Excellent. It would be consistent with Mr. Simms to emphasize the 99%, I suppose.
I'm sure that whether they are on or off the record, Mr. Reid's comments are always well informed and insightful. We look forward to having those continue in a couple of days when I finish.
I was reflecting some interesting comments from Ms. Vandenbeld who suggested—and I'm quoting the article—“powers currently allocated by the government House leadership team to the Speaker on things like the use of time allocation”.
What's envisioned by this is that perhaps after the process of negotiation between House leaders and discussion, if there were an impasse, the Speaker might decide, given the nature of a particular topic, that it were time enough for the discussion. She said during the debate, “I think we should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of giving the Speaker more of a say over the parliamentary agenda. Canada has a Parliament where the government side has more to say over the agenda than almost any other legislative body.”
Incidentally, this has been part of the debate around question period as well. It's the possibility of empowering the Speaker to not only do what he does now—he or she; in the present case it's a he—to maintain decorum, to rule on specific narrow sets of matters but also to take a more substantive role in forcing ministers and parliamentary secretaries to answer questions.
There is one proposal in the discussion paper about enhancing the power of the Speaker that involves the splitting of omnibus bills. I'm going to talk a bit more about omnibus bills later, because I haven't really gone into those yet. There's also the question of the Speaker saying, sorry, Prime Minister, you didn't answer the question, and I expect you to answer the question. There are different proposals around enhancing the power of the Speaker.
I see both sides of this. On the one hand, we already ask the Speaker to make certain kinds of substantive judgment calls. One case where we do that is on requests for emergency debates. Members come forward with things that they say are matters of urgency. Although the Speaker, of course, when making his ruling will always refer to the Standing Orders, it doesn't seem to me that the Standing Orders, with respect to the criteria for emergency debates, are overly prescriptive.
The Speaker makes a judgment call with respect to the holding of emergency debates. It's interesting that he does that already, so is it that much of a bridge for him to then start deciding how long a debate should go?
Furthermore, another possibility is that rather than having the Speaker limit the amount of time for debate, he could enforce rules of repetition across parties and not just across an individual speech. My understanding of the present Standing Orders is that I can make a series of arguments and then another member speaking later could make the same series of arguments. That wouldn't be considered repetition because it would be a different member making the argument. The standing order, as I understand it, does not refer to the repetition of matter already discussed, but refers to the repetition of the same point by the same member.
Perhaps one way of addressing some of the prospective efficiency concerns would be simply to have the Speaker identify or intervene in cases where there was a repetition of arguments that had already been made. If someone were advancing a line of argument, for example an objection to a particular bill, the idea would be that the Speaker would say, “We've already heard that particular argument, so you need to be making new arguments.”
That would still require the Speaker to make substantive judgment calls about substantive issues. It wouldn't be quite as arbitrary as what Ms. Vandenbeld seems to have envisaged, which is a system in which the Speaker would decide that this is the kind of bill that needs three days of debate, or this is the kind of bill that needs five days of debate. That would be a difficult role for the Speaker to have, and I'm not entirely sure that would be a role the Speaker wants.
If we recognize that's a role that the Speaker shouldn't have, then certainly it's a role that the government House leader shouldn't have on every piece of legislation either. If I had to choose, I probably would say that the kind of programming envisioned by the discussion paper, in which the government House leader effectively decides exactly how long every debate is going to be, would much inferior to the alternative in which some of those decisions are made by the Speaker. Of course, this is an important other distinction between Ms. Vandenbeld's proposal and the proposal in the discussion paper. It doesn't seem that Ms. Vandenbeld is envisioning that the Speaker be controlling the amount of time that committees spend discussing issues. Notwithstanding the Speaker's broad jurisdiction over what happens in that place, that would infringe on this important idea of the sovereignty of committees over matters that are within their own domain.
I wanted to highlight that as one part of the history we heard in terms of the discussion of the Standing Orders. We know there is a diversity of opinion among government members with respect to the best way to proceed on changes to the Standing Orders. Maybe if we pass this amendment and we proceed to do a study in which we are thoroughly engaged in hearing the perspectives of all members, then we'll actually have an opportunity to present some of these alternatives. What about having the Speaker make recommendations about the amount of time spent debating a bill? The Speaker could even make non-binding recommendations, perhaps. I think each of these things have potential problems to them. There is no change that is totally without a potential downside, but that doesn't mean a consensus cannot be achieved.
The history of discussions of parliamentary evolution and reform is one in which there have been changes made during the tenure of multiple prime ministers that have reflected consensus, yet they haven't been uncontroversial. They've been changes to the amount of time that members can speak, changes to the makeup of committees, to the number of committees, and so forth. There are changes and improvements that we could, through discussion, agree on, and in a way that draws on the diversity that's represented by different parties, as well as the diversity that's represented by different individuals within different parties.
I want to clarify a point that I made yesterday. In the context of our discussion last night, I was making some comparisons with the more republican approach to government, which is in a certain sense revolutionary. You draw up in a moment in time a constitution. I compared that with our tradition, which is an evolved tradition. Of course, we have written documents, but we draw on a tradition of an unwritten constitution as well. I made the argument that our evolutionary tradition is better.
Our tradition reflects the wisdom of history; it doesn't just narrowly reflect the wisdom of one group of people in a specific time. I therefore made the argument that we need to make sure that the discussions we're having are evolutionary in nature, not revolutionary; in other words, that we are proceeding in a consensus way that preserves and builds on the best of our traditions rather than seek to tear up our existing approach and adopt a different one.
But I did not want or intend to give the impression in those remarks that our system does not also entail some unique potential problems with respect to the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Some of those problems arise specifically from the fact that there is an absence of clear codification.
In, say, the American system you have clearly written rules that describe the relationship of the executive to the legislature and the way in which power is distributed, and the powers that the executive does and doesn't have. In our system these things are much more subject to convention. Our system has the benefits of that evolutionary tradition insofar as we're drawing from things that have been done in the past and are benefiting from those things as much as we choose to. There is always a risk, however, when you don't have the clear codification of limits on the power of the executive, that over-reach occurs, and it is harder to put your finger on the rule that says you can't do that.
There is no law that prescribes that you need to have, for example, unanimity in a committee on procedure and House affairs in order to move forward with proposed changes with respect to the Standing Orders. It is a convention, and it's a convention that is fundamentally the necessary product of our well-established traditions of responsible government. We aren't just arriving at this arbitrarily; we're drawing from a tradition. We can talk about some unique risks that emanate from that lack of codification.
I think the importance of passing this amendment is that it speaks to the need for members of Parliament to understand what our tradition of responsible government obliges us to do even in the absence of clear codification of specific rules that tell us, we have to do this and don't have any choice. Our tradition entails challenges, but in that sense you might also say that it expects more of us, because it expects us to interpret our tradition in a definitive way.
What is at stake in this discussion is this tradition; it is this idea of responsible government that we have. I don't think the failure of this amendment would mark the end of democracy, but it would mark a limiting of responsible government, because it would establish a precedent by which the executive—even beyond what we know, because I've read one of the alternative points of view of a member of the government caucus—can completely rewrite the rules under which Parliament operates.
If we can do that; if we can say it's up to the executive to decide how Parliament works, I submit to members that this really is the thin edge of the wedge.
I have raised a variety of concerns about the provisions of the discussion paper that have set off this discussion. Members might completely disagree with the concerns I have raised with respect to the discussion paper, but hopefully I think they would appreciate the fact that the way in which this government breaks through these established conventions has the potential to open the door for further use of that broken convention, for further abuses of what happens. Members of the government might be comfortable with the unilateral decisions of Prime Minister Trudeau with respect to the Standing Orders, but they might not be as happy with the unilateral changes that a hypothetical Prime Minister Obhrai might make to the Standing Orders. Even if they might like the power they have, it is important to leave intact institutions that preserve the integrity of our democratic system.
There is a great line on this from A Man for All Seasons. I can't quote it verbatim, but it's a discussion between Thomas More and his son-in-law.
Can you look up the anecdote I'm talking about from Thomas More? I'll read it into the record. It's short.
Okay, that's good staff member. I offered him a raise earlier, and this is where we go.
Mr. Chair, while I just sign my summer jobs allocation, I want to share with members some of the....