election workers. Sixth, we are adding new privacy policy requirements for all federal political parties, including new disclosure requirements in the event of a data breach. Seventh, Bill C-25 will strengthen the commissioner of Canada elections' enforcement mandate by providing new investigative tools and increasing administrative monetary penalties for violations of the act.
I hope my colleagues will allow me to explain these measures in greater detail. As I mentioned at the outset, election interference can occur at any time, not just during election periods. Bill C‑25 addresses this issue in several ways. First, the act will expand the prohibition on undue foreign influence, offering or accepting a bribe, misleading publications falsely purporting to be issued by a certain person, and broadcasting outside Canada with intent to unduly influence voters at any time, not just during the election period. This protection will now also apply to nomination contests in our ridings and to leadership contests.
In addition, Bill C-25 would extend the extraterritorial application of certain offences to ensure that malicious actors operating outside of Canada can also be investigated and held accountable for breaking the law. For example, someone outside of Canada impersonating a candidate, publishing misleading information purporting to be from a candidate, lying about the rules of our elections or hacking into an electoral computer system to disrupt our elections could be prosecuted even if they do not reside in Canada.
Bill C-25 also proposes important new financing rules to increase transparency and prevent anonymous, foreign and dark money from entering into our democratic system. These include banning the use of crypto asset contributions, money orders and prepaid instruments such as prepaid credit cards or store gift cards for all activities by political actors and for regulated activities by third parties.
Importantly, under Bill C-25, third parties would only be permitted to use contributions they have received from Canadian citizens and permanent residents to pay for regulated election expenses. This means third parties could not use funds received from other third parties, such as corporations or businesses, for regulated activities. However, we understand that not all third parties receive contributions, and some may want to use their own revenue for regulated expenses. In those instances, third parties whose contributions represent 10% or less of their annual revenue would be able to use their own revenues to pay for regulated activities. These amendments would enhance transparency into the source of funds and mitigate the risk of foreign or untraced money entering our elections.
The next element I would like to highlight is how Bill C-25 would tackle the challenge of disinformation. We have all seen it. We have all lived it. Disinformation is a key tactic that aims to fuel discord and erode public trust in our democratic processes. Disinformation seeks to manipulate voters through intentional falsehoods, often spread online. The Chief Electoral Officer, in recent years, called disinformation about the electoral process the “most important” threat to Elections Canada's mandate, and security agencies have noted that disinformation is a persistent threat to election integrity.
Moreover, the final report from the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions states that, “If we do not find ways of addressing it, misinformation and disinformation have the ability to distort our discourse, change our views, and shape our society...it is no exaggeration to say that at this juncture, information manipulation (whether foreign or not) poses the single biggest risk to our democracy.”
The amendments proposed in Bill C‑25 will strengthen our democratic institutions through new and expanded prohibitions designed to counter this threat. Specifically, the bill prohibits knowingly spreading false information about election activities or the voting process with the intent to disrupt the conduct of an election or affect its results, while respecting the principles of freedom of expression and open dialogue that are at the heart of our democracy.
This prohibition includes knowingly producing or publishing false or misleading information with the aim of disrupting the conduct of an election or its results. That includes information about who is eligible to vote in an election; the voter registration process; when, where and how to vote; who to vote for; the procedure for becoming a candidate; how votes are validated or counted; and the results of an election.
Another vector for disinformation is the potential misuse of technology, which Bill C-25 also addresses. As we all know, technology has helped revolutionize democracies around the world, but it also carries certain risks. For example, AI-generated content is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from reality. When combined with disinformation, AI-generated content such as deepfakes can pose a significant threat. Today, with a computer and a few keystrokes, malicious actors can generate highly realistic, yet fake, video, audio and text content.
To address this emerging issue, Bill C-25 makes amendments to the prohibition on impersonation for the purpose of capturing video footage and creating manipulated audio and video content, such as deepfakes, and extends its application to nomination and leadership contestants, who are also vulnerable to such threats.
Bill C-25 also broadens the scope of the prohibition on interfering with a computer system or database in order to, for example, launch a denial-of-service attack to influence the results of an election. The prohibition now includes the act of disrupting the conduct of an election.
That is one of the many examples that show just how essential Bill C-25 is to ensuring that our electoral system can respond appropriately to contemporary threats.
Another example of this is the way the bill would address the challenges posed by unduly long ballots. When Canadians go to the polls, they expect to see the names of candidates on the ballot who have a legitimate desire to represent their constituents if elected. This is foundational to our system of government. However, in ridings targeted by those who seek to create unduly long ballots, this is not the case. Instead, Canadians are inundated with the names of individuals who have no desire or intention of ever representing the interests of constituents.
Not only do these long ballots create significant accessibility issues for electors and election workers, especially those with disabilities, but they can also delay the vote count. This is why we paid close attention to the study on unduly long ballots by my colleagues from all sides on the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs and took note of what the witnesses had to say. I wish to express my gratitude to the members of the committee for their excellent work in this regard.
I am happy to note that what has been proposed in Bill C-25 aligns with all of the legislative recommendations from the committee. This includes the following important measures. First, individuals who seek to become candidates would require 100 unique supporting signatures from electors in their riding. Second, a candidate's official agent could only represent one candidate per election in an electoral district. Third, false information in nomination papers would be prohibited.
At a time when security is increasingly a concern in our political system, Bill C-25 proposes new measures to protect people. For example, the home addresses of returning officers would no longer be made public, candidates would be granted greater reimbursement for personal security expenses, and the rules for regulated fundraising events would be changed. We are seeing people's addresses published online, and harassing behaviour is occurring that limits the rights of people to participate in the democratic process. This is a security concern that must be addressed. In the case of a regulated fundraising event, information about the event would be publicly released, as it must, after it has occurred, including the names of participants and the municipality and province in which the event took place.
The next aspect of Bill C-25 that I would like to discuss concerns the stringent new requirements it imposes on federal political parties regarding the protection of personal information. These requirements are based on part 4 of Bill C-4, which received royal assent on March 12 and which clarified the exclusive regime governing federal political parties' dealings with personal information under the Canada Elections Act. It also made non-compliance with the party's policies subject to the act's administrative monetary penalty system. That means that a federal political party, or any person acting on the party's behalf, could face a monetary penalty if they do not comply with their own policy, depending on the circumstances and the discretion of the commissioner of Canada elections. It is important to note that Bill C-25 proposes increasing the maximum amount of the administrative monetary penalties for both individuals and entities.
Now I would like to explain some of the new policy requirements imposed on federal political parties as a condition for registration.
First, to ensure greater transparency and accessibility, each party must publish its privacy policy, written in plain language in English and French. Furthermore, to make it easy for Canadians to understand, the policy must use examples to explain how the party collects and uses Canadians' personal information.
Second, federal political parties must also include additional measures to safeguard personal information. Personal information must be protected through physical, organizational and technological security safeguards, such as locked filing cabinets and secure areas, document encryption and password protection, and a strict need-to-know rule for sharing personal information, based on how sensitive the information is.
Third, each federal political party's policy must require appropriate steps to be taken in the event of a data breach, including the loss of, unauthorized access to or unauthorized disclosure of personal information. While we would hope that this never happens, an individual whose personal information has been lost, accessed or disclosed must be notified if the breach creates a real risk of significant harm.
Fourth, privacy policies will also require parties to ensure that any third party receiving personal information from a federal political party, such as a supplier or contractor, has equivalent safeguards in place.
To ensure accountability, since the passage of Bill C‑4, each party must have a designated privacy officer responsible for conducting an annual review of the party's compliance with its policy. The Chief Electoral Officer must hold an annual meeting on the protection of personal information by federal political parties, and the privacy officer or a representative must attend. A party's policy must also cover relevant training provided to the party and those acting on its behalf.
I am going to conclude, having a missed a couple of other important measures in the bill, by just summing up in this way.
This is an important moment. It is a moment when all members of the chamber get to express themselves about our democracy. We have heard from the foreign interference commission inquiry, the Chief Electoral Officer and the commissioner of Elections Canada , and now it is up to Parliament to decide whether these measures are meeting the moment in terms of protecting our democracy.
I would observe only that much different debates are going on in democratic institutions in other places, and I am particularly grateful that here in Canada we are working to have strong, free and open elections in this country, where everyone is welcome to participate and may participate in our democracy.