Mr. Reid then placed his amendment, which was exactly the right thing to do at exactly the right time: wait a minute—the first thing we need to decide here is what the rules of engagement are. His amendment to the motion was that we agree, basically. I won't read the legalese, but the essence of it is that we agree that we won't make any recommendations that go into the report unless there is all-party agreement for those recommendations.
Suddenly, it starts to become pretty clear that the government has no intention of supporting this amendment. That's when the first real spark of trouble showed itself. Up until then, it had been the report, the motion, but no comment or context. We didn't really know what it meant. We didn't even know if it was coming up on PROC. As I say, it was a surprise thing. I won't use the word “ambush”, but it was certainly a surprise, unexpected and not explained ahead of time. There were no niceties at all.
The veteran of this committee, Mr. Reid, on behalf of the official opposition, tables a motion that says that if we are going to get into this discussion he would like to make sure that we all understand and we are all in agreement. We get the indication the government is not going to do that. What that means, Mr. Chair, strategically, is that there is a vote coming and if we lose that vote it has serious implications. In this case, what it means is that the government would then retain the right—or rather, take the right—to use their majority to ram through the things they want to do in their discussion paper, in spite of any opposition that the united opposition benches might have.
Just because the discussion paper was issued and there are things they want to do, that doesn't, by its definition, make all those things evil. But I think it's more than fair to say that if you take a close look, anybody who knows anything about parliamentary procedure will tell you that most of these things—let's just call it a round number, 100%—benefit the government. Under the plan that the majority government alone could force those recommendations through, the final report would be called the report of the procedure and House affairs committee. The government could legitimately say, “We are only carrying out the recommendations of our independent standing committee, which took a good look at this, and here is its report.” The government keeps saying, “Well, you can attach your dissension reports underneath.” Yeah, that's a little nicety. When have you heard anybody say, “What we are doing as a government is consistent with exactly what was in the report. Oh, and by the way, to be fair-minded, I want to point out that both opposition parties did put forward dissenting reports”? That doesn't happen. It doesn't have to. That is why it's so critically important that the report reflect all our opinions and not just the majority.
Trust me, the plot thickens here; that was the easy part. So, we have the discussion paper, motion, meeting, surprise, and amendment to do the right thing, and the government indicates that they are opposed to it. This means that what we have to do strategically is to make sure this doesn't get voted on. This was moved by the official opposition. Once you get an indication that the government is going to oppose it, and they have more votes than we do, it's simple math.
The last thing that someone of Mr. Reid's experience is going to do is allow that vote to happen, where we lose, knowing we are going to lose going into it, and thereby losing our opportunity to have a unanimous all-party report reflecting all our wishes rather than just the ham-fisted demands of the government running over our rights. That's the implication. That's fine. That is when Mr. Reid made it clear that he was going to do exactly what you would do in that case.
Most of us at one time or another have had to do it. That is, you sort of advise colleagues, “Settle in for the rest of this meeting because I intend to talk out the clock. The last thing I'm going to do is let the debate collapse and have a vote come forward that I know I'm going to lose.”
Mr. Reid did the thing that we all do in that situation: he started talking. His goal was to talk from 11:00 till 1:00, which were our regularly scheduled hours. Then, under normal sort of “skirmishes”—I'll call them that as opposed to the war we're in now—under normal circumstances, what would happen, Chair, is that at one o'clock, the scheduled time to rise, the committee would adjourn.
We would all then go about our business as normal, come back at our next regularly scheduled meeting, which would be the following Thursday, again from 11:00 to 1:00. At 11:00, you would gavel us into order and then give the floor to Mr. Reid, who rightfully has the floor under our rules, in that you can't force someone to end debate until they're done. Under our rules, you carry that right into the next meeting: “What's our order of business this Thursday? Well, we're going to continue what we were talking about on Tuesday, and Mr. Reid has the floor.” That's exactly what Mr. Reid and the rest of us expected to happen.
And then, things got dirty. Now, I'm sure it's happened before. I've only seen it once before. I've had it done to me once before, and you remember it.
What happened is that at one o'clock, Mr. Reid rightfully expected that he would conclude his comments and be ready the following Thursday to pick up where he left off and continue. It would be that kind of thing, which is why I call it a “skirmish”. It would be a filibuster, but it would be within the usual time frame of when that committee meets. “That committee happens to be seized up right now because we have this issue and we're dealing with it as we go along.” It wouldn't become what this has become, because of this one—and I'm going to call it a dirty trick because it is a dirty trick—ambush. I had exactly the same thing done to me.
What happens is that you find out that, where we all thought if the meeting—and this comes as a shock to members over and over, and it did to me.... We had a document that called this meeting to order, and it said that we were going to meet from 10:00 to 11:00. Well, I guess it wouldn't in this case because here we are in parliamentary la-la land; it's Friday, but we're still on Tuesday. Anyway, the fact is that you have a piece of paper that tells you what hours you're going to meet, and 99% of the time that's when you rise. You would expect that.
I think there was a member of the official opposition who said, “Chair, I would point out that it's a couple of minutes after one o'clock. We should adjourn this meeting and this discussion and reconvene on Thursday at the regular time.” The chair said, “Actually, no, we're going to continue.” Points of order ensued, and we had a discussion with the clerk about what was going on: “It said the meeting is over at one o'clock. It's now a couple of minutes after one o'clock. The chair has an obligation to end this meeting.”
Ah, but you see, that's the interesting thing about parliamentary rules: they're not always crystal clear. What's inferred at the one o'clock rise is that at least the majority agree with that. It, in and of itself, is not an ironclad law of parliamentary physics that the committee must end at its scheduled time. The committee ends when a majority says that the committee ends. Given that we are masters of our own domain and masters of our own destiny, that right remains sovereign, unless and until collectively we decide differently, or we get overarching marching orders from the House. Other than that, we control our destiny.
So when you apply that, what it means is, if the chair knows that the majority government members are not going to vote for adjournment, he has, in this case, really no alternative but to keep the meeting going. Now if need be, he can stop things and force a showing that there is a majority who want to keep going, but when there's a majority built in, it's implied and understood, and that's the way that rule works.
It was done to me, interestingly enough, on a very similar kind of matter under that good old Bill C-23, the unfair elections act. I came in all raring to go. I came in and got my stuff. I got my speech; I'm ready to go; and I'm two hours, like Mr. Reid. I have two hours to go, and then I have a day in between where I can do my homework and get my next two hours of talking points so I can keep the floor and keep it going because, as you know, Mr. Chair, we can't repeat our arguments, and any argument we make has to at least have some kind of tenuous relationship to the motion at hand, and that is a discretion that you reserve as the chair as to whether or not something is germane to the point in front of us.
I had exactly the same thing. I had that two hours, exactly the same scenario, and the whole points of order, and, “What do you mean?” and shock on my part. I'm like, “What the heck?” Then suddenly I'm filibustering 24-7, and I have about two hours' preparation. That was deliberate. It was an ambush. Now for some of us—and I won't go long on this to my Conservative colleagues—some things leave permanent scars. My good friend Harold is laughing.
Now you might expect that kind of thing from a ham-fisted government that we had before. I'll leave it at that, Harold, okay? If you take that one, Harold, I'll cut it short. I don't want to go too far down that road because it takes the sting away from this government, and that's really where the play is, but it does need to be said that we are in this.
When I used the word “war”, it wasn't on the discussion paper, and it wasn't on the motion, and it certainly wasn't on the amendment. It was the governing Liberals using.... That was the government doing exactly what Harper did, as a vicious...legitimate.... I'm not saying we'll use points of order to stop it, so it's allowed, but that doesn't make it right, and it certainly doesn't mean it was fair play. There was never any intent for fair play. The government hoped that they would catch me flat-footed. At the time I was the only one who was keeping it going on the filibuster, so if I couldn't keep talking, that meant that the debate would collapse, and the vote would have happened, and I would have completely lost any further input into how C-23 was going to be dealt with. I won't say that I won, but we did get some concessions.
My point is that it is a sneak attack. It's an ambush. It's meant to catch members flat-footed by using an interpretation of the rules that is not done day-to-day. In fact, it's not even done usually year to year around here. Once every Parliament or so, this kind of hijinks is carried out. That is when this government decided that they were going to take this skirmish, and they were going to make it a full-blown war, and I just called it for what it is. That's what triggered us going 24-7.
It's really important for those who want to understand how we got here that this is not about the opposition going apoplectic, and all we've done is step forward, and we've hijacked the House and hijacked the committee, and that we're the ones who are forcing all of this. Not the case.