Evidence of meeting #25 for Canada-China Relations in the 43rd Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was universities.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Lynette H. Ong  Associate Professor of Political Science, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual
Clerk of the Committee  Ms. Marie-France Lafleur
Richard Fadden  As an Individual
Gordon Houlden  Director Emeritus, China Institute, University of Alberta, As an Individual
Paul Evans  Professor, School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, As an Individual
Justin Li  Director, National Capital Confucius Institute for Culture, Language and Business, Carleton University, As an Individual
Ward Elcock  As an Individual

6:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan

I call this meeting or order.

Welcome to meeting number 25 of the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Wednesday, September 23, 2020, the committee is meeting on its study of Canada-China relations.

This is a hybrid meeting, pursuant to the motion passed by the House on January 25, 2021.

Before we welcome the witnesses, I want to inform the committee members that Iain Stewart, president of the Public Health Agency of Canada, and Dr. Guillaume Poliquin, acting vice-president of the National Microbiology Laboratory, have confirmed that they'll appear on Monday, May 10, 2021.

They have also indicated that they are negotiating with the Translation Bureau and will do their best to expedite the translation.

Turning to our witnesses, I would like to welcome, as individuals, Lynette H. Ong, associate professor of political science, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, as well as Richard Fadden. Thank you both for being here.

Let’s open the floor with opening remarks from Ms. Ong. Please proceed. You have five minutes.

6:30 p.m.

Lynette H. Ong Associate Professor of Political Science, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

Chairman Regan, vice-chairs and distinguished members of the special committee, it's an honour be here. Thank you for the generous invitation to testify before the committee today for a second time.

Given today's topic of foreign interference, I would like to start with some definitional issues.

What constitutes foreign interference, and how do we differentiate foreign influence from foreign interference?

A country can exert influence on another country through the use of carrots, such as financial aid and concessional loans; sticks, such as economic sanctions; and persuasion, such as propaganda or disinformation campaigns. Democracies have a more pluralistic and open society and are more tolerant of foreign influence. Conversely, autocracies are less tolerant, because policy contestation tends to take place between factions of the ruling elite rather than in the public realm.

When does foreign influence become foreign interference? Foreign interference refers to the grey zone of domestic security. The terms that have been used to describe it range from “covert” and “deceptive” to “malicious” and “manipulative”. I think the scope of what foreign interference laws cover also differs among countries. Therefore, the distinction between legitimate foreign influence, as every country aims to pursue with its public diplomacy, and foreign interference is not clear-cut. I think it should be recognized that they exist along a continuum rather than in binary terms.

I want to spend some time speaking about United Front work. The Chinese Communist Party's, the CCP's, United Front strategy is premised on the idea of uniting with lesser enemies to defeat greater ones. The strategy proved highly successful in the civil war that brought the CCP to power in 1949 by enabling it to recruit non-Communist power holders, business leaders and local communities to undermine the Kuomintang government. While much of the United Front work was inward-facing in the past, its prominence has been reinvigorated and its scope expanded since 2015. In the same year as the term limits for the Chinese president were abolished, the government departments in charge of ethnic affairs, religion and overseas Chinese affairs were subsumed within the party's United Front Work department. Since then, the United Front Work Department's foreign-facing operations have been carried out by overseas Chinese, with the party's co-optation of ethnic Chinese individuals and communities living outside China and of Chinese organizations based overseas.

The key United Front groups include peak organizations such as the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which brings together non-CCP social elites domestically. Overseas, it includes the China Overseas Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, Chinese students and scholars associations, and numerous overseas Chinese friendship and hometown associations. By co-opting these organizations under the umbrella of the United Front work, the party seeks to shape the narrative and extend its influence overseas. This raises the question of whether activities of these organizations are instances of “foreign influence”, such as attempts to project China's soft power overseas, or they amount to “foreign interference”. The covert nature of some of these activities makes a fair and impartial assessment more challenging.

I think there's a lack of rigorous academic studies on the subject of the United Front work. Being part of the United Front networks does not automatically imply that individuals or organizations are the CCP's local agents to carry out foreign interference, even though they are part of the umbrella.

I think it is also important to recognize that the diasporas are not passive or apolitical agents of their home governments. In general, the diasporas have agencies and incentives of their own. In Canada's context, it is also crucial to recognize that the Chinese diaspora is far from being a homogeneous community, and their allegiance to the Chinese government, or the CCP, should not be automatically assumed.

In 2018—

I have two more pages to go. Can I go to my recommendations?

I'm sorry; I can't hear you.

6:35 p.m.

The Clerk of the Committee Ms. Marie-France Lafleur

Mr. Chair, you're on mute.

6:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan

I'm sorry. We provided five minutes. Hopefully, the questions that are asked will draw out more from you, if you don't mind.

6:35 p.m.

Associate Professor of Political Science, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual

6:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan

Thank you very much.

Mr. Fadden, you have five minutes, please.

6:35 p.m.

Richard Fadden As an Individual

Thank you, Chair. It's a pleasure to be before you this afternoon.

I'm going to take advantage of the fact that you didn't vet my comments and provide a little context to the issue, as opposed to speaking in great detail about the specific topic of foreign interference.

I think it's important when we look at this Chinese practice, along with a raft of others, to think of the Chinese as our strategic adversaries. What I would like to talk about more than anything is what it should mean for Canada if we accept that.

I think as a precondition to dealing effectively with the Chinese on foreign interference and on anything else, we have to accept that they have a coordinated and centralized policy, an activity development program, that enables them to use all the tools they have at their disposal—foreign, defence, security and trade policy. My metamessage this afternoon is that if we are going to deal effectively with the Chinese, we have to do the same. We cannot look at foreign interference in isolation from trade activity or diplomatic initiatives in the Far East or Indo-China. We have to have a coordinated activity.

I have a couple of metapoints, if I may. First, I think we need to be realistic. China is the second most powerful country on the planet. We're a middle power among many. Except when our sovereignty is directly impacted, I'm not sure there's a great deal we can do alone to affect how the Chinese are going to treat their objectives and how they are going to carry out their objectives. If we are to have an impact on the Chinese, we must use every multilateral tool at our disposal. If the UN doesn't work, we should try the Five Eyes, the G7 and the margins of NATO. They all provide many opportunities for ministers and officials to exchange views and coordinate action.

Let me touch upon what we should do when our sovereignty is directly affected by Chinese action. We need to recognize it, first of all, and develop some sort of consensus on what that is. When we cannot stop it, and when it is not stopped, we need to take some action. Foreign influence is an activity that comes to mind. By any definition, this is unacceptable and is an assault on our sovereignty and a threat to our citizens. There is no reason we cannot discuss this common problem—this is a common problem shared by many of our allies—and coordinate any push-back.

When the Chinese activity is more indirect—too many Chinese students in universities, the extent of Chinese grants to research in areas sensitive our national security—we need to do something in this area as well. Because they affect areas other than our national security interests, they are more difficult to deal with, but they cannot be ignored in the face of control exercised by the Chinese state.

Coming back to my effort at setting out a metapoint, I submit that Canada cannot effectively deal with organized and centrally controlled Chinese activity without itself being organized and coordinated. I mean that our response needs to be whole-of-government at the level of the Government of Canada and to be national at the level of the country.

By “whole of government”, I mean that our reaction to unacceptable Chinese behaviour can't be limited to just CSIS, CSE and occasionally DND and GAC. Rather, it must encompass all elements of the Government of Canada. ISED and Natural Resources come to mind. By “national”, I mean that the responsibilities of the federal government for protecting our sovereignty and the control it has over our border means that it entails federal governmental activity throughout the private sector and civil society, and in some matters potentially affecting the province.

I stress again that we're not going to be able to deal with foreign influence or any other unacceptable Chinese activity unless we admit we have a problem and we coordinate it internally and with our closest allies. This is not necessarily very easy. It's not easy for any number of reasons. I just want to flag one: Not all Chinese citizens and not all Chinese activities are undertaking activities that are harmful to Canada. Distinguishing between the kinds of activities that Professor Ong talked about and those other activities that are perfectly fine is a great deal more difficult than it sounds on the surface. The only way we're going to do this is if we talk about it and articulate what we consider to be unacceptable, ideally coming up with standards that are very similar across our allies.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering any questions you might have.

6:40 p.m.

The Clerk

Mr. Chair, you're still on mute.

6:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan

Sorry.

Thank you very much, Mr. Fadden and Ms. Ong.

We'll now begin the first round of questions.

Mr. Paul-Hus, you have the floor for six minutes.

6:40 p.m.

Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good evening, Mr. Fadden and Ms. Ong. Thank you for joining us.

Mr. Fadden, this may sound like a simplistic question, but I'll ask it anyway. On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the threat posed by China in terms of the economy, national security and defence?

6:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Geoff Regan

Mr. Fadden, you're muted, just as I was.

6:40 p.m.

As an Individual

Richard Fadden

Thank you. I go through this all the time. My apologies.

I would put the threat level at about 8 out of 10. That's mainly because the Chinese authorities are absolutely determined to achieve their goals, no matter what people think. I'm particularly concerned about their willingness to use almost any method to succeed. We can't do that here in Canada, or in the west in general.

6:40 p.m.

Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

Since the Chinese don't have any limits or regulations, they can do whatever they want.

That said, I want to hear your thoughts on some of the issues that the committee has already addressed. For example, Mr. Juneau-Katsuya, who appeared recently, said that the number of Chinese diplomats in Canada was unusually high.

What are your thoughts on this statement? Do you think that he's right?

6:40 p.m.

As an Individual

Richard Fadden

In general, there are a few more diplomats than necessary. However, large countries tend to have huge embassies. We shouldn't necessarily be concerned about the number of people from China in Canada, but about their positions. That's what we should be focusing on. An embassy official who deals with consular and cultural issues isn't a problem. However, a number of people are basically members of the Chinese ministry of public security. That number should be reduced, and not necessarily the total number.

6:45 p.m.

Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

We must focus on the positions held by these people. We must wonder why people from the Chinese ministry of public security are working in our country, based on what you said. Is that right?

6:45 p.m.

As an Individual

Richard Fadden

Yes, exactly.

6:45 p.m.

Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

At the start of the pandemic, CanSino was given a contract to develop a vaccine, and that contract was dropped. A witness told us that China was playing political games.

Do you have a clearer idea of what type of political game the Chinese government may be playing, in particular by keeping the cell lines at Chinese customs?

6:45 p.m.

As an Individual

Richard Fadden

Honestly, I don't know enough about this topic to respond. I'm sorry.

6:45 p.m.

Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

Okay.

I know that Ms. Ong spoke about this. However, in your opinion, how should the Canadian government address the use of the united front work department and the thousand talents program?

6:45 p.m.

As an Individual

Richard Fadden

We must start by accepting that we have an issue. One of our difficulties in Canada is that, although the views of Canadians have changed over the past few months, there isn't any consensus. As long as there isn't any consensus on this type of activity, the national security agencies will have a very hard time addressing it.

Clearly, not only in Canada, but in all our allied countries, this type of activity is unacceptable. We need to provide some additional resources to the national security agencies in Canada. We give them a very broad mandate, but we don't necessarily give them the necessary resources. We heard a few moments ago that there weren't any restrictions on Chinese activities. The Chinese also have an edge over us because they have almost unlimited resources. If we want to address this type of issue, we must act.

6:45 p.m.

Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

I believe that you spoke to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security two or three years ago about Bill C-59 and cybersecurity operations, among other things. Lately, as a result of the COVID-19 crisis, we've seen that our security agencies don't have highly offensive capabilities, compared to the CIA, to counter external threats.

Do you think that, in Canada, we should start considering other ways of dealing with threats?

6:45 p.m.

As an Individual

Richard Fadden

Yes, that's what I think.

For a long time, I believed that this wasn't necessary and that defensive measures would suffice. However, the global digital environment is so dynamic and dangerous that we need tools to actively counter the threat. This requires a clear legislative and regulatory framework. We must do something about this.

6:45 p.m.

Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

In your opinion, what scares the Government of Canada? Is the government mainly concerned about the economy? Does the government have other concerns regarding China?

6:45 p.m.

As an Individual

Richard Fadden

I think that the main concern is the economy. The economic secrets of the government and the private sector are being stolen on a massive scale. There's no doubt about that. This has cost us hundreds of millions of dollars over the years. The issue is hard to ignore.

6:45 p.m.

Conservative

Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC

Thank you.