Procedure and House Affairs Committee on March 21st, 2017

[An hon. member]

Oh, oh!

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

—and wouldn't want to provide it inappropriately, at least not without unanimous agreement.

I'll just say that my last name is strong, is growing, and that's really all I have to say on the matter.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

He could be a minister.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Yes, well, there are those in cabinet who are working hard to join it, so I think my time will have to wait until 2019.

Moving on, are we done with the point of order?

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

Yes.

We'll continue on the speaking list from where we were last night, and Mr. Garnett has the floor.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Graham really wants me to cross the floor. I suppose I could then join the large number of Liberal members voting against the government. That's not going to happen, just to put all my cards on the table.

Speaking of all my cards being on the table, I would like to continue where we left off last night, or rather earlier this morning, with the important issues that we're dealing with. Our discussion was in the context of a notice of motion that came forward from Mr. Simms, and I should say that the motion came forward in a way that I don't think is respectful of the tone and of the way in which we typically operate within this place.

We had the release of a discussion paper that, as I think others have reflected, isn't so much about discussion as it is about dictating. It's just supposedly to raise some issues and some questions and some matters for consideration, but then, very immediately, it was followed during a constituency work week by a notice of motion. On the day before the budget, the government wanted to move forward with this motion that would have involved a study of the issues in this so-called discussion paper about the so-called modernization of the Standing Orders. They thought that somehow the boundaries of that study had to be determined the day before the budget.

Of course, we know that Canadians are legitimately weighing out. They are looking at the budget, looking at how much this government will increase their tax bill by and at how much debt will be left to the next generation. In the midst of that, we have something happening that I think was designed to slide in under that discussion and prevent us from really giving it the scrutiny it deserved.

What did we on this side of the House do? Not just our party but all on this side of the House, including our good colleagues in the New Democratic Party, stood up and said “no”. We said it was not right for the elected government of the day to do this. They do enjoy a certain mandate to implement aspects of their policy agenda, but it is not right for them to try to unilaterally change the way in which our parliamentary institutions function.

That has been the pattern with this government. It has met with strong opposition in every case. Initially the government thought they could unilaterally change the way in which elections occur, the process by which they take place, in a way that would work to their advantage. The opposition stood up and said “no”. We were eventually unified in saying that you cannot, as one party, change the rules of the game. You have to engage with others in the process.

This is exactly what our amendment speaks to. This is a continuation, another step in what we've already seen so far from this government. First of all, they wanted to change the way in which elections occur without meaningfully engaging Canadians or meaningfully engaging their representatives, except for those who were part of their party. Even then, we sometimes have good reason to doubt how meaningful the engagement is, even within the government caucus, given the responses we see in terms of things that happen in the House as a result of that.

Now that they've backed away from that, we see them effectively doing something very similar. They're trying to change the rules of our parliamentary processes, again unilaterally, again proceeding in a way that is not set up to be respectful of individual members of Parliament and those other voices who need to be represented in that discussion as well.

It is interesting that there is a clear similarity, a clear parallel, in terms of the kinds of arguments that are being used by members of this government in this context. My colleague Mr. Reid, on the electoral reform file, would ask repeatedly of Minister Monsef in the House of Commons, “Why won't you commit to a referendum? Why won't you commit to the wider public engagement that we would expect to take place?” Those were the questions that he asked, and the response—to the extent that the questions were answered at all—was always something in the form of “Let's put aside these questions of process and let's talk about the substance.”

We ought not jump to a discussion of substance without really prefacing that with a meaningful discussion of how the discussion will proceed, the process by which it will unfold. Yes, I am as eager as members on the other side are to have a discussion about how we move forward with respect to our Standing Orders, but that has to be done in the context established by the amendment. You can see a parallel to that in the call for a referendum that came from the opposition before. It was us—not just us as the Conservative caucus, but the united perspective of the opposition—saying, “You cannot change the rules of the game on your own.” That is not what Canadians elect governments to do.

Canadians elect governments, or members of Parliament, to be precise, and members of Parliament then coalesce to define who the government is. Through that process of selection, Canadians identify a government that they expect to make policy decisions and to propose laws for debate and discussion. At the same time, though, I think Canadians expect governments of the day to leave intact the basic framework that allows for ongoing, fair, democratic competition. To the extent that changes are necessary in that interaction—either changes to the way in which people are elected or changes to the processes of the parliamentary activities that we're a part of—any time there are proposals for change, it is not good enough that one player in the game decides that they want to make those changes.

I don't want to reduce what we do here to a sports analogy, because what we do here is much more important and consequential, but I think members would clearly understand that if one combatant in a sporting event were to set the rules of the game, the other side might have some real, significant, and legitimate concerns about that. The way in which democracy is supposed to work is that there is a set of ground rules that are identified, independent of the particular interests—and certainly independent of the narrow, immediate interests—of one particular party. Those ground rules are established with a wide degree of social consensus.

In the context of electoral reform, we said it was important that it occur through a referendum. In the context of changes that are proposed to the Standing Orders, it is important that the discussion occur through the meaningful engagement of members of Parliament. That means members of Parliament of all parties, including all members of the government and all members of the opposition.

What we have sought is an amendment that reflects the expectation that Canadians have of fairness in our democratic processes, where the framework, the ground rules, and the context in which we operate are not simply established or pronounced upon in a definitive way by one player in the game.

There have to be meaningful mechanisms for the opposition to advance their concerns, to bring them forward and discuss them. It's not surprising to me that we see, unfortunately, this repeated pattern from the government of seeking to make changes not just to policy, not just to decisions of the government, but also to that underlying substructure of democracy. Moreover, they want to to do so in a way that does not reflect our normal processes and traditions, that doesn't reflect our normal expectations of fairness. We see this in the approach they took on electoral reform, which they immediately pulled back from once they realized they had lost the public debate.

I'll say something to members of the government on this discussion of the Standing Orders. You did not win the issue of electoral reform in the way that many in the government wanted to, because Canadians rose up and objected. They spoke out clearly about the problems and the concerns they had with the things that were going on.

The public response on that issue was overwhelming. This is a new issue. This is something that the government started trying to push forward at committee yesterday. Looking at the comments people are making and at the level of engagement we are seeing on social media, I perceive this issue, and specifically the issue of the amendments we are bringing forward, to be one that is garnering very substantial public concern and consideration.

There is a reasonable expectation from the public as people discuss these issues. There is an increasing level of engagement from the public on this issue, and members probably are noticing it as they check their emails. I know we were here late last night, into the wee hours of this morning, and many of us had caucuses to attend, but I would encourage members while they are here to ask their staffers if we are hearing from people on this issue from within our own ridings. Already there has been a very strong response to this issue. People who didn't even know I was here last night have been writing to me about things they've heard from other people and are saying they hope I am engaged in this process.

This is the kind of issue Canadians want to get engaged in, because Canadians take our parliamentary institutions very seriously. They also have an intuitive sense of procedural fairness and the importance of people being engaged, of all parties being engaged, not just because there are different individual perspectives that are important, but also because we are speaking in a way that is reflective of the people who represent us, and the people who represent us—not just those from Liberal ridings who may not be heard in this process, but all Canadians—deserve to have some say over the way our democracy works.

In the government's opposition to the amendment, we see their desire to limit the ability of the opposition to have a meaningful say on the kinds of changes to the Standing Orders that would come forward. We also see in the specific proposals for change that are coming from the government a desire to remove all of those meaningful tools that the opposition has for challenging the government. There is nothing in this proposed so-called modernization that takes away the ability of a member to speak maybe once, if they can get a slot, for a limited amount of time, but in every case they remove those provisions that allow members of the opposition the strong and meaningful opportunity, on issues of vital concern to their constituents and to the nation, to stand up in a more pronounced and fundamental way and say no.

It removes the ability, for example, of members of Parliament to talk for more than a very limited period of time in the context of committees. That's obviously a problem, because the committee can be the one place where members of Parliament, generally those who sit on particular committees, will have a particular interest or degree of expertise in specific areas. This discussion paper proposes to limit the ability of not just members of the opposition but also members of the government to stand up—I guess we normally speak sitting down at committees, but to metaphorically stand up—and object in a way that is clear, effective, and pronounced.

As I look at the text of this discussion paper, and I've read through it a number of times, I see some real dissonance between the tone of the discussion, the stated objectives, and the way in which this government is proceeding vis-à-vis the amendment and the changes they are proposing to bring about. For example, as I said earlier, this discussion paper refers to modernization without clarity or definition, but it also refers to some words that are, in and of themselves, good words: “greater accountability, transparency and relevance”. How in the world, though, does removing the ability of the opposition to have a say, either with respect to the ground rules or with respect to the actual ongoing deliberations of the House, promote greater accountability? How does removing one question period every week, even if the time is reapportioned—because you are still removing the opportunity for accountability five days a week—provide what is stated as an objective, greater accountability?

It states:

Parliament must adapt to a changing and evolving...landscape and should respond to demands of greater accountability, transparency and relevance.

Greater accountability, transparency, and relevance: these are all important things, yet the way in which the government is proceeding—today, this morning, yesterday—is fundamentally at odds with the objectives we discussed here.

It was in fact our party that pushed to have these discussions in public. It was our advocacy that said Canadians have to see, in a clear way, what's going on and what the government is trying to do, which is to remove the ability of the opposition to be an effective force, and to do it in a way that doesn't give the opportunity for the opposition to be meaningfully and effectively engaged in this discussion.

Incidentally, to further support my point about public engagement on this issue, I'll just say that members saw me doing a Facebook Live about 20 minutes ago, before this committee. I had some technical difficulties because I had my camera facing the wrong way initially. That often happens with me. You might be able to tell my ability with technology by my comments about the concept of modernization, but I have figured out Facebook Live, and in 20 minutes we've already had 19 shares. That's a little less than a share per minute. I don't normally get that much traffic on the videos I post, not even on something as contentious as motion number 103, so we are seeing a high level of engagement from the public on this issue.

I think members of the government would do well to note that, and to realize that when they talk about things like greater accountability, transparency, and relevance, Canadians are already scrutinizing what we are doing here. When it comes to the government's desire to limit the conversation by not supporting the amendment, by not allowing the opposition to be meaningfully engaged in that discussion, we see that the public, who are much more able to be engaged because of social media, whether members of the government like it or not, are already reacting to that and being very clear about the kinds of concerns they have as that happens.

There is something in the introduction to the discussion paper that I neglected to draw attention to last night. The introduction talks about the recalibration of the minority and majority, and yet the process envisioned by the government is one in which that recalibration is undertaken unilaterally, where you have one member of the process doing that recalibration.

The discussion paper also says, “This balance is in need of constant attention and periodic adjustment to reflect the will of the House and of the people it serves.” Isn't that exactly what we in the opposition are talking about and are seeking to do through this amendment? This is to ensure that any recalibration or balance that takes place reflects “the will of the House and the people it serves”.

Let's be very clear about what that needs to mean. As the government was keen to talk about, at least until recently, we have a majority government that was not elected with a majority of the popular vote. That's fair. That's how our system works. That doesn't in any way take away from their legitimacy to govern, but it does speak to the fact that we need to have a little bit more of a multipartisan approach if we are to meaningfully talk about the will of the people that the House is supposed to serve, especially when we make changes that shift the underlying substructure of our democratic discussions.

It is striking to me how in this discussion paper you have the nominal recognition of the need for periodic adjustment to reflect the will of the House and the people that it serves, and yet you have a motion that seeks to allow the government House leader's vision to be unilaterally imposed on the House and on the opposition.

When we speak about the will of the House, some members might suggest that could be just a majority of the House. After all, the House can vote, and the government has a majority, so they can carry the vote on the basis of their majority. Doesn't that reflect the will of the House?

Well, I would say that the will of the House should be expressed in different ways that are appropriate to the kind of situation that is being adjudicated.

If we were to have a public whipped standing vote on the selection of the Speaker, I would consider that inappropriate. I would consider that an inappropriate expression of the will of the House in the context of that institution. It is important for the Speaker both to be neutral and to be seen to be neutral. Although formally the process of a whipped standing vote right at the beginning of Parliament would mean that the Speaker would be chosen by a majority, I think it would undermine the principle of the will of the House.

This is recognized in the Standing Orders, which for different kinds of things prescribe different kinds of numbers for the will of the House. Obviously, for the passage of legislation, there is a requirement that there be a majority of those voting who support it. On certain other matters there are different metrics or requirements. There are certain things that the House can only do through unanimous consent. There are certain things the House can do through a majority, but which need to have a proper notice given in advance.

There are certain things that can occur in the House that require a certain threshold to be passed. I am thinking of Standing Order 53 and Standing Order 56.1, standing orders that allow motions to be put forward that are deemed adopted if a certain number of members do not stand to object. In the case of Standing Order 56.1, the government can put forward a motion, and if the opposition fails to stand 25—well, it wouldn't have to be the opposition, of course—if 25 members of Parliament fail to stand, then the motion is deemed adopted. That is to deal with changes to the normal procedural mechanisms of the House.

Standing Order 53, which we had use of on Bill C-14 last spring, allows the government to seek to suspend the normal notice process that takes place for the discussion of a bill. Certainly we would not want the normal notice process to be suspended with a simple majority of the House, but I think it is sensible and right that we're willing to accept that even if there are a couple of members who object—and for the purposes of Standing Order 53, it's not 25 members but 10 members—the government can proceed with something for which there hasn't been the normal notice given, if the will of the House is for that to be done in the way that I have described.

This is the central point. The will of the House is a concept that I think requires a certain degree of proper collaboration in response to the specific events that we are dealing with. Yes, there has to be periodic adjustment, but there has to be an acceptance of the way in which that periodic adjustment takes place that meaningfully reflects the will of the House.

I think the amendment that we in the opposition have put forward reflects an appropriate concept of the will of the House in the context of this type of decision. We accept, as is well established in Standing Orders 56.1 and 53, and elsewhere in the Standing Orders, the use of unanimous consent motions in general, which would be another example of certain situations, especially procedural things, wherein a simple majority is not enough, because if we are shifting the procedural ground of the House, and the government can do that simply with a majority vote, then that puts at risk all of the subsequent discussion that should be occurring on substantive legislation.

It's not just out of sort of parliamentary nerdiness and navel-gazing that we are concerned about questions around the Standing Orders and process. It is, rather, because those things provide the substructure for discussion of substantive issues that matter to Canadians and that inform their lives in a real and practical way.

It's a reality that government legislation may have unintended consequences. It may contain mistakes, and that's why the process of parliamentary scrutiny is so important. That's why the role of all members of the government caucus, not just the cabinet, and the role of the opposition are so important: it's because our ability to engage in a meaningful way in the discussion is a bulwark against the kinds of mistakes or unintended consequences that can occur in legislation.

We need to protect that substructure and we actually, I believe, for the most part, need to have a higher standard of support for making changes to that substructure—yes, to protect it, but also to protect the meaningful policy decisions and outcomes that stand upon that framework. That's something that is particularly important.

Further, there are certain things, certain further acknowledgements in the discussion paper that while ultimately recommending changes that would be injurious to our institutions and, indeed, to a proper understanding of the role of the opposition and of all members of Parliament in that institution, that I think should point in the direction of support for the amendment that we are defending today.

I draw the attention of members to a sentence on page two, partway down the first paragraph, when it's discussing some of the issues of the deliberative function of the House. It acknowledges, “Every issue is unique and requires an amount of debate that is commensurate to the significance of the matter before the House.” This is very true. There are some issues that require less discussion; there are some issues that require more discussion. What has been striking to me in witnessing the way in which this Parliament has operated is that we've often seen efforts to curtail debate on some of those most substantive and sensitive areas where surely we can recognize the need, or we should recognize the need, for very extensive discussion.

The first time that this government proposed time allocation or closure was with respect to Bill C-14, the government's euthanasia legislation. Although, as I'm told, previous governments have used time allocation from time to time, this was a unique case on an issue of fundamental values and conscience. There were significant differences of opinion within every party, and certainly within the two largest parties, and the government moved forward with time allocation on that issue.

This speaks to some of the problems around that whole area of discussion. It also should remind us, when we're properly calibrating the discussion in the House, to recognize the differences between different kinds of legislation and recognize that different kinds of legislation require different amounts of debate, especially on legislation on which there may be broad agreement among the parties that it's something that's okay to move faster on. However, the significance of the matter, the relative time that is required for discussion in the House, is also something that we can't speak of as having a certain ontological objectivity. It is not, strictly speaking, an objective point with regard to how much discussion is required on certain items of legislation. Members of different parties will disagree based on what they're hearing from their constituents.

A recent example of this, to compare what the Conservatives and the NDP were saying, was the discussion around the government's pre-clearance legislation. I can't recall exactly the number of that bill. Our view was that this was legislation that was good, which we could support. It was a government bill. Our caucus was supportive of the government's approach with respect to pre-clearance. The NDP was not. The NDP had some grave concerns. The NDP wanted in particular to ensure that they were able to be fully engaged in the discussion. Notably, when time allocation came up on that bill, our Conservative caucus joined with the NDP in opposing the imposition of time allocation on that point. We recognized that from the perspective of the NDP, the time commensurate to the significance of the discussion of the issue had not been given. What you see today, and what you've seen on matters like this around the management of the time of the House, is some real agreement among parties with obviously very different broader philosophies.

As we think about this issue of the way in which time is allocated, this speaks to very important rules about how the House operates. Yes, individual parties, but also individual members, have an opportunity to meaningfully put forward and discuss the concerns they have. The absence of an ability to do that, the absence of the ability for the opposition to have a role, as envisioned by the study in the absence of the amendment, can obviously create some real problems with respect to the way that balance is set up.

The normal process for making changes to the Standing Orders, as well as for figuring out the time that is allocated to different things, is for discussions to occur among House leaders. There is provision in the Standing Orders—and I think there should be provision in the Standing Orders—for the government to move motions around the allocation of time when they feel there is urgency in moving a measure forward, but the important point is that those motions create an avenue, an opportunity, for public debate and discussion around the use of that procedure and create some accountability and scrutiny of that process.

The way in which the government is proceeding here really seeks to limit or minimize the debate that would normally occur around that.

Later on in the introduction to the discussion paper, the government House leader lays out some proposed reasons for these changes. As we discuss how to do the study and the level of engagement we would expect from members with respect to unanimity or not, we need to take on board and consider the reasons that have been put forward.

The discussion paper speaks about the need to ensure members have a better balance, and to encourage under-represented segments of society to seek elected office.

We should be quite aware and critical of the fact that very often this government uses references to minority and other under-represented segments of society to impose its own interests. We saw this with electoral reform, where they objected to the idea of a referendum. It seemed to be on the basis that we have to ensure that the full range of diverse voices be heard, but we never got an answer as to why a referendum would exclude a full diversity of voices.

Referendums, in fact, would generally make it easier for people to engage who may otherwise be unable to participate in the kinds of consultations that don't involve the simplicity of being able to cast a direct ballot. A red flag should go off in our minds when the government uses this reference to under-represented segments of society, if it is in the context of a broader plan to simply impose its own agenda and, perversely, weaken the ability of the full range of voices to be heard in the process.

The first point of justification that the government House leader puts forward for wanting to proceed in this direction is the comment, “to ensure Members have a better balance”. I'm not entirely sure what “a better balance” means—especially when we have a normative word like “better”—when what is envisioned by the approach the government has taken is that we're going to have a balance that is entirely conceived of and determined by the government on the ways in which Standing Orders operate and debate proceeds. The system that is envisioned is one in which the government decides before the fact how much debate is going to be allowed or not allowed on any given provision, so it's not at all clear to me what is meant there by “balance”.

On the other hand, perhaps better balance isn't speaking so much in this context of the calibration between the role of government and opposition. Rather, it's speaking about the kind of balance that members might want to have between their duties, their families, and other things in their private life. As we think about the Standing Orders in that context, there are a lot of options that we could identify that could enhance the effectiveness of representation while facilitating an optimal balance, but the engagement of those changes shouldn't be something that the government House leader does unilaterally. Of course, the government House leader is in practice a bit removed from the practical life of other members of Parliament, because the government House leader has far more staff. They have certain resources at their disposal, a driver, and so forth, that other members of Parliament don't have.

I'm not objecting to that. I'm simply saying that if you want to have a discussion about the kind of balance that can be achieved in practice for members of Parliament, you'd better make sure that you're actually engaging the full range of voices of members of Parliament.

Now, the kind of balance that is necessary in the life of a member of Parliament will be different for the government and for the opposition members, because government and opposition members have different kinds of responsibilities. In the government, of course, members have access to a greater spectrum of staff support. There are larger budgets on the government side for those kinds of things. Opposition has to spend that much more time on the kind of research and analysis that's happening within our own offices. That impacts the kind of balance we can have.

On the other hand, there are different responsibilities that may be particular to the life of a government member of Parliament, who is probably more involved in making announcements. Committee chairs, not always but generally, are members of the government. Parliamentary secretaries have another set of associated responsibilities that are different from those of other members of Parliament. This issue of balance for members of Parliament is different depending not just on whether you sit in government or opposition but also on which party you are in and what kinds of responsibilities you have within your party. Perhaps there's an issue between recognized parties and unrecognized groups. Then, of course, there's the issue of independents.

In a discussion of what constitutes a better balance, I think it should be obvious that we would want to engage the full and broad range of voices in that discussion. That's exactly the opportunity that is established in the context of this amendment. If the amendment were to pass, it would ensure that we would hear from the different kinds of perspectives that are raised by all members of Parliament as we discuss this important question of balance.

These issues of what constitutes balance will vary within parties, but they will also vary across regions. I mean “region” in the sense of the part of the country you're from or the kind of riding you have, whether you represent an urban or a rural riding. I think the kinds of expectations and the kinds of work we do for our constituents vary widely, depending on the kind of constituency we have. Some of us have to spend much more time travelling. Some of us may have a relatively greater volume of immigration casework to do. Any discussion of balance shouldn't reflect just one political party, not just because it shouldn't reflect only one party's political interests but also because it shouldn't reflect just one regional type of perspective. It should be a conversation that is inclusive.

Sometimes when we see the policy decisions of this government, it strikes us that there isn't really an appreciation of the dynamics happening in more rural parts of Canada, and that's across the board. That's something that needs to be taken into consideration when we think about the kinds of balance and the kinds of activities involved in representation for all members of Parliament. That's why it's important for us to ensure that as we undertake discussions of what balance looks like, we have a greater level of that full engagement.

Mr. Chair, I don't want to put members on the spot here, but I notice that there's a declining number of members at the table. I'm open to a brief suspension, if that is what members want.

I'm happy to continue with my remarks, but we have a pretty small number of members at the table right now.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

Ruby.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

On a point of order, as long as members are in the room they can hear the debate. I don't see what the issue is. Last night we went through this with opposition members who were not sitting at the table and were not listening to the speakers speak. This is something that will occur after two days.

I don't think there's any reason to suspend.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

And we certainly don't need to. I was just making the point that if there are discussions that are happening that respect how we can move forward in a more collaborative way, then we can suspend to allow those discussions to happen. But if that's not something the government is interested in, I have no problem continuing.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

I appreciate your raising that, but it doesn't seem at this time necessary. But any time you want to raise that, do, because sometimes we do need to break for discussions.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Sure. Okay.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

I'm sure someone on your side might bring in McDonald's again, and we may as well all get up, so we'll have that consideration for each other.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I understand Mr. Bittle was tweeting his concern that the health minister might object to the consumption of McDonald's, but I would just say it's a harm-reduction measure.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Where do you find the time to be on Twitter as much as you do?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

That's what I do after 3 a.m., when the committee suspends.

Certainly, Mr. Chair, members are welcome to be where they want in the room; I don't mean to dictate to members on that point at all. I just want to make sure that we're taking advantage of the opportunities to have discussions about some next steps here, because it would be worthwhile for the government to see the logic of what we're doing, and to work with us to facilitate study and discussion of these issues in a way that is properly collegial and properly inclusive of the broad range of perspectives that we have in front of us. In the absence of that amendment, that is not happening, so I think that's something that we need to see at some point. Whether we see the government go through that process of introspection and change after a day or after a month, it's going to have to happen at some point, because the way in which they are proposing to bring about change is just so fundamentally unacceptable to those of us in the opposition.

We recognize the importance of the role that we have as elected members of Parliament who speak on behalf of their constituents, but also as an opposition that has a responsibility for framing the public conversation and that has different tools for calibrating the intensity of our response. Sometimes we support legislation and proposals the government brings forward and sometimes we object, but we object in a way that allows the process to proceed, and very rarely do we stand up, or in the present case sit down, and say, “The government is trying to do something that is fundamentally unacceptable to the way that our democratic processes work.” That is something that we in the Conservative caucus are deeply committed to—and I know that Mr. Christopherson spoke very forcefully about this last night as well, that the NDP caucus is also deeply committed to this. I don't know if he gave the barnburner at caucus that he promised, where everyone was on the roof—

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Well, they're still on the ceiling, as I promised

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

They're still on the ceiling. Okay.

I want to continue, in the context of this discussion paper from the government House leader, by speaking to the second point that was given in terms of rationale for the changes that the House leader wants to bring forward, and that is, she spoke about this issue of encouraging unrepresented segments of society to seek elected office.

It is not at all clear to me how the efforts of the government to effectively neuter the opposition, to turn the opposition into more of an audience than a part of the process, would somehow encourage under-represented segments of society to seek elected office. I think what people look for when they consider whether or not to seek a career in public office is the opposite. What they look for is a sense that they will be able to meaningfully contribute to the process, regardless of what part of the House of Commons they're in. I think it would probably be harder to recruit someone to run for public office if you had to tell them, “Well, if you're in the opposition, the government is basically going to do whatever they want, and you don't have any tools at your disposal.” I think that might be the sort of thing that would discourage people from running for public office if they had to grapple with the fact that our rules had been changed unilaterally in a way that did not actually allow for the meaningful engagement of the opposition in the ongoing process. That's my general view about how the proposed changes by the government would impact this question of under-represented segments of society seeking elected office.

However, it's striking that despite making that assertion—as is typical of the government's rhetorical style of throwing out these concepts without actually ever explaining their relationship to the fundamental objectives, which is to weaken the role of members of Parliament and strengthen the power of the Prime Minister's Office and the House leader and the cabinet—they make absolutely no attempt to explain the relationship between that reference to under-represented segments of society seeking elected office and what they're actually in a substantive way trying to do through the way they proceed.

Moving on from that, there's further discussion of what constitutes modernization. The discussion report says:

Modernization of the rules of the House also includes ways to improve the functioning of committees. It has been frequently noted that it is in committees that the substantive work of Parliament is done, and where a significant share of a Member’s parliamentary work takes place. While committees continue to function effectively, there are merits to examining ways to improve not only their effectiveness, but also their inclusivity.

That again speaks to the dissonance in some of the government's rhetorical tone in the context of this discussion paper and the reality of what they are trying to do. They are not creating more inclusive committees. What they are seeking to do through this process, in the absence of the amendment, is to create the context in which the government can unilaterally impose things on the opposition with respect to the kinds of decisions that are made, and to do so without, then, opposition members having the normal processes that are available to them such as being able to talk about their concerns.

How is it more inclusive for the kinds of interventions and the length of interventions members could make, especially when the government House leader explicitly acknowledges in her comments on these remarks that committee members generally develop a significant degree of expertise in the topics before them? The proposed time limits for committee are actually 10 minutes, which is less than.... Well, of course, the time limits in the House vary, depending on the type of measure before the House, but every bill has a period of time for 20-minute speeches.

There's actually a provision in the House for unlimited time on certain kinds of measures. I can't quite remember exactly, but I believe that the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, in certain situations if not in every situation, but certainly the mover of a government motion and certainly the person who immediately responds to the government motion has unlimited time. Unilaterally, this government wants to make changes to the Standing Orders that would place greater restrictions on the ability of members of Parliament to make long interventions in committee than in the chamber of the House of Commons. One of the things this suggests to me is that, in the process of moving unilaterally, the government is doing it rather sloppily. They haven't even reflected upon the fact there is this dissonance with the existing Standing Orders, which do permit 20-minute speeches in certain cases and unlimited time in certain cases, while they would propose to severely limit the time available for discussion at committee.

How in the world would that make committees function more effectively? In what world does that increase effectiveness or inclusivity? Certainly if the government's goal, as it seems to be with respect to the amendment and the motion, is to just get through committee work as quickly as possible, to transform committees from meaningful, deliberative bodies into rubber stamps, if that's their metric of effectiveness, then we can see where they're going. Of course, effectiveness is a concept that can be very much in the eye of the beholder. It seems that every time the government talks about effectiveness, they don't mean effectiveness from the perspective of the health and vitality of the institution; they mean effectiveness from the perspective of the interests of one particular set of actors, not even being the entire government caucus but being those on the front bench, the Prime Minister, the government House leader, and their fellow travellers.

A less slippery term than “effectiveness”, though, is “inclusivity”. Transparently, what the government is talking about doing is not enhancing inclusivity with respect to committees. Although they have contemplated a provision with respect to independence, they've applied the same point to parliamentary secretaries with respect to committees. This raises some real and obvious problems, where on the one hand the government takes this holier-than-thou stand of saying they're not going to place parliamentary secretaries on committees, but then afterwards says they're going to create a defined role for parliamentary secretaries, in addition to that of the members they already have there.

There's a legitimate debate about what role parliamentary secretaries should have on committees. I know that it was the practice of the previous government to have parliamentary secretaries as members of committees, but I think what those who objected to that practice were objecting to was not the fact that the parliamentary secretary had a vote, but the fact that the parliamentary secretary was, from their perspective, in some way impeding, as a spokesman of the government, the independent functioning of the committee. Yet when you reinsert the parliamentary secretary into the committee as an additional member doing everything short of voting, all you've done is add an additional non-voting member to the committee. The principal power of the parliamentary secretary at a committee isn't the fact that they can cast a vote; it is the ability that they might have to influence other members on behalf of the government.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Exactly.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

We see this a lot. It's ironic that this government ran on the slogan of “real change”, because there never was change that was more unreal—and not unreal in the good sense—than the way in which they talk about changes and their supposed desires to reform our institutions. You can say they're “real changes”, but they're not real changes in the direction that most Canadians envision them happening, and they're not real changes in line with what the discussion paper refers to.

There are some points I would like to address with respect to the management of the time of the House. The discussion paper draws a comparison between different legislatures as I think a basis for implying that they would like to get rid of Friday sittings. They note that many provincial legislatures do things differently. They don't have five sitting days a week.

There is an exception, that being the United Kingdom.

Of course, it needs to be mentioned and actually is noted later in the discussion paper that we have far more members than any provincial legislature. This reflects the fact that we are a large, geographically dispersed country.

The discussion paper notes an exception, that being the United Kingdom, which does sit on some Fridays, and I don't think it's a coincidence that the United Kingdom's is also a very large legislature. When you have more members of Parliament—as Mr. Chan mentions, yes, the United Kingdom is twice our size—when you have larger legislatures, in the case of Canada or in the case of the U.K., I think it is sensible that we acknowledge that, yes, there is a different set of operating procedures that would make sense in that context to ensure that all members of Parliament can be heard.

In my home province of Alberta, there are 87 MLAs, and so the kinds of rules that would require that all 87 MLAs have an opportunity to speak on behalf of their constituents might naturally be different from the kind of rules we require here to ensure that all 338 sitting members of Parliament have an opportunity to speak on behalf of their constituents. That is fairly intuitive, and so when the government tries to create this justification, this basis for unilaterally moving in this direction by making comparisons with other legislatures, they do so without meaningfully acknowledging that different legislatures operate under different realities, and one clear difference in the realities under which they operate is the number of members of Parliament who are there.

There are some other differences with the British parliament that I want to speak about later on in the context of the way in which the House manages its schedule.

I did my master's degree in the United Kingdom, so I have a bit of a sense of our having similar institutions in a general sense while also having very different political cultures. When the government tries to justify unilaterally moving in a certain direction simply to reflect procedures that have been undertaken in the U.K., we should stop and acknowledge the different bases for the different standing orders that exist because of the important and very real differences in our political cultures, differences that are evident to members who have spent substantial amounts of time in the U.K.

The discussion of the management of time in this paper goes on to speak about how the House of Commons sits many more days and hours each year than provincial and territorial legislatures. That is true, of course, but it reflects the reality that we have more members of Parliament.

The other issue about the way this deals with Friday sittings is the tone and attitude that this discussion paper takes—and this is striking to me—with respect to the way we govern private members' business. The alternative being proposed with respect to Fridays is that, while it could be turned into a sitting day like any other, having two hours of private members' business at the end of the day could allow some members to leave early to travel to their ridings. I don't know if this was intentionally said in that way, but it's a clear expression of the government House leader, it seems to me, that somehow private members' business is less important than government orders, and that of course members might be much more willing to leave early to go home to their ridings if it were just private members' business at the end of the day.

Private members' business is critically important. A private member's bill could certainly become law, and we have private members' bills that make very dramatic changes to our national life, with much more limited debate. The Standing Orders we have prescribe only two hours of debate at second reading before the first vote occurs. It would be very rare that government legislation would move forward with the same limited debate, and there is no provision for questions and comments during private members' business except for the mover of the motion.

The government wants, to judge by the way they are proceeding and their rejection of our amendment, to unilaterally make changes that already clearly reflect a certain attitude toward private members' business. They want to do it in a way that would allow them to change the rules of private members' business. That is something we should find very concerning, especially because of the precedent it sets. When we speak about private members' business, we can refer to all kinds of rules in the Standing Orders that clearly prescribe the structure of private members' business. The intent is to protect private members from the games that a government might want to play, which negatively impact their privileges as members of Parliament to bring forward legislation that is important to them and reflects the priorities of their communities.

I think members will be familiar with these rules. The ability to bring forward a private member's bill is based on a random draw, not by party. The order that unfolds for the proposing of private members' bills is based on a random draw. There's a provision for members to trade these spots among themselves, but members can put forward those bills. They are allocated on the basis of a draw. These come to a vote. If these bills pass second reading and are referred to committee but are not considered by that committee in a certain period of time—I can't remember off the top of my head exactly what that period of time is—there is provision for their automatic referral back to the House.

Now, these Standing Orders were developed I think in the collective wisdom of the House to protect that important role that private members have, to ensure they are meaningfully able to bring forward legislation in a way that doesn't involve game playing. You could imagine that in the absence of the automatic referral provision, if the government didn't like a private member's bill, they would stack the committee with those who were like-minded with respect to that private member's bill, and then the committee would simply fail to consider that bill. Again, in their wisdom, the Standing Orders, reflecting the collective wisdom of our history in the development of them and of our institutions, insulate against that fact.

I would not want to set a precedent that the government can unilaterally, without achieving the kind of unanimous support that our amendment speaks of, change the process of private members' bills, because this would be the thin edge of the wedge. First they're saying, okay, well, we are changing it so that we have private members' bills at the end of the day on Friday so people can go home. That's the tone of the discussion here. But if we establish a precedent, if we undo what to this point has been a convention, which is for the broader engagement of members of Parliament in considerations about these kinds of things, then it becomes much easier for the government to go the next step.

This is the important thing to consider about private member's business, about every aspect of our institutions. Even with good intentions perhaps, when we undo conventions of the way in which decisions are made, we have to think not only about whether this is something we want to do right now for our immediate purposes; we have to think about the implications more broadly, more long term, for the health of those institutions. What will the likely impact of that be over time if a future government—or if later on this same government—tries to do what they perceive as further modernization, as further steps, that have the effect of further undermining and showing further disrespect for the important role that members are supposed to have in the context of private members' business? That's something that concerns me when I see the kind of language being used with respect to this whole issue.

Now, further in the discussion paper, I do want to reflect on a separate point about this issue of the way in which votes take place. I shared some thoughts last night about the broader questions of electronic voting. I am not saying I'm opposed to electronic voting, but that we need to have a discussion on its implications and to ensure that those discussions unfold in a framework in which we cannot have the government moving unilaterally. That is because if, in the context of that discussion, we discover that electronic voting reduces the willingness of members of Parliament to vote differently from the government because they feel they can simply follow the government in a relatively more anonymous way—I'm not saying that would be our conclusion, but if that were our conclusion—then the government might say, “Hey, that's a great idea; let's proceed with it then”, even if other members were saying, “No, that's not what we want to have happen at all”. If we go down the road of doing further study on an issue, I think we need to have a bit of a sense of what the implications of that would be, and we're not seeing that clarity here at all.

In terms of the time of votes, it says:

Ringing of the bells and the taking of recorded divisions is a time-consuming exercise. Electronic voting would permit each Member to record their vote and then resume other political and constituency work.

What's striking to me about this is that there are many aspects of our responsibilities that consume time, but it's not a sufficient basis to critique a practice by saying that it is consuming time. More importantly, a practice should only be critiqued if it is consuming time unnecessarily or improperly.

I see a great deal of value in the way in which we do recorded divisions. Of course, I'm open to a discussion about how these might be done differently, but the way in which we vote is an important way that members of Parliament stand up publicly and are counted clearly and visibly. With Canadians increasingly watching what we do on social media and participating in those conversations online, I think that is something that is much more immediate and practical to them. Certainly, I have shared video of members of Parliament voting, and I know other members have too. Just from tracking the response that those things get on social media, there does seem to be a real level of engagement and interest.

Indeed, there is a transparency to the kind of public approach we take with respect to recorded divisions. There is a transparency to that, which certainly still exists in a certain sense around electronic voting, but not in the same clearly identifiable and visible way. This is something that requires discussion and is a legitimate thing for us to study as a committee, but we need to make sure, if we go down that road of studying it, that ultimately the conclusion about how we proceed will be made on the basis of the public interest, not on the basis of the interests of one particular player within the process. That is the difference here. That is what should be happening, and that is not what will happen unless the amendment that has been put forward is supported and endorsed.

Again, I see the value of this discussion of the Standing Orders, but it has to be done in a context that respects the integrity of those institutions and the integrity of the processes by which those institutions have traditionally developed and evolved and changed over time.

The question of the House calendar is another issue that will be a part of this study and is, therefore, informed by the amendment and the process of study envisioned here. This is a matter that I did not have a chance to discuss yesterday. This House calendar section seems to envision expanding the number of weeks in which the House sits.

It speaks of having the House sit earlier in January, later in June, and earlier in September. There is no mention here of sitting in July and August, but there is mention of expanding the sittings in three months of the year: January, June, and September. In the case of January, we have almost no sittings—I guess sometimes we sit on the 31st—and in the case of the other months, they are less than the full month.

What we have is the government proposing, on the one hand, that we reduce the number of days we sit, and on the other hand that we expand the number of weeks we sit. It would probably be appropriate to reflect a bit on the implication that the change they are advocating would have for the carbon footprint of members of Parliament. What presently happens, with the House sitting five days a week, is that members can come here and stay for a longer period of time at once, and then those who live outside of driving distance would fly home. What the government is envisioning doing here is creating a dynamic in which members of Parliament sit for shorter weeks at a time but a larger number of shorter weeks, so there is a lot more flying back and forth involved. I do enjoy those red-eye flights, Mr. Chair, but we need to acknowledge the impacts they would have on our environment, something that seemed to be important, at least verbally, in terms of the comments of government members.

Also, there is the impact on the effectiveness of our work, when we have more starting and stopping as opposed to the continuation of the work of the House for a certain time.

I think we could continue with our current system for Friday and other sittings. When members of Parliament are coming all the way from British Columbia, Alberta, and the Maritimes, as well as from places that are relatively close but still not that close, they are staying here for a longer period of time to do their work, rather than coming for shorter periods of time but more often. That's potentially a sensible way to proceed.

The way in which we traditionally approach the House calendar—as far as I recall the Standing Orders, and I could be wrong on this—I don't think there is anything to preclude sittings at some of the times that have been mentioned: earlier in September, later in June, and a different time in January. The sense is that the way it happens now is through conversation among the House leaders. Perhaps the whips are involved as well, but there are conversations among representatives of parties, sometimes also involving those who are not members of recognized parties, and then the presentation of a House calendar that reflects the agreement, the considered judgment of the people who represent all of the caucuses. That's the kind of unfolding of the development of the House calendar that normally occurs.

Again, this is a unilaterally introduced document, which, in the context of the motion and in the absence of—

[Filomena Tassi, Liberal, Hamilton West—Ancaster—Dundas, ON]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

Go ahead, Filomena.

[Filomena Tassi, Liberal, Hamilton West—Ancaster—Dundas, ON]

I have great respect for the content of what the member is suggesting here, but the word “unilaterally” keeps being used, and I want to draw the attention of the committee to what the motion actually says. The motion we have before us is talking about expanding the discussion of what—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Can I make a point of order on a point of order?

[Filomena Tassi, Liberal, Hamilton West—Ancaster—Dundas, ON]

—the committee is already seized with. This is about broadening the discussion and getting it going, and the comments that are being made by the member and that we've heard over the last few days are the exact things we would be studying if we passed this motion. I just want to be clear that this motion is about broadening the discussion. It's not about unilateral changes.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

On a point of order, I'd also like to jump in on this.