Evidence of meeting #14 for Justice and Human Rights in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was c-9.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
Anthony Housefather Liberal Mount Royal, QC
I understand. I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.
This motion was already moved in this meeting. This is a continuation of the meeting of two days ago, of Tuesday. This exact motion was moved by Mr. Brock at that meeting, and you cannot move the same dilatory motion twice in the same debate.
Conservative
Andrew Lawton Conservative Elgin—St. Thomas—London South, ON
I'd like to speak to the point of order when you're ready, Chair.
Conservative
Andrew Lawton Conservative Elgin—St. Thomas—London South, ON
While I respect the point, the purpose of this, if you consult precedent.... When new information has transpired or new information has taken place, the context of a dilatory motion changes. While the wording may have previously—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal James Maloney
Okay, Mr. Lawton, I understand your point. You're getting into procedure now.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal James Maloney
I have enough information for the ruling, so I don't need that. Thank you.
Look, this has been moved and it has been dealt with—you're right, actually—more than once. Having said that, we will have a vote on it again, but I want to point out that nothing has changed. We're debating the same subject. In fact, this motion has been moved in the context of the debate on this very amendment, which is your amendment, so there is no new information, with all due respect. However, I will allow a vote.
(Motion negatived: nays 5; yeas 4)
That's defeated.
Ms. Lewis, you're next.
Conservative
Leslyn Lewis Conservative Haldimand—Norfolk, ON
Thank you, Chair.
I live in the small community of Haldimand—Norfolk. We're just very transparent people. All we really want is the ability to freely believe, to worship and to hold our values. We want to do so without government coercion. We understand that hate speech law is not illegitimate per se. We accept that Parliament may criminalize extreme behaviour and the deliberate incitement of violence or hatred, especially under sections 318 and 319.
As a lawyer, I also recognize and am fully aware that in the former paragraph 319(3)(b) defence, the good-faith expression of religious doctrine, a balance was struck. That balance recognized the genuine difference between faith and belief and that it should not include a hate speech definition. I think there's importance in recognizing how we reach that balance. The removal of a sincere religious belief is not a neutral removal. It's not a cleanup of the Criminal Code. It is a fundamental, structural change of the Criminal Code.
How did sections 318 and 319 survive charter scrutiny in the first place? When we look at the Supreme Court and look at what was upheld under section 319 in Keegstra and Whatcott, only after examining the entire statutory framework and the entire statutory scheme, not just the offence in isolation, did the Supreme Court reach its conclusion. In so doing, the court emphasized that the offence threshold must be high. It must be wilful. The intent must clearly be there. Prosecutorial consent was required. That was crucial. It was statutorily explicit in creating a defence that existed in including good-faith religious expression.
I know this may be trite law, because it's been so deeply entrenched in who we are as Canadians. These cannot be taken as footnotes. These are foundational. They go to the minimum impairment that's inherent in section 1 of the charter, which was included as a check and balance to the coercive apparatus of our state. In no area is this more profound in how a person thinks than in their beliefs and conscience. That's why this is such an important issue.
The court repeatedly stressed that Parliament had carved out the space for moral teaching, which we find in many of our scriptures; in the protection of sermons, which is something pastors and clergy are very concerned about; in the protection of doctrine and scriptures; and in the avoidance of turning criminal law into an arbiter of theological truth. This is why the original hate speech law survived sections 2(a) and 2(b) of our Charter of Rights.
When we look at paragraph 319(3)(b), we see there was a firewall. It was not just a technical firewall. The religious defence did more than provide an acquittal at trial, which is where we're going right now. We are actually saying that it is okay to charge a person. Then the charter can be used as a sword of defence, whereas before, our law always represented a shield.
It was a shield for people to practise their faith without the coercion of a state apparatus over them. That is a very important distinction that we should not lose sight of. It functioned as a front-end brake on the state. It ensured a prosecutorial filter early on in the case. Religious communities had predictability, and that was very important.
We must recognize that the court stressed the importance of Parliament carving out this space. The moral teachings of scriptures are very important to people's faith, to their upbringing and to the way they raise children.
I've had so much contact with clergy who are concerned about the teachings, about doctrine and about the fact that they could be criminalized and now have to dance around the text that they call and consider sacred. From that standpoint, it matters. For the criminal law, it matters how we change this law. We must have clear knowledge of what the parameters are.
Citizens should not have to rely on future constitutional litigation to know whether what they say today will be prosecuted tomorrow. The charter does not protect you from being charged, and that's what we have to remember. This is the most underappreciated danger of this change, and it is central to the critique.
The charter operates after state action has already been invoked or after the charge has already been laid, not before. The charter does not prevent police investigations. It does not block charges. It does not stop arrests. It does not intervene in bail conditions. It's not applicable if devices are seized when people are arrested. It does not prevent reputational harm. It does not prevent an institution from pressuring or cancelling people.
The charter only offers a defence after the harm or the charge has already occurred, and this is often years after. This is after expenses have been incurred. This is after people's lives have been uprooted, and this is later during a trial. This is when you raise a charter defence at a massive personal and financial cost.
From a Conservative perspective and a rule of law perspective, it is completely unacceptable that a primary safeguard is being removed. Statutory clarity is essential, and a clear exemption for sincerely held religious belief is necessary, precisely because the charter is reactive.
By eliminating paragraph 319(3)(b), Parliament has essentially increased discretion at the investigative stage. The removal is a clear signal to police and prosecutors that a shift in the risk from the state to the individual is ever so present. It could incentivize complaint-driven enforcement. A dangerous precedent can be set from hate speech law, which can be uniquely vulnerable and also politicized.
Once a statute is no longer clear and excludes religious moral teachings, there are conditions and consequences to society. Pressure groups can be weaponized to file complaints against pastors and clergy. Clergy are concerned that they will be targeted by these pressure groups. Police must look into matters they previously could dismiss. Police must also look into matters that people raised that could be weaponized against clergy whose religious positions they don't agree with. Clergy and religious educators could even start self-censoring. This is what we call a chilling effect, which occurs long before the courtroom.
Conservatives have long insisted that the criminal law is a blunt force instrument and justified only when there's serious harm, when intent is clear and when all other alternatives have failed. Eliminating these explicit safeguards expands criminal law into contested moral territory. What the Liberals are doing with hate speech law undermines pluralism. It turns the police into cultural arbiters. It weakens societal cohesion rather than strengthening it. Also, a free society does not require citizens to test their beliefs against state prosecutors.
Even if criminal courts might still uphold section 319 post-amendment, clergy are still concerned that the law is now less precise, voidly vague, less predictable and more chilling and has less restraint. From a Conservative perspective, the charter's minimum impairment has worsened. The proportionality balance has shifted, which is not the intent of subsection 319(1). Parliament has removed a protection that the Supreme Court, the highest court in the land, explicitly relied upon. This invites both constitutional risk and social instability.
This is not just about religion. It's about whether citizens need permission to express moral judgment. It's about whether the criminal law polices people's conscience and people's beliefs. It's about whether Parliament trusts the plurality of our society. It sends a warning that when statutory protections are removed in the name of tolerance, it is usually the boundaries of freedom rather than hatred that are quietly disappeared and targeted.
The Bloc Québécois sided with the Liberals to remove the exemption for a belief or opinion held in good faith under Bill C-9, the hate propaganda act amendments. That exemption historically protected Canadians from being criminalized simply for holding sincere beliefs, even if others found those beliefs unpopular, controversial, religious or counterculture.
This was a freedom of conscience issue. By removing “sincerely”, since this is a sincerely held belief exemption, the government is narrowing the freedom of expression safeguard and is expanding the scope of what could be interpreted as hate propaganda. This is scary for many people of faith. It removes a long-standing shield for people of faith, minority communities, academics and anyone expressing an unpopular dissenting view.
Not only does it do that, but it also shifts the burden: Individuals may now need to prove that their intention was not to be hateful, instead of the Crown having to respect people's faith, conscience and beliefs. It creates uncertainty around sermons, religious teachings and traditional views on marriage, on gender and even on moral philosophical positions that we as a society are intellectually capable of debating without hate. It allows political actors to weaponize hate speech laws against ideological opponents by arguing that the belief was not in good faith. It is exactly why the exemption has existed for decades. Canada has always distinguished between hatred and genuine belief.
This moves towards criminalizing some religious expression that ties into the Liberals' wider digital governance agenda, which includes tightening speech definitions, increasing enforcement and embedding algorithmic monitoring, but it also creates national tension. What protects the beliefs of a Sikh in Alberta? What protects the beliefs of a Muslim in Ontario? What protects the beliefs of a Jew in Montreal or a Christian in the Atlantic region? Removing those held beliefs affects our entire federation.
The Bloc and the Liberals have agreed to remove the protection for a belief or an opinion held in good faith from Bill C-9. This is a major shift. Canadians should never fear criminal prosecution for sincerely held beliefs, even when those beliefs are unpopular. It is a foundation of our democracy. Hate speech is already illegal. We do not need to criminalize conscience. Our charter protects freedom of conscience and religion in sections 2(a) and 2(b), and it is so fundamental that it is entrenched in our Constitution.
Removing the good-faith belief exemption erases important safeguards that have protected minority and faith communities for decades. Parliament must be extremely careful before giving the state the power to interpret or police what Canadians are allowed to believe. In so saying, I move that the committee now proceed to the consideration of Bill C-14, the bail and sentencing reform act.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal James Maloney
All right. We're not going to do that. We've already done that today. We did it just a few minutes ago.
Conservative
Liberal
The Chair Liberal James Maloney
You have that right, Mr. Lawton.
(Ruling of the chair sustained: yeas 5; nays 4)
Go ahead, Mr. Housefather.
Liberal
Anthony Housefather Liberal Mount Royal, QC
I just saw the vote. Ms. Lewis, whose speech I appreciated, didn't vote. If she's not sitting in as a member of the committee, she cannot move a motion. I want you to take note of that, Mr. Chair, for the future Conservative members who will be speaking and are not sitting in as members of the committee.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal James Maloney
Mr. Housefather, you're quite right. That was an error on my part. Thank you for pointing that out. I will admit when I'm wrong. That's a lesson for me and for all of us.
If you're done, we're moving on to Mr. Brock.
Conservative
Larry Brock Conservative Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON
Thank you, Chair.
As I prepared for today's marathon....
Firstly, before I get into this, does the chair have any further clarification on resources?
Liberal
Conservative
Larry Brock Conservative Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON
Thank you. It may not stop me from asking, but we're curious.
Liberal
Conservative
Larry Brock Conservative Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON
As I prepared, I pulled a number of resources together—publications, magazines and newspapers—and pulled out quotes and the letters my office has been inundated with, as I indicated during my last intervention, for several days this week, including this past weekend when the secretive deal was finally exposed.
One such article that tweaked my interest I think would be of value for this committee to hear, particularly the Liberal members, who, for some strange reason, are completely silent on defending the flip-flop that the justice minister did in supporting the Bloc amendment.
This was an article by author Mr. Joseph Brean. It was published on December 6. The title is “What is the religious belief defence? What to know about proposed change to Canada's hate crime law”. I'm not going to read it verbatim, but there are a couple of sections I want to read out.
What I wish to read starts as follows:
What is the good-faith religious belief defence?
To publicly and wilfully communicate statements that promote hatred of an identifiable group, according to Section 319(2) of the Criminal Code...is one of the few ways a Canadian can be sentenced to jail, up to two years, directly over what they write or say.
But there are four absolute defences spelled out in the law. No one can be convicted of wilfully promoting hatred or antisemitism, for example, “if, in good faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by an argument an opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on a belief in a religious text.”
This is what the new hate crime bill proposes to remove. The other defences include the truth of the statements in question, reasonable belief in their truth and their relevance to public interest, and pointing out hate speech for the purpose of removal.
These are the boundaries of the wilful promotion of hatred, which is rarely prosecuted, but remains one of the most politically controversial laws in Canada.
Where did it come from?
This is what has interested me for some time now, and I was glad that someone actually did the research for me.
It was an original part of Canada's hate law regime, which also prohibits hate propaganda and advocating genocide.
This came from the Pierre Elliott Trudeau government in the early 1970s. We have had statutory defences in place in this country protecting religious leaders for 55 years, yet this current brand of liberalism, which is so vastly removed from the liberalism of the early 1970s, wishes to completely abolish that.
The articles goes on:
It was developed in the post-war heyday of human rights legislation, based on the work of a special committee on hate propaganda....
I take from that, reading between the lines, that this wasn't simply a mandated exercise by the Pierre Elliott Trudeau government. In a pure democratic sense, it was properly debated. It wasn't forced upon Canadians. A special committee was convened.
It goes on:
...the four defences were debated in Parliament [as it should be] before the law was given royal assent in 1970. It has survived the transition from an era of communicating by print and telephone to the era of the internet. It has been challenged and tested many times. The very definition of hate has also been repeatedly challenged, and the new Liberal amendment also proposes to add a definition of hate to the Criminal Code, using the language of Supreme Court precedents. Hate is not simple dislike of a group of people, or disapproval, or causing them offence or humiliation. The "hate" in Canadian hate crimes is "detestation and vilification." It used to include "calumny," which means malicious misrepresentation, but that has fallen out of favour as an archaic word.
Has the religious defence ever been used successfully?
It doesn't look like it. It will certainly have been considered in advance of a charge, and if it ever looked like a plausible defence, it might have motivated decisions not to prosecute. But it does not appear to have been successfully wielded in the courtroom.
Richard Moon, a law professor with a deep expertise on hate laws and religious freedoms, told The Canadian Press he was unaware of any example of the defence winning the day in court.
Writing in the National Post—
I indicated this during my last few interventions.
—lawyer Christine Van Geyn said she went looking for cases and all she could find was one failed use. In that case, the judge put it bluntly: “It will be a rare case where one who intends to promote hatred will be found to be acting in good faith, or upon honest belief.”
I know that my intervention is probably distasteful to the Liberals, but perhaps they could show a little decorum of respect while I have the floor and not be chatting away loud enough that it's actually interrupting my flow of speech.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal James Maloney
Mr. Brock, I agree with that sentiment. I note there's one person having a conversation on the other side of the room, so I think you might be slightly overemphasizing.
Conservative
Larry Brock Conservative Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON
No, they quieted down after I called them out on bad behaviour.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal James Maloney
I'm going to ask, as I did the other night, that everybody abide by the same rules.
We'll carry on. Thank you.