Mr. Speaker, I will continue on with the lawful access speech I was providing.
Basically, the growing global nature of crime increases vulnerability as terrorist networks, organized criminal groups and human traffickers all use modern technology to perpetrate crimes and avoid detection. Many criminal organizations are using communication technologies that cannot be easily or lawfully accessed by Canadian law enforcement and national security agencies. Communication networks themselves have become more complex through the rise of mobile and Internet communications, encrypted messaging services, international roaming, service resellers and ever faster network technologies. Generally, these new types of communication services are developed with consumer protection and security in mind, not lawful access, which has created tremendous challenges for investigators. As new technologies shape the way criminals operate, we must ensure that our law enforcement and national security apparatus have the tools and resources necessary to keep up with this changed and changing technical landscape.
In 2009, 2011 and 2012, successive attempts by Conservative governments to modernize Canada's lawful access legislation did not succeed. Over the last 10 years, Liberal governments ignored the issue, which allowed the problem to fester and organized criminals to take over our streets. Canada is currently the only Five Eyes nation without a clear lawful access framework for modern communication. Decades of successive governments have not only let down but actively hindered our law enforcement and national security agencies by failing to provide them with the required legislation to allow for adequate investigative tools and resources needed to keep Canadians safe.
The country's police chiefs have been calling for modernization of Canada's lawful access framework for many years, since as early as 2001. Canada's security and intelligence organizations continue to face significant challenges in successfully obtaining lawful access to communications due to the growing gap between the lawful authority to collect information and the technical capability to do so. In fact, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police has urged elected officials to “recognise the critical need for amendments to Canada's laws, to address the widening gap between ever-evolving technology and the outdated legislative framework that Canada's policing services must work within.”
Our judicial system is constrained by investigative hurdles, outdated statutes, protracted pretrial and trial litigation and a lack of clarity. In 2018, the director of CSIS described lawful access problems as one of the most significant challenges he had identified to the government.
Three core factors contribute to the challenges faced by law enforcement: the effects of advances in technology, the absence of legislation for intercept capability and the jurisdictional issues arising due to the cross-border nature of digital data.
Our current legislation means police face barriers around seizure authorities, causing investigative delays, sometimes with no way to get access to the information they need. Modernizing Canada's lawful access framework is necessary to remove ambiguity and provide predictability and consistency for police and prosecutors while strengthening transparency and public trust. For these reasons, I personally am very pleased to see this legislation being brought forward as a stand-alone bill, and I support Bill C-22 being sent to committee, where it can be carefully studied, scrutinized and reviewed.
Part 1 of Bill C-22 aims to facilitate quicker evidence gathering by allowing police officers to demand a yes-or-no answer from telecommunications providers as to whether they provide service to a specific account. It would also create a specific judicial order to compel electronic service providers to give basic identifying information, such as a names, addresses and emails, and would introduce a new mechanism for Canadian judges to authorize requests for subscriber information held by foreign entities. This addition would be an important tool for law enforcement, as cyberspace is not constrained by Canada's domestic border.
In fact, a recent report by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians found that many, if not most, Canadians use digital services from third party companies based outside of Canada. This report also noted that most online child sexual abuse cases involve offshore tech companies. Under current legislation, if digital information is required from a company based outside of Canada, the RCMP may request that information through a mutual legal assistance treaty, commonly known as an MLAT, where one is in place.
For example, if the RCMP requires information from, say, Facebook or Apple, it sends a request to Canada's Department of Justice, which sends the request on to the U.S. Department of Justice. After that request is accepted by the U.S. Department of Justice, an assistant U.S. attorney makes an application before a U.S. judge to obtain a warrant for the information. The FBI can only execute that warrant after it is issued by a U.S. judge. Once the company provides the FBI with the information, it eventually makes its way back to the RCMP via the two justice departments.
Now, even if the legal process is successful, if a company does not have a data retention policy, the content sought by an investigator may be deleted before the investigation request even arrives. According to the RCMP, the MLAT process can take three to six months, delaying investigations while Canadians remain at risk. For example, if someone reports to police a case of extortion occurring, say, on Instagram, it is currently a very lengthy and complicated process for police to obtain the alleged perpetrator's name or IP address because Instagram is a U.S.-based company. Part 1 of Bill C-22 would allow police to obtain a warrant to request the IP address from Instagram; then identify which Canadian provider services that IP address, through a yes-or-no response; and finally compel that specific provider to disclose the name, phone number and address linked to the IP address with judicial authorization: a warrant.
By creating a mechanism to authorize these information requests from foreign entities, Bill C-22 would provide police with an important tool to seek judicial approval to obtain IP addresses and subscriber names linked to criminal communications routed through international platforms. It would also create a new tool of international co-operation in criminal matters to facilitate obtaining the court-ordered production of specific electronic data at the request of Canada's foreign partners, allowing for better co-operation with our allies. Even with these new production orders and judicial authorizations, these investigative processes often entail extensive work and time. In some cases, the time required to produce information exceeds the length of time that the service provider retains the information, meaning evidence is being purged before police can get the legal authorization to obtain it. Part 1 of Bill C-22 would expedite the response to production orders by changing the review period to 10 days, because having prompt access to these telecommunication records is a necessity for investigations.
Part 1 of Bill C-22 would also provide clarifications on the ability of police officers to receive and act on certain information that is voluntarily provided to them or publicly available. For example, if a parent discovers that their child is being sexually exploited online and finds explicit messages, the perpetrator's username and IP address may be visible directly within the chat logs. Under current law, police may hesitate to act immediately on this voluntarily provided information due to uncertainty around privacy laws and liability, potentially delaying intervention and allowing harm to continue. This clarification is important to ensure that police can lawfully and promptly use such voluntarily provided information, enabling faster identification of the service provider and quicker protection of the child.
However, this new lawful access framework is only useful if telecommunications providers have the ability to respond to these demands. Currently, Canada is the only Western democracy that does not have a legal framework requiring electronic service providers to develop and maintain certain technical capabilities. This means that even if law enforcement obtains a warrant for information to, for example, track the movements of a terrorist group through one of its members' cellphones, the electronic provider may not be able to give that information as it is not required to retain it. Some telecommunications companies' and social media platforms' policies simply do not involve tracking or saving the kind of data that police might require as evidence unless they are legislated to do so.
In addition to data storage, Canada currently has no comprehensive legislative or regulatory mechanism that obligates communications service providers to develop or deploy systems that provide intercept capabilities. When a new technology or communications service is introduced, law enforcement and national security agencies often have to research and develop new methods to gain lawful access to those networks. The lack of a technical solution, or a delay in the ability to use it, hampers investigations and prevents law enforcement and national security agencies from effectively acting on serious crimes or threats to national security in a timely manner.
Part 2 of Bill C-22 would require electronic service providers to develop and maintain the technological capacity necessary to respond to lawful access requests and would establish a monetary penalty for non-compliance. It would also empower the Minister of Public Safety to issue flexible and targeted ministerial orders compelling an electronic service provider to develop and maintain specific capabilities. These ministerial orders would be subject to approval by the Intelligence Commissioner, as privacy and cybersecurity are explicit factors that need to be considered. With the establishment of legal obligations for service providers, when law enforcement agencies obtain a search warrant, they could be assured that the information they need to combat terrorism, organized crime or human trafficking, for example, would be provided quickly and accurately.
Finally, part 3 of the bill would mandate a comprehensive review of the entire act by Parliament three years after all provisions came into force to assess its effectiveness and impact. I personally believe it would be of significant assistance to law enforcement, national security agencies and prosecutors if the public safety committee, when it does this study, also undertook to discuss and recommend amendments to sections 37 and 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, which deal with what information must be disclosed in court and what can remain protected. Currently, when police officers develop and use certain investigative techniques, they may be required to disclose how those tactics work in court, which can expose sensitive methods and undermine future investigations. Previous committee testimony by the commander of the Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau of the Ontario Provincial Police discussed how amendments to the Canada Evidence Act are necessary to maintain confidentiality regarding the way in which investigative tools are developed and how they operate, function or are deployed to protect ongoing and future investigations. I hope that at committee, serious consideration will be given to these issues to ensure that police and our national security apparatus have the tools needed to prevent, investigate and prosecute serious and organized crimes, terrorism and other such offences.
Coming from a law enforcement background, I have witnessed first-hand the growing gap between what Canada's law allows and what technologies make possible for criminals. Conservatives believe in law and order and have always stood for common-sense measures to keep Canadians safe. With that said, I am also aware of concerns raised by Canadians about the implications of this bill on their individual freedoms and privacy. I want to clarify that lawful access does not mean expanded access to private information. Rather, it means more timely and consistent lawful access to information related to specific individuals suspected of being engaged in criminal activity. Law enforcement authorities are not interested in the millions of devices used by everyday Canadians. The framework in Bill C-22 is intended to target those devices or communications that are being used to plan or execute criminal or terrorist activities. We must remember that without judicial authorization, law enforcement cannot intercept communications or request information and data.
Lawful access does not allow access to private communications without a warrant, and interception can be carried out only with lawful authority, for targeted communications, for a specific period of time. Lawful access legislation does not allow law enforcement and intelligence investigators to simply monitor anyone's Internet use, email content or social media activity.
Conservatives have been and will continue to be unequivocal in our commitment to protecting the freedom, privacy and safety of Canadians. At committee, we will scrutinize, debate and propose amendments to improve this legislation and stand firm against unnecessary infringements on the rights of Canadians.
I remain optimistic that the government is open to non-partisan co-operation in assuring that Bill C-22 achieves its stated goal of strengthening Canada's public safety and national security, as well as safeguarding the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.
