Foreign Affairs Committee on April 21st, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 31 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, February 12, 2026, the committee is meeting for the review of Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses. For the first panel, appearing as individuals, we have Kai Ostwald, associate professor at the Institute of Asian Research at the University of British Columbia, and Dr. Ari Van Assche, full professor at the department of international business at HEC Montréal, who is joining us by video conference.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed to the rounds of questions.

I now invite Mr. Kai Ostwald to make an opening statement.

[Kai Ostwald, Associate Professor, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the members of the committee for their invitation.

I'm very happy to be here today.

I want to open with three observations and draw out a few implications for the review and update of the Indo-Pacific strategy.

To begin, the Indo-Pacific strategy as written gets a number of things correct as basic statements of fact. The Indo-Pacific region, Asia, is already the global epicentre of economic dynamism by many measures. If the trends continue as they are, that will only increase in the generation to come. It's also the centre of geopolitical challenges globally, whether that's because of rising powers or, of course, specific security flashpoints.

All of these things affect Canadian interests deeply, so I think the call to prioritize attention and resources to position Canada to meet these challenges in the generation ahead is correct. I would add that the U.S. disruptions have accelerated the rationale for many of the elements that the Indo-Pacific strategy calls for.

The Indo-Pacific strategy, since its launch, has produced a number of positive outcomes. Canada's presence in the region has increased in a number of ways. One is in the form of high-level visits from the Prime Minister or the ministerial level. Trade delegations have gotten traction and increased awareness of opportunities in engaging Canada in the region. People-to-people ties have clearly increased as well.

In terms of trade architecture, there are a number of advancements. The Canada-Indonesia agreement is one of them. Progress on the Canada-ASEAN free trade agreement and discussions with the Philippines and Thailand are all important steps forward that should be recognized.

On the security front, there is more co-operation. There is a greater Canadian presence in the region, whether it's in the form of cyber-collaboration or a naval presence. There are also a number of game-changers. The collaboration with the Philippines on dark vessel detection has really increased Canada's presence in the region and goodwill towards Canada.

If there is a silver lining from some of the disruptions from Trump, it's that there is more interest in engaging Canada now than I have ever experienced before in my career. That takes many dimensions. I think this is a unique opportunity, and a unique moment as well, but those positives have to be positioned against a realistic assessment of Canada's baseline.

From my perspective, Canada has underinvested in Asia and the Indo-Pacific for a number of decades. It was a late mover in articulating a strategy towards Asia relative to a lot of its counterparts. I think that's left Canada with three major deficits vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific.

The first deficit is in capacity and knowledge. The Indo-Pacific is a highly complex region, as we're all aware. I don't think there is sufficient familiarity, knowledge, expertise or language capacity in key sectors in Canada, whether they're in the private sector or large parts of the public sector, to effectively leverage Canadian opportunities. To provide an anecdote, UBC, where I'm a faculty member, is arguably the most Asia-facing university in Canada, but it has not offered a Southeast Asian language as a foreign language in over a decade.

Second, I think Canada has some deficits in its network. Getting things done across the Indo-Pacific requires personal connections and trust. The period of underinvestment has left Canadian networks thinner on the ground across Asia than those of many counterparts. That requires sustained engagement to overcome.

Third, I would say there is a reputational deficit to address as well in Asia on the part of Canada. Canada has been seen as a fair-weather friend to some extent in appearing in the region and engaging the region, but when political dynamics in Canada shift, it's retreating to some extent. That has major implications for the Indo-Pacific and an update to it.

First and foremost, from my perspective, Canada is, by population, a relatively small country with a giant neighbour to the south that will always occupy a good portion of our bandwidth. The pressure to increase defence spending will mean that there's more competition for finite resources. In short, if Canada is to meet the generational challenge that a rising Indo-Pacific and Asia present, the region has to be a true priority in the share of attention it receives and the share of resources it receives in order to risk not falling behind further.

Expectations need to be calibrated correctly. Of course, we should expect real progress over the course of one, two or three years, but this is a generational challenge. We'll see progress more in blocks of five or 10 years than we will in blocks of one or two years.

Second, of the five pillars the original Indo-Pacific strategy articulates, it's quite clear that trade and security have become the most important. That may be warranted, but effectively delivering on both of those pillars requires, again, adequate human capacity and strong networks. It is not possible to build them without investments in people-to-people connections, a diplomatic presence and a range of other factors beyond purely security and trade—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

I have to stop you. We're way over the time. Thank you for your statement.

I now invite Dr. Ari Van Assche to make an opening statement of up to five minutes, please.

[Ari Van Assche, Full Professor, Department of International Business, HEC Montréal, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair, honourable members, thank you for the invitation to contribute to your review of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.

I will be giving my introductory remarks in English. I would be pleased to answer your questions in French or English.

My central message this afternoon is straightforward. The global geopolitical context has evolved significantly since the strategy's launch in 2022. Today, the resilience of Canada's economy more than ever depends on its ability to reduce overreliance on major economic powers, especially China and the United States, through deliberate and strategic trade diversification. The Indo-Pacific strategy can be a powerful vehicle to help achieve this objective, but it must be deployed more deliberately and more assertively as an instrument of economic statecraft.

Let me be clear. This is not to diminish the strategy's early achievements. Over the past four years, Canada has meaningfully strengthened its trade and investment presence in the world's most dynamic economic region through an expanded diplomatic footprint, new trade agreements and deeper political engagements.

Notwithstanding these gains, the strategy would benefit from a sharper and more disciplined articulation of the national-interest outcomes it seeks to achieve—one that is more tightly aligned with Canada's trade diversification strategy and broader economic security priorities. In my view, advancing this perspective requires three fundamental shifts in thinking.

First, we need to go from export expansion to value chain positioning. Rather than treating export growth to the Indo-Pacific as an end in itself, the strategy should focus on securing more resilient and strategically anchored positions within global value chains. The objective is not simply to export more, but to reduce Canada's critical dependencies on both the import and the export side. This shift requires asking more targeted questions: Which trade dependencies expose Canada to the greatest economic security risks, and how can a more focused Indo-Pacific engagement help build resilient value chain positions?

The second shift is from broad-based engagement to sector-selective focus. Rather than engaging equally across all industries, the strategy should prioritize sectors that are central to Canada's economic security. Not all sectors carry the same economic security risks. Industries such as defence, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors are far more exposed to disruption and coercion than non-strategic sectors like Christmas lights, and they therefore require more coordinated state intervention. This implies a more selective industrial policy posture in the Indo-Pacific strategy and raises two questions: Which sectors should Canada designate as strategic, and how can Indo-Pacific engagement be leveraged to reinforce domestic capabilities and international collaboration in these sectors?

The third shift is from diffuse regional engagement to targeted strategic partnerships. Rather than treating the Indo-Pacific as a single, uniform region, the strategy should focus on building deeper partnerships with a limited number of countries that are most aligned with Canada's economic security objectives.

Not all partners offer the same level of reliability or strategic complementarity. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, India and key ASEAN members each bring distinct strengths in areas like critical minerals, advanced manufacturing and clean technologies. These partnerships should therefore be tailored, sector-specific and strategically prioritized. This, again, leads to two questions: Which partners are best positioned to support Canada's objectives in strategic sectors, and how can we deepen these relationships to build trusted and resilient economic ties?

Let me briefly conclude with implementation. To operationalize these shifts, in recent work I've proposed a simple 5P framework. The five Ps are, one, pursue trade expansion in non-strategic sectors; two, protect against choke points in strategic sectors; three, promote domestic strong points in sectors that are strategic for other countries; four, partner with trusted Indo-Pacific allies to build shared economic security; and, five, pinpoint emerging risks through strong economic intelligence.

To conclude, revisiting Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy requires a more security-driven approach—a whole-of-government strategy that aligns trade diversification toward the Indo-Pacific region with economic security and industrial policy goals.

Thank you.

I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much for your opening remarks.

I will now open the floor for questions, beginning with MP Ziad Aboultaif.

You have six minutes.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses. Mr. Ostwald and Dr. Van Assche, you both highlighted some very key elements of this study and what we need to do.

Mr. Ostwald, you listed the deficits we have. One of them is capacity and knowledge, and then there are network and reputation. I am one of the members of Parliament who are aware of our deficits in trade not just with the Indo-Pacific, but also in general, due to my life experience before politics.

Here is a question for both of you, just to make sure I understood correctly. We need to focus on the market we're going to. It doesn't just have to be China, as the largest Indo-Pacific economy. We also need to choose which products we can push into these markets, because we are way behind in getting to them. We need to start somewhere, at least to give ourselves breathing space until we become ready. Then we have to look internally to see how we can be ready as a market to make sure we have the products needed, to be thrown into chosen markets.

In order to do that, how do you assess the situation in Canada as far as our readiness is concerned, and which sectors do we need to push? For example, do we need to focus on oil and gas, on energy sectors, which is something we have that is in high demand? How can we do that at a time when we know other markets are way ahead of us and the competition is ahead of us, and we know that we're not ready? Basically, we made ourselves unready to supply these markets.

[Kai Ostwald]

Professor Van Assche and I seem aligned that it is important for Canada to be strategic in directing its resources and attention. This means focusing on specific sectors and specific opportunities. I would add that on top of pursuing exports, there is a lot of demand for Canadian expertise in the region as well, and that should be an important part of the conversation.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Dr. Van Assche.

[Ari Van Assche]

Canadian firms are generally ready to internationalize, and they've been doing this very successfully for many years. Of course, there are still lots of hurdles they are facing in all kinds of sectors, either strategic or non-strategic.

Canada, for many decades already, has been helping Canadian firms going abroad. Right now, as we are looking at some of the bigger concerns and problems we're facing, one of the issues is that in many sectors—or in some, at least—we are overly dependent on specific countries. As a result of that, there is a need for us to reflect on what we can do to make sure our companies can get stronger in other sectors.

In non-strategic sectors, the most important thing is to continue reflecting on which countries we can develop trade agreements with and how we can use our diplomatic corps to help our companies internationally in these countries, but ultimately, we simply need to support market mechanisms. Then there are other strategic sectors, and maybe there is more of a need for us to reflect on industrial policies if it is going to help us reduce overly strong dependencies on specific countries that could conduct coercive actions against Canada.

That would be my answer to your question.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

In the situation we are in, the first thing you would think of is the low-hanging fruit that we need to focus on, at least to start. Would you both be able to list three examples of low-hanging fruit—products that we could lead with in those markets?

[Kai Ostwald]

I'm not an expert on trade, so I won't presume to have the answer, offhand.

One of the major challenges is that the awareness in Canada's private sector of opportunities in the Indo-Pacific is limited. There hasn't been sufficient contact, and the trade missions are geared toward addressing this. The Canada-ASEAN Business Council and other business councils have done a lot of important work here, but there's a lot more work to do to align supply on the Canadian side with the demand on the Asian side to identify exactly where the low-hanging fruit is.

I defer to my colleague on the specifics.

[Ari Van Assche]

The low-hanging fruit question is always tricky.

If we're looking at what is going on right now, we know there is a desire in the defence industry, for example, to make sure we are less reliant on specific countries to obtain our military products. That is a good area where we could, on both the export side and the import side, ask, “Can we, through collaboration with certain Asian countries, make sure we have more diversified sourcing or exporting of defence products?" That is one example.

Another example is clean energy technologies. If you look at electric vehicle batteries or solar panels, one country is the biggest source of these products, and it's China. For our clean energy transition, it's not bad to get cheap products from China, but being overly reliant on this one country can at certain moments lead to certain dangerous, coercive actions. That's another area where we could say that maybe we should be diversifying a bit.

The final thing I'll say, and this is more on the export side, is about critical minerals. We have an incredible wealth in critical minerals in Canada. This is something the U.S. is looking for, but a lot of other Asian countries, such as Japan and Korea, are also looking at sourcing critical minerals. That gives us a bit of leverage to find ways we can diversify our trade and ensure that our strong points in trade can help in our negotiations.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We will go next to MP Steven Guilbeault.

You have six minutes.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for joining us, gentlemen. The committee appreciates your participation and your testimony.

I have a question or two about trade and another on a somewhat broader topic.

What we hear a lot, particularly from small and medium-sized businesses, is that it is very easy to trade with the United States, given the common language and geographical proximity, of course. The costs of exporting or importing, as the case may be, are lower than when trading with a more distant region, for obvious reasons.

What advice do you have for us? Mr. Ostwald, you mentioned certain associations that are doing the necessary work to help, at least in terms of knowledge and contacts. That said, what would your recommendations be for the government? What other steps can we take to try to lower the barriers?

[Kai Ostwald]

Thank you for the question.

I would start by saying that awareness is really key here. The more awareness there is of opportunities and the more contact there is between Canadian firms and markets in Asia, the more evident it becomes where the opportunities really are.

The obstacle of the world's biggest market, just south of the border, which speaks the same languages and is culturally very familiar, is, of course, difficult to overcome, and it's difficult to convince the private sector to put in the work to identify opportunities abroad.

Consistently, the story of economic development and growth in Asia is largely a result of the region being very committed to development and being, on the whole, quite business-friendly. I think once work has been done, the opportunities will be evident. There are a number of success stories of Canadian companies, both larger and smaller, that have very effectively expanded into the Indo-Pacific.

The framework for doing this, the groundwork, has been done by the trade commissions, for example. The trade missions are important. The business councils are all standing by and ready to work. It is fundamentally a matter of awareness as well, though, and the messaging needs to be made more clearly that there are a lot of opportunities for Canada's private sector in Asia and that there are a lot of resources already available to support that transition.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Mr. Van Assche, would you like to add anything?

[Ari Van Assche]

Yes, absolutely. Thank you very much for your question, Mr. Guilbeault.

I agree with my colleague’s comment. Indeed, it is much easier for small and medium-sized businesses to do business in the United States than in Asia. Expanding into Asia entails higher costs for businesses.

Of course, Asia offers many opportunities. It is the world’s most economically dynamic region, which means that market opportunities are also greater there.

Indeed, among the important things, we must first help our companies understand where the opportunities lie. Second, we must reduce costs for our companies going to Asia. Third, having senior trade representatives is obviously very important as well.

Naturally, as soon as our companies start doing more business there, they begin to integrate into business networks, and as soon as they start entering those networks, suddenly the costs of doing business there also begin to decrease.

Indeed, we should start participating, doing more there, and further integrating our activities in that region. Gradually, this could really allow us to reduce the costs associated with operating there, in addition to increasing business opportunities there.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

I have two more questions, and I’ll ask them one after the other.

We’ve talked about critical minerals and the growing demand for them from several countries that also want to diversify their supply rather than rely primarily on China, for example.

That said, if we only export natural resources, aren’t we at risk of continuing to have an economy based on natural resources, rather than on the added value these products could provide us? How can we attract the interest of these economic partners, such as South Korea, Japan and India, whom we have discussed? How can we encourage them to invest here, with us, so that there is added value in the development of critical minerals?

Excuse me, this is a long question.

I have another question that might be directed at you, Mr. Van Assche, because I know you have worked specifically on the China file and on sustainability issues.

Some have criticized what could be described as a recent rapprochement between Canada and China. In your opinion, when it comes to issues like nature, biodiversity, or climate, isn’t it necessary for a country like ours—or for any country interested in these issues—to work with a giant like China on these matters, as we did at COP15 in 2022, for example?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

We will go next to—

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Do they not have time to respond?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

No.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Oh, I'm sorry.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

It's because there was a long comment. Maybe they can respond in the next round.

We will go next to MP Brunelle-Duceppe.

You have six minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

That's too bad, Mr. Chair, because my colleague was asking some excellent questions.

I'm going to ask you the same question, Mr. Van Assche, but in a different way.

We are talking about the possibility of engaging with China more on issues such as the environment. In your opening remarks or perhaps in response to my colleague's question, you talked about China's clean energy industry, solar panels and such. Since the beginning of the meeting, however, I haven't heard anyone mention the allegations of forced labour, especially in the production of solar panels.

It's one thing to say we need to engage more with China on certain environmental issues, but if products that are good for the planet result from supply chains that use forced labour, isn't that a good reason not to seek closer ties to China?

[Ari Van Assche]

Is the question for me? I can answer it.