Procedure and House Affairs Committee on March 21st, 2017

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Banff—Airdrie, AB]

I see.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

Now that it's been translated, every member should have a copy. It's the same amendment that was read out, but now it's been translated.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

He was going to give Scott Reid a break.

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Banff—Airdrie, AB]

You've determined that it is in fact the same amendment that was made then. We're comfortable with that. Is that what has been decided or...?

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

It's the same one. It was just translated. You can ask Mr. Reid if they made any mistakes.

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Banff—Airdrie, AB]

Maybe we could just give Mr. Reid a minute to look through it so he could determine that it is in fact the same as what he had brought forward. I think it would only be fair to him to do that. He has been talking for some time, so he might need a second to clear his head and just determine that.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, ON]

This is the one.

I thank my colleagues for their care in this.

I turn now, with your permission, Mr. Chair, to the question of unanimity. The substance of what is being proposed here, the substance of the words, the majority of the words, is the new paragraph (e), which is all about making sure that you must have unanimity to move forward.

The practice in the House has been not to move forward without substantial consent. There's this debate about what constitutes consensus. First of all, there's majority. If you have majority, near majority is not consensus. It's something more than that, but what is it? In certain circumstances, when you have to actually quantify it in law, it can be two-thirds.

For example, if you want to change the fundamental rules of corporate governance of a corporation, you need to get the consent of two-thirds—a supermajority—of each of the classes of shareholders. If you have classes A through F preferred shares, you have to get two-thirds of the holders of each of those classes of preferred shares. I have some experience with that, and it can be a time-consuming enterprise to put together. There's that kind of thing.

You can have three-quarters. You can have some other number. In our Constitution, we have the 7/50 formula, but the point is that consensus is something more.

So what is it? We've put down unanimity here, and I suppose one could argue that unanimity is too much. But in practice on something like this, I think it's reasonable to expect that we are not acting as individual agents, dividing with our colleagues from the same party. We are acting as agents for our respective parties.

I'm here as a Conservative member of Parliament. Mr. Chan and Mr. Simms are here as agents for the Liberal Party. Mr. Christopherson is here as an agent for the New Democratic Party. Since there's only one of him, the practical result is that if we want to make sure that all parties are involved, we have to say that the consent of all members is required, thus the reference to unanimity.

I have a question about when you go to the House and you need unanimity there. Would, for example, Elizabeth May on her own be able to say no and stop everything? That's not part of this motion. It is a reasonable question to ask. I suspect that if you took an inclusive approach, she'd be on board too. I think the things that she would find objectionable would very likely also be found objectionable by other opposition members if they were proposed. While I think the things that she would ultimately like—I shouldn't be speaking for Elizabeth, but I think I'm accurate in saying this—as proactive changes might be things that wouldn't be acceptable to the rest of the House. They might involve additional privileges for members who are not part of a recognized party. The Bloc Québécois during the hearings on the electoral form emphasized this. They didn't have party status, and they felt that the lack of a research budget had hurt their ability to act. They would have liked to see us change that. They didn't want to change the Standing Orders to something; they just wanted a change.

That's fair enough. We have unanimity down here. I could see an argument being made that we should set a lower consensus bar, but—and here I really am very tightly addressing the proposed amendment—the amendment requires unanimity in this committee. I actually think there is sufficient material and we will have no trouble finding standing order changes for which there is unanimous approval. The logical way is to start and say, as we have always done until now, “What is the low-hanging fruit? Where do we see the likelihood for such unanimity to emerge? Let's focus on those things; let's not focus on the others.”

Before I go through and try to point out some of those items and distinguish them from some of the others, which would be less likely to be the object of a consensus, let me first.... I'm just trying to think of what would make the most sense. I'll go through these and point out some of the things I think could be items that are likely to have consensus.

The paper starts with a bit of history, as these papers tend to do. It explains the justification of using three themes. As I mentioned, I am not necessarily supportive of the three themes, but we bounce up as the very first subsidiary item.... There are six subsidiary items under theme 1, which is “Management of the House”, and the first of these is what is called “sittings”, which means the days on which the House sits. The statement is made that.... I'm actually not sure that this is a factually correct statement, to be honest, but it says:

Among the provinces and most international legislatures, Canada is unique in regularly sitting five days a week. Most legislatures have either the Monday or the Friday as a constituency day. The exception is the United Kingdom, which tends to sit on 13 or 14 Fridays out of 36 sitting weeks (i.e., 38 per cent of Fridays). In terms of provincial legislatures, Nova Scotia sometimes sits five days a week. As a result, the House of Commons sits many more days and hours each year than provincial and territorial legislatures. While the House does sit five days a week, certain procedural and time limitations on Fridays make these sittings less effective than other days.

I might disagree with that. It's a less effective day for getting business through—there are certain things you can't do—but it is actually effective at what it does. At any rate, let's go back to the text.

All recorded divisions on bills are automatically deferred on Fridays, which means in some cases, the business that is taken up on Fridays cannot resume on Mondays. Additionally, Friday sittings provide for no more than 2.5 hours for Government Orders and committees do not meet.

The argument here is that we shouldn't have the House sit at all. This is not an area where we are likely to get consensus. I'm surprised that it's here again, because we had it come up in the past and it met with considerable opposition. Yesterday, it was the lead-off point for a number of the questioners in the House of Commons in question period. Their questions were, “Canadians work five days a week, so why shouldn't we?” Of course, constituency work takes place on Fridays and on weekends, and it is real work, but the work of the House of Commons, our legislative work, ought not to be subsidiary to our work as members of Parliament.

It was as recently as the 1950s and 1960s that members of Parliament started introducing constituency offices. They didn't have constituency offices before that. People elected them to go to Ottawa to deal with legislation on their behalf. The member would typically take the train, if you go back to the days before the airplane. They would go to Ottawa, stay for the sitting life of the Parliament, and come back. If you were far enough away, even a week off was not very helpful to you in the days when it took several days of train travel to get to the west coast, for example. You would just not visit your constituency at that time, so we developed the pattern. I shouldn't say we developed, but we retained the inherited pattern that the British had of long breaks over the summer and long breaks at Christmas, and then a compressed period of sittings.

I think we're moving away from that bit by bit. The schedule that was agreed to at the House leaders' meeting last autumn, which involves the one-off, one-on period, so the week-on,week-off arrangement that we now have, is a move we all agreed to, maybe against our better wisdom, I don't know. We all agreed to the move, which had the effect of causing us to very significantly....

I will just make the obvious comment that this would not have happened in the 19th century, or indeed in the first three-quarters of the 20th century, when it was too difficult to get back to some areas.

Take one of your predecessors, Mr. Chair. There was a Speaker of the House whose name, if I'm not incorrect, was George Black, from Yukon. When he was a member of the House back in the thirties and forties, getting back from Ottawa to the Yukon could not have been something that happened quickly enough to get a week in—the turnaround time. It's still not convenient for you. I know this from the adjustments you've made to your schedule, notwithstanding the vast improvements in transportation technology.

People came to Ottawa with that expectation. Now, effectively, you can see our adjusting bit by bit the same number of sitting weeks. Let's spread them out differently so that we have a week on, a week off, then a week on, a week off. Then I think it's two weeks on, two weeks off through the period of February, March, and April, after which we get down to the old-fashioned four on, one off, four on. I think that is the remainder of our parliamentary calendar to the summer.

The first thing to observe about this is that it was agreed to through informal negotiation, which led to a one-time-only 2017 suspension of the sittings that would have prevailed. We put them in place. In fact, this particular part of the Standing Orders are designed to be subject to constant revision to accommodate that. Every year there is a very substantial debate at the House leaders' meeting in which party allegiances break down and people are aligned by province, based on when their kids' school break is, as to when our sitting weeks and non-sitting weeks will be. It's the Ontarians against the British Columbians against the Quebeckers against the Albertans, based on everybody wanting to make sure they can have a vacation when their kids are off school.

That shows, number one, the virtue of doing things informally, and number two, the virtue of flexibility and doing things informally at the House leaders' meeting, flexibility as to the ability to adjust from one year to the next and actually build that flexibility into the rules. Number three is the virtue of not trying to do things in an omnibus manner.

All of that is there to be seen . All of that is relevant to the search for unanimity. because although in those meetings we don't all agree, we manage to come to a consensus every time. I've never seen the House sittings and the way they work imposed by a majority, by one party, or by the government imposing itself, and saying that we're going to do it this way. We've never needed to. We've always managed to find a consensus solution on something that is genuinely contentious and on which emotions run high.

Partly what happens is that the House leaders use the parties as their mediating bodies to go back to enforce a certain discipline upon the various caucuses. But whatever the mechanism, that works better than doing it through formal changes.

All right. Working us back now to the Fridays, Friday sittings don't provide much time for government orders, and committees don't meet. Those are absolutely true facts. This situation lets people get back to their ridings. It is a reflection of how we have adjusted our behaviour to permit MPs who are from further away to trade duty days. This is an informal system that has sprung up in every caucus so that they can be away from the House.

I actually am from near the Ottawa area. When there's no traffic, it takes an hour to get from here to my front door out in Perth. It feels like a million miles away, but it's actually a one-hour drive away, when there's no traffic. When there's traffic, it's a different story. I regularly take the Friday duty days of other MPs. I will sit for them on Friday, and they will sit for me at some other time, freeing me up from, among other things, committee work here.

That is a sign that things are working. This is presented as not working, but actually it's working well. You get 2.5 hours of government business on a Friday, which is 2.5 hours more than zero. You can have committees meet on Fridays, if they choose to do so. I was on one just last autumn that did that. It also met in unusual locations and at unusual hours. This committee has met at various times, although admittedly not on a Friday. It's a flex day.

I could go on and on about the history of weekends. Weekends used to.... Saturday was considered a half-day. Students would go for a half-day of school on Saturday. It was a half-holiday, they called it. Nobody got a two-day weekend. Before that you'd get the half-holiday. The week was that on six days you laboured and one day was the Sabbath. That's the Biblical way of doing things. Before that, in the ancient Roman empire, they had an eight-day week, with only one day per weekend. That really sucked.

The paper goes on to suggest options. It says:

One option would be to reapportion the time on Friday sittings to other days, and another option would be to make them more like other sitting days. It should be recognized that the important work of Members takes place both in the House and in their constituencies.

Now, it's true that constituency work is important, but as I say, a century ago people understood that they looked to their MP to go to Ottawa to vote in a certain way, according to the platform of the party to which that individual belonged.

I do want them to represent their constituency, but their representation would normally take the form of making sure, if a lot of cattle producers were in my riding and a lot of people in the fishing industry were in Mr. Simms' riding, that I did not sacrifice the interests—in, say, trade negotiations—of our cattle producers to our fish producers. His constituents would send him here with the same understanding in reverse.

They didn't, however, say, “I need a passport. I'll go to the MP's office to help me out with that.” They didn't say, “I'm having a problem. My Canada pension plan cheque is an incorrect amount. I want the intervention of my member of Parliament” or “The flag on our service club is wearing out. I'm going to get a Canadian flag”.

We can do all those things, and while those things are important, they are not actually our primary responsibility. I'm constantly trading time with people who say, “I have to get back to my riding for this event. It's absolutely critical.” When push comes to shove and it's an important vote, nobody expects you to be at a high school graduation or a 100th birthday party or a bar mitzvah or a Santa Claus parade. They expect you to be in the House. Which constituent would have been happy seeing their member of Parliament at a Santa Claus parade, important as it might be, instead of voting on, for example, the assisted dying bill?

Maybe that's a bad example because that was in June and Santa Claus parades are in December, but you see my point. In the end, even the people who say, “You have to come to our event” are more upset when you're not doing your duty in the House. That's our primary duty.

I am editorializing on concerns that I have with regard to the way in which this is laid out to show that this might very well be an item on which we would not be getting a consensus.

I'll just finish the last part here. Should Friday sittings be reapportioned, it would be important to reallocate any lost time to the remaining four days including time lost for opposition or for question time and private members' business. This could be accomplished by having the House meet earlier on certain days. Alternatively, if Friday sittings are retained, they should look like any other sitting day with the possible exception of having two hours of private members' business at the end of the day to allow some members to leave earlier to travel to their ridings. Somehow, maybe that's an option that we could actually get consensus on. In all fairness, I speak as someone who doesn't have a long travel day on Friday, and perhaps that could achieve success.

All right. I'm going to pass over with your permission, Mr. Chair, to electronic voting. I think there's a real potential for a consensus but I did deal with that earlier, and I'm anxious to be respectful of the other members who have all been listening intently and will not want me to repeat myself.

[Jamie Schmale, Conservative, Haliburton—Kawartha Lakes—Brock, ON]

I don't mind if you repeat yourself, Scott.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, ON]

I don't want to hear my own words again.

[Jamie Schmale, Conservative, Haliburton—Kawartha Lakes—Brock, ON]

No, I do. I thought they were very inspiring, very inspiring.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, ON]

Yes, the electronic voting was the high point of this talk.

[Jamie Schmale, Conservative, Haliburton—Kawartha Lakes—Brock, ON]

Yes, it was. Absolutely.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Coast of Bays—Central—Notre Dame, NL]

Could you email your comments?

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, ON]

No, I don't have....

There's the House calendar. This is an item that is intimately related to the Friday sittings. This goes back to the problem of.... I think I should deal with these two together. If you try to deal with these two together, it is conceivable you can get them done by the late May, early June deadline. I don't think you deal with them separately. My own recommendation would be they be pushed back and we deal with the electronic voting first. On the House calendar, the House leader's paper reads, “Should the House decide to move to a more efficient week, consideration could be given to having the House sit earlier in January, later in June and earlier in September.”

I assume that these are presented as a set of three as opposed to three alternatives from which we can choose on the basis that you'd lose about a week once you sever the Fridays and you'd need to get about three weeks back. You need to get back a week in each of these three places, so I could delve into those things.

Actually there's a thing I don't understand here, it says, “There is a correlation between the size of the House (number of Members) and the number of sittings.”

Anyway, the House, it says here:

For example, the House has nearly three times the number of Members than the largest provincial legislature. The House currently has more sitting hours than Ontario and Quebec even though the legislatures have approximately the same number of sitting weeks per year.

A greater degree of flexibility could be built into how many sittings the House has in any given year. The number of sittings could be based on the demands to sit. Urgent and important matters before the House should be given their fullest consideration despite certain time pressures. Allowing the House to agree to sit beyond the dates of adjournment and to sit longer on any given day, would provide more opportunity for Members to participate in debate. Another obvious benefit would be to calm the acrimonious proceedings leading up to the summer and winter adjournments. While there are mechanisms to allow the House to sit beyond adjournment dates, they are usually implemented by unanimous consent or by the use of closure.

In terms of “While there are mechanisms to allow the House to sit beyond adjournment dates, they are usually implemented by unanimous consent or by the use of closure”, there's actually a factual error in this. It says “usually”, but there's a possibility that's not stated here, which is you can go beyond adjournment dates with the support of the majority of the parties in the House, a supermajority. This was done in 2005 as a way of sitting extra time to allow us to enact the same-sex marriage legislation.

The Liberals, NDP and the Bloc, which I think had party status at the time, were in favour. That was sufficient to allow an extension thereby permitting the passage of that legislation in the House and sending it off to the Senate prior to the summer by allowing for some extra days of sitting.

With regard to the idea of greater flexibility, I think you could achieve that. I think you could achieve it in ways that the government might not like. You can, for example, summon a hearing, a meeting of a committee, if a certain number of members, less than a majority of the committee, ask to have it summoned. I think if I'm not mistaken—and here I'm looking to the chair for correction on this—it's four members of the committee. Am I right? Four members of the committee can summon it back or call for it to be called back for a special sitting. I believe that's right.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

Yes. It's Standing Order 106(4).

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, ON]

Thank you. I knew you had it on the tip of your tongue.

Not only do we follow the practices of the House, but here's one where the House could follow the practices of the committee, the idea being that the.... You notice it's fewer than half the members. That rule is designed to allow the government to call a committee back or the opposition to call a committee back. In practice, in our multi-party system, it almost always means that you would have to get the agreement of more than one opposition party.

We have two parties right now with official party status that are in the opposition. We would have to get the consent of the New Democrats and the Conservatives to make that happen, but that can be done. Also, of course, the Liberals could do it on their own.

You could do something like that where you say, look, either one could call the House back. This would all assume it's not prorogued of course. Prorogation is not within our powers to stop. Prorogation is important for us to discuss, but it's something that is a crown power, and it is just not part of our Standing Orders. When we're prorogued, that's it. That's cemented externally, and you have to live with it. But when we're not prorogued, when we are merely not sitting for the summer, you could call us back. Government can really do that anyway via the Governor General, so that might have some merit.

Again, this is not a simple matter. It's not something we're going to get discussed and sorted out by early June. We could discuss it. I mean discuss them—there are actual multiple topics in here. The number of sittings could be based on demands to sit. We could change the order in which things come before the House, so urgent and important matters before the House are given their fullest consideration despite time pressures. That suggests some kind of new system for reallocating business. We could discuss allowing it to sit longer on a given day. You would have to be careful you don't design it so you get extra time for debate during which the proceedings can collapse when members are trying to get off to the airport to get back for business in their ridings. Those things take time to discuss and sort out.

These are technicalities, but everything in the Standing Orders is technicalities. It's all technicalities.

I should comment on the acrimonious proceedings leading to the summer and winter adjournments. I guess there's some acrimony. It seems to me that they are simply very time-consuming, and they go late into the evening, which is different from being acrimonious, I would assert.

There has been acrimony, for sure. We're trying to get business done. Also that is the point at which you frequently get substantial co-operation of pushing some business through. The acrimony is in seeing how much the government can push through by holding out the threat of sitting late into the night every night. It's just normal government business. It's kind of like the people who, during the electoral reform hearings—I see Erin, our very talented.... We are joined by one of the analysts for the ERRE committee.

There were some utopian people coming and saying we need to get the contention, the acrimony, out of politics, and they had a system that would do that. But you don't have a system that will do that. You might improve it in a variety of ways, but politics is by its nature the battle for political office in which there's one seat and multiple candidates. It's inherently confrontational. It's unavoidable.

That's why a large number of words, including one I used earlier, are considered unparliamentary, and that's why we have a whole bunch of other things meant to tone it down. I don't think the kind of acrimony they are describing can be avoided by giving us an extra week. I think it would have the effect of causing our acrimony to occur a week later, frankly. I disagree with that.

There is a reason for why we have the allowance for the late-night sittings in June but at no other time. You have a choice here. You can sit late into the evening or, if the government has business that's important in the government's eyes and there's a majority, the government can move a motion and extend the sitting into the summer. You won't like that, but you'll dislike it in a different way from the late-night sittings. Maybe we could agree that you'll limit the number of speakers getting up for debate. That's kind of the government's bargaining position.

The opposition parties have similar bargaining positions. They all assure each other behind closed doors that their members are raring to go and would love to stay all summer if that's what it takes. Of course, that is not how the conversations are actually transpiring in the various caucuses. We all know that it's a bit of a fiction. Like the chest-beating displays of gorillas in mating season, the fact that nobody really wants to get into a fight is not communicated directly but through indirect means. Ultimately, you come up with some kind of solution. I've never seen it not happen. It's not always a solution that makes everybody happy, but the rules are surprisingly sophisticated.

The same-sex marriage bill was a great example. When there is something that is closer to a consensus than a mere majority, as reflected in our party system, you'll have a majority of the parties in the House agreeing to something and then you can extend the sittings. That is a way of saying that we're going to allow the spirit of consensus to trump the ability of those who oppose to put up endless speakers on the list, which is something that every government feels a desire to do.

This now brings me back to the Prime Minister's motivations. He is frustrated, as every holder of executive office since the pharaohs has been, both the dreadful ones and the great ones. It is frustrating to have to go through a process that frustrates my will, but the system is designed to frustrate your will. It is designed to ensure that there must be some degree of buy-in, of what Minister Monsef, when she was the Minister of Democratic Institutions, called “broad buy-in”.

That's right, you need to get something.... If you have a majority, sometimes you can get two-thirds or three-quarters, depending on what you're talking about. It can be a majority of parties. It can be the 7/50 formula. You see patterns all over the place, in the House of Commons Standing Orders, our Constitution, our corporate law, and our internal rules of corporate governance. It's in Robert's Rules of Order. The ideas that you have for different situations are everywhere.

If we were to hunt down the history of that section.... In the annotated Standing Orders, there's typically an explanation of the history of each section. I don't know the history of that particular one, but my suspicion is that some kind of situation arose where a party was blocking progress in the House of Commons, by everybody speaking to their maximum time, and slow voting, and all that stuff.

After that crisis was over and everybody could see it was a problem, the Standing Orders were adjusted so that kind of use of process by the opposition, which used technical rules in a way that violated the spirit of the House, would be corrected. As in the law of testaments and wills, the technical rule trumps the spirit in our parliamentary Standing Orders. However, when that is used in a way that is clearly contrary to the spirit, the majority ought to be able to decide, and when it's more than a majority, a smaller minority should not be able to hold things up in such a way as to prevent moving forward.

Ultimately, a change was made when everybody was not invested in one side or the other in that particular dispute. A system was found, which, although it was used in a way that was against my party and against me in 2005, I have to concede was not wholly unreasonable. There is a lot of that kind of thing in there.

That is a bit of a discussion about the House calendar. You'll see in that discussion, which I am now wrapping up, that again, there is a lot of meat in there.

I actually said you can't discuss this on its own. It has to be discussed in conjunction with the discussion about the length of our workweek and the hours we sit every day. This, on its own, in conjunction with that, would be too much for us to discuss and complete by June 2, although it might not be too much for us if we were to set it aside to discuss and complete by the end of the Parliament or even by the end of 2017, although that seems wishful to me.

If we had a separate committee dealing with this—this is not what my motion recommends—much as there was a separate committee under the Chrétien government meeting full time with regularly scheduled meetings— it could be twice a week or whatever— I think they could get through a lot of this stuff and make the same kind of progress that committee made. If we agreed to the consensus part of it, either that committee or we—it remains in our hands, as my amendment proposes—could have the effect of dealing in a businesslike fashion with those items on which there is consensus, of which as you can see there are several—several aren't and several might be—we could make real, meaningful progress. We would leave the 42nd Parliament, or if you like, we would create the 43rd Parliament better than we found the 42nd, which is not what's going to happen if we go the way the government is proposing doing this.

Now I turn to routine proceedings. Routine proceedings are the stuff that has to get done. This is the least exciting, and frankly, probably the most important part of the House when it sits. Some people want to drive a car because they want to get from point A to point B. Other people love flipping up the hood and tinkering with the internal workings and adjusting the pistons and all that stuff. People like that are the ones who like routine proceedings. People who just want to get from point A to point B find routine proceedings a drag, but it structures the business of the House.

Now I am going to read what the government House leader has to say:

However, certain rubrics of Routine Proceedings have been used to give rise to debate. The rubric of “Motions” allows Members to move a debatable motion that could, on certain days, deprive the House of the ability to deliberate on the intended item for debate during Government Orders. This not only applies to items emanating from the Government (i.e., debate on a bill), but could also apply to items standing in the name of an Opposition Member (i.e., an Opposition Day motion). More often than not, it is either a motion to concur in a committee report or a motion of instruction to a committee. The House should examine different ways to schedule debate on such motions.

I can tell you this is one area in which the government is simply not going to find consensus. By the way, in the event that the government is successful in wearing us down, passing Mr. Simms' motion in the middle of the night, and then pushing through what is going to be a non-consensus report, then there would be a concurrence debate, voting on party lines in favour of it and emasculating the opposition. If all that happens, I predict this will be in there. It's probably illegal to bet on government business, or at any rate, we should go to the Ethics Commissioner before we engage in laying wagers. I would be willing to bet of everything here, this is the one that's going through.

The ability to take away the opposition's power to move concurrence debates as a delaying tactic is something that every majority government wants rid of. It's less of a problem in minority governments, though it happens, and for an interesting reason.

Given the debate we all had, in which everybody expressed the virtues of minority governments, I just want to say, as somebody who has lived through both, that I observe that in minority governments.... I'm not sure they are better than majorities, actually. In some ways they are and in some ways they aren't. That is a subject for a discussion over a beer.

In a minority government, the fact that you are going to be defeated on a measure anyway if you're trying to push it through means that you have to compromise with the parties earlier in the process. You have to compromise by getting one other party to sign on with you, depending on the size of the parties. When Stephen Harper had a minority government in two successive Parliaments, he had to rely on the support of the Liberals, the New Democrats, or the Bloc—any one of the three would be enough. When Paul Martin was in power, it was a similar kind of dynamic.

I think that was something else. I don't think it's us.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

Is there a vote?

We are suspending for the vote. We'll be back right after the vote.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

We'll come out of suspension. When we left off, I think Mr. Reid was speaking.

For people who are new here, if you are speaking, you are speaking on the amendment of Mr. Reid, so make sure you address your remarks to that amendment.

We will carry on with—

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Could I just be added to the speaking list?

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

Okay.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, ON]

Forgive me, Mr. Chair, I did not put my speaking notes back in the right order here. Yes, I was speaking to the amendment, and I've now found it.

The amendment leaves most of Mr. Simms' motion intact, including the date of June 2, even though I think June 2 is problematic. The reason is that it focuses on the critical issue, which is the need for broad-based buy-in, for consensus, for a supermajority. We actually say unanimity, but as I tried to illustrate earlier, it's a need for something broader, which in practice—given the structure of the committee—really has to be unanimity. I went through and explained a bit of that. We're only changing a tiny bit of paragraph (d) and paragraph (e), and we're creating space between the two to drop in a new paragraph (e), which emphasizes the need for unanimity.

It also emphasizes....

I apologize, Mr. Chair. I have a cold, and as a result my nose keeps on shutting up as I'm talking. I may be more staccato in my delivery than I would choose to be.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

If there's anything we can help with, let us know.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, ON]

No, I have Kleenex. Thank you.

The goal here is to require unanimity in the committee, and the amendment states that this is consistent with the committee's past practices as discussed in its December 8, 2016, meeting. At our meeting on December 8, 2016, we reviewed what our practices in the past have been on this committee. We sometimes use majority consent in this committee. In other words, party line votes, and ultimately, when it's a majority government, the government gets it's way; that's how it works. However, we try wherever possible to be consensual. We single out certain things for a greater expectation of consent than other things. For some things, we just say, “It's going to be party lines. That's the way it works.” For other things, we say, “No, we have to treat this differently.” It is the nature of this committee to have more of that kind of business submitted to it, and above everything else, that includes the Standing Orders, our constitution.

The fundamental law that rules us, the rules of the game, the rules of engagement, if you will.... I mention all of this to bring around the important parallel—partly because it's so important in its merits, and partly because it's so important as a parallel, as a high-profile illustration that anyone can understand—of the electoral reform debate that took place earlier in this Parliament. This committee was not directly involved in it, although some members of this committee travelled across the country: Ms. Sahota, Mr. Richards, and myself. If you actually stop and look at what they were saying, the way the parties approached this was different in its details, but the same in this important, this foundational, respect. If you're changing the rules of the game, as you'd be if you were changing the electoral system, then you must have something more than mere majority support, especially in a situation where majority means one faction, the largest faction.

The way my party, the Conservatives, expressed that was by saying that there should be no change to the electoral system without a referendum whereby the new system is approved by the voters of Canada. They are the ones who get to establish what is legitimate and what is not legitimate. If they approve of a system, then, whatever that system happens to be, it is legitimate, assuming you have a clear majority on a clear question. That's a standard set by the Supreme Court.

The Liberal approach was to say.... They didn't say this initially, but they did by May of last year. Minister Monsef stood up in the House of Commons and said that they needed broad buy-in. She didn't define what broad buy-in was, and earlier in my remarks I indicated that I felt that was a bit of a moving target. The term “consensus” came up as a stand-in for the term “broad buy-in”, but it was never clear exactly what that meant, and that was a problem. It clearly did not mean a majority of fifty per cent plus one of committee members, fifty per cent plus one of the House. I think everybody understood that.

Looking at her remarks, and even though we confronted each other in the House of Commons, I think I always maintained a respectful approach towards Minister Monsef, who I felt was, if you will and are knowledgeable about poker, “playing a bad hand” as well as she could. I thought she was doing a creditable job, and she's also a very nice person. I enjoyed bantering with her. I compared this once to Archy and Mehitabel.

The broad buy-in she was talking about clearly also included, in that case, some form of broader consent from the Canadian people. We did an e-survey for the committee, which got 22,000 responses. People were asked about the possibility of using what's called a citizens' assembly to see whether that provided, in the minds of Canadians, a legitimate level of extra consensus.

People were generally favourable towards it, although they didn't seem to see it as the definitive indication that Canadians had bought in—when I say “people”, I mean the 22,000 respondents—I think perhaps because a citizens' assembly is really a process that occurs earlier in the drafting and development process, not later on. It's not really a ratification process. It is a design process. Having said that, it was an attempt to find consensus.

The New Democrats said that what you needed to have was the support of at least one opposition party as well as of the government. I don't think I'm being unfair to the New Democrats when I say that this was actually meant as a kind of bargaining offer—“Come to us, and if you're willing to find something that we can agree to and you Liberals agree to, we have a deal”—and not a referendum. Ultimately, they agreed, in a great generosity of spirit, to put the question of electoral reform to a referendum.

The point I'm getting at is that everybody agreed, on all sides of the House, that when you're dealing with the rules of the game, the rules of engagement, the Constitution—the de facto constitution, because the electoral system is not a strictly constitutional matter, or at least in most respects it isn't—you have to have a higher level of buy-in.

We have conventions about this. These conventions are then the practices of this committee, or the usages of the committee, if you wish. They are reflected in the way this committee has dealt with its standing orders in the past. As well, they are the way the House of Commons itself has dealt with the Standing Orders in the past. The House of Commons has normally, when dealing with a change in Standing Orders, tried to seek unanimous consent through the channel of getting the House leaders to agree among themselves, through some back-channel negotiation among themselves.

Then eventually, someone stands up—one of the House leaders—and says the words we all know: “Mr. Speaker, if you seek it, I think you will find unanimous consent for the following motion.” This is usually preceded by, “There have been consultations” or “All parties have been consulted”, or some other statement that indicates that the Speaker should take this seriously, and that there actually has been a way of finding agreement.

We're permitted to do that. It doesn't mean that the actual rules of the House are suspended for more than that vote, and there's no precedent-setting value to a unanimous consent motion, because we understand that it is the exception. But the Standing Orders themselves are the exception. They're the exception to the way the House normally works. The Standing Orders are, as I say, the rules under which we operate, under which we conduct ourselves, so they get special consideration.

The last time the House tried to significantly bite into the Standing Orders and take a real chunk to make a significant change, 14 years ago, it set up a special committee to deal with it. The special committee operated by unanimous consent. It approved nothing. There were no dissenting reports, because there was no dissent. Nothing on which there was dissent was put forward by the committee, which recognized that it had a wealth of material to work with and therefore had no need to focus on contentious items. It thus focused on items for which consent was going to be found on a unanimous basis.

In the interim, while the vote was going on in the House, Mr. Chair, I had the opportunity not to read, unfortunately, but to download the reports of the special committee chaired by Bob Kilger, the Deputy Speaker of the House at the time, whose seniority indicates the seriousness with which the House took the business of looking at the Standing Orders. The culture the committee members applied—I actually don't know because I didn't get a chance to read their discussions, nor the discussions that took place in the House as the motion was going forward. It may be that these were very limited discussions. It might be one of those things where they got unanimous consent by having House leaders talk about it. This is before my period serving as deputy House leader, so I would not have been privy to any of those discussions.

Although I was an MP at the time, June 2001, I was very, very junior and was frankly just lost a lot of the time when it came to what was going on at a technical level. A lot passed me by. Like any new MP, I was still discovering which local events were actually important and which were really important in the minds of the people who insisted that I had to be there. All MPs go through that in their first year.

At any rate, that approach, that consensual, unanimous approach, was adopted by the House in that round of hearings. That explains, to a large degree, why the legacy of those Standing Order changes that were made upon the recommendation of the committee have stood the test of time. I think at this point, 14 or 15 years is a good indication of the test of time. We live in a world in our Parliament where we have Standing Orders that in some cases have been on the books via our Parliament and the mother of parliaments in Westminster since the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Some of them go back that far.

The rule that prohibits the king or the king's men from preventing a member from entering the House of Commons goes back to the time of King Charles I, who was in the habit of sending thugs—and they didn't have hotels in those days, so they slept in a room over a tavern—great big guys, who could just stand at the door and make it impossible for MPs to get out if they were going to vote the wrong way. MPs would have to climb out of second-storey windows to try to get to the House of Commons to vote.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Really?

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, ON]

Yes, that's actually true.

So they put in this rule that you can't prevent members from attending the House. Obviously, those days are past. But that's where the rules come from. You can see that. They have a long history.

I don't know if, through that entire history, standing order changes were always adopted by unanimous consent. I only know the latter part of the history and the odd colourful items from the very early days. But there's been a general trend in our parliamentary system—it is the predominant trend in our parliamentary system—that we constantly improve over time based on the criteria that are the most important to us. These criteria can change from one generation to the next in some particulars, but in general the criteria could be summarized as the importance of freedom of speech. This is why in the House, on the one hand, no member can ever say another member has lied, and you can't say through the back door what you're not allowed to say through the front door. You can't say indirectly what you can't say directly. You can't say or imply that another member has lied or deliberately misled the House.

But on the other hand, if you actually do mislead the House, that is a really serious offence. That's a contempt of Parliament. You do so at your peril. It's interesting the degree to which members, ministers, and others, will avoid actually telling a known untruth. They may dissemble, hint, lead, misdirect, but actually outright lying, it's amazing how rare it is, and not because of the severity of our sanctions, but because of the skill with which we have matched minimal penalties: the loss of prestige, essentially, in the eyes of your colleagues, in a world where prestige in the eyes of your colleagues and constituents is everything for your continued parliamentary career.

I mentioned that we had a discussion when Mr. Simms was here earlier about the appropriate use of the word “guillotine”. Looking at literal guillotines, the kind that were used during the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville, the great French scholar—