Evidence of meeting #5 for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was transport.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Kathleen Fox  Chair, Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board
Sylvain Alarie  Professional Engineer, As an Individual
Gilles Primeau  Professional Engineer, As an Individual
Natacha Van Themsche  Director, Air Investigations, Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board
Jim Quick  President and Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace Industries Association of Canada
Jodi Diamant  Chief Engineer, Airworthiness & Certification, Pratt & Whitney Canada, As an Individual
David Curtis  President and Chief Executive Officer, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.
Steven Bruce  Director, Design and Certification, Viking Air Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.
Michael Deer  Airworthiness Specialist, Bell Textron Canada Limited
David Joseph Watson  Manager, Airworthiness and Air Safety, De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited, Longview Aviation Capital Corp.

3:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities to order.

Before we get on with our agenda, I would like to take this opportunity to have a minute of silence. As many members recognize, today is the first anniversary of the Ethiopian flight 302 tragedy.

[A moment of silence observed]

Thank you.

Mr. Doherty.

March 10th, 2020 / 3:30 p.m.

Conservative

Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC

Mr. Chair, in the notice of meeting from the clerk regarding our meeting on Thursday, I noted that this study would take place from 3:30 to 5:00, and then from 5:00 to 5:30 we would do committee business.

Given the seriousness of the issue and the number of witnesses we have, I offer that we extend the committee meeting and do committee business from 5:30 to 6:00. This gives all parliamentarians an opportunity to hear from the witnesses and provide questions to them.

3:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Mr. Doherty.

I'll take that as a motion.

Are there any questions or comments, members?

Mr. Sidhu.

3:30 p.m.

Liberal

Maninder Sidhu Liberal Brampton East, ON

Mr. Chair, I have a prior commitment. I thought the meeting would be until 5:30. At 5:45, I have someone coming to my office. I could cancel that meeting, if you need me to.

3:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Are there any other questions or comments from members?

Mr. Doherty.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC

Mr. Chair, it's not normal practice during a study that we arbitrarily assign 30 minutes or a portion of that time immediately after having witnesses. The purpose of the witnesses' appearing is that we can ask pertinent questions of those witnesses regarding their testimony and the topic at hand. It would be out of the ordinary to hear from witnesses and not have an opportunity to put questions to them.

Again, I put it forward as a motion that I hope the committee will adopt.

3:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Mr. Doherty.

Just for clarification, this is not in fact out of the ordinary; it is practice at times, when appropriate. Having said that, however, I will take the motion and ask members whether they have any further questions on the motion.

Mr. Berthold.

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

Luc Berthold Conservative Mégantic—L'Érable, QC

I want to add to what my colleague just said. There are three witnesses and we have 30 minutes. The witnesses will therefore come here only to make their presentations. We will not have any time to question them. According to the schedule, there will not even be a single round of questioning. I think it is perfectly legitimate for us to be able to question the witnesses and get clarifications on their presentation.

3:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Mr. Berthold.

Are there any further questions or comments on the motion?

Mr. Bittle.

3:30 p.m.

Liberal

Chris Bittle Liberal St. Catharines, ON

This is my attempt to compromise and find some middle ground on this, because I know members may have other commitments, such as flights home, and there's a cost to re-booking, not just in terms of money but of family. I'm here Friday, so it's not an issue for me, but it may be an issue for other members.

Perhaps we can cut the committee business in half and move forward based on that. That would give more opportunity for questions and allow for members who have to travel. I know some members of this committee have long distances to travel.

That's my attempt at a compromise, if it's acceptable to the opposition.

3:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Mr. Bittle.

Are there further questions or comments?

3:35 p.m.

Conservative

Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC

Again, given the seriousness of the topic at hand and that witnesses have travelled great lengths to come before us, it's important that we not rush their testimony and give ample time for questions.

3:35 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Mr. Doherty.

Are there further questions or comments? I will call the question on Mr. Bittle's amendment.

(Amendment negatived)

Now we go to Mr. Doherty's motion.

(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

Thank you, Mr. Doherty.

Now we will get on with the business outlined in the agenda. We have the aircraft certification process.

We are privileged to have witnesses today. Between 3:30 and 4:30, as individuals we have Sylvain Alarie and Gilles Primeau, both professional engineers, to start us off. As well, from the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board, we have Kathleen Fox, who is the chair, and Natacha Van Themsche, director of air investigations.

To all, welcome. It's a privilege and honour to have you here.

Of course, we'll start with a presentation by you. You have 10 minutes each. That will be followed by questions from members of the committee.

I'm not sure who wants to start.

Ms. Fox, the floor is yours.

3:35 p.m.

Kathleen Fox Chair, Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board

Good afternoon. I'd like to thank the committee for inviting the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the TSB, to discuss the topic of aircraft certification.

Today I am joined by my colleague, Natacha Van Themsche, director of investigations in the air branch. She brings a wealth of experience and has a background as an aerospace engineer with over 20 years in the Canadian Forces.

As there are some new members on this committee, I'd like to take a very brief moment to tell you who we are at the TSB and what we do.

The TSB was created in 1990 by the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act. Our mandate and our sole purpose is to advance transportation safety in the air, marine, rail and pipeline modes of transportation that are under federal jurisdiction.

We do that by conducting independent investigations, identifying safety deficiencies, causes and contributing factors, making recommendations and publishing reports. Put more simply, when something goes wrong, we investigate to find out not just what happened but why, and then we make public what we've learned so that those best placed to take action—the regulator and industry—can do so.

The TSB is independent and operates at arm's length from other government departments and agencies. We report to Parliament through the President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. This lets us be impartial, free from any real or perceived external influence.

lt is also important to clarify what the TSB does not do. We are neither regulator nor court; we do not assign fault, nor do we determine civil or criminal liability. We do not conduct inspections or audits. Those functions are left to the regulators and other organizations.

As for today's topic, aircraft certification, that is something that, generally speaking, falls outside of TSB's mandate as defined in the CTAISB Act. We cannot certify aircraft or aviation equipment. That is part of Transport Canada's role. The TSB would only be involved in such a matter if, during the course of our investigations, aircraft certification were identified as a safety-significant issue. Although such a scenario is not common, it has happened on a number of occasions. Allow me to provide two high-profile examples to give you a sense of when and how this works.

On September 2, 1998, Swissair flight 111 departed New York on a scheduled flight to Geneva. About 53 minutes after departure, the flight crew smelled an abnormal odour in the cockpit. A fire was spreading above the ceiling in the front area of the aircraft. This led to a rapid succession of aircraft systems-related failures. The flight crew declared an emergency, but several minutes later the aircraft crashed southwest of Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, killing all 229 people on board.

TSB's complex and exhaustive investigation made many findings. Two of them were both causal to the accident and specifically mentioned the issue of certification. First, the TSB found that the aircraft certification standards for material flammability were inadequate, in that they allowed the use of insulating materials that could be ignited and could sustain and propagate a fire. Second, we found that there was no requirement to consider a fire-induced failure when completing the system safety analysis required for certification.

The second example is from March 12, 2009, when a Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky S-92A experienced a sudden loss of oil from the main gearbox. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter crashed into the Atlantic, approximately 35 nautical miles from St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, killing 17 of the 18 people on board.

TSB's subsequent investigation found issues with the certification process for the main gearbox, specifically that the certification standards did not require the helicopter to be able to continue flight for 30 minutes following a loss of lubricant from the oil filter bowl, as happened in this occurrence.

Since then, other TSB investigations have made findings on topics including the design and certification of emergency locator transmitters, or ELTs, and the design of emergency exits and whether they are adequate in cases of emergency egress.

Over the years, the TSB has issued safety communications related to certification, such as safety advisory letters and board recommendations, and the subjects of these have included such issues as the recording capacity of cockpit voice recorders or CVRs, the aforementioned flammability standards for insulation materials, aircraft performance in icing conditions and the installation of stall warning systems.

In each case, once a recommendation is issued, we assess the minister's response and conduct an annual reassessment of the updated responses received. We evaluate progress made toward reducing or eliminating the identified safety deficiency and then report publicly on what remains to be done.

Again, I need to stress that the TSB is not itself involved in the actual certification process. As I said earlier, we are not the regulator. Our sole objective is to advance transportation safety by identifying safety deficiencies and reporting publicly on what needs to be done to reduce or eliminate the risks.

Thank you, and in due course I will be pleased to take your questions.

3:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Ms. Fox.

Who is next?

Mr. Alarie, welcome.

3:40 p.m.

Sylvain Alarie Professional Engineer, As an Individual

Good afternoon.

Thank you. It is an honour to be here.

I'm an aerospace engineer. I've been working in the aerospace field for 30 years, since graduating. I started out as a draftsman and worked my way up as a designer, structural analyst, project engineer and system engineer. Until recently, I was chief engineer on large fly-by-wire flight control systems, and today I work as an engineering consultant specializing in the development of critical systems, such as flight controls, fuel systems and hydraulic systems.

My approach to the certification process is mainly from the point of view of the system supplier. I want to highlight that a little bit to you to help steer some of your questions.

Since the late 1990s, a process has grown whereby the airframe manufacturers who apply for the type certificate will flow down certification requirements by contract to the system suppliers. These system suppliers, depending on their system, will negotiate which of the Transport Canada regulations are applicable to their system, and, through the whole development process, they will be working with the airframe manufacturer and by extension Transport Canada to design a system that complies with the regulations. They will also prepare all the plans and the familiarization and verification artifacts needed for the certification of the system on the airframe and the type certification itself.

My role as chief engineer was to oversee the design, but I was also responsible for the certification and responsible for costs, schedule and risk on the programs, which creates an interesting dichotomy whereby you have to manage these different priorities.

As I said, when I look at the certification process, it's more from a bottom-up perspective: How do systems comply? How do we apply the changed product rule when we make changes to our system? How do we flow to the airframer that the system change is coming? How do we deal with the change with Transport Canada?

I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Mr. Alarie.

Mr. Primeau.

3:45 p.m.

Gilles Primeau Professional Engineer, As an Individual

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair, vice-chairs and committee members.

My name is Gilles Primeau, and I want to thank the committee for inviting me to appear today as an individual, professional engineer and private pilot.

Flight controls problems are the dominant factor in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max crashes. This is where my expertise and experience reside. Early on, I simulated them and spent hundreds of hours, notably in 737-300 level D full-flight simulators. Later, I worked for several aircraft types on the design, testing and certification of actual flight controls and on the horizontal stabilizer trim system, HSTS, in particular.

This is probably the most important of all aircraft systems. If its actuator breaks, or if its controller acts abnormally and the situation cannot be contained, you lose the aircraft. This happened before the 737 Max crashes. Alaska Airlines flight 261 crashed in 2001 because of the system's actuator, and in 2011 a Falcon 7X was almost lost because of the system's controller.

One year ago today, the second 737 Max crash took place. On that day, I started my independent, neutral and voluntary study into what caused those crashes. Contributing to the prevention of similar tragedies in the future became for me a professional and moral obligation and the best way I could ensure that the 346 victims have not perished in vain.

To prepare for today, I read the transcript from the February 25 hearing with Transport Canada certification leadership, and I can agree with their assessment of the high quality of regulatory oversight and the enviable safety record in Canada. I also agree with the spearheading by Canada of the need for high-quality simulation training, especially regarding MCAS. My experience as a pilot from three separate flights with specific difficulties encountered, one of them being during my first solo flight, has me absolutely convinced that in front of the unexpected, good training is your best ally.

I also agree that the level of international harmonization of regulations should be improved. The changed product rule, CPR, is a good example. This may also apply to regulation 25.1309, the most important regarding aircraft systems.

I now wonder whether there might be merit in having every national certification authority that oversees airframers in its own country dispatch permanently some of its own representatives to each of the other countries in the same situation. If everyone acts in good faith, new developments could be made more robust from the contribution of all stakeholders.

Also relative to the aircraft certification process, almost nine months ago I concluded that there exists the potential to introduce the following two new regulations.

First, regarding the CPR and the associated so-called “grandfather clause”, no grandfathering privilege should be granted if anything is interfaced, new or modified, to a previously certified critical system. The latter then needs to be recertified. With this rule, the introduction of MCAS would have forced the modernization of the HSTS.

Second, regarding testing—and this ties to a key recommendation from the JATR, the Joint Authorities Technical Review—testing for any critical system should be forced, maybe under regulation 25.1309, to be performed integrated with all its interfacing systems. Some call this aircraft-level testing. In other words, testing of critical systems individually or in silos is insufficient. With this rule, the simple test of a faulty AOA sensor would have easily uncovered its multiple effects, forcing architecture changes upon the 737 Max.

The MCAS software changes will make the 737 Max safer; however, the HSTS will then have become the next weakest link in the chain, and no chain is stronger than its weakest link. I have identified nine technical reasons to justify the need to modernize the 737 Max HSTS.

Another key finding was that a faulty AOA sensor, in addition to causing erroneous MCAS activation, has also caused a large increase of the control column forces due to the erroneous stall detection. High column forces, along with high manual trim wheel forces, a long-known problem, made it extremely difficult for the ET302 flight crew in particular to raise the nose of the aircraft, to trade airspeed for gaining altitude, which they had to do to avoid colliding with local peaks. Google Earth near Addis Ababa reveals why the ET302 crew requested from air traffic control a 14,000-foot altitude. That's what they were struggling to achieve.

The conclusions of my study have been compiled in a 44-page document, which was recently sent to Boeing. It notably contains 24 main technical questions, makes suggestions for rebuilding trust in Boeing and gives a synopsis of what likely occurred in each accident flight, based on the findings from my study. Because of the ties to regulations and the pre-cited incentive to harmonize internationally, the FAA and Transport Canada were also put in distribution of this document.

Thank you for your attention, and I am now prepared to answer your questions.

3:50 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Vance Badawey

Thank you, Mr. Primeau.

Thank you, all, for your presentations.

We will start off with Mr. Doherty.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC

First, I want to thank the witnesses for being here today.

Mr. Primeau, would you be willing to table your findings with the committee as well?

3:50 p.m.

Professional Engineer, As an Individual

Gilles Primeau

Yes, I'm willing to do so, but confidentially, because I want to give Boeing a fair chance of answering. Some of the questions are pretty steep, and I want to give them a fair chance to answer them before this goes public.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC

Mr. Primeau, does it seem odd to you that even the flight control manuals did not mention MCAS, except in the definitions? With more than 1,000 pages in the flight control manuals, it did not even put the information in.

3:50 p.m.

Professional Engineer, As an Individual

Gilles Primeau

Given the capabilities of MCAS, that it can take control of the stab trim actuator, yes, that's unacceptable. I think it was only found in the glossary later on.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

Todd Doherty Conservative Cariboo—Prince George, BC

With your background, do you believe, given the size of fuselage and the capacity—38% longer and 52% greater size, and thrust of engines 100% greater—that the 737-800 should have been classified as a new aircraft or just certified as a new model?

3:50 p.m.

Professional Engineer, As an Individual

Gilles Primeau

I would certainly have thought that the stab trim system had to be revised. One of the questions I'm asking Boeing is whether they instrumented one of their test aircraft, instrumented the actuator itself to confirm whether the load-bearing capability was appropriate for the aircraft.