No. I have my outline here. I'm trying to stay within the outline and cover all those points, and I think I've done so already.
Because the United States Congress's example was used in the discussion paper from the government, I just want to reflect on it. The rule change introduced by the previous partisan affiliation to how Congress works, in the Senate and in the House, has nearly every single time, especially on amendments to filibuster rules, dilatory motions, motions that obstruct the majority, led to people regretting their decisions. I know many Democrats now feel that way when looking at the appointments. Appointments used to have to be passed by a supermajority of 60 in the Senate, and now that's no longer the case. They have changed it to 51. Some appointments have gone through on 51. They don't apply to Supreme Court nominees, though. They apply to other measures. This was a way for the majority to dictate to the minority how the rules will affect their rights to obstruct, to delay, and to make a point.
In the U.S. Senate it's a common joke to say that every single appointee has a buddy senator, because every single person who is proposed for appointment has to go through a confirmation hearing. Every one of them gets a buddy senator because there will be a senator who will object to the appointment, and that then delays it from getting to the committee. They've only resorted to that because of the way the rules are structured.
Chuck Grassley, a Republican from Iowa, who's been a senator since 1981, took the Senate floor to condemn the filibuster rules changes. He quoted Democrats who were opposed to filibuster reform when the party was last in a minority. “Not too many years ago, my colleagues on the other side described their fight to preserve the filibuster with great pride”, Grassley said, “Today the other side is willing to forever change the Senate because the Republicans have the audacity to hold them, the majority party of today, to their own standard.” You could replace “Chuck Grassley, Republican from Iowa” to “Nameless Conservative opposition member or New Democrat”, and replace every mention of an American one to the Parliament of Canada, to a member of the House of Commons, to the Liberal Party. What we are simply trying to do is hold you to your own standard, the high standards you ran on in the last election. That's simply what we're trying to do.
They have come to regret it, in the U.S. example, having changed their rules in the House to facilitate the passage of appointments, except for Supreme Court appointments. The Democrats have come to regret it, as you will come to regret this, and others in your government caucus will come to regret this as well. I don't think it helps you in any way to do that.
Perhaps some members will say that this, my prolonged, substantive debate at this committee, at PROC, has been unreasonable, but let me remind you about some famous filibusters in the United States, which were far more fiery, and I think I am much more even-tempered. Mr. Christopherson brought the fire on the first night. Some of the longest filibusters in U.S. Senate history since the 1900s: 24 hours and 18 minutes by Strom Thurmond from South Carolina, on the civil rights bill, 1957, and I believe this was continuous; Alfonse D'Amato from New York, on a military bill in 1986, 23 hours and 30 minutes; and Wayne Morse from Oregon, 22 hours, 26 minutes on the Tidelands Oil bill, 1953. Those are the only three I'm going to mention.
This by no means has been prolonged. I have tried to be relevant and substantive, and to produce some additional information for the consideration of the committee on why I think this amendment is worth passing, through examples in the past where it worked, it made sense, it made a contribution, and it produced something better. I don't think we're going to get there if we don't pass this amendment. Without this amendment, we have no certainty in knowing how we will be able to work with committee members on the government caucus side, and that worries me.
In the U.S., because it was mentioned in the government document that was produced, until 1841 there was the ability to filibuster in the U.S. House of Representatives.
There was, of course, the great compromise, the Missouri compromise of 1850, I believe, or 1820 and 1850, two of them. There was concern at the time about long speeches impeding House business. It dated all the way back to 1820, which was one of the first great compromises, on the territories of the United States becoming states. In 1850 it all related to the slavery debates in the United States.
They were worried about the same thing that members of the government are worried about, which is the prolonged debate on issues at committee. I don't think you can give me an example of another committee in this Parliament at which debate has been prolonged too long, at which there have been motions to delay government business on purpose. Correct me if I'm wrong, but apart from this committee at this time, I don't think that has happened. I think we've had interesting debates and I think we've had interesting discussions at different committees.
In 1841 the rule adopted on the motion of Lott Warren of Georgia, required that “no member shall be allowed to speak more than one hour to any question put under debate.” This was the first rule change in the U.S. House of Representatives that ended their ability to filibuster and ended the ability of people opposed to measures—because the party system wasn't as defined then—to obstruct the will of the majority. It passed the House by a vote of 111 to 75—with John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, who was known as “Old Man Eloquent” by his peers, among those dissenting. He was renowned for giving multi-hour speeches that would never end. Obviously, he had a preference.
According to Hinds' Precedents, the one-hour limit did not become a standing rule of the House until June 1842. That was a year after the vote, and two years after it had been raised as an issue. After that, the minority would sometimes make use of this: the disappearing quorum.
I know that the quorum rules of the House of Representatives have been used in this House in the past, and they were actually a bone of contention regarding whether there was quorum, because quorum and what a quorum of the House of Commons shall be, I believe, are defined in the Constitution.
Mr. Simms, I don't know if you can correct me on that.