Evidence of meeting #37 for Public Safety and National Security in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was data.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

Members speaking

Before the committee

West  Associate Professor, As an Individual
Darcy Fleury  Chief of Police, Thunder Bay Police Service
Myron Demkiw  Chief of Police, Toronto Police Service
Diab  Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University, As an Individual
Geist  Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-Commerce Law, Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Fraser  Partner, McInnes Cooper, As an Individual
St-Germain  General Counsel, Canadian Centre for Child Protection
Pierce  Vice-President, Government Relations, Canadian Chamber of Commerce
Beth Moellenkamp  Chief Executive Officer, Peel Children's Aid Society
Curran  Head of Public Policy, Meta Platforms Inc.
Marie Deschamps  Chair, National Security and Intelligence Review Agency
Simon Noël  Intelligence Commissioner, Office of the Intelligence Commissioner
Greene  Director, Privacy and Public Policy, Meta Platforms Inc.

5:25 p.m.

Conservative

Roman Baber Conservative North York, ON

You're a technology and Internet lawyer with the McInnes law firm.

5:25 p.m.

Partner, McInnes Cooper, As an Individual

David Fraser

That's correct.

5:25 p.m.

Conservative

Roman Baber Conservative North York, ON

I also understand that you're a prominent speaker on technology and Internet issues. I came across one of your YouTube videos on this law that we're studying now, Bill C-22, on lawful access, and I'd like to provide the committee a quick transcript of your remarks:

“If Bill C-22, the lawful access act, 2026, becomes the law, the Government of Canada will be able to secretly order Apple to build in a capability into its infrastructure to allow Canadian law enforcement and national security folks to track every iPhone, every iPad, every Apple Watch, every Apple AirPod and every AirTag in real time. Then they'll be able to require Apple to confirm whether they provide you any services.

“Then [law enforcement] can go to a justice of the peace and get an order, without actually believing that a crime has been or will be committed, requiring Apple to hand over every device identifier for every device that you use with their services. That's the digital ID for your iPhone, iPad, Apple Watch, AirPod, Apple TV, AirTag. With that information, they can go back to the judge and get an order, again without actually believing that a crime has been or will be committed, requiring—

5:25 p.m.

Conservative

The Vice-Chair Conservative Frank Caputo

Mr. Baber, please, if you could just slow down a shade—

5:25 p.m.

Conservative

Roman Baber Conservative North York, ON

I'm almost finished.

“—requiring Apple to give them the moment-by-moment locations of all of your devices. Oh, and that secret order also required Apple to keep your location history for a full year, so cops can get that, too.”

What's the problem, Mr. Fraser?

Voices

Oh, oh!

5:25 p.m.

Partner, McInnes Cooper, As an Individual

David Fraser

All of it.

Certainly, I have very few concerns with the judicial oversight. The threshold is obviously important.

However, if you take a look at all of these pieces as they go together, part 2 can require an electronic service provider—undeniably, Apple is an electronic service provider—subject to a secret order, to preserve metadata, location information, all that sort of stuff, and even build in new capabilities to their devices. That's under proposed paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) in clause 7.

Once that information exists, you can go to a judge and get an order on reasonable suspicion related to confirmation of service, then reasonable suspicion related to basic subscriber information, then reasonable suspicion in order to get the metadata and transaction information that they've been required to save.

This is potentially an entire package that we need to look at holistically and in detail.

5:30 p.m.

Conservative

Roman Baber Conservative North York, ON

This is without actually believing that a crime has been committed, without swearing an affidavit saying, “I believe that a crime has been committed, and therefore, Your Honour, I get a court order.”

I would like to dispose of some of the legal arguments that the Liberals make. I'd like to get specific, if I may, with Mr. Diab.

One of the arguments that is made on section 8, which is the arbitrary seizure.... What the government is proposing to do is to seize metadata, all of it, and order that it be held for 365 days, without knowing or suggesting that any offence has been committed. However, there's some jurisprudence on section 8—arbitrary search and seizure—that suggests that “seizure” requires a production. Here, we have no production.

How do you respond to that?

5:30 p.m.

Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University, As an Individual

Robert Diab

The seizure is in the holding of it.

5:30 p.m.

Conservative

Roman Baber Conservative North York, ON

Exactly.

5:30 p.m.

Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University, As an Individual

Robert Diab

It's in the recording.

5:30 p.m.

Conservative

Roman Baber Conservative North York, ON

The seizure is the fact that information is being held. The fact that it's not held by the cops but held on behalf of the cops by order of government is what makes it seizure, because you have government compelling the private sector to hold on to the information.

On to Professor Geist, it's very nice to see you in your non-Twitter persona.

Professor Geist, I have a major concern, specifically with the language of who can be bound by these orders. Specifically, it's the electronic service providers that can be compelled by a minister to design a system, a back door, etc. I looked at the definition of “service provider”—it's in section 2, “Definitions”—and it's basically anyone who provides electronic services to persons in Canada and does business in Canada. Then I went and I looked to see the definition of “electronic service”, and it means anything “that involves the creation, recording, storage, processing, transmission, reception [or] emission” of electronic communication.

Well, it sounds to me like any law firm would be sending emails or receiving emails through its server, any bank would and any doctor's office would. We hear from the Liberal officials that only Internet companies are subject to this, but that's not what this legislation says.

May 7th, 2026 / 5:30 p.m.

Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-Commerce Law, Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

Michael Geist

That's consistent with the question raised earlier, and no, that clearly is not what it says at the moment. It's clearly far broader.

If I might, you asked—

5:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Vice-Chair Conservative Frank Caputo

I'm sorry. You were just about to give us a brilliant thought, Professor, but that brilliant thought will have to go to Madame Dandurand, if she so chooses.

You have five minutes.

Marianne Dandurand Liberal Compton—Stanstead, QC

Yes, I would like to hear that brilliant thought.

5:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Vice-Chair Conservative Frank Caputo

Let's hear the brilliant thought.

5:30 p.m.

Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-Commerce Law, Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

Michael Geist

I think it's way too hyped, at this stage.

Voices

Oh, oh!

5:30 p.m.

Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-Commerce Law, Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual

Michael Geist

I was going to say this: You asked a question with a long list related to Apple and the notion of, “Well, what's the problem?” The problem is, of course, all the data that might ultimately be retained and potentially accessed.

There is another problem here. Layering in some of these rules will mean that these companies may well either remove some of the services that protect Canadians—we've seen this with Apple in the U.K.—or choose to exit the market altogether if they are unable to meet the kinds of standards they expect of themselves and that their customers expect in terms of the privacy they provide. When you layer a very broad definition of “electronic service provider” in with very broad demands that may be inconsistent with where a company is at, you create an environment in which Canada may well be an outlier. Companies may stop providing particular kinds of protections or stop providing services altogether.

Marianne Dandurand Liberal Compton—Stanstead, QC

Thank you very much.

I'm going to let my colleague Mr. Zuberi ask you some brilliant questions.

Sameer Zuberi Liberal Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC

I'd like to ask both Mr. Diab and Mr. Geist if they have anything they'd like to add they haven't yet had a chance to.

5:30 p.m.

Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University, As an Individual

Robert Diab

Yes. I have one thought to put out on the hypothetical that has been floated a number of times to justify the metadata preservation power: the kidnapping of a 14-year-old girl, her trafficking, etc.

That is an effort to recycle something like the ticking-bomb scenario of 20 years ago. We heard a lot about the ticking-bomb scenario as a justification for torture. I want to be careful here, but the idea was about taking an extreme situation and using it to justify and normalize powers that are otherwise beyond the pale.

The committee should think about whether this is happening here. We're taking an extreme scenario—something that, if it does in fact happen, is very rare and unusual—and saying that all Canadians should give up a significant amount of freedom, security and privacy to enable law enforcement to be a little more effective in this remote scenario.

Sameer Zuberi Liberal Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC

I appreciate that. I will continue along this path. If you can't comment, that's fine.

Right now, Canadians have a reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to talking with a friend. It is a private conversation. The fact that it happens is a private conversation.

Can you comment on how our expectation of privacy would inevitably have to adjust because of this type of collection?

5:35 p.m.

Professor, Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University, As an Individual

Robert Diab

When a law is challenged and a court is asked, “Does this allow for reasonable search and seizure?”.... That's not the way they approach it. They stand back and ask, “When two Canadians are communicating in a restaurant, for example, would they think it's reasonable to assume that their conversation is private? If they are texting each other, would the reasonable Canadian assume that their texts are private?” That's the way they do it.

When this goes to the Supreme Court of Canada eventually, the question will be, “Would the ordinary, reasonable Canadian assume that the record of their texts over the past year, or the record of their movements, remains private?” in the sense that they were not recorded by the state for a law enforcement purpose, based on the potential that these random Canadians could have been committing a crime. Ask yourself that question. If you were a judge, would you think it's a stretch, or would you say, “Of course we don't want our movements recorded.”

Sameer Zuberi Liberal Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC

With respect to this collection, there have been many concerns raised about its unintended capturing by unwanted actors.

Do you want to share any concerns about those we don't intend to have this information having it anyway, whether through the companies in question or hostile actors, be they foreign states, hackers, etc.?