Canada-China Relations Committee on June 14th, 2021

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 29 of the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations.

Pursuant to order of reference of Wednesday, September 23, 2020, the committee is meeting for its study of Canada-China relations.

This is a hybrid meeting, pursuant to the motion passed by the House on January 25, 2021.

Today's meeting is in accordance with paragraph (c) of the House order of Wednesday, June 2, which provides the following:

the Minister of Health shall be ordered to appear before the special committee, for at least three hours, at a televised meeting, to be held within two weeks of the adoption of this order, to discuss the documents and the matters referred to in them;

As you all know, these documents are related to a transfer of viruses that occurred in March 2019, as well as the revocation of security clearances and the termination of employment of two scientists from the National Microbiology Laboratory.

I would also like to remind everyone that while the witnesses must answer all of the questions the committee puts to them, members have been urged to display appropriate courtesy and fairness when questioning witnesses.

I would now like to welcome the Honourable Patty Hajdu, Minister of Health, as well as Iain Stewart, president of the Public Health Agency of Canada, and Dr. Guillaume Poliquin, acting vice-president of the National Microbiology Laboratory.

Thank you all for being here.

I will now turn to Minister Hajdu for the opening remarks.

Minister, please proceed. You have five minutes.

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Minister of Health]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and committee members, for the invitation to appear before the committee today.

As you know, on June 2, the House of Commons issued an order for unredacted documents pertaining to the transfer of viruses from the National Microbiology Lab, or NML, to the Wuhan Institute of Virology in March 2019, and the nature of the departure of two NML scientists.

We appreciate Parliament's desire for scrutiny of this matter and, of course, value the role of parliamentarians in holding government accountable.

At the same time, we are responsible for ensuring that sensitive material is protected and that the proper mechanisms are in place to safeguard any personal and security-related information. In this particular case, we have endeavoured to comply with the intent of the order while also respecting the law and ensuring that privacy and security-related information is, indeed, properly safeguarded.

Accordingly, on June 4, I referred this matter to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians for its review. At that time, the Public Health Agency of Canada also provided that committee with the unredacted documents requested by Parliament.

I welcome this opportunity to explain how the Government of Canada arrived at that decision. I underscore, however, that there are matters that are under consideration by the Speaker and the House on the same issues. These matters will be addressed in those forums.

I would like to begin with a few words about the National Microbiology Lab, which provides and continues to provide critical scientific leadership for Canada in response to COVID-19.

Right now, for example, the NML is conducting more than 100 research studies on COVID-19, which range from designing and testing vaccines to investigating treatments to understanding the genetic fingerprint of the virus.

International collaboration is an essential part of this scientific work, and throughout the pandemic the NML has worked with its partners, both inside and outside of Canada, to combat this disease.

I'll reiterate that the two former employees named in the order are no longer employed by the Public Health Agency of Canada. Further, as I had noted previously in the House, there is no connection between the transfer of viruses cited in the order and the subsequent departure of these employees, and there is no link to COVID-19.

I cannot disclose any additional information for privacy and security reasons, but I can say that the National Microbiology Lab will continue to play a critical role in protecting the health and safety of Canadians.

The Government of Canada is committed to transparency in its work, and we endeavour to be as open as possible with Parliament and Canadians while at the same time protecting sensitive information. It is a balancing act that requires us to consider countervailing laws and duties and the public interest.

In this case, the Public Health Agency of Canada has appeared before this committee twice to answer questions to the extent possible. It has also responded promptly to all requests for information, while respecting its obligations under the laws passed by Parliament. More broadly, senior officials from the Public Health Agency of Canada have made almost 30 committee appearances since May 2020, and as minister, I have appeared some 25 times since the pandemic began.

We are and we remain committed to being as responsive and available as possible to parliamentarians.

The Government of Canada recognizes that the oversight provided by Parliament is essential to a well-functioning government. We respect the need for transparency and the importance of accountability before Canadians.

However, in this particular case, the information requested has both privacy and national security implications. Complying with the order without having proper safeguards in place would put sensitive information at risk of being released publicly.

That's why I've referred this matter to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. This committee has the statutory mechanisms and protections needed to safely review sensitive information while maintaining its confidentiality.

As I mentioned at the outset, I've already provided the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians with the material requested. The Public Health Agency of Canada will co-operate with the committee as it conducts its review.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you, Minister.

We'll now go to the first round of questions beginning with Mr. Chong for six minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Minister, for appearing in front of our committee.

You said that you sent the documents to NSICOP, so I'd like to ask some questions about NSICOP.

First, when you sent the documents there, did you ask the committee to review this matter?

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

I provided the documents and referred the issue to NSICOP, as you refer to it, as it is the appropriate committee with the appropriate level of security.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Did you provide any instructions to the committee?

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

My letter refers the documents to the committee and suggests that this committee would be more appropriate for review of the documents.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I'll go to my next question. The 2021-22 departmental plan for the NSICOP secretariat indicates that its core responsibility changed earlier this year from “Assist the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians in fulfilling its mandate” to “Parliamentary review of national security and intelligence activities.”

Why was that core responsibility changed earlier this year?

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

I'm sorry, I can't speak to the core responsibility of NSICOP and why any changes have happened to that committee.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

Since you sent the documents to NSICOP, you obviously know about the committee. Can you tell us who hires and fires the members of the committee?

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

I will just say that it's a committee that does have representatives, including from your party, on it and they're very hard-working members of the committee who have the appropriate clearance to be able to review sensitive documents. Obviously that committee is tasked with reviewing documents that are sensitive in nature.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

Minister, subsection 5(1) of the act governing the committee says that the Prime Minister hires and fires the members of the committee and they hold office at his pleasure. Furthermore, subsection 6(1) of the act gives the Prime Minister the power to determine the committee chair.

Do you, Minister, have the right to refuse the committee's request for further information and do you have the right to block a committee's review of any matter?

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

I will repeat again, through the chair, that that committee is the appropriate committee to review documents that are sensitive. The documents have been provided in an unredacted manner to the committee for that reason.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Minister.

I note that subsection 16(1) gives you the authority as minister to refuse information requested by the committee, and paragraph 8(1)(b) gives you the right to block the committee's review of any matter.

My second-to-final question for you is this. Does the Prime Minister have the power to direct the committee to change reports and remove information from reports before those reports are made public?

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

I'm not understanding the line of questioning.

I understand that the Conservative Party has two members on that committee and I'm wondering if there is no faith in their own caucus members to do the work that the committee is set up to do. In fact, that committee has the security clearance and those documents have been provided in full, unredacted form, so clearly there is an interest of the government to share these documents with the committee that is appropriately tasked to do the review.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Let me ask you a very simple yes or no question, Minister. Is NSICOP a committee of Parliament?

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

Again, NSICOP was established exactly to review documents and matters that have a national security—

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I understand that.

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

—or other privacy considerations, and that's why I've sent the letter to refer this matter to that committee and provided the full unredacted documents to the only committee of parliamentarians that does have the security clearance and adequate safety protocols.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you. I'll answer the question. NSICOP is not a committee of Parliament. This is stated in subsection 4(3):

The Committee is not a committee of either House of Parliament or of both Houses.

Not only is this committee not a committee of Parliament, MPs and senators on the committee actually give up their parliamentary rights. Subsection 12(1) says:

Despite any other law, no member or former member of the Committee may claim immunity based on parliamentary privilege in a proceeding against them in relation to a contravention of subsection 11(1) or of a provision of the Security of Information Act or in relation to any other proceeding arising from any disclosure of information that is prohibited under that subsection.

So NSICOP is not a committee of Parliament. Its members give up the rights they have as parliamentarians. Its members and its chair are hired and fired by the Prime Minister. Any minister has the right to refuse the committee information and block the committee's review, and the Prime Minister has the power to change committee reports before they are made public.

It's clearly the wrong committee to hold the government accountable for national security breaches. It's like the fox guarding the henhouse, and more importantly, by sending these documents to NSICOP, you are in violation of two orders of this committee and an order of the House.

Minister, with the greatest of respect, for the last year and a half during this pandemic, you have been telling Canadians they should follow public health orders while you and your agency have thumbed your noses at two orders of this committee and one order of the House of Commons.

So much for the rule of law.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chong.

We'll now go to Mr. Fragiskatos, for six minutes, please.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for being here today, Minister. Thank you for the work you've been doing throughout the pandemic. I will say the same to Mr. Stewart. It's good to see you again, sir.

Minister, I have specific questions regarding the National Microbiology Lab just to set the context.

Could you elaborate on the security in place at the lab itself?

[Patty Hajdu, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Superior North, ON]

Because of the nature of the work that the lab does, there is a focus on security. It's best if I turn this question over to the director of the lab, Dr. Poliquin, to speak about the security protocols.

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin, Acting Vice-President, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada]

I would like to emphasize the fact that the National Microbiology Laboratory is entrusted with a number of key responsibilities when it comes to the oversight of the precious collections we have here.

The overview of security procedures is an ongoing consideration for us as we continue to review best practices, security needs and requirements in the context of the evolving needs of the day. Through our science excellence initiative, we have a robust manner of reviewing all these security suites as they are needed.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Continuing with questions on the lab itself, Dr. Poliquin, could you elaborate on the security screening that is applied to visitors and employees of the lab.