Perfect. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think copies of my introductory comments have been distributed. They are in both English and French. Please allow me to read them to keep a coherent line in my discourse.
Mr. Chairman, committee members, good afternoon.
First of all, I want to thank you for inviting me to share my experience and expertise with the members of the committee. I also want to emphasize that I have not prepared a brief, in view of the fact that I have come to testify today at the committee's request.
I therefore put myself at your disposal to share with you my observations, based on my experience of over 30 years now in the security and intelligence field, 21 years of which I spent with the RCMP and CSIS.
Since I am appearing at your request and on short notice, I was unable to prepare a suitable translation of my initial comments. I hope you will forgive me for that shortcoming and allow me to continue mainly in French for the introduction. I will, of course, be totally comfortable in answering any questions in English as needed.
In the hope of helping you determine the situation more quickly, I'd like to present an initial summary assessment, as I see it. Note that my review is based on information made public in the media, and at no time have I had access to privileged or classified information from any governmental department or agency.
My study is based on my knowledge of the field and of federal government policies that I used and applied over more than two decades. To that, I add my knowledge of the constraints, often unknown to the public, facing government investigators responsible for security clearance investigations.
From a point of view of security, and strictly security, I regret having to say that the unfortunate situation of Mr. Bernier does not strictly concern his private life. The epicentre of this case questioned the integrity and measures put in place to protect classified information and the individual handling of it, as well as the reputation and credibility of the Canadian government.
To that end, it is necessary to recognize that for several decades and well before Sept. 11, 2001, tireless work was carried out by security specialists of the Canadian government to establish and set up a system aimed at ensuring the protection of not only information, but also the individuals who are in possession or in contact with this information. With this intention, a combination of actions was implemented, from the use of technology to investigation and routine monitoring.
For individuals, everything starts with an investigation and monitoring of the private lives of persons cleared to have access to our national secrets. It goes without saying that there are limits to the demands on and intrusions into the private lives of federal employees and our elected representatives. However, it must be recognized that it is necessary to take the searches and questions to a certain level, one moreover that is reached with the permission and consent of the individuals who have sought to obtain security clearance.
The purpose of the first investigation is to determine and judge their integrity, reliability and vulnerability. As a Canadian, I am pleased and proud to know from experience that a balance has been established in recent years. The system's integrity is based on three components that evolve between the need for government investigators to know, institutional interference and individual responsibility. The RCMP or CSIS cannot be asked to monitor employees 24 hours a day, seven days a week, even less to monitor our elected representatives or persons holding ministerial positions.
The contrary could lead us into a system such as that which the United States experienced at the time of J. Edgar Hoover, where the management of a country's security was dominated by suspicion and paranoia. Even worse, the excesses in the name of security could result in an affair similar to Watergate. However, when these institutions are solicited, it is their duty to inform authorities of a potential or immediate threat that has been detected.
This is where there is a balance between the need for the government to obtain more information from its employees and the right of these individuals to privacy.
It is necessary to remember that when an individual receives a security clearance there is a contractual agreement. I will be coming back to this notion of contractual agreements, because it is the epicentre of the notion of responsibility, which is carried by the individual as well.
This contractual agreement between the person and his or her department could translate roughly, if I can paraphrase, into: “We will not search continuously in your private life; we will not watch you constantly. But in return, you must report to us any situation that could, according to you or any reasonable person, be exploited against you and possibly drive you to act in such a way as would endanger national security or your life.”
The concept of contractual agreement is very important in this case in order to understand the limits that the system has self-imposed to prevent abuses of an inquisitive nature.
That said, I sincerely believe that we have in place one of the most sophisticated and professional systems in the world. It is constantly reviewed and improved by government experts. Is it perfect? Probably not. As Montesquieu said, as long as there is man, there will be manipulation. In security, the human factor is always the weakest link.
With your permission, I would like to briefly provide you with some more specific observations on Mr. Bernier's unfortunate situation. This matter is essentially two matters in one. From a national security standpoint, there are two central components and a number of subcomponents and subsequent ramifications.
The leaving of documents classified “Secret” in an unauthorized place and in the possession of an unauthorized person is the first aspect; then there is Mr. Bernier's relationship with a person who by the admission of that person, has had relations with influential members of organized crime.
I'm going to start with the leaving of classified documents.
According to the information obtained, and in light of Mr. Bernier's confession, it is obvious that there was a breach of security. Such a situation is clearly identified in the federal government's policies concerning handling classified information and is regarded as being a serious incident that can lead, according to the circumstances and the documents involved, to dismissal of the employee.
In this case, however, important questions remain. Once again, strictly from the point of view of national security, an investigation by the RCMP is required. It is essential at this point to determine the extent of any damage and to try to circumvent the negative effect.
This responsibility is all the more important because the information left at Ms. Julie Couillard's residence related to NATO and was therefore received from our allies. There are thus three groups concerned that now need to know the range of the damages.
They are government officials, be they employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister of Canada or security officers; our international partners, both our NATO allies and all the other countries sharing confidential and privileged information regarding military, security, trade or other matters; and the Canadian people, who every day confide personal and confidential information in the expectation that it will be protected.
With respect to the first group, it is imperative that we get to the bottom of the matter in order to estimate the damage, but especially to determine improvements that can be made to Canadian protection policies and to the management of classified information and documents in order to ensure the system's integrity.
For our international partners, it is fundamentally important to know whether this situation is exceptional or whether it represents a systemic problem. The sharing of privileged information is crucially important in the context of our relations with allied governments, and the leaking of classified information can have a significant impact on Canada's reputation and the present or future trust that is placed in us.
With your permission, I would like to make an incidental remark here. With respect to Canada's reputation regarding security, we are lucky that we have an excellent track record. It is well know internationally; and that is why many people will view this situation as extraordinary, in the strict sense of that word, that is to say that it is not normal. As a serious-minded country with an excellent system and highly professional officials, Canadian is known and indeed envied. I do not believe it is hard to restore the situation with our allies, but somewhat embarrassing explanations will be necessary.
The Canadian people, like the other two groups, need to know that this situation is not the norm, but especially to rebuild the confidence it must have in the integrity and professionalism of the people who work for the government, among both elected representatives and officials.
I now turn to the second aspect of this matter: Mr. Bernier's relationship with a person linked to organized crime.
As I mentioned earlier, the management system for classified and significant information starts with establishing a system based on shared responsibilities between few parties. For the purposes of our discussion today, I would like to regroup them as follows: the management; the individual who receives the security clearance; and the agencies responsible for security, including DFAIT, PCO, the Prime Minister's Office, and any official agency responsible for investigating or protecting the information. Each one has a role and well-established responsibilities, which are defined in various policies of the public office.
Obtaining a security clearance is not a right, but a privilege, a privilege that is sealed by a contractual agreement between the individual who receives it and the Canadian government. When a person is in a job that requires them to read or handle classified information, this person must initially qualify to obtain a security clearance. A request from management, via the department's security officer, will be sent to CSIS, who will perform the necessary investigation.
In this case, because of Mr. Bernier's high-profile position, he was to receive a top secret, special access security clearance, the highest within the federal government. This level three clearance requires an investigation of that person's last twenty years. A form must be completed and submitted that lists biographical data, including names, date of birth, and the current addresses of all members of his or her family and immediate in-laws; additionally, his or her old residence; schools, when needed; former employers; and two references are also included. Thereafter, a specialized CSIS investigator will go to these various places and interview the neighbours, former employers, landlords, and any other people deemed necessary. This is the standard for federal employees.
The answer to the question whether spouses of elected representatives are investigated is yes. They are indirectly. Here I mean that it goes without saying that that person is not the main subject of the investigation, but, in certain aspects of the interviews conducted in the field, the investigator will seek to learn a little about that person.
For example, he will investigate present and past neighbours to gain a better understanding of the couple's profile and character. He will definitely seek to know what kind of relations the had with them, their general conduct and, as necessary, will ask questions about the quality of their personal relationship or of their personality. Once again, the purpose of these questions is to determine the main points of the investigation involved in ascertaining the individual's integrity, reliability and vulnerability.
Once the investigation is complete, the results and recommendations are forwarded to the department concerned. If a delicate point has been determined in the investigation, which does not result in the automatic rejection of the application but is a problem, the entire matter is discussed with the manager responsible who, in a number of cases, will have the prerogative to decide whether he can live with the situation. In other words, he is responsible for managing the risk.
When the person is accepted, the contract is signed with him or her. That person must undertake to protect the information presented to him or her. There are also awareness and information sessions on how to manage that information. The person must also undertake to disclose, at his or her initiative, any change to that individual's personal or professional situation and any situation that could place that individual in any kind of vulnerable position. It is precisely to this shared responsibility and balance that I was referring earlier.
In conclusion, I would emphasize that the measures I have just listed are valid for all federal employees. What changes in this matter is its political and public character. I would dare say that this is probably the system's Achilles' heel. Not that it is inherent to the government in power; the measures or constraints have always existed. It's more the very nature of the animal, the political animal. However, it has never sat well with security, which requires a certain rigour.
I suspect that all elected members, particularly high-placed ministers, receive different treatment. The process is much less rigorous in their case. That's what I would call confrontation between security policy and “real policy”.
Challenged by the demands of a highly mediatized public life, in which image management is just as important as the message, this situation can undermine the work of security officers. Can we imagine a CSIS investigator putting questions to the current minister's former employer or past or present neighbours?
We don't want to see the RCMP or CSIS rummaging around in the private lives of our elected members 24 hours a day, seven days a week. We can't do it either. That goes without saying, but, on the other hand, it is necessary that those elected members cooperate and, especially, show judgment in managing their personal affairs.
From the outset, the system intuitively introduced control points. For example, in some cases, the officials of a political party will conduct a certain review before endorsing a candidate. That at least is what is desired. Let's say that there is a lot of flexibility in most cases, but a certain amount of screening is done.
However, when it comes to choosing from among the newly elected members those individuals who will occupy ministerial positions, the situation changes because the policies established by the federal government come into play. How is it all reconciled? Who has to let go in favour of the other? Must the Privy Council play a more important role and be required to notify the RCMP of new individuals in the circle of ministers? That's the system's Achilles' heel.
In light of the information that was revealed and from my experience as a federal investigator, I believe you are dealing with a situation of double standards, in which elected officials are exempt from submitting themselves to the same security standard imposed on federal employees.
In all fairness, it is also important to add that the current government is not responsible for this situation. Unfortunately this situation has prevailed for decades, and all previous governments have enjoyed the same loophole.
So these are the questions. Should one re-examine this approach? Can one ensure there is no other situation like Mr. Bernier's, as we speak? To ask less of our elected officials is inevitably a substantial weakening of the system, threatening its integrity.
From the investigator standpoint, a number of questions remain unanswered.
Thank you.
