It's on division? Okay.
Even if we must continue, we can still learn things along the way, if nothing else.
I'll just add that this issue of preserving our institutions, of passing this amendment, is not only miring us down here in committee. It's also an issue in the chamber and in other committees. It's an issue that impacts a range of other policy questions.
This committee, I understand—I'm not a regular member of this committee—should be proceeding as soon as possible, I think, to a study of the Elections Act. I understand that there are some important issues with respect to the Elections Act. The Minister of Democratic Institutions has proposed a study that I think the committee is interested in taking up, and has asked for the completion of that within a certain timeline. Discussions about procedure are important, but they're not the kinds of things that are as time-sensitive, at least given the timeline that the Minister of Democratic Institutions has introduced.
We have all the things that are going on within the chamber as well. Co-operation between different parties is very important for moving forward in a constructive way. With all due respect, I'll say that the government House leader won't be getting my vote for Maclean's most collegial parliamentarian award this year. In the midst of trying to come to a resolution on this, she went on television and said that they were not going to let the Conservatives have a veto over standing order changes.
Mr. MacGregor is many great things, but he is unfortunately not a Conservative. Maybe he will be one day, but for now, he is here representing the NDP caucus. Mr. Christopherson was also here earlier, and they are fully behind this. They have, of course, a much longer history in opposition than we do. After the next election, we'll welcome them back to the official opposition when we retake the government. It will be good for both of us.
They understand the importance of this as well. I think Ms. May, who is someone who agrees with the government more often than we do—more often than the NDP does in fact, it seems, just based on the way votes have unfolded—is also standing with us. When I talk about the Green Party discussion paper, she's taking the position that's furthest from the government in terms of the kinds of changes in direction that we actually need to see.
This is a discussion that's playing out in the chamber as well, but when you have the government House leader making comments like that, basically drawing a line in the sand and saying we will not.... Effectively, what she's saying is that we will not do this by consensus; we will do it in a way that is unilateral. Now, she didn't say that directly, but that is the implied direction of the comments that she's making.
I don't think any party should be able to make changes unilaterally. I think they should be done on the basis of consensus. Doing it on the basis of consensus means that you have to listen to the opposition as well, which is something that the government House leader thus far has not been prepared to do. However, if she agreed with us, she might have a chance of getting that Maclean's award again. I might reconsider my vote on it.
There was an interesting point made by my colleague here about this issue of equality of strength between the opposition and the government. I don't know if I agree or disagree with that, but I want to just maybe flesh out what is meant by equality of strength.
Let's be very clear that when a party is in government, it means that they got the most seats. It means that they got—not necessarily, in first past the post, but almost certainly—the most votes in the election. They have a legitimate democratic right to propose legislation, to bring it to a vote, and in all likelihood, if they have the votes, to pass that legislation, to implement the program that they have. That is legitimate. No one here is suggesting otherwise. No one here is suggesting that on questions of policy....
Of course the opposition will oppose. We will debate it. We will fight back on the basis of public interest. We will try to get the government to change their mind, to see sense. We will mobilize public support against it. We will encourage stakeholders to contact the government. We will challenge the government to reconsider aspects of their program. But ultimately, especially in a majority Parliament, assuming that they maintain the confidence of that Parliament and the support of their caucus, a government can pass legislation.
Yet there are some things that a government cannot do. They cannot justly, on their own, or they ought not, change things that are dealing with that underlying substructure of democracy. One might say that policy decisions are, to some extent, actually more important than that substructure in terms of the practical impact they have on people's lives. But that substructure is actually what guarantees the integrity of our deliberation about those policy questions into the future. So yes, in this Parliament the government can put forward legislation. It can be debated. It will likely be passed if it's government legislation over the objections of the opposition. But as long as they preserve the existing institutions that allow us to present our objections, that allow us to participate in the debates, and that allow us, then, on a fair footing, to fight the next election....
But this government, it's clear, isn't actually content with just proposing legislation and policy. We see on a number of different fronts that they actually want to dramatically alter our institutions, to do so to their own strategic advantage, and to do so without the consent of the opposition. Now, that's not what the government is elected to do. Of course, this is a government that received, I think, about 39% of the popular vote in the last election. That is enough to form a majority government and to introduce policy and to pass legislation. But it is not enough to change the underlying substructure of democracy. This is well established in our traditions and our conventions. There are certain things that one could change about that substructure with a majority support through a referendum. This is what we said during the electoral reform debate. Without having been clear up front about what new electoral system was desired, 39% was not enough to make that change unilaterally, but a referendum, with 50% of the vote, would have been enough to make a change to that underlying substructure of democracy.
With respect to our rules here in Parliament, if there is a consensus among parties—that has been the tradition, that's what has been done in the past and has worked well—if we change the rules of engagement in a way that has consensus of members of Parliament, then yes, we can change that underlying substructure.