Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 14th, 2013

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Good morning.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) our briefing on the situation in Mali will continue. I want to thank both of our witnesses for being here today.

From the Canadian Council on Africa we have Lucien Bradet, who is the president and chief executive officer. Welcome, sir.

From Project Ploughshares we have John Siebert, who is the executive director. Welcome, John.

John and I go back. He used to live in my riding a number of years ago. I've known John over the years, so it's nice to have him here in front of the committee today.

Why don't we get started with you, Mr. Siebert? We'll start with your opening statement, and then we'll move over to Mr. Bradet, and then we will go around the room over the next hour to ask questions back and forth. I believe you have a presentation of between eight and ten minutes. We look forward to hearing from you, and then we'll go back and forth with the members of Parliament to ask questions.

Welcome. The floor is yours, sir.

[John Siebert, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares]

Thanks for this opportunity to discuss Canada’s current role in Mali.

Let me start by saying that the cautious approach being taken by the Canadian government is welcome.

In the detailed briefing I have sent to you, I propose five principles to guide Canada’s decisions on how to contribute to the creation of sustainable peace in Mali. Specific initiatives can be tested against these principles.

The first three, dealing with humanitarian assistance, democracy and restoration, and building peace between the south and the north, have been spoken to very eloquently by other people who have appeared before this committee. I want to focus on the fourth and fifth principles that deal more directly with the military mission in Mali.

The crucial decision from my vantage point isn't boots on the ground or not boots on the ground, but what those boots do when they're on the ground. This applies to boots whether they're from Canada, France, Chad, Mali, the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, or the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Canada should press Mali and other military forces to make protection of vulnerable citizens their primary mission, displaying the highest respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. Protecting vulnerable civilians will win and maintain the support of the local populations and should be the primary mission of Malian and international troops. Concrete military operational implications flow from this principle.

It's worth remembering that al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have a clear strategy for drawing western militaries into debilitating fights in inhospitable terrain. They use asymmetric tactics to exhaust the will and resources of their opponents. Why let them set the agenda when alternative frameworks for restoring security in Mali and the broader Sahel region are available?

The actions of Canada and others in Mali should not be characterized as being part of an anti-terrorism struggle. Instead, we should see Mali’s current challenges as the culmination of political, military, and ethnic breakdown in Mali, which various groups have exploited.

The initial success of the French, Chadian, and Malian armed military forces in dislodging al-Qaeda and other insurgent forces from various urban areas is a welcome development, but as you well know, it's not definitive. In the vast countryside, AQIM and some Tuareg factions have reportedly established bases and supply lines that will permit them to carry out asymmetric attacks well into the future.

It is tempting for French and other military forces with advanced technological weaponry to now engage in search and destroy missions in the desert using air and drone strikes and to send special forces on raids to kill insurgents. This is a whack-a-mole strategy that has actually been counterproductive in other settings. As they say, for every insurgent killed, another 10 brothers or cousins step forward to repel the apostate enemy.

Instead, the military mission in Mali should continue to focus on protecting civilians in main population areas and along travel and trade routes. Keep open humanitarian assistance corridors. Patrol the borders as well as possible to disrupt supply routes for insurgents. Contain those who use terrorist methods, and then capture and submit them to democratic processes of justice. Military capabilities may be needed on an interim basis for these tasks, but the function is more akin to policing and should in fact devolve over time into a policing mission rather than a military mission.

The Malian military is reportedly engaging in human rights violations and targeted killing of civilians, particularly people identified as Tuaregs and Arabs. These actions are morally reprehensible and contrary to international law. Such behaviour also deepens the alienation of local populations and makes the tasks of re-establishing democracy and negotiating south-north peace much more difficult.

Robert Fowler, who appeared before this committee earlier in the week, said in his book that during his captivity in northern Mali, on a regular basis he and his colleague, Louis Guay, were subjected to al-Qaeda propaganda loops on laptops.

Always part of the show were pictures and videos of Abu Ghraib in Iraq and Guantanamo in Cuba, where western human rights standards were sacrificed on the altar of the great war on terror. Fowler bitterly detests and denounces these violations of fundamental human rights.

The deployment of ECOWAS troops to Mali under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 2085 is welcome. The problems in Mali threaten a broader range of countries than just Mali.

As a general principle, Canada should support policies and provide assistance that encourage and enable regional and sub-regional bodies like the African Union and ECOWAS to directly engage in peace operations in their own territories, assuming, of course, that the mission is properly authorized and implemented. Neighbours know the problems better and likely are more attuned to cultural and other dynamics.

Canada should strongly consider providing financial and technical assistance to the African-led international support mission to Mali, AFISMA, and to its UN successor, if AFISMA is re-hatted in some way as a UN mission. It should then address the problem of illegally circulating small arms and light weapons in Mali and its neighbours, and implement, as soon as possible, a program of disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation of fighters on all sides of the conflict.

Controlling and reducing the number of small arms and light weapons in Mali and the broader Sahel region should be a pressing priority for Canada and other new national actors in Mali. ECOWAS has enacted a convention on small arms, light weapons, their ammunition, and other associated material. This legally binding sub-regional instrument can provide the framework to attack this menacing reality. Canadian police and military have expertise in weapons stockpile management and control of guns in civilian possession and would make an important contribution to Mali’s long-term stability.

Finally, peace agreements, when they're reached, often fail when combatants are not disarmed, properly demobilized, and reintegrated into the social and economic life of their communities. DDR programs have been established in many countries after peace agreements were reached and, again, Canada could provide leadership to define both the need and the plan for implementation in the medium and longer term. There is a range of non-combatant but military contributions that Canada can make to Mali’s long-term peace and stability.

In closing, allow me to agree with Major-General Jonathan Vance, who appeared before this committee last week and said:...there is a tendency sometimes to see military kinetic action as being the silver bullet on the Islamist threat. In fact, kinetic action does not address root causes. An appropriate balance between hard military and all of the other things that have been mentioned here is what actually stops the Islamist threat. You simply are unable to use kinetics to stop this.

Thanks very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, Mr. Siebert.

We're going to turn it over to Mr. Bradet from the Canadian Council on Africa.

The floor is yours, sir.

[Lucien Bradet, President and Chief Executive Officer, Canadian Council on Africa]

Mr. Chair, members of the committee, good morning.

I'll just give you my background in Africa. I think I am the only Canadian who has ever graduated from the University of Rwanda, so it goes a few years back, just a few years back, fortunately, but Africa has been a little bit in my blood since then.

Thank you for giving the Canadian Council on Africa an opportunity to talk about such an important issue for Africa, but also for many Canadians.

In October 2012, in Paris, our Minister of Foreign Affairs declared the following:We must not allow the same problems that the world allowed to happen in Afghanistan to show their face in the Saharan region and Mali. The territorial integrity…the humanitarian situation, the fight against terrorism must remain a priority.

The minister expressed, I think, at that time, what Canadians believed then and still believe now. We should then look at Mali with that frame of mind, with the same glasses. Does it require the same action, the same approach? Maybe not, but one thing is for sure in our minds: that to be absent, to do nothing, is definitely not the response for such a condition.

CC Africa is an organization that was established about 10 years ago in the footsteps of Kananaskis. We're a group from the private sector, education, universities, and colleges. All of the government departments interested in the economic development of Africa also are members. Our mission is the economic development of Africa. We're not as much on the humanitarian side as many others are. We work with them, but our main focus is the economy of Africa.

Canada cannot afford to adopt an attitude of indifference or inactivity. That would be a serious mistake, as we would be failing to meet our responsibilities as a rich and developed country.

I realize a number of witnesses addressed the humanitarian issue as well as the stability of the region. Today I would like to shed some light on the economic aspect of the crisis, and what it means for Canada.

I will not go into all the potential scenarios in the region.

Again, there are many ways of looking at the region and what might happen there.

Many people have probably painted a bleak picture of the situation. Unfortunately, that could become a reality faster than we think. I would like to raise three reasons for Canada to play a role in this conflict.

For starters, some Canadian companies have major investments in Mali and the neighbouring regions. In Mali alone, we have 30 mining companies, which have invested a total of $400 million. Although those companies have not decided to leave the country, they may have to do so if peace is not restored. Some companies have already started slowing down their investments.

For the same reason, no new investments should be expected. Mali is a poor country in great need of those investments. So we have to protect the asset those natural resources represent. If investors continue to pursue economic development, those resources will help the countries make progress. The investments are even larger in the neighbouring countries—especially Niger and Burkina Faso—totalling billions of dollars.

Canada also continues to play a key role in Mali's economy. For those who are unaware, since the 2000s, a Canadian company, Canadian Bank Note, which is based here, in Ottawa, has been in charge of Mali's whole passport issuing system. It has also been responsible for the border control, tax documentation, license tax and tax systems. That's an enormous amount of work. An interesting fact about that huge job is that Canada won the contract over France, its competitor in that case. Some would say that France is creating an amazing springboard for itself going forward. So if Canada is not involved, it will lose out considerably.

More recently, a Montreal-based company, CRC Sogema, developed in Mali what could be referred to as a key element—a tax system. That project has been in the works since the 2000s and has just been revived with the setting up of a property tax system. That represents a revenue of 67 billion CFA francs for the Malian government. That figure is now over 200.

Canada has set up basic economic systems in Mali. It continues to provide Malians with very considerable assistance. Unfortunately, the conflict has led to a drastic drop in some of that revenue. The tax recovery rate is now 30%. It was much higher before the conflict began.

There is another reason for Canada to answer the call. My colleague here has talked about that. Despite all the good will of a number of African countries that have volunteered to help restore peace or perform peacekeeping activities, most of them do not have the required financial resources to equip themselves properly. The same goes for human resources training.

Given those circumstances, how could a military or peace force ensure peace, be it in large cities or across the country? I think that an exclusively African intervention would be very risky and would fail to achieve the desired outcome—peace, security and democratic governance.

As for the third point, I care deeply about Mali. I am sure that's the case for some members of the committee and perhaps even, I hope, for everyone around this table. Mali is one of the rare francophone African countries that could be qualified as a “country of focus”. Since the government made changes one or two years ago, only 2 francophone nations out of 26 remain countries of focus—Mali and Senegal.

If we reduce our presence in Senegal, the situation in certain communities will become even more of a purgatory than it currently is. In other words, that country is very appreciated by Canada. Its governance has been used as an example for a number of years, and Canada has carried out some amazing assistance programs there, as I just mentioned.

Can Canada afford to be a casual observer in this conflict? We don't think so. We have played an important role in Afghanistan, be it when it comes to assistance, development, logistics or training on the front, among other things. A few minutes ago, we talked about boots. We also played an active role in Libya. To a lesser extent, we play a role that has an impact on Syria, even though it is outside its territory. The terrorism issue is not close to being resolved. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs said, that issue is still very real in Mali and the region.

Why are we considering taking an almost-neutral approach in the case of such a poor country? I may be exaggerating a bit. We are not neutral; we say we are in favour of a solution. However, some of our actions indicate that we are not far from being neutral. Yet that is not in keeping with either the statements made by the minister or those made by Canadians.

We do not recommend an approach similar to that used in Afghanistan or Syria. However, we believe that Canada can increase its humanitarian aid and public safety assistance, and provide logistic support to African troops that are in the field and will probably remain there for quite some time. I am talking about support in communications, training and transportation. Finally, we recommend that Canada be very active when it comes to diplomacy and trade.

Knowing that I would appear today before this committee, members of certain companies asked me to give a clear message to the elected representatives. They want you to know that they continue to work in Africa because they have access to a system that complies with laws and regulations. According to them, if they leave or drastically reduce their presence, Canadian investments will be withdrawn or the commercial territory—if I may use that expression—will be totally taken over by others. If that is the case, Canada will lose out in one of the only two countries where it has some presence.

We risk losing a great deal, be it in terms of our influence in Africa, as I mentioned earlier, our trade interests—especially when it comes to investments—or the francophonie. I constantly hear other governments in Canada talk about that. I think that the Canadian government should also pay attention to that aspect.

I have gone slightly over my 10 minutes. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We're going to start with the opposition. Mr. Dewar, for seven minutes please.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I thank both of our witnesses today. I think they both provided us with some very precise advice.

Mr. Chair, I will share my time with my colleague Madame Laverdière. I have one question.

Mr. Bradet, I'm going to start with you. I'm going to read from your presentation back in 2009 when you said the following to the committee. I think you'll be okay with this. We'll find out. You said:

Africa shares the concerns of the African diplomatic missions. In the last few years we have clearly observed a trend that indicates the Canadian government, in general, is less and less present in Africa, whereas the Canadian population is doing more and more there. We are here today to ensure that this concern is communicated clearly to the members of Parliament, and that this issue is taken as a priority by the committee. We understand you have many priorities, but we believe this is one that should be considered very seriously. It is our assessment that there is an emergency and that Parliament must take necessary action to stop it and put in place a moratorium on budget cuts, on embassy closings, until a comprehensive strategy is developed after appropriate consultations with Canadians.

You said that in 2009. I want to get your assessment in 2013. Do you stand by those words?

[Lucien Bradet]

As I said to one of your colleagues before the meeting, I'm a missionary for Africa in Canada. I think the mission is having a number of successes. I think I would not repeat exactly the same words on that one. I think in the last year or so, I definitely have felt a renewed interest in Africa by the Government of Canada. There's no doubt about that, and I'm so pleased. I'm seeing some success in some places. It's not 100%, but we are succeeding.

In the last six months two presidents came from Africa, the first in six years. That was major progress. We've had about four ministerial visits. Two weeks ago we had the first business mission ever to Ghana and Nigeria by the Minister of International Trade.

So things are warming up.

I think the United Nations episode will have wakened a few thinkers. Also, the economy of Africa is really going up, contrary to that in the rest of the world, and that attracts attention. Our government has decided that trade is one of their priorities. There are emerging markets in Africa, and I think we are getting to the right place, and I'm very pleased about that. I will be able to retire soon because I think we are succeeding.

So I will not repeat that judgment. I think we're making progress.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Would you agree.... I have to share my time so I'll be quick. We should not close further missions—

[Lucien Bradet]

No.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

When I asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs how many we closed in the last number of years, he wasn't sure. He'll get back to us on that. But I could tell him it was five in the last number of years. Should we at least stop that trend and maybe even open some new missions?

[Lucien Bradet]

You're preaching to the converted. I'd like to have more missions.

I'll tell you a short story. Ten years ago, we were exactly where Brazil was with 17 missions. We are now at 14, and they are at 32. All I'm saying is that I'd like to be like Brazil today. I don't know if we'll get there. Also, when you look at the numbers, we were at $2 billion; they were at $2 billion. We are now at $12 billion and they are at $35 billion, so do the math. If you go there, you develop friendships. Friendships cannot be developed at a distance. You have to be there. So yes, is the answer, I'd like more. There's no doubt.

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Paul Dewar]

Now I'll hand it over to my colleague.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to both presenters.

As a former diplomat, I have to say that, yes, you have to be on the ground. You can't do it from the outside.

I have a question for Mr. Siebert, who mentioned the tool acquired by ECOWAS to control arms. I'd like to know more about how the tool is being used in the region right now. There is something else I'd like to know.

If we had a global arms trade treaty, would that provide more support or more prevention tools? Would it be useful in that region?

Thank you very much.

[John Siebert]

The ECOWAS small arms agreement has been in place for a number of years, and like for many of these sub-regional or regional agreements on arms control and disarmament, implementation is a huge challenge. There is great support both by civil society in that region and more broadly to assist in that process.

The arms trade treaty certainly would help because it would be comprehensive, in other words worldwide, if it was passed in a comprehensive fashion and also had implementation assistance attached to it.

The instrument is in place. It is a way to work with our African colleagues who are there on the ground. It's a very difficult situation. We talk about controlling, and then reducing. The illegal trade across borders, which are obviously very porous, is a huge challenge throughout Africa, in Mali, in Niger, in Algeria, and other places.

Yes, an arms trade treaty would help.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

There is about 30 seconds left. We'll give a little extra time next time.

We're going to move to Mr. Dechert, for seven minutes, please.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Gentlemen, thank you for being here with us today.

I'd like to start with Mr. Siebert. You made a number of interesting comments about military action in Mali. You obviously heard what Mr. Fowler had to say on Tuesday. He went into some detail about how he thought Canada should have a greater military role than we're currently doing there, that we should have special forces there working alongside French special forces, and we should provide logistics and intelligence support.

Basically he was encouraging us to get more involved in fighting the terrorists, rooting out the terrorists, specifically with a focus, I think, on the people who perhaps had kidnapped him and caused so much grief to him and Mr. Guay. We certainly sympathize with that. I can certainly understand that. It's the way I'd feel I guess if I went through what he went through.

But I sort of hear something different from you. You mentioned a comment about.... I'll come back to it. Mr. Bradet made the comment I want to come back to.

I want to hear from you in terms of what you think about what Canada is currently doing in supporting the French army and the Malian army in the fight against the terrorists, and stabilizing, and bringing peace to northern Mali, and whether you agree with Mr. Fowler that Canada should be sending more military personnel there to take on a greater role.

[John Siebert]

Thanks very much.

Obviously with great respect for Mr. Fowler and for the experience he went through, which none of us would like to experience ourselves, I think the notion of offensive special forces, drone, and other kinds of attacks in the long run can be counterproductive, and not only should Canada refrain from these things, but so should the French, and so should the Malians.

You want to stabilize the population centres and over time spread that stability. Clearly there are a range of insurgents in Mali as has been reported. Some are extremely difficult, hard people, and over time, like spoilers in any insurgency, they are going to need to be confronted or they will come too and be confronted.

The emphasis should be on protecting civilians rather than offensive military action primarily because over time that's what works.

In 2006 there was a Rand study, not exactly the starting point for a Project Ploughshares reference, but it looked at how insurgencies end, and 93% end not by military or offensive military action. There are different ways of handling insurgencies.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Bradet, you said a number of things. One was that terrorism is not about to disappear, and in your view we are getting perilously close to neutrality.

How does transporting troops and weapons to Mali to support the French army and the Malian army in this conflict make us neutral?

[Lucien Bradet]

In the paper recently, I saw that we had a plane and we had some of the logistics. I was very prudent in not saying total neutrality; I said it's quasi. I don't want us to be neutral. I want to go further than that. I could have used other words.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

I just want to clarify because I'm assuming, and we're all assuming, that some of the equipment and personnel that we've transported to Africa has been killing people and terrorists, the bad guys, in northern Mali—

[Lucien Bradet]

If the decision of the government is to do all of that for the next period, and that's what we see at the end of my proposal, we should do those things. I agree that we should not send boots by the hundreds and things like that, but we should have logistics support and transport if we can, and so forth. I retract that word.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Okay.

[Lucien Bradet]

That word “neutrality” was a little bit too strong.

[Bob Dechert, Conservative, Mississauga—Erindale, ON]

Okay.

I want to switch gears and talk about the return to democracy in Mali. As you both know, the Malian government has adopted a road map to return to democracy. They've put forward a date for elections of July 31.

Can you tell us what you think are some of the specific challenges that Mali faces in preparing for those upcoming elections? What are some of the benchmarks we should be looking at prior to July 31? Do you think that Mali will accomplish the goals in the road map to democracy? I'd like to hear from both you and Mr. Siebert on this.

[Lucien Bradet]

There's no doubt that what's happening now will definitely determine if they are able to respect that calendar. I must admit that in countries where there has been conflict, it's always very challenging to respect election dates. I'm not saying it never happens on the right dates. It always happens at one point in time, but it's rare that the dates are respected. I think that when we have to watch it is when all the pieces are coming back and if it's durable, because if there is another surge from one area to the other, it will change. The best barometer or the best way to watch for it is to see the intervention of the French and when they are going out. They will play a major role. If the French go out very soon or rapidly, then it may be chaotic very rapidly, too.

There are a lot of questions that we don't have answers for that will have an impact on that question of the dates. Am I an optimist or a pessimist? I don't know. We should be very realistic and say it's a little bit soon to think about a specific election, but it's important for the government to declare itself. I know people there who were Canadian who are now in the Government of Mali as ministers. There are very good people there, too. They will fight for democracy but they don't manage everything. I agree that the coup did not help because the former president was a very good president, as far as I'm concerned. The fact that it was renversé didn't help at all.