Evidence of meeting #5 for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was transport.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Kathleen Fox  Chair, Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board
Sylvain Alarie  Professional Engineer, As an Individual
Gilles Primeau  Professional Engineer, As an Individual
Natacha Van Themsche  Director, Air Investigations, Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board
Jim Quick  President and Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace Industries Association of Canada
Jodi Diamant  Chief Engineer, Airworthiness & Certification, Pratt & Whitney Canada, As an Individual
David Curtis  President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.
Steven Bruce  Director, Design and Certification, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.
Michael Deer  Airworthiness Specialist, Bell Textron Canada Limited
David Joseph Watson  Manager, Airworthiness and Air Safety, De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.

4:30 p.m.

Chair, Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board

Kathleen Fox

We have a very good safety record in Canada in aviation.

We're about to release—tomorrow—our statistics for 2019. It was a very challenging year for some sectors of aviation, notably general aviation, but the safety rate in commercial aviation, the type of aircraft that most people board—talking about the large carriers—is quite safe. When we look at segments like air taxi, we have some real concerns in that area, and we've published a special study on that.

4:30 p.m.

Liberal

Chris Bittle Liberal St. Catharines, ON

Do you think the minister acted responsibly in grounding the Max 8 fleet?

4:35 p.m.

Chair, Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board

Kathleen Fox

The action was taken, and it obviously has been demonstrated to be the right thing to do, given the ongoing work and the fact that the aircraft is still undergoing testing. Plans are still being made as to when, how and what additional requirements will be put in. I think it was the right thing, if only from a public confidence perspective.

4:35 p.m.

Liberal

Chris Bittle Liberal St. Catharines, ON

Thank you.

4:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Ms. Fox and Mr. Bittle.

To all of you, Mr. Primeau, Mr. Alarie, Ms. Fox and Ms. Van Themsche, I thank you for your time today. As Mr. Doherty mentioned earlier, possibly you will get a phone call in the future to participate once again.

I will suspend for a moment.

4:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

The committee will reconvene.

First, I want to take this opportunity to welcome our witnesses for this session between now and the end of the meeting.

We have Jodi Diamant, chief engineer, airworthiness and certification, Pratt & Whitney Canada. We have Jim Quick, president and chief executive officer of the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada. We have Michael Deer, airworthiness specialist at Bell Textron Canada Limited.

From Viking Air Limited, we have David Curtis, president and chief executive officer; and Steven Bruce, director of design and certification. From De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited, we have David Joseph Watson, manager, airworthiness and air safety.

With that, we'll start with presentations for members.

Mr. Quick, you had your hand up, so I'm assuming you want to go first.

4:40 p.m.

Jim Quick President and Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace Industries Association of Canada

I'll volunteer; how is that?

4:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

The floor is all yours.

Welcome.

4:40 p.m.

President and Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace Industries Association of Canada

Jim Quick

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.

On behalf of the members of the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada, thank you for including us in your study on the aircraft certification process.

Aerospace stands as one of our country's proudest achievements, providing 215,000 jobs and $25.5 billion annually to the Canadian economy.

It is also a sector that is facing increasingly fierce global competition. Frankly, Canada is falling behind from a competitiveness standpoint. That's why our association launched vision 2025, a pan-Canadian, industry-led initiative, just over a year and a half ago. We travelled across the country, engaging our members, federal and provincial governments and our 215,000 employees. The process resulted in a comprehensive report that outlines the industry's concerns. We have also provided recommendations.

One of the key priorities identified involved Transport Canada's certification process and ensuring its status as a world-class regulator.

I'd like to say right off the top that AIAC has full confidence in TCCA's work to certify Canadian aircraft. However, we have some recommendations from an organizational and resource perspective.

I'll start with the organizational structure of TCCA. My remarks today are not intended to criticize; in fact, we feel that TCCA has an unparalleled commitment to safety. However, opportunities exist to improve efficiencies in its interaction with industry.

Currently, TCCA is the only major civil aviation regulator that is structured within a government department. This isn't the case with our major trading partners. The U.S.A.'s Federal Aviation Administration, the FAA, and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, EASA, are different. TCCA is hampered by a structure that places it in competition within a multimodal Transport Canada and with a complicated internal reporting structure.

AIAC's civil aviation technical committee, comprised of industry representatives and subject matter experts, has reviewed that structure and made the following recommendations: TCCA should be structured within Transport Canada as a stand-alone branch, with proper autonomy, authority and accountability. A senior-level official with relevant aviation experience—an ADM or higher, in our view—should be appointed with overall responsibility for civil aviation matters in Canada. A strong and clear mission statement for civil aviation should be issued. Finally, we recommend to work with us at AIAC to re-establish and invigorate the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory Council, CARAC, to ensure industry is working with government to assess and recommend potential regulatory changes through co-operative rule-making.

That brings me to the investment side. Our industry is growing at a rate of 5% a year, yet investments at TCCA are not keeping pace. Our most important trading partner, the United States, funds the FAA in a very proactive and transparent manner. It's a matter of public record. AIAC's civil aviation technical committee recommends that the Government of Canada create a high-level stakeholder team—industry stakeholders as well as Transport Canada—tasked with the following: identifying the staffing and funding requirements by the TCCA, and identifying fair and practical methods of achieving the staffing and funding. The team should be mandated to provide their findings and recommendations within a short, defined timeline, and this should occur in parallel with improving the efficiency of the organizational structure of TCCA.

I'll wrap up by reiterating that it's imperative that TCCA's reputation as a leading civil aviation regulator be protected and enhanced. These recommended changes, we feel, will ensure that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4:45 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you.

Ms. Diamant, you are next.

March 10th, 2020 / 4:45 p.m.

Jodi Diamant Chief Engineer, Airworthiness & Certification, Pratt & Whitney Canada, As an Individual

Good day, Mr. Chair, vice-chairs and members of the TRAN committee.

I would like to thank the committee for undertaking this important review of Transport Canada’s aircraft certification process and extend my sincere condolences to those who have lost loved ones in the tragic events that have led to this study.

Let me introduce myself. My name is Jodi Diamant—Joanne to some. I am a professional engineer with a specialty in aircraft certification. I spent 18 years at Transport Canada Civil Aviation, and for the past 14 years I've been the chief engineer for airworthiness and certification at Pratt & Whitney Canada. I’ve been extensively involved in the development and application of design standards, the aircraft certification, validation and delegation processes, and implementation of safety management systems. I am here today in an individual capacity, because I've been involved in this process for over 30 years and I'm well qualified to explain how it works and how it can be improved.

As Mr. Quick indicated here, Canadian industry is a world leader in design and production of aircraft, helicopters and gas turbine engine products, and Transport Canada is recognized as having one of the most robust type certification processes in the world, resulting in an exceptional level of product safety.

As state of design under ICAO, Transport Canada is now responsible for the type certification and continued airworthiness of over 18,000 aircraft and helicopters today and over 60,000 Pratt & Whitney Canada engines currently flying in the world, including in Canada.

The type certification of aircraft and engines—which is exceptionally complex, as the Transport Canada representatives explained in February—is just the starting point of aviation safety, before the products enter service. It's very critical, though. It's a partnership in which there are very defined roles, obligations and accountabilities of the parties involved in the certification process. I'm going to go through it very quickly.

There are the regulators: ICAO, which you heard about from Ms. Fox; Transport Canada; and FAA. There's the applicant, which is us in the industry represented here, and delegates.

I have to stress that however it's been characterized, the system is not self-certification and it's not regulation at all. Very simply, starting at the top, ICAO—which Ms. Fox talked about—is an international body. It's a special agency of the UN that has been in place since 1944. Canada is a main signatory, and obviously ICAO is headquartered here. It defines the high-level responsibilities, requirements and processes that are used by countries, regulators and the industry to design and certify a safe product. It drives bilaterals and harmonization. Note that this approach is unique to the aviation sector. There is no other industry that has the same model of international regulation governance and oversight.

Transport Canada, based on the ICAO requirements, defines the design standards and processes to establish the product level of safety and the acceptable methods to demonstrate compliance with these requirements, and how to prove it.

Industry, the companies that design the products—we're called “the applicant”—have to design them using many suppliers and our own expertise. We have to design them to meet those design standards. That can take years. Then we have to prove to ourselves but, more importantly, to Transport Canada that a product complies with or meets all of those design standards that are set by Transport Canada and that the product is safe.

For an aircraft, there are over 1,200 requirements. For an engine, there are at least 100. We have to prove that each and every one of those meets those requirements.

Transport Canada will only approve that aircraft or engine once the company—the industry—has proven that each and every one of those requirements has been demonstrated. They have to have confidence in that.

At the beginning of the certification process, and throughout, there is constant communication between Transport Canada and the applicant. It's not just at the beginning and then we'll see you at the end. It's all the way through.

Transport Canada uses a risk-based approach to determine its involvement during the compliance demonstration phase of the process. They focus on safety-critical aspects, new and novel processes, and design and compliance methodologies. They witness tests. They read reports. They're in there constantly.

Post-certification, the type certificate holder—because we now hold the design approval—has the obligation to monitor the products in the field, identify and analyze issues that could lead to unsafe conditions, work with Transport Canada to introduce required corrective actions and apply lessons learned for design and certification of new products. It's a continuous improvement cycle.

The Transport Canada aircraft certification process is fundamentally robust. It results in an exceptional level of product safety. However, as we know, in the current environment of increasing product complexity and integration, evolving technologies and commercial pressures, the process can be further improved. My recommendations on industry require organizations involved in product type certification and production to have safety management systems.

Let me explain safety management systems, or SMS. Canada was a world leader and recognized in rolling out SMS in the early 2000s on our large CAR 705 operators. It has taken a bit of a hiatus. Many of the committee members may appreciate the journey it has been on.

For certification, let me say that SMS does not replace the certification process or requirements at all. They exist as they have been and will be. It complements and reinforces that by requiring an organization's management system to identify and manage product safety risks associated with the business processes and decisions. It requires executive accountability for product safety and the development of an organizational safety culture.

ICAO has recognized the importance of SMS, not just for operations, but also for our sector of industry, and has introduced the requirement into ICAO annex 19. Transport Canada should put the processes and resources in place to evaluate and recognize those organizations that would like to have SMS or should have SMS on a voluntary basis in advance of or in place of rule-making.

They need to mandate SMS. For Transport Canada, to echo Mr. Quick's comments, it is very important for the Canadian public as well as the industries sitting here at the table. They have to maintain their certification competency through the retention and development of sufficient qualified experts involved in key steps of the certification and continued airworthiness process.

That includes everything from standards development, bilaterals, involvement in the actual product certification processes and oversight of company processes for certification, as well as SMS. In addition, Transport needs to ensure that the appropriate organizational structure is aligned with main bilateral partners.

With the above suggestions, the current robust Transport Canada certification process and product safety record will be further enhanced.

I would like to thank you for your attention. I'd be pleased to respond to questions at the appropriate time on certification, delegation, validation and SMS.

Thank you.

4:55 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you.

Mr. Curtis.

4:55 p.m.

David Curtis President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today.

As a clarification, I am CEO of Viking. I am also the executive chair of Longview Aviation Capital, which owns Viking and a number of other aviation entities in Canada, including De Havilland Canada.

Longview, through its subsidiary companies De Havilland Canada and Viking Air, based in Victoria, Calgary and Toronto, designs, certifies, manufactures and modifies commercial turboprop aircraft, including the class-leading Dash 8 series 400 regional turboprop, the world-renowned DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft and the highly specialized Canadair CL-415 water bomber.

The Longview group of companies employ nearly 2,000 directly and 4,000 indirectly within the Canadian aerospace supply chain, and we account today for over $1 billion in sales, of which 95% is exported. With Bombardier's exit from commercial aviation, Longview is now the largest commercial OEM of turboprop-powered aircraft in North America. We own over 23 different aircraft designs, 21 of which were designed and built in Canada over the last many decades.

Why is this notable? Certifying new clean-sheet aircraft designs is incredibly capital-intensive. We only have to look at the recent development of the Bombardier C Series, now the Airbus A220, to better understand this. Our entire business model is focused on developing second or third product life cycles from robust and proven designs.

The Twin Otter, for instance, was first certified in 1965 and in production until 1988. It was out of production for 22 years. Viking restarted production in 2010. It went through a robust CPR process with Transport Canada and has since delivered another 150 of those new variants. The same is true for the Dash 8. It was first introduced in 1983, and derivatives were developed and have extended the production life of the Dash 8 aircraft over 37 years.

The aircraft certification process and how CPR—the changed product rule—is applied is incredibly important to Longview and our subsidiary companies. The CPR process allows a robust evaluation of the design change with respect to maintaining an acceptable level of safety. The evaluation of newly proposed changes and the proven in-service performance of the aircraft is a fundamental key to identifying the certification basis and ensuring that the appropriate means and method of compliance are completed.

The early involvement of TC—Transport Canada—in the examination of the design change and the certification aspects enables evidence- and risk-based decisions regarding TC involvement throughout the entire certification process. TC's continual engagement with the applicant as the certification progresses allows for the monitoring and adjustments of their involvement as any risk factors change and the appropriate oversight requirements are maintained. Through this oversight and an established system of delegation, TC can rely on the delegated organization to complete the compliance findings with confidence.

Both Viking and De Havilland, through working experience with Canadian airworthiness and operational requirements, have established that we have the necessary knowledge and capabilities as organizations to enable authorized persons within our teams to make findings of compliance on behalf of the minister, not as an employee of the OEM.

TC is a worldwide and respected leader in aircraft certification. Once the aircraft is certified, as we sell globally, TC becomes a partner in achieving certification in other jurisdictions. They become our advocate. The acknowledgement of the role of TC as a certifying authority from the state of design through strong bilateral agreements with other foreign regulators is critical for our business and to sustain our business.

The Twin Otter and the Dash 8 are validated worldwide. This activity would not have been possible without TC maintaining its status as an industry-leading regulator.

Thank you.

5 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Mr. Curtis.

Mr. Bruce.

5 p.m.

Steven Bruce Director, Design and Certification, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.

Actually, I'm here with David.

5 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Mr. Deer.

5 p.m.

Michael Deer Airworthiness Specialist, Bell Textron Canada Limited

I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss the Canadian certification process. Bell has been developing and manufacturing helicopters at our Mirabel facility for more than 30 years now. To support the certification of our products, we built a strong relationship with Transport Canada and have held the Transport Canada designation of design approval organization based on the Transport Canada delegation system for over 28 years.

In my role at Bell, I'm responsible for the management and certification process for Bell Canada and for validation of our products globally. As such, I have had the opportunity to observe how Transport Canada compares to and is viewed by other authorities.

I can say that Transport Canada Civil Aviation has a strong reputation around the world as one of the premier certification authorities. Due to Transport Canada's reputation and strong bilateral partnerships, other countries recognize Transport Canada's competence and have trust in the Canadian certification process, which ensures that aeronautical products like ours, developed and certified in Canada, meet the safety standards that have been established by the world's leading authorities.

As mentioned before, Transport Canada uses a risk-based approach to certification. The Transport Canada certification process with its system of delegation is effective and robust. Transport Canada's oversight, known as level of involvement, is based on assessment of risk to determine where and when they are involved in certification projects so their attention can be focused on areas that are the most important and have the greatest impact on safety.

Bell has developed safe products through an open relationship with Transport Canada. The certification process is structured to initiate communication with Transport Canada early in the product development life cycle. The Canadian delegation system is mature and is based on trust. It includes Transport Canada level of involvement to ensure product safety. Early and open communication between Transport Canada specialists and Bell specialists is encouraged to ensure engagement and common understanding of our design and compliance with the applicable standards.

A strong delegation system is necessary to maximize the efficiency of the certification process and to ensure that Transport Canada resources focus on areas that have the greatest impact on safety. There are finite authority resources to provide oversight of the certification process, so delegation and a strong partnership with Transport Canada are necessary for the success of the Canadian industry. Early collaboration, trust, and continued delegation and reliance on the OEM's expertise are needed to continue to develop safe products.

Strong bilateral partnerships with other major authorities are also essential. If there is trust in Transport Canada's certification process, foreign authorities can focus their attention on areas of greatest risk as well.

We appreciate our partnership with Transport Canada. It's important to Bell that Transport Canada be properly resourced and have predictable and stable funding to retain a strong international and domestic voice.

I would also echo the recommendation from Ms. Diamant about the safety management systems. Bell has already started the process to voluntarily adopt safety management systems within our organization. We have already adopted it in several other facilities and are in the process of adopting a voluntary safety management system here in Canada as well.

Thank you.

5:05 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Mr. Deer.

Are there any other comments?

Mr. Watson?

5:05 p.m.

David Joseph Watson Manager, Airworthiness and Air Safety, De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.

I have no further comments.

5:05 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Okay. We will start with the questions.

Mr. Doherty.

5:05 p.m.

Conservative

Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC

Thank you to our guests here today.

Mr. Curtis, you said that certifying new is a very capital-intensive process. You mentioned the recertification of the Twin Otter and Dash 8 that your company has gone through. How much change to the airframe was done in the new certification of both aircraft?

5:05 p.m.

President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.

David Curtis

I can speak for Viking on the Twin Otter program.

5:05 p.m.

Conservative

Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC

Yes, go ahead.

5:05 p.m.

President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.

David Curtis

Essentially, in order to meet the changed product rule and update the certification basis, a number of things related to passenger safety had to be addressed. New regulatory requirements around passenger safety, improved avionics systems, situational awareness, lightning strike...all these kinds of things went into it.

However, structurally, with regard to a new Twin Otter compared to a legacy Twin Otter, you wouldn't be able to tell the difference.

5:05 p.m.

Conservative

Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC

Great, thank you.

So if we had an aircraft that had changed an airframe—38% longer, 52% greater capacity, the size and thrust of the engine 100% greater than previously, the wingspan 27% wider, the aerodynamics, stable or unstable under certain conditions, questionable.... In your opinion, should this have been a new type certification?