If she believed in answering questions, that's something she could implement herself unilaterally, and we wouldn't mind in that particular case. The issue is that, again, we see this discussion paper focusing on issues that are, in some cases, not even best adjudicated in the context of the Standing Orders. Certainly, however, these are questions that we would expect to be raised by somebody who is focused on the interests of the government in the context of that discussion, in the context of that interaction.
I think this is the reality coming out of our experience with two “Prime Minister's question times” that have unfolded before our eyes. Actually, the fact that this has happened clearly makes the opposition's point—namely, that the Prime Minister can do this without changes to the Standing Orders. According to our conventions, the Standing Orders don't police who does and does not answer questions in general. Clearly, the principal concern of opposition members is the quality of the responses.
If I were asking a question, a substantive policy question, and the Prime Minister was simply going to throw out the kinds of non-answers we got today, I would probably say I'd rather hear from the parliamentary secretary on that issue, assuming the parliamentary secretary knows the file and can answer the question. The Prime Minister should know these files and should be able to answer these questions.
There was a justice issue, and I believe it had to do with Wynn's law, although I could be wrong. There was a justice issue that the Prime Minister was asked about in a town hall. He basically said he didn't know the position himself, but he trusted the justice minister. Well, what's the point of having Prime Minister's question times if the Prime Minister is going to say that? He hasn't said it in the House, but he said it in a town hall. He said he didn't really know why he took that position, but he trusted his minister in the matter. It's all well and good for the Prime Minister to trust his ministers, but he should be able to give a reasonable public account of the positions that his government has taken on issues, especially if they're positions that have, presumably, gone through some kind of a cabinet discussion process. Yet this was a very important issue that was sloughed off on the basis of his trust in his minister
We have to be legitimately concerned about the quality of responses. My perception so far, not that I was overly enamoured by the quality of responses we were receiving initially, is that the quality of responses we received in these Prime Minister's question times were actually much lower. It's much more narrowed to a small set of talking points. We have the flagrant refusal to answer questions, for example, in the case of the ethics issues raised.
I'm not naive enough to think that these are problems we could solve through the Standing Orders. We cannot fully prescribe in the Standing Orders the degree of substantiveness we would like to see from ministers in responses to questions. Ultimately, it's up to the people of Canada to consider and evaluate the quality of the responses given by the government and to take that information into consideration when they decide whom to support in the next election.
If we're talking about changes to the Standing Orders, the kinds of changes, the direction of changes we're talking about, is striking. That brings me back to the point I was making before Mr. MacGregor jumped in, and that is this issue of modernization. What does “modernization” mean? If it means fewer answers, then I'm against it. If it means more power to the government and less power, or no power, for the opposition to hold them accountable, I'm against it. If modernization means the opposition doesn't have the ability to be involved in decisions about changes to the Standing Orders, then I'm against modernization.
I'm for modernization, however, if it means passing this amendment and having a constructive conversation, a conversation based on established ground rules, a conversation among members of Parliament to come to a conclusion we can all get behind, a conclusion that moves the Standing Orders in ways we all agree on. I guess I'm using some of that progressivist language with a view to moving this forward, but I'm doing so in the interest of making improvements to the Standing Orders.
That's the kind of modernization that I'm in favour of, modernization that empowers individual members of Parliament, modernization that gives us a greater ability to bring forward private members' bills and see them debated and voted on. Right now it's a relatively small number of members of Parliament, even in a four-year Parliament, who actually have a chance to bring a private member's bill to a vote. If we're talking about changes that make it possible for more members of Parliament to do that, then that is the kind of modernization that I'm in favour of. But I don't think anybody here on either side of these questions could say, just based on the word, if they are for or against modernization.
As we try to come to constructive conclusions here, we should rightly be suspicious of the kind of wording that's used if it doesn't actually mean anything. We should use words that are clearly defined that mean something in the context of our discourse. That is a pretty fundamental thing for us to ask for when we're hearing proposals from the government House leader.
One other thing that I don't think has been discussed thus far by anyone at this committee is the relationship between Standing Orders' changes in the House of Commons. and the way in which those are done, and the Senate, and the relative power and influence of the House of Commons and the Senate. It is interesting in the present time we're seeing proposals for very dramatic changes to the way the House of Commons works and to the way the Senate works, both in the name of modernization. What's striking to me, though, is how those changes actually move in opposite directions.
I don't know that anybody has dug into this or commented on this, but it was something that was obvious to me right away as a member of Parliament because I was very involved in the debates around Bill C-14, the government's euthanasia legislation. Right from the start, that process involved both the House of Commons and the Senate; and given the government's desire to move this forward quite quickly, the work with the Senate was quite important. A joint committee of the House and the Senate did an initial study on the question of euthanasia and reported back to both Houses in a report. There was a dissenting report. Then following on that there was legislation brought forward.
The process was that legislation was brought forward in the House of Commons. It was debated. Eventually the government invoked time allocation. Then there was a vote on time allocation, a vote on the motion. It went to committee. There was a whole host of amendments proposed at committee. I proposed 13 amendments, three of which passed, the rest of which were rejected. The changes that were accepted were fairly minor and didn't save the bill, not by a long shot from my perspective.
I was able to propose four report stage amendments in the House and they were all defeated. In and of itself, that was relatively rare. The Standing Orders provide for report stage amendments only in very rare cases, but because of the exceptional importance of this issue, the sensitivity of it as well as the differences of opinion within different parties, I made a case to the Speaker. Other members made a case to the Speaker, and he ruled yes, you could have report stage amendments.
There were report stage amendments. There was a vote on those, and I was up all night sending emails to other members, trying to encourage them to vote in favour of my amendments. A few members of the government did vote in favour of my amendments, but at most there were five or six votes on the government side for any of the amendment proposals that I put forward. All of the opposition amendments on the floor of the House were defeated.
The amendments were passed. Bill C-14 was then passed at third reading, and this is the important point of contrast. Then Bill C-14 was sent to the Senate, and there were a substantial number of amendments to Bill C-14 that were passed in the Senate, one of which was very similar to an amendment that I had moved at report stage in the House that was defeated. The amendment dealt with people receiving information about palliative care options as part of the process leading up to their receiving euthanasia.
The bill went through the House of Commons. There were a number of amendments, one of which was very substantial and would have very dramatically liberalized the eligibility criteria. Although I felt the eligibility criteria were quite ambiguous in any event, and it wasn't clear that there was actually that much substantive difference from the liberalization advocated by the Senate and the original version, nonetheless the perception was, and certainly linguistically, there was a significant liberalization of that process. Then this went back to the House. There was a motion in the House to support some of the Senate amendments but not others.
What was striking right at that point was the government did not want to bring in some of those Senate amendments, in particular that dramatic, more liberalizing one, but they agreed to support some of the Senate amendments including, in particular, the one that I had moved. It wasn't the same but it was a similar one to the one I had moved and it had been voted against at report stage. The government understood that they wanted to get this legislation through the Senate and it wouldn't have been that strategic for them to just reject all the Senate amendments. They wanted to reject some, but not all.
This came back to the House. The government proposed this motion to support some of the Senate amendments, not others, and then send the bill back, in a somewhat amended form, to the Senate. That all happened on one day. I think it was a Thursday, right before the session was ending in June. That motion passed.
At the time, if I remember right, all of the government members, perhaps with the exception of a small handful, voted in favour of that government motion to support some of those Senate amendments, even though those same members had voted against one of those amendments when it came from me at report stage. Then the revised version of Bill C-14 went back to the Senate, and there was a proposal to re-amend it. That proposal was defeated, and then the bill was passed as it was, as it had been received from the House. Bill C-14 was passed and it went for royal assent, and it became law. That's what happened.
What is striking about that process is the fact that I, as an elected member of Parliament, had effectively much less leverage in that legislative process than a senator who moved that same amendment. I think it's very clear, given that the government would not accept the amendment when it came from a member in the House but did accept it, ultimately, when it came through the Senate, that government members, generally speaking, within the House vote together. There is an effort, further even from where we were at the time of the Bill C-14 debate—and it's represented in this discussion paper—to strengthen the centralization of the structure in the House of Commons to make it that much easier for the government to push through legislation without having the opportunity for extended interventions at committee. It will allow the government to do programming, and so on and so forth.
You have all these things that the government is doing, which have a centralizing effect in the context of the House of Commons. At the same time, the discussion in the context of the Senate is the opposite. The government doesn't even have a government leader in the Senate. They have a government representative who, to be fair, is for all intents and purposes likely the same thing. I'm not an expert on the Senate, but it's clear that the emphasis with the Senate is on empowering individual senators to act more independently, in a non-partisan manner, and to be able to deviate from what would be the direction of their party. You have all these different groups in the Senate. We still have a Conservative caucus in the Senate, but then you have these Senate Liberals, who are supposedly independent—depends on the day— and then you have the independent Independents group. Then you have people who are independent of the Senate, independent Senate Liberals and the independent Independent caucus.
It's confusing, obviously, but it is the kind of environment in which individual members, in a House of 100 members, can actually exert a lot of leverage. If a member can, on an individual basis, persuade their colleagues to support something, then it can pass in the Senate. Then it puts a lot of pressure on the government to adopt all or some of those changes, as we saw happen with Bill C-14. But if an individual member of the House of Commons puts forward an idea, an amendment to legislation, very likely the way things operate is that members will vote along party lines and that proposal will be shut down.
We should be concerned about the roles of individual members of Parliament, but I think we should be particularly concerned if by these two forces of reform or modernization, which are actually opposite forces—the empowering of individuals within the Senate and the strengthening of efficiency of the centre in the House of Commons—we're actually increasing that disparity in power and influence over the legislative process between members of the Senate and members of the House of Commons.
I think the Senate is important. The Senate has an important job to do. It was striking to me as a new member of Parliament, right away being involved in that Bill C-14 debate and finding that appointed senators—people who were put there by a prime minister, who did not have to win an election and in many cases had never sought election—actually had more influence over what kind of legislation ultimately became law. That was clear in the instances of the amendments we dealt with on Bill C-14. There was a greater influence there from the Senate members than from the House of Commons.
When we look at Standing Orders changes, how we make those changes, and who's involved in making those changes, we have to be particularly sensitive to the kinds of changes that are happening in the Senate if we want to ensure that we have an environment in which the elected House of Commons is the most important House. In principle, we would all accept the idea that the House of Commons—the elected House, and not just the House as a whole over the Senate but individual members of the House—should have more of an influence than individual members of the Senate.
Of course, some members have advocated the abolition of the Senate; others might favour moving to an elected Senate. Those are larger debates that require changes to the Constitution. What we do in the Standing Orders has an impact on the relative influence of the House and the Senate, and we need to be cognizant of that in the discussion here.