Justice Committee on Oct. 30th, 2025

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Miller]

Thank you, Mr. Fortin.

We now have the second round.

It will be led off by MP Lawrence, followed by MPs Lattanzio, Fortin, Brock and then Housefather.

[Philip Lawrence, Conservative, Northumberland—Clarke, ON]

Thank you.

I'll start out by acknowledging the hatred that Hindus, Jews and Christians have all experienced over the last years. It's been truly and utterly unacceptable. Never did I think in the Canada that I know and love I would ever see a synagogue shot at, churches burned or gurdwaras similarly affected. I just think it's an absolute shame on our country and something we need to get resolved.

I do want to switch to a more technical discussion. I was very much intrigued by the testimony of the Quebec bar. You talked specifically about how this bill creates a parallel process that could, in fact, complicate and actually maybe—I'm putting words in your mouth—impede the prosecution of people who commit hate offences.

I was wondering if you'd be kind enough to expand upon that.

[Marcel-Olivier Nadeau]

Once again, I will let Mr. St‑Jacques answer that question.

[Nicholas St-Jacques]

In fact, this proposal by the Barreau du Québec echoes the economy of the Criminal Code, which does not create specific offences for each situation involving aggravating factors in the commission of the offence. Obviously, the circumstances of the offence are always taken into consideration by the judge responsible for determining the sentence, but offences are not created for each specific situation.

Let me give you an example of an offence that would be committed in the context of a health service. The Criminal Code specifically provides that, in the sentencing regime, aggravating factors may be considered, such as the involvement of a minor. In this case, it could be the fact that the offence was committed in the context of a health service provided. However, the Criminal Code does not create an offence for this specific situation.

The way the proposal is worded in the current bill creates the possibility of adding an aggravating factor within a new offence, which must be committed in the context of another offence under the Criminal Code. What we are doing now is creating an offence that includes an additional element, and giving the Crown the option of asking itself what it would prefer to do in the circumstances: Will it go for an offence with more elements that are more difficult to prove in terms of guilt, or will it go for a less complex offence in terms of guilt, but for which it can still, in determining the sentence, consider as an aggravating factor the fact that, in the circumstances, the offence was motivated by hatred? What we are saying is that this could create a difficulty in terms of the discretionary choices of the Crown.

I heard one of the speakers mention earlier that, in bail hearings, this type of offence is not necessarily taken into consideration. However, judges hearing bail hearings do take into account the circumstances of the crimes, particularly if they were committed in the circumstances set out for this new proposed offence.

So, all of this is already considered in the Criminal Code.

[Philip Lawrence, Conservative, Northumberland—Clarke, ON]

I will go back to the Quebec bar. With respect to the definition, it's my understanding, from your testimony, that you find the definition of hatred in Bill C-9 problematic, perhaps constitutionally. Is that a correct understanding?

[Marcel-Olivier Nadeau]

I will ask Mr. St‑Jacques to answer that question.

[Nicholas St-Jacques]

That is indeed what we propose in our brief.

It is important to look at the decisions that have been handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada. It began in 1990 with the Keegstra ruling, which is a criminal law ruling, where hatred is defined as “emotion of an intense and extreme nature that is clearly associated with vilification and detestation”. However, the new definition proposed in the bill refers instead to an “emotion that involves detestation or vilification and that is stronger than disdain or dislike”.

The reason why the Supreme Court expressed itself in this way in the Keegstra ruling and requested that hatred be defined as an “emotion of an intense and extreme nature” is because the offences under the Criminal Code are reserved for the most harmful behaviours in our society. Of course, hatred can be defined in other ways, as we saw in the Supreme Court case Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, where hatred is defined somewhat differently. However, when we talk about criminal offences, we must be referring to the most reprehensible acts, because they have significant consequences in terms of individual rights. For example, a prison sentence may be imposed after a person has been found guilty.

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Miller]

Thank you, Mr. St‑Jacques.

Thank you, MP Lawrence.

Go ahead, Madame Lattanzio.

[Patricia Lattanzio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being here, whether in person or joining us by video conference.

I will be putting my questions to the president of the Quebec bar, Mr. Sikora, and Mr. St‑Jacques.

The offences set out in Bill C‑9 are drafted in a restrictive manner and require clear intent. In your opinion, how does this precision strengthen compliance with the charter?

[Marcel-Olivier Nadeau]

Mr. St‑Jacques, would you like to answer this question?

[Nicholas St-Jacques]

Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

Obviously, when determining whether a prescribed offence respects the rights and freedoms granted by the charter, sooner or later we will have to apply the test set out in the Supreme Court of Canada’s Oakes decision. We must ensure that the prescribed offences restrict individual rights and freedoms as little as possible.

The more specific and restrictive the wording of the offence, the more we must ensure that the constitutional validity test is met.

[Patricia Lattanzio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Let’s go back to the definition of the word “hatred” found in the bill, which is an “emotion that involves detestation or vilification and that is stronger than disdain or dislike”.

In your opinion, is this definition stronger or weaker than the one found in the Supreme Court ruling? I understand that there is the notion of emotion, but in terms of wording, how does the definition proposed in Bill C‑9 compare to that of the Supreme Court, in your opinion?

[Nicholas St-Jacques]

Two things must be considered.

First, there is the notion of emotion, that is, the degree of emotion expressed by the person in their statement, whereas the Supreme Court, as I mentioned earlier, referred to an “emotion of an intense and extreme nature”.

Second, some words are different. According to the new definition proposed in the bill, it is an “emotion that involves detestation or vilification”, whereas in the Keegstra decision, it is referred to as an “emotion…clearly associated with vilification and detestation”. So the terms used are not the same. For example, the word “vilification”, which is proposed in the new definition, does not mean the same thing as “slander”. Slander is a type of vilification. According to the definitions provided by the Government of Canada, vilification “consists of deliberately making false accusations against someone in order to discredit them”.

The reason it is important to return to the definition presented in the Keegstra decision is that the latter was precisely a test to verify the constitutional validity of this definition and the offence provided for in sections 318 and 319 of the Criminal Code. At that time, it was examined whether it respected the right to freedom of expression.

Currently, by changing the term and the definition, we risk subjecting this definition to review by the courts once again to determine whether it complies with the charter.

[Patricia Lattanzio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

In terms of legal education, what role could the bar play in helping professionals and the public better understand these reforms once they are adopted?

[Marcel-Olivier Nadeau]

The bar assists its members in various ways, both through guides and training. It also conducts various public awareness campaigns to raise awareness of the rule of law and different social realities. It goes without saying that, as in any other area, the bar will provide training to its members and raise awareness among the public.

[Patricia Lattanzio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Creating a separate offence for hate crimes emphasizes that hatred is never just one motive among many others.

How significant is this symbolic and practical statement by Parliament?

[Marcel-Olivier Nadeau]

Are you still talking about creating a specific offence for hate speech? If so, I will let Mr. St‑Jacques answer that question.

[Nicholas St-Jacques]

This is a question that legislators must ask themselves: is it necessary, in the circumstances, to create a new, separate offence? Would it be possible instead to introduce elements into the Criminal Code, in the sentencing regime, that emphasize the fact that this type of offence is unacceptable in Canadian society and that it is the circumstances in which such an offence is committed that increase the associated penalty? Would that message be sufficient in these circumstances? It is up to the legislator to decide whether to depart from the general structure of the Criminal Code.

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Miller]

Thank you both.

Thank you, Ms. Lattanzio.

Mr. Fortin, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will address Mr. Shack.

You heard me read earlier the comments made by Adil Charkaoui last fall. I will not necessarily repeat my quote, because I do not want to weigh down the debate. I am sure you have heard about it.

As we consider hate-related offences today, I wonder whether we should consider removing the religious defence from the Criminal Code. Isn’t this the kind of provision that could influence a prosecutor when deciding whether or not to bring charges against an individual who makes statements such as those made by Adil Charkaoui last fall?

What do you think, Mr. Shack?

[Noah Shack]

Unfortunately, the example you cited isn't isolated. We've heard similar things being spoken about and preached in other parts of the country as well, and I think it speaks to the serious issue that we have, the deficiency with Attorney General consent. The jurisprudence seems to be clear that the religion defence should not and cannot be used as a Trojan Horse.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

I have about 30 seconds left, if you would like to add anything.

[Noah Shack]

I'll just say that the jurisprudence is clear that the religion defence cannot be used, as a Trojan Horse, to allow otherwise hateful speech to come through, and yet we don't see any prosecutions moving forward with this. That's something that needs to be addressed. We need to find the right balance to ensure that legitimate religious expression is not coming under attack but, at the same time, that the auspices of religious speech are not being abused to advance hateful rhetoric and incite hatred against people here all across the country.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Miller]

Go ahead, Vice-Chair Brock.