Procedure and House Affairs Committee on March 21st, 2017

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

There is still no willingness to televise the important discussion that we're having right now. As we've seen on social media and through the good work of those covering this discussion, this is still something that's going to be very much in the public attention, but it is interesting that the government is not interested in making that as accessible as possible.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Let's see if we return to Centre Block after today, too.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

These meetings may end up getting scheduled in Kanata at the rate we're going.

The issue of private members' business is addressed within the discussion paper that the government has put forward. There are plenty of possible changes that could be made to the way we do private members' business. One might be to distinguish between private members' bills and private members' motions and to create avenues for greater debate and a faster movement of the discussion specifically on bills on substantive legislative initiatives that members of Parliament might want to put forward. That would be one option for change.

The important point is that there needs to be an engagement of all parties and all members in this process. We've seen with respect to private members' business a really interesting dynamic on the government side where—and I'm not sure whether this is a function of forms of communication or just the way they intend it to be—very often members of the government propose private members' bills that have more support from the opposition than from the government. I have had a chance to vote in favour of many, I think, good private members' bills that have come from members of the government. I'd have to do an exact count, but I probably have voted for more Liberal private members' bills than the Prime Minister has.

This is why there's a need for engagement of all members in the discussion about private members' business and why we should proceed on the basis of unanimity, which would not only protect the interests of the opposition in a discussion about the form and structure of private members' business, but would also protect the legitimate role and expectation for engagement by members of the government who may, on questions of structure of private members' business, have views that are slightly different from the government caucus, which they are a part of. So that's the issue of private members' business.

I'd like to talk a bit about the issue of prorogation. This is particularly serious because, although it happens on the advice of the prime minister, it is not the prime minister who does it. Prorogation is a crown prerogative. It is not, strictly speaking, the Standing Orders that prescribe crown prerogatives. As much as we wouldn't want to have a system in which our monarch or her representative exercise too much discretion, I think that the weakening of some acknowledgement of the role of the crown in this can have the effect of strengthening the office of the prime minister in a way that we wouldn't want to see.

I was politically active, actually a staffer, at the time of the infamous coalition crisis of 2008, when opposition parties proposed to form a coalition and assume the government. At the time, of course, the prime minister prorogued Parliament. Members will remember the history of this. I think that privately, many Liberals were relieved that Parliament was prorogued because they saw that the public was not reacting well at all to their proposed coalition strategy, and they were not at all sure how their planned collaboration with the New Democrats and the Bloc would work in practice.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Do you think they still feel that way?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Perhaps. Who knows what Michael Ignatieff thinks these days about that?

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

We can guess. Never say no to power.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Yes, but the point was that this was a very dynamic time in which Canadians were grappling with and debating questions of how our elections actually work and whether it is appropriate or not for a party that just went through a significant loss of seats to then position itself to be the government, and for a party that only runs candidates in one province to then have a veto effectively over the decision-making of government. These were all questions that Canadians were grappling with. It was not a slam dunk. The Governor General would necessarily at that appointed time prorogue Parliament.

I think she made the right decision. I think it was a decision reflecting what the public was looking for, as well as a decision that reflected the traditions of this place that have evolved. It was a decision that I don't know we could properly describe as being within the full ambit of personal discretion for the Governor General. It was one on which I'm sure she engaged constitutional experts. It was a decision which I think reflected the evolution of our system, but it was ultimately a decision that was not made by the prime minister. It was a decision that was made by the Governor General.

When we contemplate changes to prorogation, and when we think about the way in which those decisions are allowed to take place, I think we have to acknowledge the role of the crown as in some sense a guarantor of our constitutional order in the process of those decisions. Certainly, it seems to me that some of the proposals with respect to prorogation don't seem to properly acknowledge that reality.

I'll draw the attention of members, for example, to the first sentence of the third paragraph in the prorogation section of this discussion paper which says, “One option would be to require that the Government table a document early in the following session that sets out the reasons for proroguing Parliament.”

Now, this idea of having a sort of prorogation ceremony would seem to suggest that this was fully within the discretion of the government, and that's not to say that it could not be undertaken with the proper development of the process. Another concern I have is that this is just the government creating another venue outside the normal orders and processes of the House where they can stand up and try to use the time to justify their own political agenda. The government could pursue prorogation, and having pursued prorogation, could then opt to take the opportunity in Parliament to provide a justification that really they could provide in other formats, and that doesn't need to be provided.

Of course, the discussion paper envisions that happening early in the following session. Very likely this is relatively after the fact anyway. If the government were to choose to prorogue Parliament—let's say they were to do that some time this spring—then, as envisioned by this process of a prorogation ceremony, the follow-up to that, their justification for that, would not happen for months until Parliament resumed. If there were a question about prorogation, certainly having that opportunity to make a statement at some point in the distant future...very likely clear statements would have been made as well.

There is a provision for a study to be done at committee, for a report being automatically referred to committee for study, and it could be the subject of debates on supply days. Well, that's very generous, but of course anything can be the subject of debates on supply days. On supply days, the opposition can put forward motions on any topic they wish.

When it comes to the tone of the discussion paper from the government, it is trying to create the impression that the government is offering concessions on things that might be beneficial to the opposition. For those who dig into these rules, it's quite obvious that the government is looking for ways to sort of nod to things that the Liberals thought when they were in opposition, while really moving forward with the draconian approach they envision, which is something that hasn't been done by previous governments, which is seeking to unilaterally make changes without the full engagement of those who should be engaged with this discussion.

I'd like to speak to the issue of the management of debate as it's envisioned in this study and, first of all, about some of the issues around so-called closure or time allocation. Again, we see references here to protocols in the British House of Commons. I think there is an important point that's missed in that comparison, recognizing one of those differences in political culture between the way our democratic system operates and the way their system operates. I'll talk about that in a few minutes, but I think that should be highlighted in terms of the way we proceed with respect to the Standing Orders.

Again, this is a case where the government seems to use, as implied justification for moving in the direction they want to move, that this is something that is done in the British House of Commons and they seem to like it. However, there are important differences. Notwithstanding that our institutions are relatively similar, there are important differences. I'll get to that.

In the first paragraph of this discussion paper, where the government talks about the use of time allocation, it notes the history of it and its controversial nature, and it says that its use has been seen rather disdainfully by the opposition and by the media. Certainly, many members of the current government who now defend the use of time allocation were part of the commentariat that viewed time allocation particularly disdainfully.

It's interesting to think about the way our system operates, because there are formal checks and then there are public opinion checks. There are ways in which the government has the ability to do certain things, but there is an implied sense that if the government goes to certain extremes, these would be the subject of greater public debate, and they would risk a greater backlash. Perhaps an analogous case might be the use of the notwithstanding clause. Although the notwithstanding clause gives the federal government the ability to override certain kinds of decisions of the courts, in practice, governments thus far have been fully reluctant to use it at the federal level, perhaps for a host of reasons. One of them likely is the way in which that would be viewed by the opposition, the media, and the wider public. That's not to say it might not be something that's usable and in some cases legitimately, but it's the sort of thing that would raise more questions than would be raised if it were not used.

The same is true for time allocation, although time allocation has obviously been used much more frequently than the notwithstanding clause. It's one of those things for which the current rules provide fully that the government can do them, but they open a situation in which there is a heightened level of conversation around them, and that's built into the procedure by which the discussion unfolds.

As members know, there is a period around the proposal of time allocation where ministers can be asked questions about why they're doing it, and yes, there's an opportunity for public debate and conversation around it. Does that mean the current system is perfect? No, I'm sure there is value in having a discussion here about ways in which that system could be changed, and perhaps we could seek a different kind of calibration between the legitimate competing interests. That calibration first of all should recognize that the system we have already has the push and pull of the institution there, but it also should recognize that improvements cannot be considered real improvements if they are just undertaken to advance the interests of one particular actor within the system.

The time allocation proposal in this discussion paper is essentially one in which the imposition of time allocation would be automatic. The government would decide that a certain number of days would be used. This is completely different from the normal process, in that the government would prescribe a specific number of days or weeks at the committee stage. I only really noticed this reference to the committee stage on my second or third time through this. The Standing Orders at present, as I understand them, provide for time allocation in the chamber, but they don't provide for the allocation of time for study of legislation in committee. Certainly they don't provide for the government House leader, the cabinet, to impose time allocation on a committee. This isn't even a committee itself, through its own deliberations, deciding to impose certain limits on itself in terms of amount of time that would be spent discussing particular items.

We're talking about a significant derogation from the principle that committees are supposed to be masters of their own domain, by introducing a provision that allows the government House leader to automatically, as a matter of course on every item of legislation, say that a committee will only have a day, a week, or a certain period of time to consider a piece of legislation. That is a revolutionary change. That is a significant deviation not only from the way we normally operate but also from the sort of foundational assumptions we have about what committees are supposed to be about.

Committees are supposed to be about providing opportunities for members of Parliament to become expert in particular issues, to study those issues, to drill down more deeply into those issues, and then to engage in a meaningful consideration of them, and yes, a consideration of them that may involve more time than we allow during House debates. Naturally, in controlling the flow of House debates, we have 338 members, and in committee we have nine members, excluding the chair, so obviously there's more allowance for discussion of substantive matters at committee and among people who have a real level of expertise. Even with respect to the time management issue, there is a point here that the committees would be more restricted in terms of the length of an intervention than many House speeches.

The discussion of the management of debate then proceeds to review the experience of programming, or this form of automatic time allocation, in the context of the British House of Commons. While I have a great deal of respect for the British House of Commons and for its operating procedures, of course it doesn't change the fact that there is a legitimate expectation here that the changes we make reflect the consent of the Canadian people and reflect the wide expression of voices of Canadian members of Parliament and of Canadian political perspective in the context of that discussion.

There are a few important differences between our system and the British system that would suggest how this automatic time allocation would operate differently. One is the number of members of Parliament. There are twice as many members in the British system, and this probably creates different time pressures than exist in our system, where there are half as many members. That's one aspect of the dynamic we can think about.

Also, it's interesting to reflect on the different processes of candidate selection undertaken in the British system versus our system and the implications of that for expectations of local representation. Obviously, Canada is geographically much larger than the United Kingdom, and expectations for regional representation to some extent vary, even across our country, but we generally select candidates through a process of local nomination elections. We can think of it in some ways as a hybrid between the American system of large-membership open primaries and the British system. Although certain political parties are experimenting with nomination or primary-style contests, the traditional approach to candidate selection in the U.K. has been somewhat different, and I'll mention that in a minute.

Our nominations, because they involve the process of local nomination elections, generally emphasize the ability of a candidate to fully engage with a particular community, to represent that community, to draw support from that community, and then to be elected from that community to speak on behalf of it in Parliament.

The denial of the opportunity for certain members to speak fundamentally limits the voice of that constituency, which has, through the process, generally speaking, although sometimes there are cases where leaders intervene in nomination processes, chosen a person who, because of the process they went through, is clearly there as someone from that constituency speaking on behalf of it.

The British tradition of candidate selection is slightly different. The typical form that candidates would follow in the British system is that a candidate would go through a process of application to get themselves into a larger candidate pool. They would apply through the party and would present an accounting of their skills. Then they would be added to—I can't remember exactly the names used by the different parties—a candidate selection pool. The process that is then followed is one of individual constituency associations seeking applications from people who are on this prospective candidate list based on what they think will be important for their constituency. The U.K. geographically is a much smaller country. It is common that a person may get on a general candidate list. Then they may make multiple applications to different constituencies, conduct interviews with different constituencies, and then be invited by a particular constituency to be the candidate for that party in that area. It is possible that the candidate would have grown up there or would have lived in that constituency. To me, in the context of our democracy, it seems that the U.K. does not attach the same importance that we do to having somebody come out of a particular geographic location.

If you compare, in general, our system with the British system, you see that our political culture is much more defined by our geography. We are a vast country in which it is harder for people to fully understand what is going on in a different part of the country, because it's so much farther away than it might be if Canada were a smaller country. Obviously there's also the issue of the two official languages that we have here in Canada, which further accentuates that geographic or regional dimension that informs our politics.

When we talk about how debates are managed in terms of the time for discussion in the context of the British system, we need to recognize those differences. In their system it may be much easier to say certain members who are there principally for their interests and particular topics can speak to those topics in a certain period of time, whereas for other members who may have less of a specific interest in that topic, there is less of a need. This report claims, and I haven't verified that claim one way or the other, that British MPs don't mind the systems that have been put in place. However, the structure of our system is one with that heightened geographic dimension in which the use of this programming, the use of closure in general, might prevent members of Parliament who have a particular need to bring forward a specific regional or geographic voice in Parliament from doing so. We, as 338 members of Parliament, representatives of 338 regions, should be able to have the opportunity to bring those voices forward.

Very often when the government brings in closure motions—and under the current rules we at least have an opportunity to debate and challenge the government on it, an opportunity that we may well not have in the context of the proposal for programming—the government will say, “Well, we've already had 30 members speak to this.” Of course, that's nowhere near the full number of members, and we wouldn't expect that every single member of Parliament would speak to a particular issue or bill, but when there is an effort to bring about an advanced closure of the conversation, that of course limits the opportunity to give voice on the basis of some of those regional perspectives. This is the kind of dynamic that we need to be aware of.

I would caution members and I would caution the government House leader on the suggestion that we should, in the absence of an amendment, move unilaterally in the direction of this motion as it engages the discussion paper. We cannot assume that the structures that exist in other places are applicable here, or at least fully applicable, given the range of ways in which our country is unique. We have institutions similar to those in some other countries, but certainly profound differences in political culture, and specifically for the purposes of the argument that I've made here, very substantial differences in the way our geography informs our politics.

Further to the discussion of time allocation or so-called programming, the discussion paper notes that other legislatures have different kinds of measures to plan the business of the House that are “similar in principle to programming”. I haven't had time, given the short notice with which this motion has been pushed forward, to study in detail the kinds of processes that exist in New Zealand or in the United States, but I'm skeptical of a claim such as “similar in principle to programming” because, let's be clear, that could mean almost anything.

I will just raise the issue here that the motion put forward by Mr. Simms doesn't at all give due time to do, for instance, a detailed study of the kinds of systems that exist in other places. I'm not usually the biggest apologist for committees going on extensive international travel, but this might be a case where actually getting a deeper appreciation of the way these mechanisms operate in practice would be worthwhile.

What there is instead is a timeline where it seems the expectation is that the committee would simply take the government House leader's word for it that the systems in these other countries are working in the way she has described. As much as there are differences, as I've outlined, between our system and the U.K. system, it would be worth having those conversations with British members of Parliament. That wouldn't have to involve travel. There would be, of course, other ways of engaging their perspective, such as inviting experts to appear via Skype and so forth, to actually get a sense of what people are saying there about the way their system works. This would be the benefit of an opportunity for a longer and more detailed study. It would give the opposition the opportunity, in the context of an expectation of ultimate unanimous decision-making, to ask questions that would probe in a deeper way the assumptions that are present in the discussion paper that we have from the government House leader.

This is, I think, one of the key reasons that the amendment is important, because at certain points, when the discussion paper isn't just arguing the government's perspective but is making statements of fact or implied statements of fact, such as “similar in principle to programming”, a good, fulsome study would give opposition members the opportunity to more deeply study and probe those claims, and the expectation that at the end of that probing they would be meaningfully engaged in decision-making. That's one of the other key arguments we can see coming out of this discussion paper, pointing us to recognizing the importance of passing the amendment that has been proposed.

Recognizing the discussion of the international context here, the discussion paper speaks of a made-in-Canada programming scheme. I mentioned before that this sounds a lot like a made in the Prime Minister's Office programming scheme. We have no problem talking about made-in-Canada changes to the Standing Orders in general terms that engage all voices here, and that's exactly what our amendment does.

In the final paragraph in the section on so-called programming, the second sentence states:

It could include a range of time for all stages for the consideration of a bill, which would be negotiated between House Leaders then would be subject to debate, amendment and a vote in the House.

Let's be clear about what already exists. We already have a process by which House leaders can and do negotiate the amount of time that will be spent on the discussion of particular legislation. We already have a process by which that can and does take place. It doesn't always work. At times the government House leader is intransigent, and certainly that's never the case with the opposition House leader. The government then proceeds with a motion for time allocation. There already is provision for there to be discussion and negotiation about the process that takes place.

If you read more deeply into it, I think the sentence is saying that there would be a process of negotiation—it doesn't say “agreement”—among House leaders. It just says that there is going to be a process of negotiation taking place.

Then it would be subject to debate, amendment, and a vote in the House, which effectively means that again if the government proceeds with this unilateral motion to make unilateral changes, in the absence of the amendment they will establish a reality in which they could effectively—a majority government at least, not a minority government—unilaterally put forward what I suppose would likely be a motion setting out the amount of time that certain bills would be discussed, and that would still be imposed via a vote in the House.

I guess on the one hand you might say, depending on what the intention is here, that if the government is proposing legislation and in each case there is going to be an individual programming motion that will have to be debated and voted on, then all we actually have is a commitment from the government to use closure on every bill. That's all that would amount to: having the debate and the vote, perhaps minus the existing provision for a period of questioning of the minister that I think is an important part of the current time allocation procedure.

It should be noted that we say “negotiate,” but it's still subject to a vote, and there's a question as well of what would constitute the threshold in the context of that debate. If you were going to have a debate and a vote, would it be a simple majority? You could imagine a system in which programming could be voted on, but you would have a higher threshold. You would have something like the threshold established in Standing Order 53 or in Standing Order 56.1, but that isn't specified here, and noting the government's general attitude toward this amendment, noting the broader tone of this debate, I suspect that we would not have them taking great interest in the increase of that threshold to allow that discussion to take place.

I will go on to this whole area of question period and how this amendment, this motion, would inform this vital institution, which I guess unfortunately we've just missed.

The section on question period begins: “Question Period is where the Government is held to account for its policies and for the conduct of Ministers.” I might have appreciated if they had added “and of the Prime Minister,” but the important point here is that this discussion paper does seem to acknowledge the purpose of question period is for holding the government accountable for the things they have done, the decisions they have made, and also more broadly, for their conduct. However, we still see a desire to weaken the accountability associated with that mechanism. Surely the government should acknowledge that if that kind of objective is going to be achieved, you need to have meaningful opposition engagement in the discussion around what constitutes the rules for that question period.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

Garnett, could you hold that thought?

As promised, we're suspended until 7:30 tonight in room N-112.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

I'll call this meeting to order. We were debating the motion by Mr. Scott Simms at the time we were previously debating. The time before that, Mr. Genuis was speaking, so we'll let him carry on.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. It seems we have achieved a consensus as to the pronunciation of my name. Hopefully that will be a harbinger of consensus to come.

I apologize for going back a minute. Mr. Graham started off this morning by referencing the attacks on our mother Parliament. At the time, I didn't make a comment on it, because I hadn't had a chance to get familiar with what was happening in the news.

It is quite striking, I think, that we're having this discussion about our parliamentary traditions with reverence and respect for our mother Parliament, recognizing the traditions that come to us from that Parliament, at the same as this terrible event has happened today. I want to express my solidarity, our solidarity, with those who are affected by those events, and certainly extend our best wishes to all those affected and their families.

I haven't had a chance to look at all the coverage, but there have been some remarkable stories of heroism coming out in terms of people, law enforcement, and even elected officials, who were stepping up to help in some way. In the midst of great tragedy, those stories are certainly an inspiration to us.

I wanted to briefly read into the record a Facebook post made by the former member of Parliament for the area I represent. At the time it was Edmonton—Sherwood Park. Before that it was the riding of Elk Island. Some of you, perhaps Mr. Reid and Mr. Simms and Mr. Bagnell, had a chance to serve with Ken Epp, who was, I think, an outstanding member of Parliament. He was someone who was always a great defender of our parliamentary traditions and someone who spoke in the House a lot. This was also the time before social media, so he didn't have the same opportunities I do to share his frequent interventions back home. He's an avid user of social media now, so he posted this, and I think it raises some important points about our discussion today. This is from Ken Epp:

Heads-up! The Liberals are pushing through procedural changes to (in their words) make Parliament more efficient. This is so transparent. You need to understand that the Prime Minister and the Ministers of the Crown (the Cabinet) form “Government.” Parliament is a separate thing—it's the place where the representatives of the people meet to discuss, debate, and vote on matters pertaining to their constituents—the people. In Canada, Government is made up mostly from Members of Parliament. (There is usually at least 1 unelected Senator in Government too.) Parliament is supposed to give direction to the Government, and the Government is there to implement the decisions of Parliament. But when you have a dictatorial government, then Parliament is an annoyance. So the Liberals are using their new plan to limit Parliament further. They want Parliament to meet only Monday to Thursday, 4 days per week instead of the present 5 days. Less debate, less questioning of the government, less accountability. Their words “greater efficiency” are simply a euphemism for “we want more freedom to do what we want and we don't want to go through the hoops of parliament.”

Consider how this impinges on the work of the Parliamentarian. It means more travel time and cost for each hour of debate. MP's from B.C., the North, and remote locations could spend up to 12 or even more hours on their travel to Ottawa, and then another 12 going back to their ridings. When I was an MP, I often thought of this. I was only 1/2 hour away from the airport, so home to hotel in Ottawa on Sunday was usually about 9 hours (via Calgary) and office to home on Friday was usually about 6 hours. There are others who would have to take connector flights or long drives. It is important for MP's to spend time in their ridings, to meet the people, to listen to their concerns, and to reflect those concerns in their speeches and votes. This new plan will mean that many MP's will not even get an opportunity to express their views on many Bills and Motions. There won't be time. Some MP's stay in Ottawa every other weekend, because their travel time is so long.... There already are “weeks out” when MP's can be back home for the full week. This is much more efficient because it reduces travel time and cost. These Liberals manage to get everything wrong.

Those are some words from an individual who isn't just someone speculating about the process. It is from someone who was a member of Parliament. Maybe Mr. Reid can help me with the exact length of time, but for about 18 to 20 years, Mr. Epp served in this place and was indeed a great parliamentarian.

I think he makes the point very well, and he provokes an area of conversation that we need to explore in the context of this whole debate, the question of efficiency.

As we go through the discussion paper that the government House leader has given us, there is a big emphasis on efficiency. It's interesting that in debates about the forms of governance, there has always been this allure of the concept of efficiency from those who see efficiency as the primary goal and that it is reasonable from that perspective to limit scrutiny, debate, discussion, accountability, the representative functions of Parliament, or whatever the case may be, in the name of efficiency.

There are those who look at dictatorial systems and think they are very efficient and perhaps envy that efficiency. I think this is a dangerous tendency. It's a dangerous tendency to look at dictatorial regimes or perhaps possible changes to our democratic system and say, “Yes, but they're so efficient.” When the Prime Minister made his now-infamous comment about China's basic dictatorship, I don't think it was just a joke. On the other hand, I don't think he was really saying he wanted to make Canada into a dictatorship, but he was expressing what seemed to be a genuine sentiment, which has been a genuine sentiment of various people who desire to claim or to draw from the supposed efficiency of more authoritarian systems. When you come to the conclusion that these kinds of systems are more efficient, you are vulnerable to move in a direction that involves the adoption of attributes of those systems.

The motion that we have in front of us without the amendment emphasizes an approach that I think conforms to that particular view of efficiency, in that it invites the committee to undertake, in response to a very stressed timeline, a study in which at the end of the day it would be up to one party to decide the way forward and it would then be up to the government in the House, which holds the majority, to further ram through those rules without requiring the consent of other parties.

To proceed in that way, without the amendment, conforms to a certain view of efficiency that says we have to put all these considerations aside with respect to accountability and with respect to the patterns and the way things have been done in the past. It speaks to that revolutionary tendency that I spoke of last night, when you have leadership that says, “Let's tear up what we've done in the past and come up with something new that we think fits.” In particular, it is a revolutionary tendency that's rooted in an attraction to the idea of efficiency as being an ultimate goal.

I was reading different things and watching some videos in between times, when I probably should have been napping, to stimulate my thoughts about this whole question of reform, specifically on efficiency. There was a good quote from a talk that our colleague from Wellington—Halton Hills, Michael Chong, gave at the Manning Centre a number of years ago about the issue of centralization and particularly the question of efficiency in government. He said centralized systems are efficient, but they lead to bad outcomes.

I think an enlightened notion of efficiency shouldn't just be about moving as quickly as possible, but it should take on board this sense of advancing as quickly as possible toward a desirable goal, because if we are moving quickly, advancing quickly, but we are not actually moving in the direction of a desirable goal, then we're not any further ahead. To put it that way, I think, should make the point rather obvious: we should not speak of efficiency as if it were a good, independent of a clear identification of the goals we are trying to achieve. Centralized systems allow governments to move faster, but by limiting the number of voices that are included in the conversation, they actually lead to bad outcomes, and the process of identifying the failure of those outcomes and undoing those mistakes makes the overall system much, much less efficient, so in the end we should not at all be critical of the fundamental ground on which our institutions stand.

Democratic systems, systems that enhance the power of the people and the decision-making process, may not facially have the same degree of efficiency as alternative kinds of systems, but they do achieve better outcomes, and certainly they reflect the values and the priorities of the people who sent us here. This question of efficiency is another strand that informs the broader debate between, on the one hand, the unamended motion and, on the other hand, the amendment we're proposing. Getting unanimity, getting the buy-in of all parties, is going to take perhaps a little more time. Perhaps the June 2 deadline, which seems to be fairly arbitrary, is not really going to gel very well with the need for unanimity, but I don't see the logic of imposing that timeline anyway. I think we need to first make sure we're moving in the right direction, and then move efficiently there and do so with the co-operation of all parties.

Since we're talking about British politicians and traditions, here is a quote from Winston Churchill. He has a number of insightful quotes about democracy. One of them was to say that democracy is the worst form of government except for all the other ones that have been tried. He also said it is not enough to say you have done your best; you must first know what to do, and then do your best. This is why we say it is important to have a large number of voices to have a meaningful process of accountability.

Members may be familiar with a Canadian history publication called The Dorchester Review. I'm going to read a fairly short article from it called “A 'Basic Dictatorship' Problem”, which discusses this very question in a way that very directly informs on a discussion of the amendment. How efficient are more authoritarian systems versus more genuinely democratic systems?

The Prime Minister of Canada has a “Basic Dictatorship” Problem. To borrow his infamous phrasing from 2013, Mr. Trudeau has expressed a disturbing and obsequious admiration for both China’s “basic dictatorship” and now for Cuba and its “longest-serving president,” Fidel Castro, who died on November 26.

In November 2013, Trudeau attended a fundraiser that the Liberal Party described as a “ladies’ night” involving “cocktails, candid conversation, and curiosity-inducing ideas.”

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

I was there.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

The article goes on:

Before these fawning supporters the moderator asked Trudeau: “Which nation, besides Canada, which nation’s administration do you most admire?” And he replied:

There’s a level of admiration I actually have for China. Their basic dictatorship is actually allowing them to turn their economy around on a dime, and say, ‘we need to go greenest fastest,’ y’know, ‘we need to start investing in solar.’ There is a flexibility that I know Stephen Harper must dream about, of having a dictatorship that he can do everything he wanted, uh, that I find quite interesting.

Parenthetically, we see this canard of Stephen Harper the dictator, which is a total canard in light of the fact that it's not Stephen Harper, but the now Prime Minister who is expressing this admiration.

The article continues:

Trudeau thus unequivocally expressed his “admiration” for a “basic dictatorship” that has since 1949 committed various atrocities, including — like all Communist regimes — mass murder of political opponents and forced famines that starved to death millions of peasants in Mao’s Great Leap Forward. Perhaps Trudeau means that he admires China’s “basic dictatorship” only since the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. In that case, Human Rights Watch describes what China truly is today:

Ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for more than six decades, China remains an authoritarian state, one that systematically curtails a wide range of fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, and religion.

Trudeau talks of China's command-and-control economy's turn toward sustainable energy sources. But then, oddly, he ends his comment with a rhetorical flourish on how Stephen Harper, when he was prime minister, must have fantasized about wielding the immense power of the Chinese president, thereby deflecting some attention and responsibility away from his own self-described “admiration” for dictatorship. Indeed, Harper was such a dictator that the Liberals defeated the Conservatives in a free and fair election which saw Harper's resignation and an orderly transition of power on Nov. 4, 2015.

Trudeau later offered this mendacious reinterpretation of his earlier remarks at a subsequent press conference:

The point I made was that despite all of our freedoms and our extraordinary system of government and democracy, we are up against countries that play by different rules that we would never accept, but that find themselves, uh, able to address big issues quickly and completely.

My comment would be that we see again here the re-emphasis of the efficiency narrative, this idea that less consultation, less engagement, less requirement for involving other perspectives, even if there's a recognition that there are some problems with this approach, has the alleged virtue of efficiency.

The author continues:

But of course that was not the point that Trudeau was making. Instead, he clearly expressed personal “admiration” for a “basic dictatorship” and implied that authoritarian regimes are superior to liberal democracies, at least on the issue of sustainable energy.

The Prime Minister's Nov. 26 press release on the death of Castro is worth quoting in full for the record:

The Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, today issued the following statement on the death of former Cuban President Fidel Castro:

It is with deep sorrow that I learned today of the death of Cuba’s longest serving President.

Fidel Castro was a larger than life leader who served his people for almost half a century. A legendary revolutionary and orator, Mr. Castro made significant improvements to the education and healthcare of his island nation.

While a controversial figure, both Mr. Castro’s supporters and detractors recognized his tremendous dedication and love for the Cuban people who had a deep and lasting affection for 'el Comandante.'

I know my father was very proud to call him a friend and I had the opportunity to meet Fidel when my father passed away. It was also a real honour to meet his three sons and his brother President Raúl Castro during my recent visit to Cuba.

On behalf of all Canadians, Sophie and I offer our deepest condolences to the family, friends and many, many supporters of Mr. Castro. We join the people of Cuba today in mourning the loss of this remarkable leader.

Trudeau has eulogized the dictator in euphemism as a “legendary revolutionary and orator” instead of confronting Castro’s brutal legacy: like all Communists dictators, he imposed his utopia by wading through a sea of blood, jailing and murdering political opponents, and then maintained his dictatorship through authoritarian repression.

The Prime Minister glosses over Communist dictatorship and, in a statement that sounds like a joke, Trudeau deigns to acknowledge Castro as a “controversial figure” — as if his record were merely a matter of polite disagreement.

Trudeau even throws in a welfare nationalist line about healthcare and education. Perhaps, we should add, the Castros provided a certain standard of education and healthcare to all those Cubans whom they hadn’t already murdered, detained, or exiled. If Cubans expressed a “deep and lasting affection for ‘el Comandante' ” they had no choice in the matter. Overall, Trudeau clearly fell for the Potemkin Village routine that all dictators put on for visiting foreign dignitaries.

In 1999, Human Rights Watch noted:

The Cuban Criminal Code lies at the core of Cuba’s repressive machinery, unabashedly prohibiting nonviolent dissent. With the Criminal Code in hand, Cuban officials have broad authority to repress peaceful government opponents at home. Cuban law tightly restricts the freedoms of speech, association, assembly, press, and movement. In an extraordinary June 1998 statement, Cuban Justice Minister Roberto Díaz Sotolongo justified Cuba’s restrictions on dissent by explaining that, as Spain had instituted laws to protect the monarch from criticism, Cuba was justified in protecting Fidel Castro from criticism, since he served a similar function as Cuba’s 'king'.

There is no due process, habeus corpus, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, free markets, political parties, and certainly no free and fair elections. In short, Cuba’s basic dictatorship outlaws and criminalizes all that which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms upholds and guarantees for Canadians.

Next comes the really important point on political romanticism:

Trudeau demonstrates a disturbing naiveté about the nature of dictatorships, falling for the Potemkin Village and the mythology of dictatorship as an efficient form of government.

In reality, dictatorships are inefficient. Indian economist Amartya Sen has shown that dictators cause famines, which shows that they cannot or do not distribute resources efficiently and justly — which should be obvious to any 20th century observer. We need look no further than Stalin’s Holodomor in Ukraine or Mao’s Great Leap Forward.

Good government fundamentally depends upon a strong link between taxation, representation, and expenditure, which bind together the accountability and responsibility of the government and the consent of the governed. We know what happens when that relationship breaks down: many petro-States are authoritarian precisely because the government can rely on royalties from natural resources for revenue rather than having to rely on taxation of the people. Consent and accountability break down when people have no stake in the government.

Classical liberals in the 19th century well understood this principle, especially Lord Durham. In his famous report on the Canadas, which provided the blueprint for liberty and self-government in the British Empire in the 19th century, he maintained that the Royal Recommendation (the requirement that Ministers of the Crown sanction and take responsibility for all money bills) coupled with the principle that all money bills must be introduced by the people’s elected representatives in the assembly was a necessary condition for Responsible Government. Durham even referred to this principle as a “the real protection of the people.”

We're talking specifically about the period when we saw the origin of responsible government in our country, something that I will argue is specifically threatened by the unamended motion.

The article goes on:

Regrettably, Mr. Trudeau has consistently shown that he either does not understand or is confused about the difference between the executive and the legislature. He presumes to speak “on behalf of all Canadians,” as he did in that press release about Fidel Castro’s death, and he has taken to asserting that “Canada is back” — the implication being that only the Liberals can legitimately represent Canada. This implies that other parties are unpatriotic and do not represent the millions of Canadians who voted for them. This is ironic and contradictory given that Trudeau has also described Canada as a “post-national” state, which may make patriotism itself a thing of the past.

Let's do a quick civics review. In our parliamentary system, the Prime Minister and Cabinet represent Canada as a State and as an international legal person (as in le pays), and they govern in a way that should promote Canada's national interest. But the Prime Minister and Cabinet cannot “represent all Canadians” in the sense of “reflecting their values in government.” It is the Sovereign and Governor General who represent Canada in the sense of la patrie.

Only the House of Commons “represents all Canadians” as a political nation because we elect Members of Parliament. Within the House of Commons, the loyal opposition represents “the political minority” and makes the representation of political dissent integral to Westminster parliamentarism, and the government's legitimacy depends on commanding the confidence of a majority of MPs within the chamber. Therefore, no Prime Minister could ever claim to “represent all Canadians” unless his party won all 338 seats in the House of Commons in what would then be a one-party State — rather like the Communist countries that Justin Trudeau claims to admire so much. As Ajzenstat states, “the supreme benefit of parliamentary government is that it protects political opposition, the right to dissent.”

At the party event in 2013 where Trudeau expressed admiration for Chinese dictatorship, he also praised the “consensus government” that pertains in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut.

But if I were to reach out and say which kind of administration I most admire, I think there's something to be said right here in Canada for the way our territories are run. Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and the Yukon are done without political parties around consensus.”

I would just say parenthetically that I don't actually think that's correct with respect to Yukon. My understanding is that there's a consensus system in Nunavut and Northwest Territories, but not one in Yukon. I guess our chair might know better than me on that point, but this is the direct quote that I'm reading from the Prime Minister, so I'll continue to read it:

And are much more like a municipal government. And I think there's a lot to be said for people pulling together to try and solve issues rather than to score points off of each other. And I think we need a little more of that.”

We're in the middle of the municipal election season in my province, and that might be a little bit of an idealistic view of how things operate at the municipal level.

However, to carry on:

Trudeau is essentially right in his description—

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, ON]

Mr. Chair, I've lost track. Was the comment about the partisan arrangements in the three territories and in municipal politics a quote from the author of the article or from the Prime Minister?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Yes, so this much—

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Coast of Bays—Central—Notre Dame, NL]

If I can add to that, how does that pertain to the amendment?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I'm establishing one of my fundamental concerns about the motion in the absence of the amendment, which is that it reflects this unhealthy prioritization of efficiency over accountability. This, I think, emanates from an admiration of supposed efficiencies that exist in other systems, which I think this article well establishes do not exist. I think this article highlights the problems of that romanticism. I think that does inform our political conversations that happen here and I think we need to be aware of that as a committee.

For Mr. Reid's benefit, the quote was:

But if I were to reach out and say which kind of administration I most admire, I think there’s something to be said right here in Canada for the way our territories are run. Nunavut, Northwest Territories, and the Yukon are done without political parties around consensus. And are much more like a municipal government. And I think there’s a lot to be said for people pulling together to try and solve issues rather than to score points off of each other. And I think we need a little more of that.

That's the end of the quote, but I'm going to continue reading from the article itself. We're approaching the end, not of my remarks, but of this article.

Trudeau is essentially right in his description of how consensus government works.

Oh, here we go:

But he is wrong about the Yukon, which in fact has had standard responsible government with competing political parties since 1978. Only the Northwest Territories and Nunavut have consensus government.

While this comment received less attention, this remark and his praise for China are not as tangential as they might first appear. The only difference between consensus government and an authoritarian regime is whether the threat of force and coercion are necessary to mandating, manufacturing, and maintaining that consensus. In small communities, a genuine consensus can emerge legitimately and peacefully. But this is impossible in a large State.

What appears to animate Justin Trudeau’s political thought therefore, is, above all, something akin to Counter-Enlightenment Romanticism. It seems to be a “philosophy of community” where “all strive to be virtuous according to the same definition of virtue.” In its mild and benign form, political Romanticism manifests itself as a kind of “civic republicanism,”

—and I know David will be interested in this because of his interest in virtue ethics—

which derives more from the Ancients like Aristotle and his views on a “virtuous and participatory citizenry” than the Moderns. In its worse forms, Romanticism derives from Counter-Enlightenment philosophy from Rousseau onward, with infusions from Hegel and Marx.

Romantics see the absence of consensus as an existential threat to the general will and the public interest. Therefore, anyone who disrupts that consensus prevents the political nation from realizing the general will and becomes an impediment that must be removed. Romantics also view history as teleological and thus as a force inexorably moving in one direction toward a clear endpoint.

Trudeau expresses his teleological “sunny ways” romanticism in his blithe phrase, which has since become a meme, “Because it’s [insert current year].” In other words, anyone who attempts to disrupt, slow down, or alter the course of history must simply step out of the way of progress. Trudeau’s “post-nationalism” best corresponds to what political scientists would call “post-materialist politics,” which concerns itself with “opening opportunities for political demands” — particularly of historically marginalized groups — and participation rather than the distribution of scarce resources. In short, as Ajzenstat puts it, “romantics shrink from the adversarial politics of the parliamentary system.” Trudeau laments the “politics of division,” enveloping himself in what Weber would call “monarchical authority” in his official biography, as the living embodiment of Canadian unity:

His passion for public service and vision for Canada are shaped by his experiences and influences — his father, Pierre, and mother, Margaret; the Trudeau and Sinclair families; his roots in the East and West, French and English.

Note that “The Trudeau and Sinclair families; his roots in the East and West, French and English” evokes the Tudors, with their rose both red and white, with roots in the Houses of Lancaster and York, both North and South.

However as Christopher Hitchens observed, “politics is division by definition,” because in a liberal-democratic society, we are free to express disagreement and because our parliamentary system itself legitimates opposition and adversarialism in order to maintain the accountability of the government. Politics is by nature divisive. Without the disagreement and dissent that comes from persons who sincerely hold opposing views and beliefs, politics would cease to exist.

It might seem strange to members who know my political philosophy well that I would read from an article that praises Hitchens and criticizes Aristotle.

I don't agree with everything in this article, especially some of the implied latter critique of virtue ethics. I think that, broadly speaking, an Aristotelian virtue ethics lens is compatible with a belief in the importance of political diversity and dissent. I think the compatibility of an Aristotelian account of virtue ethics and modernity is well established in John Stuart Mill's work. I could talk more about that, but that might go beyond the scope of the amendment.

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Banff—Airdrie, AB]

Don't encourage him.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Maybe with unanimous consent, we can go further afield than I normally would.

I think the fundamental point of this article is a really fascinating one: the reality that dictatorship should not be in any way romanticized, first because of the basic violations of human rights and dignity that it entails, and second because it really is not efficient.

Even if we could have benign dictatorship in the absence of human rights violations, I think all the evidence suggests that it would still make bigger mistakes and be less efficient in the long run than democratic societies would. Even if they move slower, democratic societies, by including more voices, are more likely to be moving in the first instance in the right direction. They are more likely to be heading where they intend to head.

What we are debating today is not something that will end the formal process of democracy or democratic elections, but we are very seriously contending with questions of the strength of our system of responsible government and the kind of relationship that exists between the executive and the legislature, with how they understand their roles relative to each other.

This article lays out that it is Parliament, not the government or the Prime Minister, that speaks on behalf of Canadians at the end of the day.

Our approach to proceeding with prospective review and changes of the Standing Orders might appear to members to be less efficient if you take up this romanticized idea of centralized power as the road to efficiency. You might be critical of this amendment on the basis that it seems to be inefficient because it requires engagement with more people. It requires consultation. It requires more voices to be heard in the process of determining how to move forward, but what we have put forward is right. It respects our values and our traditions, but it conforms to a more realistic and, in a sense, a deeper understanding of what constitutes efficiency, because again, as Churchill said, it is first knowing what we ought to do and then proceeding in that direction.

As I was growing up, in my own personal history of political development I recall that one of the most important political movements that I initially focused on was the Reform Party tradition. The tradition of reform coming out of western Canada highlighted all these issues about the need to counterbalance the increasing power and control of the executive and strengthening the role of the legislature.

At the same time, it reflected the genuine will of the people, which was for greater efficiency of the public service, which was for the improved effectiveness of government, which was balanced budgets. It was a tradition that was both realistic and interested in efficiency and effectiveness of government, but it was also bold in its call for this evolutionary move to enhance accountability and to enhance the role of members of Parliament.

I think we really need to revisit that tradition. It was not just about the role of the opposition. It was about the way our government works with respect to all parliamentarians and with respect to the relationship between parliamentarians and the executive. It was a tradition that said there is a role, yes, for the executive, but it is the members of Parliament who speak on behalf of the people who elected them; and there is a need for, on key changes, a more substantial level of consensus when those kinds of changes are made.

That was the tradition put forward. I do think that there are changes that we need to talk about as a committee, and we need to do it in a way that is informed by the amendment that says we will move forward together and that the process won't be controlled by one party. There are changes we do need to talk about that live out this tradition.

It's interesting to me that this was a tradition that came out of what was, in many senses, although perhaps not in every sense, the Conservative Party, the Reform Party, but this rhetoric has been adopted by the Liberal Party since the time of Paul Martin. Paul Martin spoke about the need to address a democratic deficit, and the Liberals, in their last election commitment, talked about reforms, but certainly they did not talk about dramatically changing the rules of Parliament and the process by which consent would normally achieve that.

We are seeing this increase in public expectation for engagement, but at the same time there have been actions of this government that go fundamentally against public expectations, and indeed, I think, deviate quite significantly from the commitment that this government has made in the past.

Members only need to reflect on what happened today. Many of us missed question period because the work of this committee was going through at that time. We had the Leader of the Opposition and the leader of the NDP each building off the legitimate points that the other was making.

With respect to what happened in question period and the impact this had and the discussion around the amendment, first the Leader of the Opposition asked the Prime Minister what he would have said if Stephen Harper had done this. I think this is a very good question, because Stephen Harper advanced policies that reflected a Conservative perspective, but he did so with respect for and within the rules of the system that were established and well accepted. He did what we would expect a Prime Minister to do, which was, within the context of the rules, seek to advance policies that are reflective of his priorities and the priorities of his government. That is what happened under Stephen Harper.

However, now we have Justin Trudeau, who was supposed to represent real change, and yes, it's real change, but it's not in the direction that I think folks expected.

That is, it is going in the other direction with respect to what's happening in committee. He was asked, what would you do, if Stephen Harper had done these same things? He made some comments about heckling in the House of Commons, but he never answered the question at all.

Thomas Mulcair posed the same question. Again, we had some references to children who were in the gallery, and those are the children for whom we are trying to preserve the integrity of our democratic institutions. He made some references to this, but did not answer what I think was a very legitimate and important question.

Then we had something else happen today. I think all members here were witness to it, because it was right after a vote. It was in the context of a suspension that had then taken place in the work of this committee, concerning which repeated issues of privilege had come up in the House of Commons about breaking of the rules—in one case by a government member.

There was also what appears to be a case of government members receiving the budget when they shouldn't have, in advance of its being read in the House. There were issues of members being prevented from voting, for reasons I didn't fully understand, but for something involving the Prime Minister's vehicles. I don't know who was responsible for that, and there's a need for a thorough review, of course, of all of these questions. I know the Speaker will be coming back to the House on those questions.

What happened today should, in the context of what's happening here, give us all some real pause, because members have important responsibilities and members were limited in their ability to undertake their responsibilities, just as this discussion paper proposes to do and just as the mechanism by which it is proposed that we would discuss this discussion paper, absent the amendment, would have us do.

We have, then, the very important issue of the integrity of our parliamentary institutions at stake here, but there are also other issues that are part of the discussion. We have issues of—

[An hon. member]

I have a point of order.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Chair, maybe you could ask for a little quiet.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Coast of Bays—Central—Notre Dame, NL]

Yes. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

Let us have a little bit more respect for the speaker, please. It's getting a little loud in here.

Thank you.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you. A hush fell over the crowd.

I know that Mr. Chan is paying attention deeply and I appreciate that, as I'm sure are other members. I didn't mean to suggest he was the only one. Nonetheless, now I seem to have touched off further conversation.

In any event, I know this is an active place for deliberation and I do welcome that. However, as members deliberate in different ways at and behind the table, I think they should be reflecting on the importance of the deliberative and decision-making role of our Parliament and the way in which we need to ensure that we protect that substructure of our democracy, that we don't allow the kinds of things that have happened today to become a pattern in terms of the way we deal with each other.

I think the form of events that unfolded today really illustrate a point that is central to our discussion of this amendment, which is the way in which well-functioning parliamentary institutions inevitably require the consent of more than just one side of the discussion in order for them to work properly.

If we in the opposition are so frustrated—as I think we are, and legitimately so—by the lack of respect we are receiving from the executive, we will seek every opportunity we have to strongly present our objections and concerns. Of course, that takes a variety of forms. We had the raising of different kinds of motions and the lack of use of the normal notification processes. There are many things that we accept as being important for Parliament to function well that involve the collaboration of parties.

Reflective of the mood established by the government's position on this amendment, I think we saw some of the outworking of that frustration, including, on the one hand, a further disrespect on a number of fronts shown by the government to the opposition; and on the other hand, the opposition rightly needing to raise a number of points of order and questions of privilege to respond to those concerns.

I think ultimately we want to be spending as much of our time as possible, if not all of our time, debating the business of the nation, not discussing procedural issues. Of course, this is a committee whose function it is to discuss procedure, but outside the context of the committee, especially in the chamber itself, we would want to be at a point where we're spending as much of our time as possible discussing those substantive aspects of the situation that inform the realities that are part of the lives of Canadians who don't spend a lot of time in this place. However, we need to take a stand when those aspects of procedure undermine the natural co-operation and expectation of consensus that exists between parties. When that is undermined, that has a negative effect on the way in which our traditions can operate.

I think the other issue is that if we are going to explore this study, it has to be within the framework of the amendment, because that requires us then to do the sorts of things that will engage a broader number of members and therefore provoke discussion of the kinds of questions that might not be in the interests of the front bench of any party, but might actually reflect the better functioning of the House.

One of the reforms to the way our democracy works that merits serious consideration and study is the question of whether party names are on the ballot. Removing party names from the ballot would be one very simple reform that would increase the chances that voters are paying particular attention to the name of the individual. Of course, it wouldn't prevent people from affiliating with parties and from voting on the basis of the party, but it would give somebody who does not have a party affiliation a greater ability to run. It would create an opportunity for someone who may identify with a philosophy of a party but was prevented from getting the blessing of the party. It would make it easier for that person to present themselves successfully in an election if you didn't have the name of a party on the ballot.

That, of course, is the kind of change that I think may have some potential problems, but I think it's certainly worthy of further study. It's the kind of change that you're unlikely to see proposed by the leadership of any party, or a whip or a House leader get behind. The reason is fairly simple. If members of Parliament have a greater sense of independence, if there isn't the issue of the party name beside their name on the ballot anyway, then perhaps that's a reason or an opportunity for members of Parliament to exercise a little more independence or leverage in the context of the discussions that are taking place in the House.

Recognizing that, it's unlikely that that kind of reform would come through in a very partisan approach to discussions of changes to the Standing Orders.

If we don't have this amendment in place, then inevitably the discussion becomes partisan, because you have different parties trying to seek majorities. But if you introduce the requirement for unanimity, you remove the option of the government's acting in this respect unilaterally. You increase the chances that members will think about changes to the Standing Orders that may go in a different direction from the proposals of the government House leader, but may reflect, in particular, their priorities as members and may seek to address that balance in a positive way, between the executive and the legislative functions of our government.

I note parenthetically that the article that I read from The Dorchester Review spoke specifically of the Prime Minister's admiration for consensus governance.

I don't think it would be practical or desirable to move to a non-partisan, consensus-style government for the whole of Parliament. I think that would be impractical and unrealistic. I think it would also forestall the exposure of legitimate debates that people need to see clear sides of. I think we need to have a government and an opposition in our discussion of the issues that come before us.

But I think committees, as smaller communities of people who work together in a more direct, more personal way, can benefit from at least a consideration of that model of more consensus. We can operate as committees in a way that, as much as possible, takes a step back from our partisan identity and emphasizes our identity as members and asks, as 10 people around a table, what we want to do with the issue that's in front of us to make the country better.

When you require unanimity to move forward, I think you end up with a system in which you have strengthened that possibility, that role for consensus, when you have something like the amendment we have to put in place. But its absence creates a condition in which we all fall in line. If there is that consensus system, I think, in the context of that study, good ideas will bubble to the top that wouldn't otherwise. You'll have members within the same party who may disagree with each other, and there will be discussions that will be particularly productive. Maybe that will be, in some senses, less efficient and will take time, but it will be quite worthwhile.

In the discussions of the Standing Orders that have taken place so far, I think we started off on a reasonably good foot when we had debate on this issue take place in the House of Commons. We had different points of view expressed by people from different parties, and we had members of the same party presenting alternative points of view. I'm probably not going to be able to find the exact quote, but I think there was a reference made by some members of the government—not just the government caucus, but the government—that maybe the procedure and House affairs committee could together come up with a set of proposals. I think that would be a really productive and interesting way to proceed.

Putting aside this discussion paper, we could establish an agreement about moving forward with agreement, with unanimity, and have the committee as a whole then work through it, discuss it, hear experts and ask how we could change the Standing Orders, with the expectation at the end of it that you could build a unanimous report coming out of the committee that would say, “These are some changes to the Standing Orders that we agree are needed.” At that point, we'd have an opportunity to make some really good changes.

Going through the discussion that happened earlier on Standing Orders, I note that even if there's been an effort to control it by this discussion paper and the way in which the government has proceeded, we already have some really interesting and innovative suggestions from members of the government caucus that don't seem to accord exactly with what the government is proposing in the discussion paper and that are still certainly very much worth considering.

I note that a Hill Times article covered the discussion in mentioning the interventions of Ms. Anita Vandenbeld, who not only is a member of Parliament but has also worked as a political staffer in the past. I didn't know that. She suggested changes—I'm quoting from the article—including “having government bills go to committee after first reading instead of second reading to let them be reviewed before the government becomes too invested in seeing it pass”.

I don't really agree with that, but I think it's an interesting idea. I think it probably makes sense for the House to pronounce on the principle of the bill before it is studied in committee. Although there are provisions now for the committee to do some prestudy of legislation, and there are certain cases where that may make sense, it is not normally automatic. I don't think I agree with Ms. Vandenbeld that it should be, but it's still an interesting idea.

As well, says the article, “She also suggested handing over powers currently held by the government House leadership team to the Speaker on things like the use of time allocation.” That's an interesting idea, isn't it, to have the Speaker—

[Blake Richards, Conservative, Banff—Airdrie, AB]

On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I'm sorry to interrupt my friend while he gives a very eloquent and informative speech. I'm learning quite a bit from him this evening. There have been some really informative articles that he's read from, for example, and there are some great theories he's providing to this committee that I think are all very helpful and hopefully will be very helpful to the members who are listening, in order for them to determine how they would vote appropriately on this amendment to the motion.

The unfortunate part is that many members are not really listening as he is speaking. There's a lot of chatter and noise going on, and even I am finding it hard to concentrate and listen, so I wonder if you might remind people, Mr. Chair, that it would be best to take advantage of the opportunity that's being provided to them to learn and to gather from other members opinions and insight that might be helpful to them in forming their opinions about this amendment and this motion.

The best way to do so, of course, Mr. Chair, would be to ensure they are engaged and attentive to the person who's speaking and to not be engaged in activities that would interrupt or interfere with that member's opportunity to do the same.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Coast of Bays—Central—Notre Dame, NL]

I concur with the vice-chair.