Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
My name is Scott Thurlow, and it is my pleasure to be here to share my views as the committee reviews the Conflict of Interest Act.
At the outset, let me remind committee members that the Conflict of Interest Act is designed as a disclosure act. It places an obligation on officials to disclose their assets for conspicuous public scrutiny. The act also places specific limitations on gifts and benefits and creates post-employment rules.
My experience with the act is not academic; it's practical. I have had the responsibility of representing many of your colleagues as they prepared documents to submit to the commissioner's office. As everyone on this committee is hopefully aware, those disclosure requirements are not modest. They are also publicly disclosed. In rare cases, I have engaged directly with the commissioner's office as it investigated potential violations of the act and the codes it administers.
I have some practical, real-world examples of changes that can be made to the act and corresponding codes and guidelines.
First, a conflict of interest rule should not compromise the democratic process. I would suggest a very modest edit to the current act that would ensure that participating in an electoral event—provincial, municipal or territorial—is exempted from creating a conflict of interest. Running for office should be defined as the public interest. The House's Board of Internal Economy rules already limit the use of parliamentary resources in elections.
There is a decision from a former commissioner that stands for the proposition that campaigning on someone's behalf to seek support is attempting to influence an individual's decision. Of course it is. That's also a constitutionally protected activity. It should not come under the scrutiny of the commissioner's office. Your constituents care about your positions on an array of issues at the heart of other elections, and there should be nothing to prevent you from telling them what you do or do not believe in.
Second, do we really need as many different codes as we have? Subtly, there are many different interpretations that distinguish the various codes from one another. This lends itself to confusion, which is perpetuated by a duelling banjos of rules for parliamentarians interpreted by different officers of Parliament. Having a consistent set of rules will help build a more consistent culture around what a conflict of interest is or is not. I have a personal pet peeve about a separate set of conflict of interest rules created by the lobbying commissioner, but that is a study of a different act for a different day.
Speaking of which, third, I think all post-employment limitations should be placed in one act. You may know that post-employment obligations are found in the Lobbying Act. I also don't like those limitations because they treat all designated public office holders as one giant class, which they are not. Certain aspects of those rules came to be after an order in council, which might not have been as legal as we would like. Please ask me about that.
Fourth, I think there should be clarity on the ability of members to advocate on behalf of their constituents. There is a statutory limitation on “improperly” using one's office to advance a private interest. That is not necessarily the case for individuals who become parliamentary secretaries or ministers. I would refer to you the commissioner's own guidance, which precludes you from “using your position to influence a decision to further private interests”. Advocating on behalf of a constituent's private interest should never be seen as creating a conflict.
The technical language of that document needs to reflect the statutory term “improperly influence”. It should never be improper to advance the interests of your constituents. Personally, if I were in that position, I would wear that so-called conflict as a badge of honour.
It is possible to be both a member of Parliament and a minister and have a genuine tension between your roles. Just ask a transport minister who has a farm in their riding during a rail strike. That's not a conflict of interest; that's a conflict of ideas. That's what Parliament is for.
Finally, I would conclude with a warning to stay away from assigning too much importance to the concept of an apparent conflict of interest. Certainly, this is at the heart of the test enshrined in the Supreme Court of Canada precedent on conflict of interest. The appearance of a conflict is not the same as the existence of one. This is something public officials should be cognizant of, but it shouldn't paralyze them from doing their jobs.
I can tell you from experience that a human being—a politician—waffles on the right decision because they are worried it might look bad because of some link that is so tenuous that the most hackneyed Hollywood screenwriters couldn't come up with it. People agonize over these decisions.
The committee can make recommendations on the thoughtful application of that appearance of a conflict test. Wiser men and women than me have noted that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and the same is true about what may or may not appear to be a conflict.
I would welcome your questions, in particular about other aspects of the act and codes that may not have been as colourfully explored by previous witnesses.