Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

Democratic Institutions

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, Conservative members know what actually happened at committee that day, but when it comes to foreign interference, this is something we take incredibly seriously. It is something we have taken seriously since we formed government, something that unfortunately Mr. Harper's government did not do. We have put in place measures like the NSICOP committee. We are currently debating Bill C-70 at committee, which will bring forward more provisions to help strengthen our democratic institutions.

I hope Conservatives will stop playing political games and instead focus on resilience in our democratic institutions.

Business of the House

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, there is indeed a secret in the House, and that is the Conservative Party's true intentions when it comes to cuts. “Chop, chop, chop,” as my colleague from Gaspésie—Les Îles-de-la-Madeleine so aptly puts it. That party wants to cut social programs and the programs that are so dear to Quebeckers and Canadians: women's rights, the right to abortion, the right to contraception. The Conservatives want to scrap our government's dental care and pharmacare plans. The secret is the Conservative Party's hidden agenda, which will do great harm to all Canadians.

With our government's usual transparency, this evening we will proceed to report stage consideration of Bill C-20, an act establishing the public complaints and review commission and amending certain acts and statutory instruments, and Bill C-40, an act to amend the Criminal Code, to make consequential amendments to other acts and to repeal a regulation regarding miscarriage of justice reviews, also known as David and Joyce Milgaard's law.

Tomorrow, we will begin second reading of Bill C-63, an act to enact the online harms act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Human Rights Act and An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service and to make consequential and related amendments to other acts.

I would like to inform the House that next Monday and Thursday shall be allotted days. On Tuesday, we will start report stage of Bill C-69, the budget implementation act. On Wednesday, we will deal with Bill C-70, concerning foreign interference, as per the special order adopted last Thursday. I wish all members and the House staff a good weekend.

Democratic Institutions

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to think that all parliamentarians take democracy seriously, that everyone who is fortunate enough to be elected to the House to serve their constituents and Canada takes democracy seriously.

That is why I am very pleased to have worked with my colleague from La Prairie on establishing the Hogue commission, for example. I really enjoyed working together last summer. I look forward to seeing the Hogue commission's report. I look forward to working with members to pass bills like Bill C-70, which will strengthen our ability to resist foreign interference.

We will continue to pursue this approach.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here today and joining us on such short notice. Your contributions are most helpful. They will help us move forward in our study. You may withdraw at this point if you wish to do so.

I would like to remind the committee that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk by 4 p.m. Eastern Standard Time tomorrow. It's important for members to note that pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

The clerk has advised me about the amendments package and when it will be distributed. If there are fewer than 20 amendments, we will probably get it by six o'clock on Friday. If there are more than that, there's an open question of when we will get it.

I would also remind the committee that we'll meet again on Monday at 3:30, and we will sit here until we're done. That will depend on the amendments.

I'd like to thank all of the committee personnel who have stuck with us through all of this. I'm particularly thankful for the ongoing endurance of our analysts, who have been here hour upon hour, and the perseverance of our clerk. A week ago we dumped a massive list on his lap.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you.

My next question is for Mr. Al Qadi.

The government has released a charter impact statement, which notes a number of protected rights and freedoms that are potentially engaged by Bill C-70, including freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly, the right against unreasonable search and seizure and others. Do you feel that the charter rights of Canadians are adequately protected by this legislation? Are there any adjustments you would recommend?

You have also highlighted some civil liberties concerns that your organization is raising with the text. Can you explain that?

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to all of the witnesses for appearing before the committee.

My first question is for Mr. Noël.

We have seen in the past that national security legislation, especially when passed quickly, can lead to unintended consequences, especially for members of minority communities. These same communities, which are most often targeted by state actors or foreign repression, have often felt unfairly targeted by intelligence and security agencies.

Could you share what the intelligence agencies are doing to build trust with these communities, especially as they seek expanded powers in Bill C-70?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you. I appreciate that.

I want to direct my next questions to the NCCM.

I appreciate the concerns you outlined with this bill. From the committee's perspective, this has been a busy week for us as we dive deep into Bill C-70.

I take note of your concern about the definition of the term “intimidation” in the proposed amendments to the SOIA. I had a chance to ask the Minister of Justice a question about that. I don't think I got a direct answer to my concerns, though he said—and I'm paraphrasing—that it would only be for when there's an element of foreign interference, not lawful and proper protests. It has to be something attempting to influence Canada and subvert Canadian interests. I would also note that in the existing SOIA, under section 24, the consent of the Attorney General is needed to prosecute any SOIA offence.

From your perspective, what definition of intimidation would the NCCM like to see put into this bill?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Commissioner Noël, I'd like to direct my first questions to you.

The first part of Bill C-70 makes some pretty consequential amendments to the CSIS Act, notably massive upgrades to the CSIS dataset regime. We've been describing it as bringing an analog law up to speed so that it fits in a digital age. However, I've read the NSIRA report on CSIS's use of the dataset regime and it's littered with comments like this: “CSIS's current application of the dataset regime is inconsistent with the statutory framework”, “CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act”, non-compliant information was held and “CSIS has failed to adequately operationalize the dataset regime.” That's a pretty scathing report. Now I'm being asked as a legislator to fix the dataset regime and give CSIS more powers, but that's in the context of them failing to act by their current statutory obligations.

From your point of view as the commissioner, what can you tell me, a legislator, that would put my mind at ease so that a few years down the road from now, I'm not going to read another NSIRA report that shows CSIS has blown past the statutory limitations I'm being asked to give them here and now?

[Marcus Kolga, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee.

I'm a journalist and civil society activist who's been researching and exposing foreign information and influence operations targeting Canada and our allies for nearly 15 years. I'm also a human rights activist. Through this work, I've had the privilege of supporting and collaborating with extraordinarily courageous champions of democracy and human rights, some of whom testified before this committee earlier this week. Others have faced intimidation or detention for speaking out against the totalitarian regimes in Beijing, Moscow and Tehran. Some have been poisoned and others have been brutally murdered for their activism and advocacy.

For my work in supporting many of those brave activists and our common causes, I've directly witnessed and experienced the chilling effects of foreign authoritarian transnational repression. These effects include death threats, harassment and defamatory articles regularly published by Kremlin-controlled media outlets against me. Kremlin-aligned influencers and proxies in Canada have attempted to discredit and silence me through psychological intimidation and whisper campaigns.

While my personal experiences are less severe than those of witnesses you heard from earlier this week, such as the brave members of the Uyghur, Tibetan and Hong Kong communities, the objectives of these influence operations are universal: to repress the free and open expression of regime critics within the Canadian political and media environment, and ultimately to undermine our democracy.

These operations aim to cast doubt on the credibility of their victims. Tactics may include malicious online articles or poisoned letter-writing campaigns containing false accusations about the target, sent to media, government officials and even the victim's employers. In my case, such campaigns were carried out by Canadians working with Russian companies, trade promotion organizations and Kremlin-controlled think tanks.

The psychological impact of being targeted and defending against such foreign influence operations is, by design, exhausting. Victims feel isolated and defenceless. Concern for the safety of family members creates additional psychological stress, all of which is made worse when these campaigns include threats of physical violence. This can lead to significant psychological trauma and further problems. Ultimately, the target becomes so overwhelmed that they give up and silence themselves, limiting their ability to freely express themselves.

The lack of a coherent support system for vulnerable communities compounds the problem. In 2019, when my family and I were targets of death threats sent from a Moscow-based IP address and on social media, no law enforcement organization was equipped to deal comprehensively with the issue of transnational repression. When I called my local law enforcement unit, they told me to contact the RCMP. When I contacted the RCMP, they told me to contact CSIS. CSIS is, of course, a dead end.

When Bill C-70 comes into force, all parliamentarians need to support the development of policies that provide meaningful support for vulnerable communities and the brave activists and journalists who become victims of transnational repression. For Canadians vulnerable to transnational repression, Bill C-70 is a welcome ray of hope in our common cause to defend our democracy against authoritarian regimes that seek to undermine it.

The transparency and accountability required by the foreign influence transparency registry will help ensure that dishonest Canadians who are lured into the service of foreign authoritarian regimes with lucrative opportunities are identified. This will allow government officials, media and vulnerable communities to be aware of who and what these individuals publicly represent. When properly enforced, this new law will help prevent them from manipulating our political and information environment.

However, I believe the act would be further strengthened by a definition of both physical and digital transnational repression. Such activity targeting vulnerable diaspora communities and human rights and pro-democracy defenders should be included in the act and the foreign influence transparency registry.

Our foreign adversaries spare no expense in their efforts to undermine our democracy. Until now, they've manipulated our information spaces, influenced policy and intimidated our brave frontline defenders of democracy with relative impunity. Properly implemented and enforced, Bill C-70 will end their impunity and provide a new bulwark to defend our democracy.

Thank you.

[Nusaiba Al Azem, National Council of Canadian Muslims]

Thank you very much.

Ahmed is indeed right that a number of provisions require further study. For example, under part 2, for section 20 of the Security of Information Act, SOIA, there is an amendment to add the language of intimidation:

Every person commits an offence who, at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with, a foreign entity or a terrorist group, induces or attempts to induce, by intimidation, threat or violence, any person to do anything or to cause anything to be done.

However, as has been raised before for this committee today, “intimidation” is not defined in the SOIA, and this is hugely problematic. Are we using the tort definition or relying on parallel Criminal Code uses of the concept of intimidation or another definition entirely? This ambiguity could be used by this or future governments to target different kinds of protest activities that some have accused of being foreign-funded, whether they involve convoy protesters, Black Lives Matter protesters or others. We recommend that this section be deleted in its entirety or that “intimidation” be clearly defined in the act to ensure there is a civil liberties carve-out similar to the proposed carve-outs in subclause 60(2) and clause 61 of Bill C-70.

The bill also, in part 1, expands substantively CSIS powers. The expansion of CSIS powers to, as proposed, help it adapt to changing technology beyond Canada is a significant change that deserves study. Changes around surveillance and warrant procedures deserve significant study as well.

We are also concerned about the expansion of the inadmissibility provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, IRPA, the sabotage provisions and many others. The new IRPA provision, for example, suggests that the minister may be able to find someone inadmissible if the minister deems that they are bad for Canada's “international relations”. How would this impact dissidents from dictatorships that Canada has diplomatic relationships with?

This legislation has many complex implications. Appropriate due diligence is not being exercised when it appears that all parties, with what we view as good intentions, are inadvertently rushing to make significant changes to our national security infrastructure without adequate checks and balances through longer, rigorous and informed study.

Subject to any questions, those form our submissions. Thank you.

[Ahmad Al Qadi, National Council of Canadian Muslims]

Thank you, Chair.

Good morning. My name is Ahmad Al Qadi. I'm joined by Nusaiba Al Azem, director of legal affairs for the National Council of Canadian Muslims. We're here to offer submissions on Bill C-70.

Let us begin by noting that many of the goals in the act are laudable. In fact, more than four years ago we testified in front of the foreign affairs committee about the need for Canada to crack down on foreign agents from any nation, given the clear intimidation that Uyghur Canadians were facing from Chinese state agents. We are deeply troubled by the numerous reports of interference by foreign states, including the governments of India, China and others, which have a pattern of engaging in crackdowns on minority communities

We are in full agreement with what many others have stated before you in this committee: Canada must take action to challenge foreign interference. That's why we have clearly supported parts of this legislation, such as the call for a foreign agents transparency registry.

That being said, while there is much that is good about this act, we must first note as clearly as we can that rushing to pass this bill in its entirety would be problematic. When we are rushing to make changes to our national security legislation that have fundamental impacts on privacy legislation, when we are further empowering agencies like CSIS that numerous judges have cited for their problematic behaviour and when there has been no time for academics or civil society actors to review the legislation, respectfully, there is a high likelihood that unintended consequences will result. Even today, as we are offering our initial response to the legislation, we doubt we will be able to provide fulsome answers to all of the questions posed given that we received a technical briefing on the legislation from government officials only yesterday.

Moving too fast can impact everyone negatively. Our national security agencies have in the past erroneously targeted Christian social conservatives, environmentalists, Sikh communities, indigenous communities, Muslims, progressives and everyone in between. That's why we believe more time is needed to conduct a fulsome study with academics and experts that isn't crammed into one week. Our first and most important recommendation to this committee, therefore, is to split the bill, pass part 4, which most have considered to be strong and relatively uncontroversial, and study the rest of the important suggestions laid out in the bill in a far more thorough fashion.

I will turn it over to my colleague Nusaiba.

[Simon Noël, Intelligence Commissioner, Office of the Intelligence Commissioner]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss Bill C‑70 with you.

Joining me today is Justin Dubois, executive director and general counsel of my office.

The role of the Intelligence Commissioner was created in 2019. I've been in this role since October 2022. In one sentence, my mandate is to approve or not approve certain national security and intelligence activities planned by the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS.

More specifically, CSIS and CSE may sometimes engage in activities that could involve breaking the laws of Canada or interfering with the privacy interests of Canadians. These activities are authorized by the minister. The intelligence commissioner, whom I will refer to as the IC, reviews the minister's reasons to determine whether they meet the test of reasonableness as recognized by the Canadian courts. If reasonable, the IC approves the authorization, and the agency can proceed with the planned activity. My written decisions are binding, and redacted versions are published on our website.

A number of ministerial authorizations subject to the IC's review relate to the use of datasets. The IC's main role relating to the dataset regime ensures that CSIS exercises its authority to collect non-threat-related information about Canadians and persons in Canada in a balanced manner. That the minister has given proper consideration to privacy interests and independent oversight is, in my mind, crucial.

Bill C-70 proposes certain amendments to this dataset regime. Most of the changes are intended to facilitate the use of the dataset regime for CSIS. Overall, I am of the view that the proposed amendments will not change the nature of my role when conducting independent oversight.

Having said that, I want to highlight a few proposed amendments that would nonetheless impact the work of the commissioner.

First, Bill C‑70 would authorize CSIS to collect and retain datasets for the purposes of section 15 of the CSIS Act. This section allows CSIS to conduct investigations to provide security assessments to the Government of Canada. In addition, it would broaden the scope of the datasets affecting Canadians that it can collect. The addition may raise new concerns that I will have to consider during my quasi‑judicial review.

Second, this bill would allow CSIS to disclose foreign datasets authorized for retention. The conditions for disclosure of the package would need to be clarified. It is conceivable that this element would be considered by the commissioner when examining the reasonableness of ministerial findings.

Third, this bill includes amendments related to the validation period for ministerial authorizations.

I highlight these changes because I think they are the most consequential and help me explain how the dataset regime is operationalized. The IC's oversight role is limited to datasets falling within part 1—that is, the collection of personal information not directly and immediately related to a threat to the security of Canada.

Bill C-70 makes it clear that CSIS will make use of the dataset regime only when the dataset cannot be collected through other jurisdictional means. I'm here as the intelligence commissioner, but I carry my baggage of experience—you can see my age—as a designated judge of the Federal Court for 21 years, as well as counsel involved in national security matters and commissions—the first one being the 1979 McDonald commission on the FLQ crisis in Quebec—and the reform that brought about the CSIS we know today.

I will add this before I finish. As a judge, I was involved in the dataset regime, the within and outside Canada regime—something you have in front of you today—and fine-tuning the special advocate's role and involvement in proceedings on section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.

Having said that, I'm open to any questions you may have, if that's helpful to you. I look forward to it.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting back to order.

I would like to welcome the witnesses for our last panel on Bill C-70. From the office of the intelligence commissioner, we have the Honourable Simon Noël, intelligence commissioner, and Justin Dubois, executive director and general counsel. From the National Council of Canadian Muslims, we have Ahmad Al Qadi and Nusaiba Al Azem by video conference. Finally, as an individual, we have Marcus Kolga, senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, also by video conference.

Welcome to you all.

I will invite Mr. Noël to make an opening statement of up to five minutes, please.

Go ahead, sir.

[Sarah Estabrooks, Director General, Policy and Foreign Relations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Bill C-70 includes a new provision that would clarify an ability to disclose personal information when it's “in the public interest” and when “that interest clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure”. This is a corollary to the broader provision that would allow for the disclosure of information to build resiliency to threats to the security of Canada. It doesn't exist now. It's in this bill.

[David Vigneault]

I think this is one of the most fundamental questions we can talk about. The world is getting more and more complex. The threat environment is making Canada less safe and less prosperous than before. We need different tools and different mindsets when approaching threats to national security.

In a democracy, it's fundamental that elected members of the House and members of the Senate, in an organized way, have access to the right information to inform themselves, hold the government to account and hold agencies to account through NSICOP, for example. My colleagues and I have had to appear many times in front of NSICOP to speak at the top secret level, to share details and to be questioned and challenged on this issue, and I believe it's fundamental in a democratic environment to do that.

There is one line in the NSICOP report that I think is very important, which is the challenge of intelligence and evidence. It's about the ability to use the intelligence collected by CSIS, by CSE and by other partners, or shared with us by international partners, in a judicial proceeding that will hold people accountable. That is extremely complex. There are some improvements through Bill C-70, and the government has spoken to the need to do more, but if you're not able to find accountability and create an element of deterrence through a judicial process, then there are the other mechanisms that have been referred to, including for leaders to have information and make decisions. It's not going to be a judicial process. It's not going to be someone charged by a court of law. It's someone who may not be allowed to run or may not be allowed to sit in a caucus because of the classified information being used.

We absolutely need to find better ways of using intelligence in judicial processes, but it also needs to be used for other types of decision-making. One of the most important elements for foreign actors when they look at us is to see whether there are enough consequences for their activities. If there are not, they will be emboldened to do more. I think your question is critical.